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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
The thesis of this study is that 'nondescript women' are a muted
group within the criminal justice system. They are subject to multiple
discursive oppression which is subtle and sophisticated. Their
oppression is dependent not on their active and constant domination by
one group (men) in society but by the inability/refusal of a number of
authorised definers or agents of signification (who may, empirically, be
either men or women) to hear or listen to communications which are
incongruent with professionally legitimated modes of expression about
female conditions of existence. Consequently, the women are disqualified
as speakers about their own condition and are, instead, strategically
constructed as the programmable objects of professional discourses. They
are effectively offered a contract which promises to minimise the
consequences of their criminality by rehabilitating them within the
dominant discourses of femininity (that is, domesticity, sexuality and
pathology). Despite these programmes of feminization, nondescript women,
it is argued, are also those women who attempt to resist such construction
by exploiting the contradictions of official discourses. As a result,
the 'exp'rts' find such women impossible to define and they appear to be
beyond definition both as women and as criminals. They are, in effect,
seen to be nondescript. Vet, whilst much of the women's resistance is
individualistic, inconsistent and, in some senses, self-destructive, it
has the important effect of undermining the authority of official
discourses and keeping open the possibility of the creation of new
knowledge about them - both as women and as lawbreakers.
INTRODUCTION
WOMEN, CRIME, PSYCHIATRY AND SOCIAL WORK
Genesis of a Thesis
This thesis is about lawbreaking or otherwise deviant women who in
the interstices between the discourses of law, sexuality and psychiatry
are constituted as being beyond description. The thesis is not,
therefore, primarily about women in prison or women in mental hospital.
Nor is it about all women who break the law or all women who consult
their general practitioner about 'nerves'. It is about those women who,
because they are not 'bad enough' or 'mad enough', may be found at any
given time 'in place' yet 'out of place' in prison, in hospital, at the
doctor's - and frequently on probation. It is about the women that
nobody wants (Carlen, 1983) and whom nobody can adequately describe. It
is about women who are cited as being forever twixt that criminality and
madness which their very existence questions. It is about those sites
whence emanate the descriptions that render some lawbreaking women
nondescript. In short, it is about judging certain deviant women - and
finding them always, already, forever lacking a place in official scripts.
In the beginning, I intended to write a rather different thesis.
Having worked for a number of years as a Probation Officer, I was
conscious of a small, but disproportionately demanding, group of women
clients who did not fit into the two traditional stereotypical categories
available for describing female lawbreakers, namely, 'the pathetic
menopausal shoplifter' and 'the sophisticated criminal' (Worrall, 1981).
I was conscious that these other, more difficult to define women
occupied much of my time and energy because I could identify neither their
needs nor the remedies for those needs in any way which satisfied either
2.
me or them.
They were women who were variously described as 'inadequate',
'demanding', 'manipulative', 'aggressive'. Whilst Elizabeth Wilson (1977)
might see them as 'feminist' clients, challenging the state's
definitions of them and seeking to take control of their own lives, I
was left with the uneasy feeling that their behaviour exemplified the
'defences of the weak' (Mathiesen, 1972) - mere shadow-boxing by the
powerless. I was conscious that I was not alone in my dilemma. Social
workers in Social Services Departments, solicitors, psychiatrists,
magistrates - all had, from time to time, been exercised by the demands
to define these women who appeared to defy description. Those demands
emanated not only from the discourses within which I and my fellow
professionals considered ourselves accountable, but from those same
discourses within which the women themselves had been constituted.
Indeed, it was their apparent inability to define themselves outside of
the needs, demands and definitions of other people that impressed me
above all. They seemed to lurch continuously between two states of
consciousness - the sense of obligation to fulfil the needs of husbands,
lovers, mothers, children, neighbours and the sense of outrage (at times
suppressed into depression) that their own needs were not being met.
And in the eyes of the agents required to define them they more often
than not appeared to be nondescript.
But this realisation was of a purely (non) descriptive nature; I
was left unable to explain either the 'how?' or the 'why?' of their
plight. With Miller I believed that what they shared with all women was
the absence of 'the right or the requirement to be full-fledged
representatives of the culture' (1976: 76). But what made these women
different from other women and what, if any, were the implications of
that difference? At some stage in their careers, these women had broken
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the law and had been found out, thus immediately acquiring a statistically
elite status and exposing themselves to the gaze of those whose inter-
weaving official and expert discourses inform the criminal justice
system. Could it be that a study of this small group of female
lawbreakers might throw into sharper relief the factors influencing the
treatment and experiences of all women? Could the case of the non-
descript female lawbreaker be usefully taken as a metaphor of womanhood?
I was conscious throughout this process that I did not want to make
yet one more radical statement about 'female offenders'. I wanted, at
one and the same time, to be both more specific and more general. I
knew that nothing I could say would hold true for all female lawbreakers,
that the range of their experiences would be as wide as that of any other
group which becomes defined by its master (or mistress) status. The
search for an empiricist truth, whether conservative or radical, would, I
knew, prove futile. Instead, I thought that by using current knowledge
about the ideological and material conditions and processes that over-
determine the lives of all women, I might be able to explain how and why
this particular group of female lawbreakers is repeatedly seen as being
beyond description. At the same time, I hoped too that a theoretically
informed case-study would contribute further knowledge about the
discourses within which conventional women are recognised as such.
The issue then became one of deciding how narrowly to draw that
sub-group and my initial intention was to draw it very narrowly indeed.
It seemed to me that there were very specific moments at which the
discourses of law, sexuality and psychiatry could be seen to converge
and those moments occurred for women a) when they became subject to
Probation Orders with conditions of psychiatric treatment and b) when
they became subject to Guardianship Orders. Analysis of the former would
allow a direct examination of the relationship between psychiatry and
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social work within the criminal justice system; analysis of the latter
would allow additional examination of the criteria for, and implications
of, redefining women lawbreakers outside the criminal justice system - the
rules which include in or exclude from criminality. Within that frame-
work, I saw myself being able to ask such questions as:
1. 'Under what conditions is lawbreaking by women defined as either
wickedness or symptomatic of need'?
2. 'Under what conditions is mental disorder seen to be either the
cause of female lawbreaking, or a diagnosis that is subsequent to
or coincidental with that lawbreaking?'
I became quite excited by the possibilities of such an analysis
until I consulted the criminal statistics and found that in 1981 a total
of some 270 Probation Orders with conditions of treatment had been made
nationally on women and no Guardianship Orders! It was imediately clear
that any analysis of the use of Guardianship Orders on women would have
to focus on their absence rather than their presence. It was also clear
that obtaining a reasonable sample of psychiatric probation orders on
women would, in itself, be an expensive and time-consuming task. I was
fairly confident that my fund of good-will with the Staffordshire
Probation Service would enable me to have access to material locally but
I had no reason to suppose that other areas would be equally responsive.
In fact, my inability to obtain any positive response from Staffordshire
Social Services Department in respect of this research was another
factor which caused me to reconsider my empirical plans.
It was then that I began to realise that the absence of clearly
identifiable material and the problems of obtaining access to such
material as was identified might be an important feature of the issues
I wanted to explore, rather than an indication of their non-existence.
If one is arguing that certain women are written out of certain official
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8cripts, then difficulty in detecting their existence - or any official
recognition of their existence - should come as no surprise.
This realisation had a liberating effect on me and I thereafter
resolved to broaden the definition of the group of women in whom I was
interested, thereby allowing the people I intended to approach more scope
for presenting their own criteria for defining those troublesome women
who seemed to elude description. It later became apparent that this had
been the right decision, for one of the things I quickly discovered when
I started my interviews was that the psychiatric probation order is not
always imposed on the most disturbed or troublesome women nor,
conversely, are the most disturbed and troublesome women always described
in the terminology of psychiatry. In the letter which I sent to the
sample of Probation Officers (see Appendix II) I indicated that I wanted
to talk about women who had been diagnosed as mentally disordered and
other women clients. At the beginning of the interviews I was
frequently greeted with a denial of the existence of the former ('I don't
think I've got anyone you'd be interested in'). Nevertheless, on being
prompted to talk about other women who might be difficult to work with,
there was rarely a pause in the ensuing monologue. My task, I soon
appreciated, was not to be the relatively straightforward one of
positivistically establishing 'the facts' that might account for the
homogeneity of a particular, pre-defined sub-group of lawbreakers, namely,
women who had been diagnosed as mentally disordered. Rather, I had to
extrapolate from an abundance of common-sense and professional
observations:
(1) the rules by which differential diagnoses and judgements
are made;
(2) the material conditions of existence within which those rules
acquire meaning; and
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(3) the material consequences of those rules for the women who
are constructed as the objects of various, often contradictory,
discourses.
Originally, I had intended to use a combination of statistical
analysis and structured questionnaires (both mailed and personal) to
elicit both factual and more qualitative information about the
descriptions of mentally disordered female lawbreakers, (see Appendix II)
but such a methodology seemed to be increasingly irrelevant and
restrictive. Instead, I decided to use such statistics as I could
obtain simply as a means of identifying the people I most wanted to talk
to and to use a far less structured interview schedule or mental check-
list (on Appendix II) of areas I wanted to cover in interviews. It
seemed less important to ensure consistency of replies to a pre-
structured schedule than to be able to trace the spontaneous logic of
and relationship between ideas present by subjects with a minimum of
prompting. Ihe search was not for a set of essential criteria for
determining definitions of and attitudes to particular women lawbreakers.
Rather, it was an attempt to unearth, to 'discover t
 the mechanisms by
which
(1) similar words and ideas can be used to contradictory effect
and
(2) apparently conflicting discourses have similar material
consequences.
Such a programme did not involve an investigation based on either
empiricist techniques or probability theory (see Appendix I for
further explanation of the methodology employed).
Aim of Thesis: Nondescript Women
This thesis is specifically about a group of female lawbreakers
who constitute a 'muted group' within every discourse which claims
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privileged knowledge about female lawbreakers. I refer to these women
as 'nondescript'. They have been 'written out' of all, official scripts
because they persistently fail to be appropriated by the descriptive
categories available to the speakers of expert discourse. At a more
general level, the thesis not only draws attention to the needs of one
particularly neglected group within society, it also charts some of the
complexities, contradictions and coherences of the wider process which
is all too often simplistically articulated as 'women's oppression'.
Mtitedness
The theory of mutedness was first proposed by Edwin Ardener (1975)
and developed by Shirley Ardener (1975; 1978 to account for the
refusal/inability of dominant groups in societies to 'hear' or 'listen to'
communications from subdominant groups:
'The theory of mutedness....does not require that
the muted be actually silent. They may speak a
great deal. The important issue is whether they
are able to say all that they would wish to say,
where and when they wish to say it. Must they,
for instance, re-encode their thoughts to make them
understood in the public domain? Are they able to
think in ways which they would have thought had they
been responsible for generating the linguistic tools
with which to shape their thoughts? If they devise
their own code will they be understood?'
(Ardener, 1978: 21)
Members of muted groups, if they wish to comunicate, must do so in
terms of the dominant modes of expression. But dominance, within the
theory of mutedness, does not require the active domination of one group
by another, nor does it require any one individual's structural position
in a society to be constant. It is dependent, rather, on a 'sub-
system, or particular universe, of relevance at any one time' (Ardener,
1978: 28), whence emanate:
a) ideas about 'reality' and who is authorised to define it;
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b) the blunting of self-perceptions through the encouragement of
'trivial' concerns and small scale pleasures;
c) the exclusion of muted groups from 'public' space.
The subtlety of such dominance ensures that rebellion is confined to
'minor deviations' which 'can become charged with emotive force' for the
participants but may exert little influence on the dominant group
(Ardener, 1978: 28-9).
Chapter One sets out the fundamental theoretical project of this
thesis, the deconstruction of the various discourses which dominate the
particular universe or sub-system of relationships occupied by a
particular group of women who break the law. In Chapter Two, the
parameters or boundaries of those discourses are identified. In Chapter
Three, the women on whom this study is based are introduced. The accounts
of their own experiences are examined to elucidate the rules by which
they give expression to those experiences and the extent to which they
are able to exploit the contradictions in the dominant discourses within
which they are constructed. Chapters Four to Seven analyse the unique
and often competing appropriations and interpellations of dominant
discourses by magistrates, solicitors, psychiatrists and probation
officers. The consequences for the women being studied are also examined.
Chapter Eight summarises the preceding chapters and reiterates the
theoretical and practical implications of the study.
Thesis
It is argued that the discourses of the medical, judicial and
welfare personnel whose job it is to assess, judge, defend, treat and
punish nondescript women are constituted by the ideological and material
conditions of their jobs in the following ways:
1. Magistrates' discourse in general is constituted by the ideology
of common sense and the material conditions of a privileged existence.
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Additionally, women magistrates are required simultaneously to claim (for
the purposes of authoritative understanding) and deny (for the purposes
of' authoritative attribution of culpability) similarity with female
lawbreakers.
2. Solicitors' discourse is constituted by the ideology of legal
representation which requires solicitors to repackage female lawbreakers
according to typifications of 'normal' women which can be discursively
recognised by 'magisterial comon sense'.
3. Psychiatrists' discourse is constituted by the ideology of
forensic medicine, which requires and authorises psychiatrists to make
wide-ranging medical, moral and judicial judgments of female lawbreakers
in order to render them describable for the purposes of recognition by
'magisterial cooinon sense'. At the same time, this ideology makes
women's eligibility for treatment both ideologically and materially
dependent on a far narrower range of gender-stereotyped classifications.
4. Probation officers' discourse is constituted, on the one hand,
by the competing discourses of magistrates, solicitors and psychiatrists
who, having failed to describe these women adequately within their own
discourses, often reach consensus about the competency of probation
officers to describe them. On the other hand (and simultaneously),
probation officers' discourse is constituted within a social work
ideology, which requires and authorises them both to care for and to
control women as key figures in the maintenance of the nuclear family
(whether or not the woman are, in fact, members of such families).
Despite the complexities and contradictions of these competing
discourses, their consequences for certain female lawbreakers are
coherently and systematically oppressive. A recognizable (though not
definable) group of female lawbreakers is therefore consistently muted
for the following reasons:
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1. Nondescript women are subject to a multiple discursive
oppression which requires that any investigation of their experiences
be subjugated by the typifications of 'normal femininity' articulated
by 'experts'.
2. As speakers about their own condition, these women are
disqualified because of their inability and/or refusal to articulate
the paradigms of domesticity, sexuality and pathology which dominate
explanations of their behaviour.
3. Nondescript women are strategically constructed by judicial,
medical and welfare discourses as the programmable objects of discourse
and subjected to technologies which regulate their minds and bodies
through power relations which are local and immanent. They are
effectively offered a contract which promises to minimise the
consequences of their criminality by rehabilitating them within the
dominant discourses of femininity.
4. Resistance to such description tends to be individualistic,
inconsistent and, in some senses, self-destructive.
Nevertheless, it is argued that such resistance has the important
effect of undermining the authority of official discourses and keeping
open the possibility of the creation of new knowledge about them - both
as women and as lawbreakers. By exploiting the contradictions in the
material and ideological conditions that render them 'nondescript',
these women are able to wrest a limited degree of power from the
dominant groups by whom they are muted.
PART I: THEORIES
11.
CHAPTER ONE
THEORETICAL PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE DECONSTRUCTION OF DISCOURSE
Introduction
This chapter sets out the theoretical framework within which the
process of knowing (Foucault, 1972) about female lawbreakers is being
located in this thesis. The starting point of this chapter is Burton
and Carlen's assertion that 'discourse analysis has displaced epistemology'
(1979: 15) and this statement is examined under the following headings:
Displacing Epistemology
Head and the Significant Symbol
The Characteristics of Signs
Claiming Privilege: The legacy of Sovereignty
The Problem of Recognition
Strategies, Progrannes, Technologies and Resistance
Conclusion
Displacing Epistemology
Epistemology has been concerned with the seeds of truth; it has
asked the question, 'where does knowledge come from?'. It has struggled
with distinctions between the natural and the social world, between causes
and reasons, between Positivism and Verstehende, Functionalism and
Dialectical Materialism. It has asked whether knowledge is obtained by
observing behaviour or understanding action, by accretion or by rational
thought. It has asked whether it is indeed possible for humans to study
themselves at all or to have a full and absolute knowledge of themselves.
In sum, it has had three main concerns:
1. The demarcation of science from non-science (of truth
from falsehood).
2. The relationship between theory and observation.
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3. The conundrum of a knowing subject producing objective
knowledge.
Discourse analysis has displaced these concerns by challenging the
ontological concept of 'truth'. Its search is not for the Hand which
primordially and teleologically planted the seed. Rather it is a search
for the underlying structures whence emanate the rules that authorise
claims 'to know'. Such authority must itself always be under erasure,
for it must always be informed by some other authority. Hence one talks
of a continuing process of discovery and the metaphorical vocabulary of
archaeology becomes more appropriate than that of botany.
As opposed to dealing with questions of truth this thesis struggles
with the process of signification and the position within that process of
the speaking subject. It searches for a method of analysis which reaches
beyond what is said to be, to an understanding of what informs a
particular claim to know. Its aim is to unhitch itself from the collusive
search for properties, essences and unities; instead, it asks, why the
need for coherence in representation? Yet, by asking that question,
privilege is immediately claimed for its own discourse. The trap is
unavoidable and can only be acknowledged as the (essential?) contradiction
which underlies any attempt to legitimate contradiction. As Kristeva
(1975) says:
'Everything in current research that is solid
and intellectually adequate impels those pursuing
it to stress the limits of their own metalanguage
in relation to the signifying process.'
It is nonetheless recognised that stressing the limits of its own
metalanguage does not automatically render this research solid and
intellectually adequate!
No claims are made here that tne frontiers of discourse analysis are
being extended. Rather, this thesis appropriates from a number of writers
13.
a bricolage of concepts and ana1yticn tools which are useful in the
kind of analyses undertaken here. These analyses have to do with the
drawing of distinctions, the organisation of differences and the
recognition of contradictions.
'It is essentially a distinction between
institution and event, between the underlying
system which makes possible various types of
behaviour and actual instances of such behaviour.'
(Culler, 1976: 33)
It is from writers such as Foucault, Saussure, Kristeva, Coward and
Ellis, that tools have been appropriated - from the expositions of
archaeology and semiology.
'By archaeology Foucault is referring to a method
of analysis that sites knowledge and its subjects
by excavating the rules that form a particular
discourse and exclude others (rules that have more
to do with power strategies than scientific validity).'
eitt., 9B3: 68)
'Semiology is thus based on the assumption that
insofar as human actions or productions convey
meaning, insofar as they function as signs, there
must be an underlyincj
 system of conventions and
distinctions which makes this meaning possible.'
(Culler, 1976: 91)
This thesis thus starts from the premise that no human action is
intrinsically meaningful and that no human being is endowed with pre-
given properties or essences which transcend the social system and
determine his/her lived experience. It says 'No' to those idealist forms
of knowledge which depend on notions of 'human nature'. It argues that
the human subject is constructed in language through social practices
which have conventional rather than 'natural' meanings. It argues that
social practices, as well as linguistic units, can be read as signs.
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Mead and the Significant Symbol
The rejection of positivistic explanations of human behaviour did
not immediately lead away from the traditions of epistemology. Reacting
against notions of truth as unchanging and monolithic, the notion of
truth as a pluralistic realism was attractive. Truth, according to
Symbolic Interactionism (with its roots in Pragmatism) is a matter of
perspective (Rock, 1973; Plumer, 1979). It resides neither in subject
nor object but in their interaction. Knowledge is not the product of a
priori reasoning, nor does it inhere in the nature of phenomena themselves.
Knowledge is:
1. Dialectic - for it is contradictory and uncertain;
2. Indeterminate - for it is dependent on changing conditions
and contexts;
3. Pluralistic - for it is scattered among the minds of those
who ask questions;
4. Exploratory - for it cannot be reduced to axioms but is a
'mosaic' built up through exploration.
Knowledge can never be total - it is better described as a process
of 'knowing'. Central to this knowing process is the 'knowing subject' -
the SELF that interacts with society. Symbolic Interactionism draws its
concept of the self from the work of George Herbert Mead (1934).
Originally a behavioural psychologist, Mead concluded that the stimulus -
response model was inadequate to explain the behaviour of humans. Humans
intervene between stimulus and response:
S	 •,	 I?
That intervention:
a) gives meaning to both stimulus and response and
b) frees the actor to respond other than physically.
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It is none other than the intervention of the symbolic - the
intervention of language. Unlike animals, humans interact symbolically,
interpreting stimuli and acting (rather than behaving) in response. But
the emergence of the self is a more complex process than this. Initially,
the child responds behaviourally to the adults in her life but without
ascribing meaning to that behaviour. Gradually she begins to play
certain roles in relation to significant adults - 'mummy', 'daddy' and
'baby' begin to have meaning, to imply rights and duties, to instil an
expectation of certain responses in certain situations. But at this
stage, the child still experiences herself only as an object in the
wold of other people. It is with the acquisition of language that the
child begins to have a picture of her SELF. At this stage she begins
to take on a variety of roles and to organise them into a system. She
begins to see herself reflected in the actions of others towards her.
She begins to realise that she can both influence and be constrained by
her social environment. She begins to take intn herself the role of the
Ceneralised Other. And she begins to adjust her responses in the light
of the responses she anticipates from her environment to act reflexively.
By such a process, the 'I' and 'Me' aspects of the self develop.
'The "I" is the response of the organism to the
attitudes of the others; the "Me" is the organised
set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes.'
(Mead, 1934: 230)
Diagrammatically:
ME
SIGNIFICANT
	
GENERALISED	 INTERNALISED
ST IMULUS
	
OTHER
	
OTHER	 OTHER
SYMBOLS - ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE
UNIFIED
SELF
RESPONSE	
SELF AS _______________ SELF AS
OBJECT
	
SUBJECT
	
I
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It is through this process of maturing that the individual comes
to have a sense of herself as a 'whole' person:
'The reflexive character of self-consciousness
enables the individual to contemplate himself
(sic) as a whole; his ability to take the social
attitudes of other individuals and also of the
generalised other toward himself, within the given
organised society of which he is a member, makes
possible his bringing himself, as an objective
whole, within his own experiential purview; and
thus he can consciously integrate and unify the
various aspects of his self, to form a single con-
sistent coherent and organised personality. More-
over, by the same means, he can undertake and
effect intelligent reconstructions of that self or
personality in terms of its relations to the given
social order, whenever the exigencies of adaptation
to his social environment demand such reconstructions.'
(Mead, 1934: 269 - emphases added)
But the women with whom this study is concerned most certainly did
not 'consciously integrate and unify the various aspects of (themselves)
to form a single, consistent, coherent and organised personality' and
that apparent failure implied yet more positivistic explanations of
'iniriaturity' and 'lack of socialisation'. Like humanistic Marxism,
Symbolic Interactionism seemed to reduce problems of both society and
the individial to a question of consciousness. Consequently, their
resolution lay in the raising of (individual/social) consciousness and
this would be done by increasing knowledge of the complexity of human
interaction and its consequences. Such an analysis seems to be based
on two fallacies:
1. Knowledge of itself leads to change.
2. The Self is potentially as powerful as the Other.
Underlying those two fallacies is a neglect of issues of power and
structure. What in fact is neglected is any analysis of the interrelation
between consciousness and the material world whence it emanates. The
model of the social is 'a rational model of communication, participation
and compromise' (Roberts, 1977: 102). This model, when internalised,
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serves to lessen and/or devalue internal conflict, so that a self which
is experienced as contradictory, inconsistent or incoherent, is viewed
as pathological, rather than the product of social relations which are
themselves the product of inequalities of class, race and gender.
Important though an analysis of symbols is to this study, such an
analysis would be inadequate unless in some way it included an analysis
of structure - of the rules that govern the use of symbols and the social
structures from which these arise.
The Characteristics of Signs
The importance of structural linguistics to the study of social
practices lies in the emphasis they place on the form, rather than the
substance, of units (practices) and their relationship with each other
within a System. Saussure's assertion that the relationship between the
signifier (sound) and the signified (concept) is arbitrary, rather than
natural, or inherently meaningful, allows an analysis of language (practice)
which, freed from the obligation to search for causation, can explore the
rules by which difference is organised and the effects of that organi-
sation. It allows for a distinction to be made between 'la langue', the
underlying set of forms which an individual assimilates when she learns
language and 'parole', the particular selection of and use to which a
speaker puts that language. The consequences of this distinction for the
study of social practices is summarised by Culler (1976: 33):
'Study of the system leads to the construction of
models which represent forms, their relations to
one another, and their possibilities of combination,
whereas study of actual behaviour or events would
lead to the construction of statistical models which
represent the probabilities of particular combin-
tions under various circumstances.'
Having denied, however, the existence of any pre-given, 'natural'
relationship between the signifier and the signified, the somewhat ironic
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problem of the suspiciously 'essential' arbitrariness of that relation-
ship arises. The speaking subject does not have complete freedom to
endow her words or her actions with meaning. She is not the centre of
meaning (knowledge). Words and actions acquire socially determined
meanings which exist independently of the intentions of the particular
subject who use those words or engages in those actions. It may be self-
evident that there is nothing intrinsically polite about opening a door
for a woman (Culler, 1976: 92) but any intention on the pert of a male
subject to ascribe politeness to his action would be futile in an
environment where the act itself was assumed to be patronising. To
understand the complexity of meaning that underlies such a ritual, one
would have to go beyond the meanings articulated by the individual actors
to an understanding of the relationships between conventions arising
from idealist notions of chivalry and those arising from materialist
discourses about women's oppression. Within those relationships one
might identify any number of moments of signification - a process of
signifying, involving a chain of signifiers.
The question which then arises is the extent, if any, to which the
speaking (or knowing) subject plays any active part in that process.
The subject has been 'decentred' but has she become totally powerless?
Before addressing that question specifically, the other facet of the
foundation of the methodology of this thesis - the relationship between
power and kr.owledge - must be considered.
Claiming Privilege: The Legacy of Sovereignty
The process of freeing oneself from absolutist or sovereign thought
is a difficult ore. The desire to know is the desire for power but a
distinction needs to be made between 'power' as a creative, generative,
energetic force and 'power' as a superior, dominating and repressive
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force. For Foucault, power is not something which is produced by
institutions, laws and systems, but is something which inheres in all
social relations. Its origins are local and immanent, and its circula-
tion through the social body can be metaphorically represented by the
circulation of blood by capillaries through the physical body:
'Power is everywhere; not because it embraces
everything, but because it comes from everywhere.'
(Foucault, 1979: 93
But the legacy of epistemology is the desire for a sovereign power. The
more coherent the representation of knowledge, the more monarchial will
the power achieved appear. Sovereignty is characterised by the search
for 'an ideal, continuous, smooth text that runs beneath the multiplicity
of contradictions, and resolves them in the calm unity of coherent
thought' (Foucault, 1972: 155). In other words, paradox is sirnulta-
neously affirmed and denied; its surface appearance is acknowledged but
its implications are repressed. 'Representation appears to render that
which is absent present' (Cousins, 1978: 1).
As Hewitt (1983: 80) points out, sovereignty exists in both
liberal and marxist thought. Chapter Two of this thesis illustrates the
ways in which a number of conservative, liberal and radical discourses
have claimed privileged (or sovereign) positions in relation to
'knowledge' about 'normal' and 'abnormal' women. Each discourse
'appears as an asset - finite, limited, desirable,
useful - that has its own rules of appearance, but
also its own conditions of appropriation and
operation; an asset that consequently, from the
moment of its existence (and not only in its
"practice applications"), poses the question of
power; an asset that is, by nature, the object of
a struggle, a political struggle.'
(Foucault. 1972: 120
But not only do those discourses relate paradoxically to each other, they
contain within themselves discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, lacunae, which
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remain unspoken or, if spoken, always-already subordinate. For example,
it is the paradox of sexuality, that the categories of maleness and
femaleness, 'are not simply categories which oppose each other on a
neutral ground. They are set up in a "violent hierarchy", for they are
already organised by the privileged term in relation to which the other
term is both necessitated and subordinated' (Cousins, 1978: 4). Women
are always-already lacking as not men. That which is a common condition
of the paradox, whose inclusion would allow an inversion of the hierarchy -
the oppression of women - is excluded. And, being thus excluded, such a
condition loses its power to control the effects of discourse. Therefore,
statements emanating from discourse are always iterable - they can
always be 'read' in and out of a variety of contexts, elevated or demoted
between levels, forever excusing and indicting. So it is that the
discourse of psychiatry privileges clinicians to perceive any distressed
female as 'sick', whether she accepts or rejects the female role, that
is, whether she is depressed, incompetent, frigid and anxious or hostile,
successful and sexually active (Chesler, 1974: 110). Likewise, such
privilege enables the experts to differentiate, despite identical
presenting symptoms, 'premenstrual syndrome from menstrual distress' and
thus 'those women who are jumping on the bandwagon and falsely claiming
premenstrual syndrome (as a mitigating factor in their crime) from the
genuine sufferer, who is crying out for help and for a new chance in life'
(Dalton, 1982: 13). Dalton's work, (described more fully inChapter
Two) in fact, provides a specific example of the complex relationship
between medical and judicial discourse, which Foucault describes thus:
'Medical decision recognises absolutely the
authority of the judiciary to define crime, to
determine the circumstances in which it is
committed, and the punishment that it deserves;
but reserves the right to analyse its origin and
to determine the degree of responsibility involved.'
(Foucault, 1972: 44)
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A further example is provided by Carlen's discussion of the use by
psychiatrists of the concept of 'psychopathic disorder' in relation to
women lawbreakers:
'If they as psychiatrists do not know of any way of
treating the 'disturbed' person who is also an
offender then they will use their position as
psychiatrists to deny illness and to make a judicial
decision, a judicial decision which will, in fact,
have penal effects.'
(Carlen, 1984: 4)
So the privileging of discourse is about the ascription of power.
But how does that power have effectivity? Partly, because it operates
in some secrecy but mainly because 'the representation of power has
remained haunted by monarchy. In political analysis and thought, we have
still not cut off the king's head' (Foucault, 1976: 117 quoted in
Gordon, 1977: 17). The analysis of knowledge power as a ubiquitous force
which is generated continuousl y within the relations of the social body
remains a resistable and resisted analysis. In other words, epistemology -
the search for the seeds of knowledge - is only slowly being displaced
by discourse analysis (Burton and Carlen, 1979: 15).
Implicit within epistemology are the concepts of origin and
exclusion:
'The category of original experience carries the
implication that discourse is to function essentially
as a recognition and repetition of pre-given
significations.'
(Gordon, 1977: 15)
To ensure the 'infinite continuity of discourse' Foucault, 1972: 25)
its boundaries have to be demarcated by 'practices of exclusion' (Gordon,
1977: 15). Examples of such practices are:
- the prohibition of certain topics (e.g. poverty in psychiatric
discourse);
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- the disqualification of certain individuals as speakers (e.g.
women about their own gynaecology);
- the rejection of certain statements as illegitimate (e.g.
prostitution as a convenient way of earning a living).
It follows that any attempt to analyse discourse has to challenge
the legacy of sovereignty and question its plausibility by asking:
'Who (question of the author) has to say what
(question of the object) to whom (question of the
reader) in order to destroy which (question of
the Other)?'
(Burton & Carlen, 1979: 33)
It is to the unpackaging of this question, and its implications for
the position of the subject that this chapter now turns.
The Problem of Recognition
'Discourse analysis has. . . . transformed the problem
of ideology into the problem of Recognition.'
(Burton and Carlen, 1979: 19)
Epistemology conventionally positions ideology in opposition to
knowledge (science), yet the exact relationship between ideology and
knowledge remains elusive. As Coward and Ellis observe (1977: 2), the
idealist assumptions underlying notions of free individuals who use the
'transparent, neutral milieu' of language to discover truths about a pre-
existing, fixed universe are themselves characteristic of a bourgeois
ideology which 'depends on notions of "human essence" which somehow
transcend....the social system'. Such assumptions have been undermined
by the development of Marxist analyses of history and the awareness of
the constraining influence of the economic base of any society on the
consciousness of its subjects and their representation of the real world.
All such analyses have demonstrated the inseparability of ideology from
knowledge but understandings of the nature of that dependency vary. For
Intellectual
Bourgeois
Truth
-	
- lectual
Class
Position
Proletariat
Truth
Class
Position
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some, there still exists a 'truth' which is ultimately knowable and
recognisable, but that truth is consciously distorted by those whose
interests are served by a false representation of the real world
(Mannheim, 1960). For others, there exist two 'truths' - the bourgeois
truth and the proleteriat truth (Lukacs 1971). In both versions, the
neutral intellectual is the final arbiter of truth, whose all-seeing
position might be illustrated thus:
Version I
	
Version II
But the reduction of ideology to class position and the elevation of the
intellectual to an all-seeing position above the battle has led these
primitive Marxist analyses into an empiricist trap which makes them
vulnerable to attack by sophisticated empiricists such as Popper (1972),
Kuhn (1970) and Lakatos (1970). But Popper's criticism of Marxism as
'historicism' which has been empirically falsified and should therefore
be rejected is ultimately, as Williams points out (1975) a 'red herring'.
The real issue is the contradiction of objective knowledge being produced
by a knowing subject. And Popper, Williami argues, cannot tolerate
contradictions. Indeed, it is the search for continuity, consistency and
rationale in the development of scientific knowledge that underpins such
concepts as 'World 3' (Popper, 1972), 'articulation' (Kuhn, 1962) and
Lakatos' attempt to reconcile these two writers:
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'It is not that we propose a theory and Nature
may shout NO; rather we propose a mass of theories,
and Nature may shout INCONSISTENT.'
(Lakatos, 1970: 130)
To which the excluded reply is, 'Why not?'
The failure of traditional Marxism to address what Foucault describes
as
'not a question of a battle "in favour" of truth
but of a battle about the status of truth and
the economic/political role which it plays'
(Foucault, 1976: 14)
has to some extent been rectified by Louis Aithusser (1966). Through his
writing, materialist ideology has outgrown its status of ta slogan under
which political and economic interest of a class presr&s ii.f'
has established itself as 'the way in which the individual actively lives
his or her role within the social totality: it therefore participates in
the construction of that individual so that he or she can act' (Coward
and Ellis, 1977: 67). The reintroduction of the subject (albeit a
positioned and decentred subject) and the distinction between repressive
and (relatively autonomous) ideological state apparatuses has allowed
materialism to extend its analysis to language itself. Language has been
recognised as central to the construction of the subject in his or her
social reality. That construction is seen to take place through social
practices which are not necessarily overtly repressive, but which work
through the subject's view of him/herself - in other words, through the
Unconscious. At this point, it becomes possible to rehabilitate Freud.
The process whereby language is acquired becomes an important moment for
the understanding of the role of ideology in the construction of self-
image or identity (Coward & Ellis, 1977: 110).
That process has been analysed and expounded in the writings of
Lacan. His thesis of the 'mirror-phase' - the moment when the infant
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forms an image of itself, as a body which is separate from its drives
and its relations with its mother - has led to the development of the
concept of the Imaginary.
The Imaginary represents an important advance on Head's theory of
socialisation. For Head, the moment of Self-recognition is a moment of
acquisition. It is the moment at which the infant experiences herself
as an integrated, unified whole. For Lacan, it is a moment of loss.
What the infant recognises is the possibility of the production
(representation) of a unified self. But in the production of that self -
the Ego - the subject simultaneously misrecognises itself, for the price
of that apparent unity, that desire to reproduce a self-identity in
relation to the speculary counterpart, is the denial of contradiction,
of fragmentariness, and the consequent splitting-off/loss of the Other.
The Other may be described as those non-legitimated forms of lived
experience which thereafter forever dictate the paradigms from which the
speaker selects, in order to exert control over them.
Ideology, then, has to do with the handling of that moment of self
(mis) recognition. It has to do with the simultaneous affirmation and
denial of contradiction through language:
'Ideology is discursive closure. The process of the
subject is double-edged, admitting closure and
contradiction, closure and 	 plurality of the
discourse of the unconscious. The subject is a
site of contradiction and hence of the possibility
of revolutionary change, of rupture.'
(Adlam & Salfield, 1978: 100)
The relationship between ideology and knowledge can therefore be
redefined as the relationship between the Imaginary and the Symbolic.
In the context of this thesis, the term 'symbolic' may be used to
describe both language and specific social practices which 'can lean on
linguistics as a model for the elaboration of their systematic reality'
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(Coward & Ellis, 1977: 1). The production of knowledge is therefore
dependent on the maintenance of space between the Imaginary and the
Symbolic (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 31). The goal of conventional epistem-
ology is to close the gap by representing as always-already present a
unity or coherence which is forever absent. In discourse analysis,
however, that apparent unity is challenged. Its presence is not accepted;
it is seen as the Object of a discourse, as the articulation of a Desire -
the desire to 'confront and control the Other' (Burton & Carlen, 1979:
24).
Programmes, Technologies, Strategies - and Resistance
The Desire of discourse is the ejection of the Other and the closure
of the gap between the Imaginary and the Symbolic. But this thesis is
not only about discourse; it is also about social and institutional
practices in relation to a specific group of female lawbreakers. And
it is about the effects of both discourse and practice. What, then, is
the relationship between discourse, practice and effectivity?
Foucault employs three concepts which assist in understanding that
relationship (Gordon, 1979: 35). Those are the concepts of the
programmes, technologies and strategies of power.
Programmes of power are not merely the formulation of wishes and
intentions but, as Gordon relates, have two fundamental characteristics:
1. They presuppose a knowledge of the field of reality in
which they intervene and
2. they render reality in the form of objects which are
programmable.
In relation to the present study, the assessments which are made of
female lawbreakers, especially in the form of social inquiry and
psychiatric reports, will be examined as programmes of power. The rules
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by which such women are rendered programmable will be identified and,
likewise, those knowledges and rules which exclude from programmability.
Technologies of power are those mechanisms whereby programmes
produce effects. They may be architectural institutions, like court-
rooms, hospitals, schools, factories or prisons (Bentham's panopticon
being a classic example); they may be practices, such as the provision of
welfare, the muting of subdominant modes of expression (Ardener, 1975)
or the ascription of motives (Taylor, 1979). Finally, they may be
norms - technologies which have been internalised to the extent that they
are no longer viewed as technologies at all. Self-regulation demonstrates
the supreme success of a programe. In this study, 'technologies' will
be taken to mean all those things which professionals do to, with, for
and about female lawbreakers, together with the resources upon which they
draw.
One of those resources is the field of strategy. It is a difficult
concept to define, but Gordon's interpretation seems particularly
pertinent to the present study:
'What is meant by a strategy of power is the inter-
play between one or more programmes technologies
and an operational evaluation in terms of
strategy: a logically hybrid (and sometimes
elusive) complex which couples the production of
effects with the utilisation of those effects.'
(Gordon, 1979: 39-40)
Strategy is not coherent, logical, overall plan of action (although it
may be represented as such). Rather, it is an opportunistic and
expedient means of exploiting the social field of intervention. It is
the means whereby the authority of programmes can be maintained (or not)
in spite of (and yet because of) their effects. It is, for emple, the
means by which a programme 'caters in advance for the eventuality of its
own failure' (Gordon, 1979: 38). The recent decision by the Home
Secretary to extend the 'short, sharp, shock' regimes, introduced in 1980
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in four Detention Centres, is good example of strategy:
'Any reasonable Home Secretary would have first
permitted himself a wry smile at his proof of the
irrelevance of his party's prejudices, square-
bashing clearly proving infinitely preferable to
the soul-destroying tedium of detention centre
work, the so-called "soft" option. Not Mr. Brittan.
The more embarrassingly pleasurable elements, such
as extra PE, have now gone. But the tougher
regime is to be extended to other detention centres,
even though this report states that such a regime
has had no deterrent effect on reconvictions rates
or crime rates.'
(Guardian Editorial, 26th July 1984)
The 'masterly stroke of professional imperialism' achieved by
psychiatry in its use of the concept of 'psychopathic disorder' (Carlen,
1984: 5) is another example of strategy, which has already been quoted
in this thesis. Yet another example is that of the 'recuperation' of
sub-cultural signs:
'It is through this continual process of
recuperation that the fractured order is repaired
and the subculture incorporated as a diverting
spectacle within the dominant mythology from which
it in part emanates: as 'folk devil', as Other,
as Enemy.'
(1-lebdige, 1979: 94)
Gordon characterises strategy as:
a) 'the exploitation of possibilities which it itself
discerns and creates';
b) 'the arena of the cynical, the promiscuous, the
tacit, in virtue of its general logical capacity
for the synthesis of the heterogeneous.'
(1979: 39)
In this study, the concept of strategy will be used to analyse the
ways in which professional agents of signification sustain themselves in
their continued work with female lawbreakers (or, alternatively, justify
their ceasing to work with them) in the face of incongruity between
programmes and their effects.
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At this point, however, there is again a danger of losing sight of
the speaking subject. What power, if any, does she have over this space?
The programmes, technologies and strategies by which the gap between the
Imaginary and the Symbolic is conventionally closed servc to give meaning
or signification to the subject and her acts. To the extent that this
signifying code is accepted by the subject, then it holds and controls
her. Nevertheless, the subject does have power - the power to 'infringe
the code in the direction of allowing the subject to get pleasure from it,
renew it or even endanger it' (Kristeva, 1975: 52). The power of the
subject is, therefore, the power of negativity and heterogeneity. It is
the power to 'say "No" to the conditions of existence of existent
knowledae' (Burton and Carlen, 1979: 19); it is the power to transgress
and call in question the 'transcendental ego' (Kristeva, 1975: 51); it
is the power of resistance to and refusal of assumptions of homogeneity.
By demonstrating the existence of heterogeneity and contradiction, the
speaking subject is helping to keep open that space whence knowledge is
produced.
But is the nondescript female lawbreaker really a resister? Does
she, in fact, defy description? Surely, to describe her as such is
merely to romanticise her plight? For the most part, female lawbreakers
appear to be markedly non-resistant and their tactics of rebellion, such
as they are, merely 'defences of the weak', (Mathiesen, 1972). Yet, on
closer examination, it begins to seem as though such an assessment may
be patronising, and itself a programe rooted in a discourse which
positions women as powerless because their power is not overt. But:
'the existence of those who seem not to rebel is
a warren of minute, individual autonomous tactics
and strategies which counter and inflect the
visible facts of overall domination.'
(Gordon, 1979: 43)
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Female lawbreakers have their programmes, technologies and
strategies, too!
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework within which my
thinking about female lawbreakers has developed. Chapter Two identifies
the discourses wherein the statements gathered from interviews with
court-room personnel are lodged. The following chapters use the analysis
of discourse and its relationship to practice to illustrate, expand and
reinforce the various elements which constitute my hypothesis.
These rules governing the various discourses may now be summarised
thus:
1. Female lawbreakers are constructed as targets upon which power is
inscribed (in the language of positivism - 'It is possible to know the
truth about female lawbreakers').
2. Their lawbreaking activity (whether defined as meaningful action,
meaningless action or determined behaviour) is read as the property of a
unified self - a whole personality. 	 Even the notion of a disintegrated,
sick personality presupposes its opposite).
3. Statements which reinforce notions of essence and unity are
privileged as statements of 'assessment'; those which do not are
excluded as 'common sense'.
4. The organisation of the distinction between 'assessment' and
'common sense' depends, not on
	 the action behaviour signified, nor
on the substance of the statement, but on the power of the agent of
signification.
5. That power is represented as the power of sovereign knowledge - a
privileged power which is justified in subjugating inferior knowledges.
6. 'Assessment' may therefore be defined as 'that which is recognised
by a powerful agent. And that which is recognised is mutually dependent
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on the material consequences of that recognition. The purpose of
recognition is to normalise; that which cannot be normalised (i.e. appro-
priated by an already institutionalised rule) cannot be recognised.
7. Contradictory statements may therefore be reconciled in assessment
or complementary statements dispersed to ensure the effectivity of
discourse in the specificity of diverse non-discursive practices and in
the face of powerful (i.e. energetic) challenge from the Other (i.e. those
non-legitimated forms of lived experience which thereafter forever
dictete the paradigms from which the speaker selects, in order to exert
control over them).
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PARAMETERS OF FEMALE CRIMINALITY: A REVIEW OF SOME DISCOURSES
Introduction
Traditional theories of female crime have all been fundamentally
positivistic in their nature. They have premised that:
1. It is possible to distinguish female lawbreakers from non-
lawbreakers by characteristics other than their lawbreaking action1;
2. These characteristics reside within the individual physiology
and psychology of generalised woman and/or specific women and that,
whilst there may be some debate about whether these are innate or socially-
determined, they are nevertheless represented as inherent, in the sense
that they exist as permanent attributes in a unitary form;
3. These 'essential' characteristics are also universal within the
category 'female lawbreaker' and can be analysed ahistorically.
In other words, the observed category, 'women who break the law'
corresponds with an abstract category, part of a pre-existing universe,
about which 'knowledge' can be discovered through various discourses and
institutions. Almost all existing literature on women who offend has
been written with an explicit or implicit positivistic agenda, involving
the classification of symptoms, the diagnosis of a syndrome and the
search for an aetiology. This thesis, by contrast and in line with the
most recent literature on the subject, is premised on a view of women
offenders (and indeed all human subjects) as 'the differentiated terminals
of the varied capacities and practices they engage in' (Hirst and Woolley,
1982). Initially, however, it is necessary to outline the discourses
within which female lawbreakers have traditionally been constructed.
33.
Criminological Discourse
The 'Unfeminine' Female Lawbreaker
It would be a mistake to assume that Lombroso has long been dis-
credited in anything other than the technicalities of his 'findings'.
His spirit is alive and well and resides in many practitioners and not a
few academics who focus their interests on women who offend in the 1980s.
His belief that women, being lower on the evolutionary scale than men
and having not reached the stage of refinement where 'atavistic stigmata'
clearly distinguish the 'degenerate' from the 'normal', must all be
considered by nature 'subnormal', and that those few women who also
displayed stigmata were thus monstrous, is a theme which constantly
recurs - in a more or less disguised way - in discourses of all degrees
of academic respectability, and none. The logic o1 'nis s''rt \c's,
since women were 'congenitally less inclined to crime than men',
(Lombroso, 1959) those who did offend were inherently more masculine
than they should be, remains highly influential. 2
 Prins for instance,
as late as 1980, makes reference to a number of recent research 'findings'
in respect of the chromosomal make-up and physique of female offenders,
suggesting that delinquent girls tend to be taller and heavier than
average for their age and sexually precocious with a statistically
significant tendency towards lesbianism or bisexuality. He suggests that
there is a need for much more research in this area and one must therefore
conclude that Lombroso, far from being dead and buried, has a robust
future.
The 'Essentially Feminine' Female Lawbreaker
If the 'essentially unfeminine' theories of female crime appear to
have a healthy future, the same cannot be said of the 'essentially
feminine' theories of female crime - those theories which attempt to
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establish a relationship between anti-social behaviour and essentially
female physiological conditions. The most consistent research in this
area has been by Katharina Dalton (1964) who found a correlation between
offending and the experience of 'pre-menstrual syndrome' in a much
higher proportion of female offenders than would be expected statistically.
The 'pre-.menstrual syndrome' will be discussed further under the section
headed 'Gynaecological Discourse' but at this stage it is perhaps
interesting to note the reluctance of academic and practising
psychiatrists to give credence to her work. Prins suggests that much of
the evidence provided in other studies (by men) is conflicting and that
evidence provided by women is 'anecdotal'. Similarly, evidence linking
the menopause to lawbreaking is also, according to Prins 'not conclusive',
and, although pregnancy is, by definition, a prior existing condition for
the crime of infanticide, current psychiatric thinking (Bluglass, 1978)
is that the physiological aspects of pregnancy and child-birth have been
overstated in relation to the crime. Although it is not being argued
here that socially-defined acts, such as crime, can be reduced to
biology - and the substance of Dalton's theories is not accepted - the
refusal of a (predominantly male) medical profession to allow women a
theoretical site to talk about their own bodies themselves, is a theme
that will recur throughout this thesis. Whilst it would be simplistically
reductionist to argue that the maintenance of gender roles is a con-
stitutive feature of psychiatry, disorders arising from a disturbance
of female biology do tend to be marginalised (Allen, 1984) and women are
encouraged to see themselves as 'sick' only within definitions provided
and controlled by men.
The Role-Playing Female Lawbreaker
Having said that, all theories which attempt to reduce action to
biological differences can be criticised, at the very least, for
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conflating concepts of sex and gender (Oakley, 1972). Sex differences
may exist, although they may not be so great or fixed as we suppose, but
the greater influence on our action is gender and that is materially
constituted. The role theory of female crime premises that the normal
socialisation process of girls results in a greater emphasis on internal
controls and outwardly conforming behaviour (particularly sexual
behaviour) than does the socialisation of boys. The delinquent woman is,
therefore, an under-socialised woman - one who has fallen short of the
expectations of her role. Invariably the key to delinquency is seen to
lie in the expression of sexuality.
Thomas (1923) argues that human behaviour is based on natural
'wishes' - for new experience, security, response and recognition. These
wishes are in turn based on instincts of anger, fear, love and the desire
for power. Women, he argues, have a stronger love instinct than men and
a more forceful wish for response. Delinquency is simply the
inevitable response of a woman who has not had her 'wishes' satisfied
legitimately. The corollary of this is that the illegitimate expression
of (sexual) wishes must be unsatisfactory because it is unnatural.
Therefore, its sole purpose must be as a currency to purchase other
(material) things - to manipulate:
'Good women keep their bodies as capital to sell
in matrimony for marriage and security, whereas
bad women trade their bodies for excitement.'
(Klein, 1977)
If Thomas sees the delinquent woman as 'unadjusted' but corrigible,
Pollak (1950) takes a more pessimistic view of female nature, and the
impact of socialisation on it. Whilst recognising that the double
standards of sexual morality in society discriminate against women and
that many domestic tasks to which women are socialised are irritating
and frustrating, he clearly believes that women, far from suffering in
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this situation, actually use it, not only to commit as much crime as
men, but also to dupe men into protecting them against the consequences
of their behaviour. Their hhaviour is characterised by sublety rather
than violence. They commit as much crime as men but socialisation
influences the detection, reporting and treatment of such crime. Men are
physically strong and have been socialised to protect women, who are
physically weak. But, Pollak argues, men are actually more vulnerable
emotionally than women because they cannot, physiologically, hide their
true feelings (the lack of an erection cannot be disguised) whereas
women can (a female orgasm is not essential to the act of copulation
and is not necessarily apparent to the man). Men have, therefore, been
socialised into adopting a chivalrous attitude towards women - an
attitude which women have abused because they are, by nature or nurture
(Pollak doesn't make it clear which) - inherently and incorrigibly
deceitful and manipulative.
Advocates of role theory locate the causes of female delinquency in
the relationships which women experience in their childhood and, more
particularly, their adolescence. It is a liberal view which proposes the
manipulation of individuals through institutions (primarily the
institution of social work) and which denies the existence of inherently
biological tendencies towards crime. But even in these so-called
cultural theories assumptions about the essential nature of woman cannot
be avoided.
The insights which role theorists offer into the differential
socialisation of boys and girls can be attached to either liberal or
radical theories of society as a whole. The problems with 'liberal role
theory' is that it still - if only by default - makes assumptions about
'human nature'. Men and women start off with a pre-given package of
instincts and drives, on which the socialisation process acts. At the
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end of the day, the package may be different but it is still a static
package of attributes. Although the packages will vary between societies,
the economic and historical conditions within a particular society which
might originally have dictated the kind of package 'appropriate' to that
society at a particular time have become detached from the process of
socialisation, which is seen to have a coherence, stability and self-
perpetuation of its own. 	 The process becomes impervious to external
influence and, whilst conditions in the real (material) world may
change, role expectations do not - or do so only very slowly. Forms of
role theory which fail to take account of the wider connotations of
concepts such as racism, gender and class within any society, tend to
become authoritarian, static and politically conservative.
The Feminist Female Lawbreaker
Those (primarily American) writers on female crime who have
challenged traditional role theories have pointed to the obsessional need
to define women's behaviour sexually (Klein 1976). By contrast, they
highlight the poverty which correlates with much female crime (Crites,
1976) and predict that the current economic crisis could result in poor
women losing what jobs and income they had and committing more 'street
offences' - vagrancy, drunkenness, drug dealing, soliciting etc., (Klein
and Kress, 1976). On the other hand, the same writers accept that
certain classes of women - thanks in part to the Women's Movement - have
actually improved their positions within the labour market and may there-
fore have more opportunities for 'white-collar' crimes such as embezzle-
ment.
If comon-sense indicates that 'not all women offenders are poor'
(and not all poor women offend) then those who so enthusiastically sought
to establish a direct link between women's 'liberation' and an increase
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in female crime (e.g. Adler, 1975), have had to face the common-sense
reality that many women offenders are poor (Smart, 1979) and that very
few show much appreciation for or understanding of the aims of the
Women's Movement, (although there is some evidence (Carlen, 1983) that
they can very well articulate an untheorised awareness of women's
oppression). The new 'violent' woman criminal may have caught the
imagination of the media and threatened to become yet one more of the
'moral panics' of the late 1970s but more sober analyses have been
sceptical of such a simplistic approach. Indeed, where research has
been specifically concerned with the correlation between attitudes to
feminism and delinquent behaviour (e.g. James and Thornton, 1980) the
indications are that 'positive attitudes towards feminism tend to
inhibit rather than promote delinquent involvement'.
It is, in any case, misleading to think of the Women's Movement
simply as a body concerned with equal opportunities for women (Smart,
1979). The purpose of the Women's Movement in relation to female crime
is not to urge equality of exposure, opportunity or treatment at an
individual level. Its purpose is 'to challenge the dominant assumptions
long held by academic practitioners and by workers within the criminal
justice system' (Klein and Kress, 1976). It aims to draw attention
away from individual offenders and concentrate on the social structure
which produces 'specific systems, such as imperialism, racism, capitalism
and sexism, because they promote inherently repressive relationships and
social injury'. So the very definition of crime changes from that of
individual law-breaking to that of anything which violates basic 'human
rights to self-determination, dignity, food and shelter, and freedom
from exploitation'. Justice becomes a political rather than legal
concept, and the traditional distinctions between offenders and victims
are questioned.
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It is only within this conceptual framework that Carol Smart's book
'Women, Crimp and Criminology' (1976) (until the recent publication of
Heidensohn, 1985, the only British feminist critique of the literature
on women and crime) can be viewed as a coherent whole. Dealing, as it
does, with women offenders, rape and mental illness, the unifying theme
is that of women as 'the unrecognised victims'. The danger of such an
approach, however, is that, yet again, the theoretical site has been
drawn up - this time not simply for 'women who break the law', but for
all women. All women are victims. Their specific circumstances,
experiences, behaviour can be, to all intents and purposes, ignored.
From the Scylla of Lombroso's 'born' criminal woman, we have lurched to
the Charybdis of the woman as 'victim of the law' - both equally unable
to define (and thus control) their situations.
But, as Cousins (1980) remarks satirically., is it really good enough
to say simply that the 'law grinds women and men rule the law'? It can
be argued that there is no essential or singular relationship between the
law and women as such. The law is complex and multiple in its functions
and effects, nor does it recognise pre-existing 'men' and 'women'
categories as such. The law creates a 'legal person' in relation to
particular actions in particular circumstances. Our task, therefore,
should not be one of exposing, through a moral discourse about 'fairness'
and 'natural justice' the way in which the law responds to a pre-defined
category, 'women' but to analyse the mechanisms by which the law
organises sexual difference and the structures that give rise to those
mechanisms (Cousins, 1980).
In the light of Cousins' exhortation, Heidensohn's (1985) eloquent
exposition and critique of the 'state of the art' in relation to feminist
criminology is disappointing. Her thesis, that we should focus on
explanations of female conformity in order to find clues to female non-
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conformity, assumes rather than establishes a symmetrical relationship
between these t.wo objects of discourse. Understanding why the vast
majority of women appear to conform to society's legal rules does not
provide a full understanding of the reasons for non-conformity. By
exploring the specific experiences and circumstances of those female
lawbreakers who are defined as insufficiently bad to be imprisoned yet
insufficiently mad to be hospitalised, this thesis locates itself in a
relatively new tradition of criminological discourse. That tradition has
so far seen only three studies relating to female lawbreakers - McLeod's
study of prostitutes (1982) and Carlen's two studies of women in prison
in Scotland (1983) and the autobiographical accounts of 'Criminal Women'
(1985). A further study is about to be published (Carlen, 1987). It is
a tradition which, to borrow from Thompson (1978) (quoted in Taylor
(1980)), seeks to bring to particular account those discourses which
variously define female lawbreakers as born, socialised or victimised
into crime.
Judicial Discourse
Very little has been written about the processing of female offenders
by the Criminal Justice System and official discourse is virtually
silent on the subject, dismissing women in footnotes or single sentences
as statistically insignificant (Butler, 1975; Younger, 1974; Criminal
Justice Act 1982). Much of what has been written is concerned with
juvenile girls and/or American women. However, the unifying theme of
existing literature is whether or not women offenders are treated more
leniently than their male counterparts.
The hypothesis that women are protected from the full force of the
law by the chivalry of men was first proposed by Pollak (1950). The
concept of chivalry has been challenged from two directions: firstly, it
has been argued that it does not exist and secondly, that it exists, but
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that its motivation is not one of altruism, as Pollak suggests, but pure
self-interest. Documentation of the absence of chivalry in the British
criminal justice system is sparse and seems confined to Dell's study
(1971) of the lack of legal representation amongst women who were
eventually sentenced to imprisonment and Mawby's (1977) frequently mis-
quoted finding that 'when previous record is taken into consideration,
females are more likely to be imprisoned than males'. More recently,
Farrington and Morris (1983 a & b) have argued that when account is taken
of the fact that women generally appear to commit less serious offences
than men there is little disparity between the sentencing patterns of
men and women and certainly no evidence that women are consistently
treated more leniently. Eaton (1986) comes to a similar conclusion,
though she argues that concentration on the end product of sentencing
masks the inequality of treatment which female lawbreakers recel\le as
result of the dominant position occupied in criminal justice proceedings
by the ideology of the family. Other (American) studies (e.g.
Steffensmeier and Kramer, 1980) demonstrate that women do consistently
receive lighter sentences than male defendants but that chivalry is only
one reason for this. The practical difficulties of imprisoning women,
the fact that (despite 'moral panics' to the contrary) adult women do
not constitute a statistical crime problem, the belief that women respond
better than men to non-custodial treatment and the prevailing perception
of women as non-dangerous, all play their parts. Male dominance in the
public sphere, it is argued, is not served by putting women in jail. It
is actually in men's interests to keep women in their homes wherever
possible.
But such studies still search for an essential relationship between
the criminal justice system and all women. The reality is more complex
than that. Chivalry is to do with the relationship between 'gentlemen'
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and 'ladies' and, as Khin points out, 'ladies' are the least like]y to
come in contact with the criminal justice system in the first place.
'Ladies' are wealthy and white, whereas 'offenders' are poor and dis-
proportionately black (cf. Home Office, 1986a; NACRO, 1986). Klein makes
an important material point about the relative absence of a whole class
of women from the criminal justice system but it is a point that can be
made with equal force about men and it actually misses the point about
the force of the concept of chivalry, namely, the ideological. The one
thing that is not expected of men offenders is that they should behave like
'gentlemen'. It is accepted that they are not - they are 'scoundrels'
and the most that is expected of them is that they be 'honest scoundrels',
'likeable rogues'. But there is no equivalent celebration of female
delinquency Heidensohn, 1985). Women offenders are still expected to
behave 'like ladies' - submissive, maternal, emotionally fragile
(Chesney-Lind, 1978; Worrall, 1981 if they are to benefit from male
chivalry. Those who resist such labelling, who are non-conforming in
their manner or life-style, forfeit those benefits and find themselves
dealt with as harshly as, or more harshly than, their male counterparts.
When processing adult female lawbreakers, considerable emphasis is
placed on their domestic situation and responsibilities (Carlen, 1983)
but the other characteristic which is assumed to evoke male chivalry is
that of women's mental, or at least emotional, state. Courts have been
advised to be 'specially vigilant' for any sign of mental disorder in
women defendants (Butler, 1975). Woodside (1974) found that, in her
study of an Edinburgh Court, 'a good job' was done by the court in
picking out mentally abnormal women offenders, although she goes on to
criticise the lack of treatment facilities for such women once detected.
The power of psychiatric discourse will be discussed in more detail below
but at this stage it is sufficient
	 to identify it as an excusing
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condition alongside domesticity - a further invasion of the female
lawbreaker's space within which she may seek to define herself and her
actions. This thesis is about the negotiation of that space and, in
particular, the mechanisms some women have employed to resist a total
pitch invasion by a discourse which recognises only those excusing
conditions that are located and fixed within domesticity, sexuality and
pathology.
Penal Discourse
Official discourse in respect of the imprisonment of women is
ambivalent. A Home Office publication in 1970 expressed the hope that by
the end of the century 'even fewer or no women at all' will be given
prison sentences. However, recent developments in the government's prison
building programme (NACRO, 1987) and official statistics of women's
imprisonment over the past fifteen years, (Home Office, 1985) do not
suggest that such hope is justified. Over twice as many women were
imprisoned in 1981 as in 1971 and there was an even higher increase in
the numbers imprisoned for fine default. The numbers of women remanded
in custody also indicates no great will on the part of the judiciary to
keep women out of prison. Of those remanded, only about one-third
eventually receive custodial sentences - about half the proportion of
remanded men. It is a matter of debate whether the reasons for remancJs
are 'chivalrous' - that is, made in the belief that criminal women are
sick or abnormal - or punitive - to give them a taste of prison
(Heidensohn, 1981). The fact that there has also been a marked increase
in the numbers of women sentenced to less than six months imprisonment
would suggest the latter.
Until recently, very little had been written about women in prison
in England, apart from an historical account by Smith (1962) and articles
by Heidenshon (1975), (1980). Three major studies have been published in
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the 1980s (Carlen, 1983; Dobash, Dobash and Gutteridge, 1986;
Mandaraka-Sheppard, 1986). Other available information tends to be of a
campaigning nature, such as that produced by the National Association
for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders and the Howard League for
Penal Reform (see, for example, Seear and Player, 1986), or autobiographi-
cal (McShane, 1980; Peckham, 1985).
All the evidence seems to suggest that women cope less well with
imprisonment than men. A much larger proportion of female than male
prisoners are considered to be behaviourally disruptive and, in many
cases, are considered to be 'mentally abnormal', if not actually 'mentally
ill' (Butler, 1975). But there are two broad schools of opinion as to
why this should be so. Firstly, there is the view that women, by
nature, withstand the stresses of prison life less well than men - that
they are 'depressingly normal' women, put under abnormal strains.
Secondly, there is the view that many women in prison are highly
disturbed prior to imprisonment and are therefore, inappropriately
sentenced.
Despite official unease, however, the imprisonment of women would
seem to serve a purpose of disciplining - through a very specific form
of social control - the behaviour of women (Carlen, 1983: 59). Women
who end up in prison (in Scotland) are those who have not only broken
the law, but have already stepped out of place as wives and mothers.
They may not consciously have rejected the traditional discipline of
family life - many still believe in the ideal of family life - but their
experience of it conflicts with that ideal. In reality family life has
meant poverty, poor housing and drunken, violent husbands. The
judiciary claims to understand this but nevertheless judges women who
have broken away from this as 'bad mothers'. Women do not go to prison
only because of their domestic situation but the fact that this traditional
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form of discipline has already broken down is, at the very least, an
indicator that the discipline of prison may not be wholly inappropriate
for them. If, in addition, they have demonstrated that they are 'beyond
care or cure' - by virtue of intractable disorders such as alcoholism
arid personality disorders - the need for discipline may be considered
even greater. The appropriation by psychiatric discourse of the
'dumping zone' (Gunn et al., 1978) known as 'personality disorders' will
be discussed in more detail below but suffice it to say here that the
use of such a label, by definition, implies that the discipline setting
of prison is an appropriate disposal.
Within prison, the official discourse encourages women to be
sociable, feminine and responsible (Carlen, 1983). in practice, 'however,
the careful structuring and surveillance of association and bodily care
and the absence of freedom to make even the most trivial decisions for
oneself, can produce directly opposite results. In fact, the short-term
imprisonment of women is about the control of the women that 'nobody
really wants' (1983: 218).
By the time a woman arrives in prison (unless she has committed one
'serious' crime) ii is assumed that she has expended and exhausted
(often literally) the carers and curers outside. It is assumed that what
she was offered outside was fundamentally different from what she will
have to endure inside. However, Carlen has shown that the 'caring
society' is often a 'dismissive' one, not offering the care it professes.
It will not be argued that the women who are the subject of this thesis
have been dismissed - yet. They are the ones about whom a glimmer of
official hope still exists. But what will be argued is that the nature
of the 'help' they receive is often based on injunctions identical to
those of penal discourse: 'Discipline, medicalise and feminise' (Carlen,
1983:	 18).
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Gynaecological Discourse
To invoke the concept of the witch in the interpretation of
perceptions of womanhood in Western societies in the twentieth century
may seem somewhat eccentric. The relevance of a study of the Bori cult's
containment by spirit possession of sterile and childless Hausa women in
Nigeria (Lipshitz, 1978) may at first elude, but the belief that 'women
are witchlike in being able to give birth to live beings' remains deeply
embedded in western as in non-western cultures. As Shorter has argued
'something about the uterus, and the sexual and reproductive functions
associated with it, presents a magical threat to men' (1984: 286). The
realisation that the internal processes of the female body are crucial
to, yet beyond the control of, men is something which provokes fear and
a desire to contain, to limit and to punish.
Two themes emerge from this fundamental fear of the female body -
this belief that even the 'normal' woman is 'not normal'. Firstly, the
'normal' woman can actually be controlled, or at least contained by her
abnormalities. Menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth, and the
climacteric can all be used to restrict the 'normal' women's perception
of herself and thus her behaviour may be contained without, by and
large, much explicit external pressure. The ideology of 'normal
abnormalities' has become so powerful since the development of 'scientia
gynaecologia' (Edwards, 1981) in the nineteenth century that it rarely
needs to be restated. The domination of western culture by male visions
has led to these fears of women's physical qualities being incorporated
into the culture as a whole and being believed by both men and women
(Shorter, 1984). The second theme, and corollary, however, is that
women who suffer gynaecological dysfunctions or who reject the controlling
influence of the reproductive cycle (e.g. by taking the Pill) become
problematic and potentially out of control. They have to be controlled
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in some other way. For the Hausa, the solution of accepting!
acknowledging devil possession is clear - and it is as clear to the women
themselves as to the men who seek to control them. (The role of women in
controlling women (Hutter and Williams, 1981) will be discussed further
under 'Social Work Discourse' below). For British women the solution may
also be clear - a retreat into mental illness (not so far removed from
devil-possession). But there exist women who do not have the 'decency' to
accommodate their biology in this way and for them a more punitive
discourse must be invoked - a discourse which is in some way related to
sexual activity and its abuse (Edwards, 1981).
The dilemma posed by the contradictory unspoken belief that 'the
normal woman is not normal' is exemplified by the work of Katharina Dalton
(1964) on the Pre-Menstrual Syndrome, and by her subsequent critics.
She admits that 'this title covers a wide variety of cyclical symptoms,
which regularly occur at the same phase of each menstrual cycle'. She
then goes on to itemise no less than 39 possible symptoms, so varied
that one feels there can be few women unable to Jay claim to at least one
or two regularly preceding their monthly periods. Indeed, Dalton reflects
that the incidence of the premenstrual syndrome may be anything between
25 and 100 per cent, 'depending on definition'. But the syndrome, she
hastens to add, must not be confused with premenstrual discomfort:
'A mild degree of premenstrual discomfort is not
necessarily undesirable and gives the woman a
useful reminder to provide herself with protection.
One woman was relieved of her premenstrual headache,
but instead of welcoming the relief, complained that
she had begun menstruation when unprepared' (my
emphasis).
(Dalton, 1964: 39)
And this is where the unacknowledged, but all-pervading ideology of
the book emerges. Ostensibly, the premenstrual syndrome is about the
physiological changes that occur each month in the female body, the
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possible effects these may have on mood and the possible alleviation of
these effects by drug-therapy. So far so good - a morally neutral,
clinical exploration of a previously neglected area of medicine. Though
why, one might ask, has the area been neglected? Arguably, it is
because the premenstrual syndrome is about 'protection' - and protection
is not merely about buying sanitary towels but about protecting the
woman from herself. When talking about the relationship between men-
struation and crime, Dalton later refers to a study of a women's prison
where:
'....a number of women are given the precautionary
privilege of requesting to be locked in their
rooms each month during the days of premenstrual
tension, when their mental instability is most
dangerous and acute....The appreciation by
women prisoners of a time when their behaviour
will lead to trouble has no parallel in male
prisoners' (my emphasis).
(Dalton, 1964, 82)
An almost direct comparison can be made with studies of pre-industrial
and non-western tribespeople where women are expected to go out into the
bush during menstruation.
The need of a woman to be protected from herself underlies the
sporadic popularity of the use of 'P.M.S.' in mitigation in criminal
cases, and, on the surface, it is an excusing condition that one would
expect to appeal to the male sense of chivalry. But, as we have seen
earlier, it does not and the attitudes of both the medical profession
and the judiciary to it are ambiguous (Edwards, 1982; Luckhaus, 1985).
Critics of Dalton point to studies where placebos work as effectively as
progesterone and talk of 'a trained incapacity' rather than any genuine
illness. Where there is evidence that progesterone has made an
aggressive defendant 'sane and benign' then 'P.M.S.' may be regarded
with favour, but where there is a suspicion that a woman is seeking to
protect herself, not from herself, but from the due process of law, she
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may experience a less chivalrous attitude:
The relationship between menstruation (and indeed gynaecology as a
whole) and the psychological/emotional state of a woman's mind is not
just one-way, (Oakley, 1972: 45) and it is the two-way nature of the
relationship which is most threatening to men. It is perhaps no
coincidence that the almost total control which the Pill (in theory at
least) has given women over their own pregnancies appears to correspond
with an increasing reluctance on the part of the medical profession and
the judiciary to allow pregnancy or child-birth as an excusing condition
in criminal cases. Proposals for the abolition of the offence of
Infanticide (Butler, 1975: 249) are based on the apparently enlightened
view that the medical theory that childbirth causes a hormonal disorder
that may lead to mental illness is outdated. Instead, the social factors
surrounding child killing are stressed and it is noted that these may
affect the father as much as the mother! Whether this might lead to a
more punitive attitude towards a mother killing her baby remains to be
seen, but the benefits to women of a formal equality before the law
which continues to ignore substantive material inequalities are by no
means self-evident (O'Donovan, 1984).
The menopausal woman within English society occupies a 'negatively
marked category' (Ardener, 1978). Identified throughout her life solely
through the care of husband, children and perhaps ageing parents, freedom
from these duties and responsibilities brings no sense of joy but 'a
humiliating process of gradual, sexual disqualification' (Sontag, 1978,
quoted in Phillipson, 1981) and the exacerbation of conditions of
powerlessness and social exclusion (Phillipson, 1981). Yet the only way
in which this all-pervading experience can be represented as an excusing
condition in respect of anti-social behaviour is by its reduction to a
quantifiable unity - clinical depression. As a psychiatrist explained
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to me, 'the inhibitory function of the brain (which prevents us from
expressing directly our innate, primitive and of anti-social drives) can
be lost as a direct: result of the clinical depressinn sometimes associated
with the menopause'. II is perhaps not surprising that some women find
this definition somewhat inadequate to describe the complexity of
contradictory feelings that threaten to overwhelm them. Yet if they do
not accept the expert's definition of their experience (more of which
under 'Psychiatric Discourse' below) they are likely to be classed as
malingerers - as 'silly, self-indulgent and superstitious' (Ehrenreich
and English, 1973
So the 'normal' woman is controlled by the 'normal abnormalities' of
her life cycle, institutionalised as they are in 'normal' domestic life.
This makes her sexually available to only one man throughout her life,
who tolerates her times of unavailability providing, in return, he can
define her perception of them and instill a process of guilt and
compensation in her. Where such a system breaks down, the introduction
of an expert usually male is permissible to provide different
definitions, but at no time must the Woman seek to define herself and
draw up her own space.
It has been argued that the assumed 'normal' woman in fact tends to
be white and wealthy (Klein, 1976), and this adds another dimension to
the complexity of the gynaecological discourse. Female biology as a
disease, like the ideology of the family, has its root in the Victorian
era. Women were considered to be lower on the evolutionary scale than
men and more and more concerned with reproduction alone (Ehrenreich and
English, 1979). This meant that the more civilised and redefined women
became, the more inherently weak they became. So middle and upper class
women were considered the most sickly and in need 	 constant rest and
medical care. Poor and working class women were deemed inherently
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stroiiqer (1e;s civtli3ed) and lliis was convenient, since their lifestyle
precluded them from lengthy (and expensive) medical treatment anyway.
Some other explanation had to be found for any abnormalities in their
biology and/or behaviour and that was invariably one of sexual depravity,
for which they themselves were considered totally responsible (Edwards,
1981).
So the appeal to gynaecology as an excusing condition is
characteristically available to the 'normal' (white, wealthy?) woman.
Conversely, (and this may be more relevant to this thesis), if it is
possible to reduce behaviour to biology then this implies an essential
'normality' and is therefore a desirable status to aspire to. The poorer
woman may not have access to such an appeal - by reason of her poverty -
but may, ironically, subsequently be defined as 'abnormally abnormal' -
and therefore responsible!
Psychiatric Discourse
Just as the 'normal' female body is perceived to be physically
abnormal (thus reinforcing the ideological normality of the masculine
body), so the 'normal' woman is often assumed to be mentally unstable,
possessing few of the positive traits associated with being a 'normal
healthy adult' (for which read, 'normal healthy man' - see Broverman
et al., 1970). Official rates of mental morbidity are considerably
higher amongst women than men (see Procek, 1980; Davis et al., 1985;
Allen, 1986 . The traditional explanations for this difference tend to be
similar to the explanations of crime in women - only in reverse. Women
are seen to be inherently more predisposed towards mental instability,
this view stemming from the traditional interpretations of Freud's theory
of 'penis-envy' (though see section on Psychoanalytic Feminist Discourse,
which stresses the importance of Freud's concept of the unconscious in
facilitating the ideology of masculinity and femininity) or, alternatively,
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are assigned social roles which are less satisfactory and more stressful
than men's (Smart, 1976). Whether married women are more inclined
towards mental illness than single, divorced or widowed women is also a
matter for debate and the results seem to have been inconclusive (Cove,
1972; Nathanson, 1975; Dominian, 1984). Of more importance than the
technical marital status of women, or even the number of traumatic life-
events experienced, however, is the meaning of the status and those
experiences to women, their perceptions of themselves in relation to those
experiences, their feeling of being in control (or not) or their low self-
esteem (Brown and Harris, 1978). One of the most important factors
influencing that perception is isolation. Women with no intimate,
confiding relationship with their husband, women with a number of small
children, women whose mothers died when they were young, women without
employment outside the home are all seen to be 'vulnerable' to depression.
The importance of the social worker's role in alleviating loneliness will
be a recurrinq theme in this thesis but, at this stage, ii seems
important to suggest that the alleviation of loneliness was one of the
greatest expectations the women in this study had of psychiatry and the
one in which they seemed most greatly disappointed. The general
adherence of psychiatrists to physico-chemical explanations and treatments
conflicted with the women's intuitive understanding of their illnesses
as 'forms of communication' (.Jordanova, 1981
Those psychiatrists who engage in psychotherapy have been accused
of encouraging women to talk rather than ad (Chesler, 1974) and of
reinforcing the 'deferential dialectic' of marriage (Bell and Newby,
1976) by focussing on the asymmetry of the doctor-patient (male-female,
powerful-subordinate) relationship, whilst ignoring the 'objective facts
of female oppression' (Chesler, 1974: 104). Yet, 'if the personal is a key
site of female oppression....this is also a key site for women's
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struggles' (Procek, 1980: 347).
	
The Women's Movement has had no more
influence on the women who most frequently consult psychiatrists than it
has on those who commit crimes. They are not 'powerful revolutionaries'
(Chesler, 1974: 53) - their behaviour 'represents a socially powerless
individual's attempt to unite body and feeling'. In short, they desire
to 'cope' (Davis et al., 1985; Allen, 1986).
As Jordanova (1981: 99) observes, 'their needs aren't dramatic but
most often relate to long-term dissatisfactions and a sense of hopeless-
ness'. Many never reach specialist psychiatric services, but, through
their GPs' prescription pads, become dependent on the products of a highly
profitable drug industry. But coping, with the help of medication, does
not release the individual from the range of personal and family
responsibilities, because she is not recognized as entering a 'sick role'
(Davis et al., 1985). Ironically, then, whilst women are readily
diagnosed as suffering from psychiatric disorder, their treatment denies
them the status of a sick person.
This is particularly true in relation to the diagnostic category of
'psychopathic or personality disorder' (the latter being taken, in this
thesis, to constitute a milder form of the former), which was used to
describe several of the women in this study. Represented to the court in
the diagnostic language of science, the psychopathically disordered
offender is constructed as the member of a homogeneous group with a fixed
pattern of symptoms. But, unlike other diagnostic categories, which imply
certain causes, the psychopathic disorder is, by definition, often
untreatable. 3 It is an extraordinary situation - 'a masterly stroke of
professional imperialism' (Carlen, 1983) - where professionals can claim
the knowledge to define certain patterns of behaviour clinically, yet,
because there is no apparent medical 'treatment', can then claim that the
'syndrome' does not, after all constitute an 'illness'. This has
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particular implications for women since, as Allen (1986) observes,
psychiatrists often use the label of 'personality disorder' where gender
role deviance is the primary complaint. The label is used, however,
'not as a legitimation for intervention but as a ground for declining to
intervene'. Instead, the person is held responsible for her actions and
deemed to need either social work intervention or a discipline setting.
Yet once in prison, such a person is frequently controlled by drugs (Home
Office, 1983) because, in layman's terms, she is 'mad'. But to argue,
with Gunn et al., (1978) that 'the concept of psychopathic disorder is
used as a dumping zone for a host of problems which do not necessarily
interrelate' is not to accept Szasz's theory (1973) that all madness is
manufactured. It is to argue that the full implications of the use of
psychiatric discourse should be explored and its appropriateness in
particular circumstances, for people in particular conditions of
existence assessed.
Much has been written about the controlling nature of psychiatric
discourse. By locating the source and treatment of problems in the
individual, 8nd effectively closing other levels of intervention, the
labels of health and illness - particularly mental illness - 'are
remarkable "depoliticizers" of an issue' (Zola, 1972). Writers over the
past 25 years who can be broadly grouped into the 'anti-psychiatry'
school, have attempted to contextualise the concept of mental illness
within the family (Laing and Esterson, 1964), the asylum (Goffmann, 1961)
and the criminal justice system (Szasz, 1965). Theorists of the political
left, such as Laing (Pearson, 1975) and Goffrnann have concentrated on
the need to preserve the 'self' in the face of untenable social
circumstances; those of the political right, such as Szasz, argue the non-
existence of the 'mind' and a reduction of all behaviour to voluntary
conduct or physical disorder (Hirst and Woolley, 1982), the latter being
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clearly amenable to scientific intervention, the former - where it is
socially unacceptable - being controlled by explicitly judicial methods.
There is a danger in attempting to identify 'anti-psychiatry' as a
unitary programme. Attacks on traditional psychiatry emanate from
differing medical, moral and political interests and it has been argued
that a distinction needs to be drawn between those writers such as Laing
and Cooper who argue that the theories and practice of psychiatry 'stifle,
block and distort the expression of a fully human consciousness'
(Pearson, 1975: 19) and, in particular, Szasz who argues that the whole
concept of mental illness is a myth which disguises the moral and
political character of 'problems in living' (1973: 23).
The problem with Laing is that he posits, as does psychiatry, an
individual confronting society. Whilst psychiatry locates the problems
of society in the individual, Laing hypothesizes an 'essential'
personality which can be fundamentally disconnected from the practices
and institutions within which it exists. By arguing in this way, he
ignores 'the substantial number of disorientated, depressed, suicidal or
irresponsibly dangerous persons who need more than tea and sympathy'
(Hirst and Woolley, 1982).
The arguments of anti-psychiatry (together with the liberal
principles of the Mental Health Act 1959) may therefore have had unintended
consequences for the treatment of mentally abnormal offenders. By under-
mining the faith that courts may have had in mental hospitals as alter-
natives to imprisonment, it can be argued that more people have been
forced into the prison system - a move which Szasz would no doubt
welcome. The faith which courts have had in mental hospitals has never
been a wholly naive preference for treatment over punishment. The desire
to control behaviour and achieve conformity has always been implicit in
decisions to hospitalise, (Rothman, 1971; Scull, 1983). The importance
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of the asylum as a space over which the doctor - as a wise man, rather
than a scientist - can exercise total control (Foucault, 1965) is an
essential piece of understanding when examining its use by courts as an
alternative to imprisonment.
The traditions of the 'anti-psychiatry' schools and the historical!
archaeological approach of Foucault have attempted to make 'madness' a
relative concept, whose diagnostic categories and treatment consequences
differ in meaning according to the specific conditions of time and place
in which they are located. Interest in the 'identified patient' has been
displaced by a concern to examine the environment of illness - the
institutions within which illness is constructed. Relatively little
attention has been paid, however, 'to home and work environments where
similar questions about the social construction of pathology could be
asked' (Jordanova, 1981: 101). This thesis argues that psychiatric
discourse allows women who break the law an extremely restricted space in
which to struggle for either their sanity or their insanity.
The women with whom this thesis is concerned are not those who, by
bizarre and dangerous behaviour, challenge the whole fabric of society.
They are those who suffer what Brown and Harris call 'the duller realities
of affective disorder' (1978: 42) - and mild personality disorders. But
whilst they argue that 'empirically, few people would confuse depressive
symptoms with social rule-breaking', this can be disputed. The 'mad'
acts of bizarre and dangerous behaviour are nowadays less likely to be
seen as mental illness than as acts of pure wickedness. The implication
of a reduction of moral responsibility means that only those women who
are seen as basically powerless, safely gender-socialised and whose
behaviour is perceived as of little social significance, can be allowed
the redefinition of their behaviour as 'disordered' - and only then if
they appear likely to be able to carry on 'coping' with the assistance of
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medication. In other words, psychiatric discourse accepts responsibility
only for those female lawbreakers who can be constructed as 'dull and
insignificant, but potentially coping'.
Psychoanalytic Discourse
In attempts to regulate the behaviour of both parents and children,
Freud's theories have been invoked by the political left, right and
centre (Adams, 1983). On the one hand, he has been accused of 'ahistorical
phallocentrism' - of ideologically reinforcing the oppression of women
'by describing the characteristics of femininity in terms of the
immutable structures of the psyche' (Burniston, Mort and Weedon, 1978:
118) and on the other heralded as giving us 'the beginning of an
explanation of the inferiorized and 'lternative" (second sex) psychology
of women under patriarchy' (Mitchell, 1974: 402). The discovery of
the unconscious and its influence on the construction and organisation
of sexuality has been used both to prescribe and proscribe and sociali-
sation of women as wives and mothers. It has been the unavoidable Other
to which all post-Freudian theorists of essential and non-essential
womanhood have had to address themselves.
Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to explore the significance
to women of psychoanalysis was made by Mitchell (1974). Her thesis that,
if properly understood, Freud has more to offer feminism than do his
critics, has revived interest in psychoanalysis, particularly by feminist
counsellors (Eichenbaum and Orbach, 1982), who see an understanding of
women's material existence as mediated by their unconscious mental life
to be vital to their personal (and hence political) struggle with the
'great antithesis between the sexes' (Mitchell, 1974: 50). Mitchell
argues that Freud is analytical not prescriptive and that his significance
lies in his identification of the myth which facilitates the ideology of
masculinity and femininity.
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'To Freud society demands of the psychological
bisexuality of both sexes that one sex attain a
preponderance of femininity, the other of
masculinity: man and woman are made in culture.'
(1984:	 131)
Of particular significance in this process is the recognition of
castration - the recognition by women that they are lacking, that they
are 'other', that they are 'different from normal people (who are men)'
(Orbach, 1978: 24). Following this recognition, a woman can choose
from three possible reactions (Mitchell, 1974: 96): she can fear her
own sexuality and become inhibited and neurotic; she can refuse to
abandon her sexuality (as represented by the clitoris) and remain in a
pre-Oedipal 'masculine' phase; she can exploit the passive aims of her
sexual drive, transferring her affection from mother to father and
desiring the phallus, thus 'successfully' resolving the oedipal complex
and becoming a 'normal' woman. Through this latter course, the woman
embarks on an exchange relationship with the phallus, reproducing within
the personal the economic relations of production which underpin
capitalist society. Thus, the personal is political.
But if Mitchell re-awakened an awareness of the importance of
psychoanalysis for understanding female psychology, she has been
criticised for implying that femininity is essential and immutable and
that the best that can be hoped for is a celebration of femininity - a
glorification of oppressed characteristics (Sayers, 1982).
The debate which has followed Mitchell's re-reading of Freud has had
a number of interweaving strands. It has been about the correctness or
otherwise of giving primacy to personal consciousness over economic
reality (Sayers, 1982); about whether desires and needs are constructed
within capitalist relations or distorted by them (Coward, Lipshitz and
Cowie, 1976); about the comparative importance of pre-Oedipal mother and
Oedipal transformation/resolution of object relations (Chodorow, 1978);
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about the rejection of a biological base to the unconscious in favour of
its construction in the acquisition of language (Lacan, 1977). In short,
1€ has been about two things: 'the concept of physical reality and the
nature of the relation between the psychic and the social' (Adams, 1983:
43).
Central to this debate is the conflict between the reality and the
representation of loss - what Adams calls the 'lack-in-being' (1983: 48).
The obligation on the mother is, at one and the same time, to provide the
objects that satisfy her child and to disillusion the child about the
guaranteed predictability of such provision. Coming to terms with the
unpredictability and uncontrollability of drive satisfaction is the
essence of the Oedipal stage of development, but whilst the little boy
can compensate for the loss of the mother by gaining identification with
the father, (the phallus, the definer), the little girl is left to
identify with the failed provider, the forever lacking mother, the Other,
the defined.
Miller asserts (1976: 132) that 'the big secret that psychoanalysis
found....is the secret of conflict itself'. For the little boy, the
discovery of conflict is the entrance to power; for the little girl it is
the portent of powerlessness. The underlying thesis of psychoanalysis is
that little girls must be transformed if they are to develop into 'normal'
women. They have to come to believe that their own desires and needs are
not their own but someone else's and that they can only be satisfied
through serving the needs of others. In this way, women allow themselves
to become the 'carriers' for society of certain unresolved aspects of
the total human experience - they allow men to off-load unresolved
conflicts about their own sexuality' (1976: 23).
But women also 'know' that sexuality is not only about service and
fulfilling the needs of others. Men may depend on the service of women
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but they do not usually love them for that reason (or for that reason
alone). Service may be essential but it is unattractive, so women must
serve whilst giving the impression of not serving. Intrinsic to the role
of normal womanhood is the concept of 'appearance'. 'Appearance' is an
ambiguous word, for it means both 'what is seen' and 'what is not real'.
It implies both visibility and pretence. Women are constantly exhorted
to attend to their appearance - both physically and emotionally.
'Looking good' is of paramount importance (Coward, 1984). But the hidden
messages in this exhortation are that the normal woman looks good even
if she doesn't feel good (pretence for the benefit of others) and that
she will feel good if she looks good (pretence for the benefit of self).
The pre-occupation of so many women with their body shape and size
reflects precisely this conflict betwe?n the felt reality of a woman's
existence and her desire to present herself in an acceptable, conforming
and attractive way to the world (Orbach, 1978).
Women, then, are always already NOT MEN and the experience of being
female is that of being not male. Femininity is constructed on the site
vacated by masculinity and this absence of maleness is manifested in two
opposing sets of expectations, revolving around the socially ambiguous
status of dependence (Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1984). On the one hand,
femininity is characterised by self-control and independence. Being a
normal woman means coping, caring, nurturing and sacrificing self-interest
to the needs of others. It also means being intuitively sensitive to
those needs without them being actively spelled out. It means being
MORE THAN MAN, in order to embrace and support Man. On the other hand,
femininity is characterised by lack of control and dependence. Being a normal
woman means needing protection (Hutter and Williams, 1981). It means being
child-like, incapable, fragile and capricious. It means being LESS THAN
MAN in order to serve and defer to Man.
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Feminist rehabilitation of Freud has highlighted the importance of
sexuality in human development and has led to a 'psychotherapeutic
practice organised constitutively around questions of gender' (Allen,
1986). It has, therefore, provided the leverage for examining the
association between being a woman and feeling inferior or abnormal in
our society. Nevertheless, it has been argued (Allen, 1986) that
feminist therapy 'attracts' a clientele very similar to that attracted
by traditional psychoanalysis - articulate, moderately wealthy women
whose disorders are unlikely to be either so debilitating or so
dangerous as to require hospitalisation or imprisonment. To many other
women (including those in this study) - 'the "insightless", the
impoverished, the dangerous and the inarticulate - feminist therapy has
little or nothing to say' (Allen, 1986). In the context of the very real
economic and educational deprivation with which many female lawbreakers
contend, it may be materially counter-productive to exhort them to cease
to serve and to reclaim conflict. Such exhortation, in the absence of
appropriate material (not just emotional) support is more likely to lead
to their construction within judicial and penal discacitse as bethq iii
'need' of a discipline setting!
Social Work Discourse
If the doctor can be described as the 'labeller, certifier,
legitimator' then this makes him a very powerful person and, it has been
argued, 'social workers are not in this league' (Huntington, 1981: 107).
Huntington explores the conflict between the two professions of social
work and general medical practice and argues that social workers are
relatively powerless. They are seen to be the hand-maidens of medicine,
engaging in maternalistic relationships with clients to complement the
paternalistic relationships of doctors (1981: 137), despite the fact
that they themselves believe they are a profession in their own right,
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adopting a different approach to the problems presented by their clients!
patients. It is, however, the nature of that alleged difference, as
highlighted by Huntington, which is of present interest. When faced with
problems of 'psycho-social distress....depression and anxiety', it is the
doctors who 'appeared to feel bound' to eradicate the psychic pain
accompanying these conditions, frequently by prescribing drugs. It is
the social worker who argues that the presence of such pain 'would
motivate the patient to look at his problem more deeply, to work on it
and resolve it' (1981: 59). It is the doctor who appears to respond in
a technical fashion to problems 'as presented'; it is the social worker
who adopts the approach more traditionally associated with psychiatry
and psychoanalysis.
Traditional Social Work
Individual social workers may indeed feel themselves in conflict
with, and powerless in relation to, doctors for reasons of sex, age, life
experience and role expectations (Huntington 1981) but social work
discourse is, by contrast, very powerful precisely because it is overseen
by psychiatric discourse, reinforced by diffuse legal powers, (Donzelot,
1979 , and has served the political progranines of both left and right
wing governments (Cough, 1979). The traditional social work method of
casework appropriates psychoanalytic theories and individualises social
problems. People are poor and underprivileged because they are personally
inadequate and the victims of defective upbringings. Although there has
been, post-Seebohm, a move away from psychoanalytic casework, 'notions of
individual or family pathology as the root of social problems remain
influential in contemporary social work' (Langan, 1985: 31). Mainstream
social work educators present the social work profession as comprising:
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'society's response to a variety of problems
posed by marginal individuals of many different
kinds....society maintaining itself in a
relatively stable state by making provision for
and managing people in positions of severe weak-
ness, stress or vulnerability....(and by) its
emphasis on the idea of respect for the client,
optimism for the future, and faith in the
essential, or a least potential, unity of society.'
(Davies, 1981: 3-4 - emphases added)
This is not to deny that conflicts of interest may exist between the
individual and the state, but the role of the social worker is seen as
essentially one of reconciliation and, although it may frequently, in
practice, fall short of its ideals, 'the profession of social work is
living testimony to a political commitment to safeguard and further the
welfare of all citizens' (Davies, 1981: 209).
This generalised commitment to 'humanist endeavour', the 'caring
community' and 'the absolute right of every man, woman and child to
independence and growth' (Davies, 1981: 213) finds more specific
expression in 'the maintenance of family life in the face of disinte-
grating or atomizing influences that may naturally tend to undermine,
loosen or at least change it' (Wilson, 1980). It has been argued that
social work buttresses the nuclear family, but not in such a way as to
render it autonomous and impervious to influence by the state (Donzelot,
1979). Rather, the family is to be seen as an agency of 'supervised
reproduction', supported by means of 'contract and tutelage'. The means
of achieving this objective vary with the class of family. The offer to
the middle-class family is that of a contract, an alliance between the
doctor and the mother. By promoting the mother and educator and medical
auxiliary, the state secures its influence over the family and the mother
increases her power within the domestic sphere. But for 'unstructured',
'rejecting' or 'deficient' families the objective must be achieved by a
different means. The key site of intervention remains the woman as
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mother, but it is now she herself who requires education and supervision -
not directly, but through the medium of social work, with its emphasis
on the 'needs' of her children and, consequently, on child psychiatry.
The latter fills 'the space hollowed out by the search for a convergence
between the prophylactic cravings of psychiatrists and the disciplinary
requirements of the social apparatuses' (1979: 131). The psychiatrist
is no longer content to treat illness but now wishes to promote health
and has found a way to do this, 'without getting his hands dirty' (1979:
168).
Donzelot deliberately rejects what has become the standard Marxist
analysis of the family under the capitalist Welfare State (Zaretsky,
1976; Wilson, 1977) but the result is that he neglects the oppression of
women within the family. He sees 'contract and tutelage' as designed to
enhance the position of women as mothers - albeit with ulterior motives -
and he sees women as 'collaborators with the enemy', responsible for
'the demise of the patriarchal family in all its glory (Barrett and
McIntosh, 1982). Other writers (Wilson, 1977; 1980 and Mayo, 1977;
Dominelli & McLeod, 1982; Hale, 1983; Langan, 1985; Hudson, 1985) have
demonstrated the coercive influence of social work on women and the
readily disapproving attitudes of social workers towards women who
transgress the norms of wifeliness and motherhood. Mothers produce and
socialise the next generation of workers and mothers are the guardians
of morality in society. Motherhood is therefore promoted as a vocation,
as a worthy career in itself (Calvert, 1985). But approbated motherhood
is a) dependent motherhood within the structure of the nuclear family
and b) responsible co-operative motherhood within the structure of the
Welfare State. The normal mother is both economically and emotionally
dependent on the father of her child and it is considered essential to
that child's welfare to have two parents in situ in the family home
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(Barrett and McIntosh, 1982). 'A mother without a male for support is
seen as a social problem' (Calvert, 1985). It is therefore unacceptable
for a mother to be only coping, nurturing and in control for she may
thus render Man redundant. Motherhood must also be represented as a
time of vulnerability and a time when the normal woman needs protection.
Such representations of motherhood are based on psychological theories of
child development and the 'maternal instinct'. Post-Bowiby doctors and
social workers promote the nuclear family on the grounds that it
satisfies both the needs of the child and the need of women to find
self-fulfilment. Women, it is argued, 'need to be needed'.
But, motherhood alone is not allowed to exhaust the normal woman's
domestic role. If unsupported motherhood is problematic, so too is
single-minded motherhood, for the normal woman is not only a mother but
also a wife. The ideology of wifeliness involves additional, conflicting
expectations of coping yet not coping. Being a good wife means main-
taining a clean, tidy, welcoming home, yet giving the impression of
doing so with a minimum of effort, which leaves sufficient energy and
motivation to be attractive, attentive and seductive. The home may be
one of the few places offering a genuine outlet for women's creativity
but that creativity is submitted to a visual ideal whose main statement
is the absence of the work they do, and absence of conflict about that
work' (Coward, 1984). Evidence of labour, conflict or mess is interpreted
as evidence of failure, rather than as a true reflection of the reality
of women's domestic lives.
This discourse of domesticity is legitimised by a 'knowledge' of
child psychiatry and role psychology which is articulated at a number of
levels. Privileged (predominantly male) professionals are empowered to
circumscribe the behaviour of women through alliance or tutelage. Their
power, however, is frequently delegated to (predominantly female) semi-
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professionals (e.g. nurses and social workers) who mediate between them
and the women who enter the roles of patient or client. These are the
'wise women' (Heidensohn, 1985) who, in addition to translating 'expert
knowledge' into 'common sense' for the consumption of the always-already
failing woman, also provide an authoritative role model of normal woman-
hood (Hutter and Williams, 1981).
Huntington talks of the deferential relationship between the
(normally female) social worker and the (normally male) doctor; Donzelot
talks of the contract alliance between the 'good' mother and the doctor,
and the tutelary relationship between the social worker (sex unspecified)
and the 'bad' mother. Hutter and Williams (1981) talk about 'women
controlling women'. Social work has always been related to female roles
within the family Walton, 1975); it is about 'doing womanly things'
(Wilson, 1972) - nursing, comforting, caring, nurturing and educating.
The female social worker is a 'good mother' - she looks after those in
need. But the ideal of personal service is underlain by the concepts of
'modelling' and 'dicipline'. The female social worker is presented to
her female client both as an 'imitable model of normal femininity' and
as acting with 'a firm but caring maternal discipline' (Hutter and
Williams, 1981: 30 . The female client who challenges the state's
definition of her and attempts to take control of her own life 'is
labelled "anti-authoritarian", "aggressive", "problem mother" or "castra-
ting"' (Wilson, 1977: 41).
Radical Social Work
Radical social work writing (e.g. Simpkin, 1979; Bailey and Brake,
1976; 1980; Bailey and Lee, 1982) has emphasized the political nature of
social problems but has not achieved any great shift in the focus of
social work discourse because, 'at the immediate level it is not clear
that rehousing will help a depressed housewife....or that a better job
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will slop a man bealinq his wife....behaviour takes on a momentum of its
own' (Wilson, 1980). Some attempts to integrate theory and practice have
been made by Corrigan and Leonard (1978) in generic social work and by
Walker and Beaumont (1985) in the field of Probation practice but the use
of such texts in social work training is not widespread. By and large,
that training still sensitizes social workers (and the term here includes
probation officers) to see problems in individual terms, and it is not,
therefore, surprising that most social workers concentrate on the sphere
of the personal.
langan (1985) observes that whilst 'most social work clients and
most social workers are women, the theory and practice of social work
reflect little appreciation of the important questions of women's
oppression'. Until recently, this has been as true of radical social
work as of traditional social work.
Nevertheless, the call from feminist writers on social work for the
development of a discourse which will link the personal and the political
and which will stress the ambiguity of the family (Wilson, 1980) is
beginning to be answered. The twin planks of this feminist analysis of
social work are, firstly, a 'need to question thoroughly how women's
needs and problems are defined and responded to both by.. ..individual
workers and by social work organisations generally' and, secondly, a
'need to examine both the criteria for the allocation of social work
resources and the implications for women of such criteria' (Hudson, 1985:
649). One of the surfaces through which such an analysis emerges is the
mechanism of 'consciousness raising' (Longres and McLeod, 1980), which
'has developed as a method of helping women to reflect upon their
experiences as women and to name previously private experiences....(It)
can also offer women an unpatronising opportunity to feel cared for and
supported' (Hudson, 1985). Consciousness raising has also led female
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social workers into an awareness of their own oppression within agencies
and the contradictory effects on them as workers of an ideology which
sets them up as role models and controllers of female clients.
The extent to which a feminist analysis of social work does, or can,
directly inform social work practice and its organisation within
statutory agencies is now emerging as a political issue alongside (though
somewhat behind) concerns about racism in social work. The contradictory
effects of the discourse are apparent at a number of levels. The
vocabulary of 'consciousness raising' is felt by some practitioners to
be alien to many of their female clients. At least one has preferred to
substitute the term 'confidence raising', defining it as 'encouraging
female offenders to become less passive and apologetic' (Whitlock, 1983).
Other feminist social workers have found that this ideology of working
in a non-oppressive way with women itself raises fundamental conflicts
for social work practice. In a graphic and moving account of her own
journey towards 'Becoming a feminist social worker', Sue Wise (1986)
observes that 'much feminist analysis of social problems was of little
use in helping me to analyse and guide my practice'. Its simplistic view
of women's oppression had 'little to say about women and men who fall
outside the usual gender stereotypes'. It did not equip her, for example,
to deal with the fact that women, as well as men, abuse children, that
some mothers do collude with sexual abuse and that some women's refuges
are so violent and dirty that some women are driven back to violent men
by their experiences of them. Her endeavour to reconcile her feminism
with her social work led her to conclude that the proper function of
social work (and one which is compatible with feminist concerns about
powerlessness) is:
'the policing of minimum standards of care for, and
protection of the rights of, the most vulnerable
members of our society - some of whom are women,
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but most of whom are not.'
(Wise, 1986: 2)
The consequence of these contradictions for the women in this study,
is that, whilst they may openly be held responsible by traditional social
work for the problems of their families, they are also precisely the
women who are unlikely to be the recipients of the 'confidence raising'
methods of radical social work because, despite their own powerlessness
and vulnerability, they are viewed as the perpetrators of harm to
members of society who are even more vulnerable - namely, children.
They are the women who appear to act with sufficient agency to exclude
themselves from the category of the 'genuinely' powerless and victimised.
Conclusion
This literature review has illustrated the ways in which various
distinct, yet interweaving discourses have attempted to lay claim to
knowledge about troublesome women. Each discourse is characterised by
(a) its setting - both historical and physica];(b) its code - its
language, form and style of documentation and (c) its non-discursive
practices (see Donzelot), and each has sought to locate the 'not quite
normal' woman within its own theoretical site. Yet we are left with the
feeling that this woman has not been adequately described. She is
criminal, yet not criminal, feminine yet not feminine, sane yet not sane,
motherly yet not motherly. She is at the same time corrigible, yet
incorrigible, definable yet indefinable. The discourses seek to converge
but there remains an unappropriated space. The search for the
essentially normal woman - the unspoken Desire of these discourses - has
failed. The indescribable remains - a 'mere black hole in someone else's
universe' (Ardener, 1975). Yet the parameters of that hole have the
effect of caging-in and every discourse constitutes a bar to that cage
which confines and renders these women muted:
Discourse
Criminological
Judicial
Penal
Gynaecological
Psychiatric
Traditional Psychoanalytic
Radical Feminist Therapy
Traditional Social Work
Radical Social Work
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Attempts but fails to describe the not-
quite-normal woman as:
Born, socialised or victimised into
lawbreaking.
Excused by reason of domesticity,
sexuality or pathology.
Needing to be disciplined, medicalised
and feminised.
Normally abnormal and not responsible
or abnormally abnormal and therefore
responsible.
Dull and insignificant but potentially
coping.
Inferior and needing to serve.
Needing to reclaim conflict.
Problem mother in need of tutelage.
Powerless, victimised and in need of
consciousness raising.
It is by the concomitant recognition and denial of those parameters that
this thesis aims to interrogate the space between the lived experiences
of those female lawbreakers who defy description - the nondescript
women - and the attempts (and failures) by privileged discourses to fore-
close on those experiences.
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CHAPTER THREE
NOT MAD ENOUGH, NOT BAD ENOUGH: FIFTEEN FEMALE LAWBREAKERS
AND THEIR DISCURSIVELY CIRCUMSCRIBED STRUGGLE
TO DEFY DESCRIPTION
Introduction
Chapter One of this thesis set out the theoretical framework
within which the process of knowing (Foucault, 1972) about female law-
breakers is being located. That framework is one which facilitates the
analysis of both existing and new knowledge in terms not only of its
content and internal coherence but of its authorship, its audience and
its material conditions of existence (Burton and Carlen, 1979).
Chapter Two, deconstructed existing knowledge of female lawbreakers
by isolating a number of interweaving discourses which at times reinforce
and at times contradict each other. Integral to the analysis of each
discourse, it was claimed, is its authority, by which is meant the
power of, or status ascribed to, those who speak it. Authors whose
status is privileged, those who are powerful speakers or definers are
termed 'agents of signification'. That is, they construct, through their
definitions of reality, the field of social relations in which others
(in this case, female lawbreakers) move. Taken together, these inter-
weaving discourses form a 'chain of signification' which circumscribes
the struggle of such women to defy description.
In this chapter, and those which follow (Chapters Three to Seven)
the theoretical framework set out in Chapter One is used to construct
readings of the empirical data obtained from interviews with female law-
breakers, magistrates, solicitors, psychiatrists and probation officers.
This chapter begins to examine the process whereby female lawbreakers
are (or are not) constructed as 'criminal women'. This is done in two
ways. Firstly, it is demonstrated that the discourses outlined in
Chapter Two over-determine the pedagogic and pathologising dimensions of
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the routine descriptions of female lawbreakers. Secondly, the accounts
of their lawbreaking activity given by fifteen women and their probation
officers are deconstructed. It is argued that the female lawbreaker is
routinely offered the opportunity to neutralise the effects of her
lawbreaking activity by implicitly entering into a contract whereby she
permits her life to be described or re-presented primarily in terms of
its domestic, sexual and pathological dimensions. The effect of this
'gender contract' is to strip her lawbreaking of its social, economic
and ideological dimensions in order to minimise its punitive consequences.
Many female lawbreakers accept this deal; some reject it outrightly
(Carlen et al., 1985).
There exists, however, a group of female lawbreakers who create
particular problems for the criminal justice system because they neither
accept nor reject the 'gender contract'. They are the women who are
constantly on the margins of categories - never sufficiently this or
that - and seeming to defy description. They never appear to be 'dealt
with' to the system's satisfaction. Despite (or because of) everyone's
best endeavours, they remain 'nondescript' - out of reach and untouchable.
The ground on which their relationships are built appears to be shifted
constantly within the contradictory discourses of the definers and they
seem to frustrate all offers of 'help' and structure. They are women
who tend not to assert themselves or to challenge openly, but who use a
variety of subterfuges to sabotage attempts to observe, assess, classify
and change them. Their responses to such attempts are akin to those of
Victoire, the mother of the 19th century French triple murderer,
Pierre Riviere (Foucault, 1975: 181) who
'felt that any contract remained a trick, an
institutionalized assault - as if in a frozen
arrested, perpetual combat. She set herself up
as the everlasting cancellor of contracts,
perpetually put them in doubt, and shifted their
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signs by setting them moving again - which is
tantamount to repudiation and challenge.'
It may be argued by some that there exists a similar group of
male lawbreakers who are persistently resistant to influence. They do
not, however, defy description in the same way. On the contrary, the
mushrooming provision within the criminal justice system (since the
introduction of Community Service in 1972) of 'alternatives to custody'
has been based on an acknowledgment of the challenge presented by
'persistent petty' male lawbreakers. Similarly, current models of
juvenile justice (Rutherford, 1986) emphasize the 'normality' of
adolescent male delinquency and the legitimation of minimal intervention
by potentially stigmatising 'helping' agencies. And, if all else fails,
our soaring prison population testifies to the acceptability of dismissing
persistent male lawbreakers as 'unmotivated, incorrigible rogues'. The
nondescript female lawbreaker presents a greater moral dilemma, since
her ideological (if not her material) positioning at the centre of the
family requires that greater efforts be made to rehabilitate her within
the dominant discourses of femininity, in particular the discourses of
domesticity, sexuality and pathology, which are detailed below.
There are several reasons why the women on whom this study is based
are not, and cannot be, presented here as 'typical' criminal women.
Firstly, since they are unclassifiable, they are, by definition,
'untypical' and secondly, as Carlen (1985: 10) argues, 'there can be
no such thing as the "typical" criminal woman'. Thirdly, they may not,
in practice, represent the majority of women on Probation caseloads.
Nonetheless, it is argued here that the search for 'nondescriptiveness' -
the desire to evade the consequences of being seen as a stereotypical
WOMAN - is a crucial (and hitherto neglected) element in the activity
and behaviour of many female lawbreakers. It is the hypothesis of this
study that exploiting the material and ideological conditions that are
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preconditional to nondescriptiveness is one of the ways in which female
lawbreakers - and, indeed, all women - say 'no' to the oppressive nature
of stereotypical descriptions and prescriptions. It is to be hoped that
by exploring the material and ideological conditions which determine both
these prescriptive descriptions and the restricted range of responses
available to women a fuller understanding of women's lawbreaking and
its relationship to class and gender discrimination in society will be
achieved. It is argued (see Introduction) that:
1. Nondescript women are subject to multiple discursive
oppression which requires that any investigation of
their experiences be subjugated to typifications of
'normal femininity' articulated by 'experts'.
2. As speakers about their own condition, these women are
disqualified because of their inability and/or refusal to
articulate the paradigms of domesticity, sexuality and
pathology which dominate explanations of their behaviour.
3. Nondescript women are strategically constructed by
judicial, medical and welfare personnel as the programmable
objects of discourse and subjected to technologies which
regulate their minds and bodies through power relations
which are local and immanent. They are effectively
offered a contract which promises to minimise the conse-
quences of their criminality by rehabilitating them within
the dominant discourses of femininity.
4. Resistance to such description tends to be individualistic,
inconsistent and, in some senses, self-destructive but has
the important effect of undermining the authority of
official discourses and keeping open the possibility of the
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creation of new knowledge about them. By
exploiting the contradictions in the material and
ideological conditions that render them nondescript,
these women are able to wrest a limited degree of power
from the dominant groups by whom they are muted.
The Gender Contract
Crime and law enforcement are presently male-dominated worlds and
women who enter them threaten the maintenance of the power relationship
between men and women (Smart, 1976; Edwards, 1984; Heidensohn, 1985;
Adler, 1987). Criminality is assumed to be a masculine attribute and
women criminals are therefore perceived to be either 'not women' or 'not
criminals'. Many women who break the law also have the attributions of
normality which provoke the latter description and thus tacitly enter
into a contract which seeks to minimise the consequences of their
criminality by rehabilitating them within the dominant discourses of
femininity.
Femininity is constructed on the site vacated by masculinity (see
Chapter Two) and the women in this study experienced 'being female' as
being NOT MALE. Those experiences were mediated by their bodies, their
minds and their social interaction. The discourses within which those
experiences were structured were constituted by sets of relationships
which cluster around notions of Domesticity, Sexuality and Pathology.
These pedagogic and pathologising dimensions themselves interrelate and
are not mutually exclusive. As with the images of a kaleidoscope, each
discourse organises its components uniquely but not arbitrarily.
Domesticity
Motherhood is regarded ambivalently in our society and was
experienced as such by the women interviewed. The young mother is a
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valued category (Ardener, 1978) and it is assumed that the normal young
woman is either a mother or a mother-in-the--making. Adolescent girls
are regarded as potential mothers and their behaviour as daughters is
viewed as indicative of their capacity for future home making and child
caring (Hudson, 1983). Becoming a mother is one of the ways in which
the normal woman demonstrates that she is 'more than Man' and that, in
both a literal and metaphorical sense, she encompasses Man. Yet the
ability to reproduce is a characteristic which inspires in men fear as
well as celebration. The myth that 'women are witchlike in being able to
give birth to live beings' (Lipshitz, 1978) remains deeply embedded in
the collective consciousness. The realisation that the internal processes
of the female body are crucial to, yet beyond the control of, men
provokes anxiety and a desire to contain, to limit and to punish. Thus,
if the physiological processes of reproduction cannot be controlled by
men (beyond insemination), the material and ideological conditions under
which women become and remain mothers are tightly structured.
Approbated motherhood is a) dependent motherhood within the
structure of the nuclear family and b) responsible, co-operative mother-
hood within the structure of the Welfare State (see Chapter Two). The
family is seen as an agency of 'supervised reproduction', supported by
means of 'contract and tutelage' (Donzelot, 1979). The means of
achieving this objective vary with the class of family, but the key site
of intervention is always the woman as mother. Donzelot, however, is
less concerned with the oppression of women as mothers than with the
'demise of the patriarchal family in all its glory' (Barrett and
McIntosh, 1982). In this he reflects a wider concern within patriarchal
society 8bout the threat to male authority within the family posed by
the celebration of motherhood. The challenge of omnipotent motherhood
is rebutted in two ways. Firstly, the power of the mother is regarded
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as only temporary. As she ages, the mother is forced to relinquish her
power as she becomes increasingly devalued in the eyes of her family.
The normal middle-aged mother is the 'martyr mother' (Arcana, 1979).
She is the mother who serves but is unappreciated. But the widest
dissemination of the 'Ideal Homes' ideology (Coward, 1984) is through
the influence of women on each other as peers. Such influence is
informed by media images and given voice in the practices of neighbour-
liness. Neighbourliness reinforces domesticity through the opportunities
for friendship, gossip and competition provided by proximate and visible
daily living. It functions at the interstices of the public and private
worlds of women and fashions their self-image through exercises in
comparison which are both other - and self-generated. Neighbourliness
was both a source of comfort and fear for the women in this study.
Sexuality
The discourse of domesticity is premised on a theory of the
functional equivalence of men's productive and women's reproductive
roles in society. In its most enlightened form this is expressed in the
hackneyed phrase, 'equal but different'. It has become axiomatic in
any more radical analysis of women's position in society that the
concepts of sex and gender which are implicitly conflated in this premise
must be separated. Just as men's physique constitutes no pre-ordained
imperative to work, so women's ability to give birth to and feed
children does not of itself imply any instinctive drive to build and
maintain a nest for life. Yet it would be simplistic to argue that
women are confined to domesticity only by external pressures to conform,
however subtly mediated. Such pressures may reinforce, but they do not
create what the normal woman 'knows' about her own femininity.
Post-Freudian attempts to explain the development of gender
consciousness - or sexuality - have struggled with contradictory inter-
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pretations of his writings (see Chapter Two). The discovery of the
unconscious and its influence on the construction and organisation of
sexuality has been used both to prescribe and proscribe the socialisation
of women as wives and mothers. The power of the professional to invoke
a reading of Freud which supports politically conservative theories of
healthy gender role adjustment has been challenged by a feminist reading
which argues that what Freud really did was to identify the myth which
facilitates the ideology of masculinity and femininity.
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the underlying thesis of psycho-
analysis is that the discourse of sexuality is a discourse of conflict.
Through the socially 'successful' resolution of this conflict, the
woman embarks on an exchange relationship with the phallus, reproducing
within the personal the economic relations of production which underpin
capitalist society. Thus the personal is political.
The construction of femininity through the discourse of sexuality
is thus dependent on a gender consciousness that develops from early
childhood through the unconscious mental struggles of the little girl to
make sense of the conflicts and contradictions of the reality of her
physical and emotional world. Such struggles are reinforced by
privileged intermediaries such as teachers, social workers and doctors,
and by those trapped within the same ideologies - mothers, fathers,
family relations and friends.
Pathology
It has been argued here that the ability of women to give birth to
live beings invokes a fundamental fear of the female body and arouses in
men a need to limit and control the environment of personal relationships
within which a woman is allowed to become a mother. It has also been
argued that the ideology of femininity is internalised by women from an
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early age and that the development of gender consciousness is a struggle
which a woman has with herself as much as with other people. In this
relationship with herself, the normal woman becomes aware of the
conflicting expectations of the in-control/out-of-control dichotomy.
This dichotomy is further manifested in a discourse which constructs
female biology as a disease. The description of the normal woman as
'sick' derives from two sources. Firstly, the normal woman's body is
perceived as intrinsically 'abnormal' in that, though capable of more
than a man's body, it is less reliable. Menstruation, pregnancy, child-
birth and the menopause all result in 'hormonal imbalance' - a phrase
which connotes that the woman may herself be 'imbalanced' during those
times. Secondly, women are statistically over-represented amongst those
who use medical facilities; in particular, they appear to suffer
disproportionately from ostensibly gender-neutral mental illnesses. The
normal woman accepts and accommodates the 'naturalness' and inevitability
of the power of her bodily functions to dictate her self-image and
restrict her behaviour. The corollary of this ideology is that women
who suffer gynaecological dysfunctions, or who reject the controlling
influence of the reproductive cycle (e.g. by taking the Pill) require
alternative means of control involving moral judgments about either their
sexual proclivities (the 'promiscuous' woman) or their genuineness (the
'malingering' woman).
This poses in practice a dilemma relating to the eligibility of the
women in this study for inclusion in the medical category 'normal woman'.
The dilemma is exemplified in the ambivalent attitudes of medical and
judicial personnel towards the potentially excusing condition, Pre-
Menstrual Syndrome (Dalton, 1964, 1978), but similar debates surround
the assessment of the significance of post-natal and menopausal depression.
Very different material consequences flow from the differential definition
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of such experiences as either clinical conditions or socially and
culturaUy constructed rites of passage and underpinning these practices
is the need for women to prove themselves 'genuinely' sick.
The assessment of women's eligibility for medical help constitutes
a 'practice of exclusion' from normal femininity. Allen (1986) has
observed that disturbances arising from women's reproductive cycle -
along with those deviations of gender role that have come to be defined
as 'personality disorders' (sexual deviance, violence, rejection of
family relationships) - have been increasingly marginalised by the
medical profession. Since they do not display a 'proper' psychiatric
symptomatology, women so categorised are excluded from 'proper'
psychiatric treatment and are increasingly defined as requiring social
work intervention. Thus certain women (such as those in this study) are
doubly restricted by being constructed within a discourse of sickness
which nevertheless denies them access to the means of health.
Sickness arising from the 'normal abnormalities' of the female body
is perceived invidiously to be a universal quality of womanhood. Women,
however, also appear to be more susceptible than men to those illnesses
of the mind whose aetiology is not directly gender-related. Two
ideologies dominate explanations of this. Conventional psychiatry takes
for granted that women are either inherently more vulnerable than men
to mental illness, or that the ineluctable pressures of their social
existence (an existence which is nonetheless essential for the general
health of society) predispose them to becoming mental casualties.
Feminist critiques of conventional psychiatry argue that such pressures
are created by the patriarchal order and/or that psychiatry itself
controls women through the imposition of gender-biased diagnostic
categories and through mechanisms of treatment which encourage women to
believe that the resolution of their problems lies in the alteration of
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their 'mood' by medication or talking.
The effectivity of the discourse of sickness, unlike that of the
discourses of domesticity and sexuality, emanates from the elasticity
of its parameters. The boundary between normality and abnormality is
constantly blurred. Chronic dependence on minor tranquillisers
prescribed by general practitioners, for example, represents such a
widespread form of 'sickness' amongst women that it has almost ceased to
be regarded assicknessat all. Three factors contribute to this
elasticity. Firstly, health is implicitly defined in relation to
maleness, in the sense that the 'normal' female body is regularly and
predictably abnormal or 'unhealthy'. Secondly, the emphasis in the
ideologies of both femininity and current psychiatric practice on
'coping' (Allen, 1986) predisposes women to define themselves as 'sick'
when they feel they are not coping. Thirdly, the centrality to the
construction of femininity of the dileriina of having to be both 'in-control'
and 'out-of-control' poses a routine problem for the normal woman.
Whilst she may perceive herself to be crossing the boundary between
normality and abnormality many times a day, that journey is itself a
feature of normal femininity. The point at which a woman becomes
'genuinely' sick is therefore never clear. Such confusion serves to
control women's behaviour and may explain the preventive use of medica-
tion by many women who learn to dread the debilitating self-hatred that
results from not knowing whether they are - or should be - in control of
their bodies, their minds and their relationships with other people.
Femininity in our society is constructed within the dimensions of
DOMESTICITY, SEXUALITY and PATHOLOGY. The ideology of normal womanhood
communicates to women that certain features of her social existence are
essential, natural and inevitable. Those features are the centrality of
family relationships, differential social experiences arising from
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biological differences, and the predisposition of the female body and
mind to malfunction. The normal woman is expected to accommodate con-
flicting expectations that she is both in and out of control of her body,
her mind and her relationships. Underpinning these demands on women is
the assumption that authoritative knowledge exists about the respective
functions and needs of men and women, and about the behaviour that is
appropriate to their roles in society. But that knowledge, stemming
from the sciences of gyneecology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry and
psychology, contains contradictions, gaps and discontinuities. Its
presentation as unified, coherent and continuous requires privileged
mediation.
Chapters Four to Seven examine how that 'knowledge' of deviant
women is mediated by magistrates, solicitors, psychiatrists and probation
officers. This chapter seeks to explode the myth of the 'normal woman'
by deconstructing the deviant careers of fifteen women who cannot be
classified neatly as either 'normal' or 'abnormal'. They are women who,
when they break the law, confound the criminal justice system.
Fifteen Women - The Material Circumstances
The ideology of normal womanhood is mediated to women not only by
powerful agents of signification, who claim to have authoritative
knowledge about appropriate feminine behaviour, but also through women's
own material conditions of existence. The essentially normal woman may
not exist, but neither does the universally oppressed woman. Class,
race and age all affect the extent to which women can resist the
ideological discourse of femininity and the relative significance of
these variables is a question of historical, social and economic
specificity, rather than theoretical debate. It has been argued, for
example, that teenage girls find it particularly difficult to fulfil role
expectations because adolescent femininity is constructed within two
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conflic'ting discourses - adolescence, with its emphasis on change,
rebellion and increasing independence, and femininity, which emphasises
passivity, dependency and the permanence of relationships (Hudson, B.,
1984). The experiences of elderly women 'who face the major agony of
seeing a life-long partner sicken and eventually die' are at least in
part dictated by class differences in sickness and mortality amongst men
(Phillipson, 1981) and in financial ability to employ nursing assistance.
Similarly, it is theoretically an unresolvable debate whether black
women are oppressed more by racism, class or gender. Lees (1986)
observes that
'Oppressions based on class, race, religion or
region have in comon their ability to rely upon
and indeed a tendency to strengthen, family and
community as forms of solidarity and resistance
on the part of the oppressed. Sexual oppression,
however, is located within these very
institutions.'
The fifteen women in this study were predominantly working class,
poorly educated and living in conditions of poverty. Most had no income
other than Social Security Supplementary Benefit and most, for various
reasons, were bringing up children on their own. As women on welfare,
they were fairly typical of the 10.7% of families identified by the 1981
General Household Survey as being headed by lone mothers (Family Policy
Studies Centre, 1984). They were also likely to be 'regarded as
deviant (if not criminal) by virtue of their lack of economic and
emotional dependence upon a male' (Cook, 1987). The material position
of such women ensured that they were ill-equipped to resist the
ideological pressures of privileged discourse relating to femininity,
yet they were, ironically, also uniquely ill-equipped to meet its
demands. Consequently, these women found themselves trapped by the
moral judgments of professionals, who were also confined by the
ideological and material conditions of their jobs (see Chapter Two).
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The unspoken Gender Contract offered to these women, based on
assumptions about both willingness and capacity to fulfil mutually
aqreed obligations, was therefore simultaneously binding yet unfulfill-
able.
Fifteen Women - The Official Account8
In the course of interviewing probation officers (see Chapter Seven),
thirteen women were identified to me as 'troublesome' women, who might
nevertheless be prepared to discuss their experiences of the criminal
justice system. Of these thirteen, nine eventually agreed to be inter-
viewed, two refused and two agreed, but failed to keep two pre-arranged
appointments. Of the remaining two women, one responded to my letter
in a local newspaper and one was interviewed during my visit to a
Special Treatment Unit. (Her probation officer was contacted subsequently
and interviewed.)
With the exception of Fiona, all the women in this sample were the
subjects of Probation Service files. Their biographies had been
officially written; they had been assessed and classified, not simply
in terms of their lawbreaking activity, (see Table 1) but in an
endeavour to 'make sense' of the multitude of 'facts' which constituted
their official lives (see Table 2). Certain dimensions featured strongly
in these official accounts, others were notably absent. Domesticity,
sexuality and pathology were prominent; class and race barely, if at all,
mentioned. Again with the exception of Fiona, all the women could be
described as 'working class' and all lived in council-owned accommodation.
Only Fiona and Kathy worked full-time. Pauline and Janet had part-time
jobs but the rest were unemployed. Yet unemployment and poverty were
not features of their official biographies. Racism was totally absent
as an issue. Only one woman (Carol) was black and neither she, nor her
probation officer identified racism as contributing to her situation.1
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Table 3.1: Fifteen Women: Offences and Previous Convictions
Name & Age	 Offence	 Sentence	 No. of	 Nature of
Pre-Cons	 Pre-Cons
Fiona (21)
	
Conspiracy to
	
Fine	 None	 -
cause G.B.H.
Jackie (21)
	
Motoring and	 Probation	 Numerous	 Theft
drink-related	 s.3	 Drink-related
Prostitution
Eileen (29)
	
DHSS fraud	 Probation	 One	 Theft
Pauline (30)
	
Shoplifting	 Probation	 Several	 Shoplifting
DHSS fraud
Janet (36)
	
Deception &	 Probation	 Several	 Shoplifting
Shoplifting
Ann (36)	 Deception,	 Voluntary	 Several	 Burglary
DHSS Fraud &	 After-	 Damage
Theft of	 Care
Electricity
Carol (37)
	
Shoplifting	 Community	 Numerous	 Shoplifting
Service
Gwen (38)
	
Damage	 Probation	 None	 -
s.3
Veronica (40)
	
Shoplifting	 Suspended	 Several	 Shoplifting
Sentence	 Drink-related
Supervision	 Assault
Maureen (46)	 Theft	 Probation	 Numerous	 Theft
Ivy (58)
Kathy (20)
Linda (24)
Shoplifting
Manslaughter
Failed to send
Child to School
Probation	 One
9.3
Probation	 One
9.3
Probation	 Several
Theft
Deception
Theft
Burglary
Assault
Susan (30)
	
Shoplifting	 Probation	 One	 Shoplifting
9.3
Jean (36)
	
Child abduction Voluntary	 Numerous	 Damage
After-	 Assault
Care	 Prostitution
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Lawbreaking/Deviance
Of the 15 women, 13 had at least one previous conviction and 8 had
several. Such statistics immediately rendered these women difficult to
classify, since the 'typical' female lawbreaker is a first offender. In
1984, for example, 33% of the 15,000 women on probation on 31 December
had no previous convictions, compared with 15% of the 38,000 men on
probation (Home Office, 1986b). Recidivism is thus regarded as a
typically masculine quality and one which raises questions about the
'femininity' of the female lawbreaker in the minds of those who deal with
her.
Similarly, although the majority of the offences committed by these
women were 'typical' offences of theft (mainly shoplifting) and fraud
or deception, a number were not. Maureen's offences were seen as
typically feminine:
'Always with Maureen, it's been a case of
deception - fiddling DHSS or shoplifting or some-
thing like this - and usually the offences are
triggered off by family pressures at home. They
get in a mess with their money and budgetting and
housekeeping.'
(Probation Officer 9 on Maureen: Vol. 2, p. 222)2
Linda's offence of failing to send her child to school could be
regarded as role-inappropriate (the equivalent, perhaps, of status
offences amongst adolescent girls). Jean's offence of baby-snatching,
on the other hand, was regarded as highly 'gender-inappropriate', since
'real' women would never do such an aggressive and uncaring thing. Gwen,
Jackie, Fiona and Kathy had also committed 'unfeminine' offences, since
they involved aggressive behaviour which was considered unacceptable in
women. For example,
'It appeared that she upsets the neighbours and
she rants on a bit and she was pretty paranoid and
she'd finished up throwing a couple of bricks
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through her own Council house windows. But
evidently, it had been a series of problems with
the police and they had been almost forced to bring
her in.'
(Probation Officer 2 on Gwen: 160)
None of the women had received their current sentence for offences
related to prostitution, but two had previous convictions for such
offences. Four women had previous convictions for burglary, damage or
assault.
The majority (10) of the women were on probation. Five of that
group had conditions attached to their probation orders that they should
receive medical treatment although, as will be seen later, the inclusion
of such conditions appears to bear little relation to the extent of
'illness' diagnosed. Of the remaining five women, one had had no
involvement with the Probation Service beyond the preparation of a
report for court (Fiona). Three had been on probation in the past but
were currently experiencing different forms of contact with their
probation officers (Ann, Veronica and Jean). One (Janet) was serving
both probation and a Comunity Service Order (imposed at two separate
but chronologically close court appearances). Carol had a history of
contact with the Probation Service but had not actually been on probation
in the preceding ten years. She was currently serving a Community
Service Order.
Domesticity
The ages of the women ranged from 20 to 58 years and only the two
youngest (Kathy and lions) were not mothers. Of the remaining 13, only
three had failed to attract the tutelary gaze (Donzelot, 1979) of the
'psy' agencies in relation to the quality of their mothering. Ivy's
children were already grown up and had left home when she committed her
offence; Pauline and Janet were considered 'good' mothers. Ten of the
93.
mothers, however, either had children currently in the Care of the Local
Authority (Ann, Gwen, Jean), had had children in Care in the past
(Maureen, Carol, Susan) or were under suspicion of being 'bad' mothers
(Eileen, Veronica, Jackie, Linda). Jackie and Linda had both been
threatened directly with the removal of their children unless they
resolved their problems. For Linda,
'the problem does appear to lie with her lack of
organisation of herself and her family, to make sure
that David does attend school on a regular basis'.
(Social Inquiry Report on Linda: 122)
Amongst other things, she was instructed,
'to seek psychiatric and medical help with her
personality disorder in an attempt to organise her
own life and thus provide a secure and stable home
for her children'.
(Case Conference notes: 123)
Jackie's problem was excessive drinking and promiscuity (see below). Her
psychiatric report contained the following comments:
'Failure to cooperate with our treatment which
includes aversion treatment to alcohol followed
by regular Antabuse treatment will constitute a
breach of the terms of probation.. . .She has been
told that unless she does something about the
problem, she will jeopardise the chances of
keeping custody of her daughter.'
(279)
Her probation officer (16) informed me:
'That was put in for the sake of the magistrates
who were clearly thinking of sending her to prison,
and he (the psychiatrist) was very aware of that.
(279)
Here, Jackie's status as mother is simultaneously hailed (to compensate
for her abnormal sexuality) and denied to enable her to be described
within psychiatric discourse as a judicially recognisable subject, in
need of both treatment and punishment. Eileen had been under suspicion
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for a long time:
'We've always had our doubts... .and we had a
conference recently....we were imagining all sorts
of things....we had to look into it. Some of them
could probably be substantiated but they're not
sufficiently bad to warrant serious action....I think
more than anything those kids will suffer more
mentally than physically.'
(Probation Officer 6 on Eileen: 201)
The suspect nature of the women's mothering was exacerbated by their
suspect 'wifeliness'. Only one woman (Janet) could be considered 'normal'
in the sense that she was still living with her first husband, who was
the father of her children, and even her marriage was seen as possibly
contributing to her offences, according to her probation officer:
'One of the things I think we ought to be looking at
fairly closely is Mrs. l's marriage. Sometimes I tell
her off because I don't think we're looking at the
questions behind her depression.'
(Probation Officer 21 on Janet: 71)
Maureen's marriage, though long-standing, was highly unstable. She
had left her husband on numerous occasions. Her psychiatrist was
'more convinced every day that her problem is
basically a marital one. I think that, as a
psychiatrist, I have very little to offer this
lady. Host of her problems ace social ones'.
(Psychiatrist on Maureen: 109)
Three other women (Jean, Ann and Jackie) were currently married to
their first husbands but all three men also had criminal records. Ann
and Jackie's husbands had been to prison for assaulting them; Jean's
husband also abused her when he was drunk. Susan was married for a
second time, apparently to a man who was, according to her probation
officer, 'much more enlightened'. Her first husband, however
'used to beat her and drink a lot, and made all the
decisions and had quite an old-fashioned view of
marriage.'
(Probation Officer 17 on Susan: 285)
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It had been during this marriage that. her child had been taken into Care.
Eileen had been married three times and her present husband was currently
in prison, having been 'shopped' by her. He had threatened to divorce
her and apply for custody of the children but Eileen was planning for a
reconciliation on his release.
Three of the women (Ivy, Veronica and Pauline) were divorced.
Pauline was viewed by her probation officer, as the innocent victim of
an 'inadequate' man who had an affair with another woman whilst working
away in Scotland.
'Then he brought this woman home to meet his wife,
and she was ringing when he came home at weekends -
all this sort of thing she had to cope with. He
really did show how inadequate he was, because he
couldn't make the break but he couldn't decide to
staywith his wife.'
(Probation Officer 5 on Pauline: 184-5)
Ivy, on the other hand, received somewhat less sympathy. Her husband
also left her for another woman, but her own unfaithfulness was seen as
contributing to the break-up of the marriage. Veronica was certainly
not viewed a an innocent victim, since she had a history of assaulting
her husband when she was drunk.
The remaining three mothers (Carol, Linda and Gwen) might well have
been defined as bad wives (or even bad women), since they were not wives
but should have been! Carol was separated and cohabiting with a man who
was not the father of all her children, whilst Linda and Gwen had never
lived with the fathers of their children.
The two women without children were assessed as daughters. Fiona
and Kathy (despite killing her sister!) were both perceived as 'good,
dutiful daughters', living at home and being portrayed as 'normal'
teenagers.
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Sexuality
The extent to which these women were deemed to have made 'unwise'
choices in relation to men was implicit in discussion of their domestic
situations. It was also, however, an independent theme underlying most
of their official biographies. At one extreme, Pauline's plight was
described as
'a very sad history of a very inadequate man and a
very adequate lady who then decided to become
inadequate so that she didn't overshadow her
husband.'
(Probation Officer 5 on Pauline: 184)
Kathy, too, had been taken advantage of by a feckless man:
'Her feelings for this man were so strong that they
blinded her to reality....Everyone could see that
this man was simply using her, except Kathy herself.'
(Social Inquiry Report on Kathy)
Carol, Ann, Jackie and Susan were all seen as 'attracting' men who drank
heavily and were violent, the implication being that such men met psycho-
sexual needs in them. Jackie's probation officer described her relation-
ship with her husband.
'He'll black both her eyes and walk out. She's very
capable of winding him up and he didn't strike me as
being a particularly nice character.'
(Probation Officer 16 on Jackie: 276)
Three of the women (Eileen, Jean and Jackie) were described as promiscuous.
According to her probation officer, Eileen had a reputation for having
numerous boyfriends and this was seen to be antithetical to the welfare
of her children:
'She's that sort of girl....she loves her children,
she doesn't want them to go away....but she's got
needs of her own which are far away from the needs
of the children really.'
(Probation Officer 6 on Eileen: 204)
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IL was assumed that a woman who attended to her own sexual needs must
therefore be either neglectful of the needs of her children or else be
placing them in 'moral danger' through her own bad example.
Jackie's probation officer recounts a confrontation between her and
her psychiatrist:
' By this time she'd been pretty worked up. The
doctor told her that she was an easy lay for a drink.
I suppose that's fairly accurate, but I suppose
she's not used to being talked to like that.'
(Probation Officer 16 on Jackie: 275
One might question the medical status of the psychiatrist's assess-
ment of Jackie but, as will be seen in Chapter Six,
'forensic psychiatry is authoritatively charged with
the legal, judicial and moral management of law-
breakers....'
(Carlen, 1986, emphasis added)
Additionally, as white, middle-class professional men, psychiatrists are,
within capitalist patriarchal society, ascribed the right to exercise
both verbal and physical control over working-class women (cf.
Hesserschmidt, 1987 . Jean's promiscuity dated back to her adolescence,
according to her probation records:
'Went out every night and became "lad mad" - says
she was described as the "sex bomb of the estate"....
highly promiscuous at the time and this was encouraged
by her fellow workers. Confided in older women.
The way in which she kept the older women interested
was to tell her exploits and this increased her need
to engage in such exploits.'
(Social history on Jean: 124)
More recently, however, her promiscuity was seen as a form of revenge of
her husband:
'During her husband's imprisonment, Mrs. M prosti-
tuted herself and although there was some financial
gain, the reason seems to have been anger with her
husband, projected on to the men concerned, for
whom she had no feelings.'
(Social history on Jean: 125)
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In committing their offences, whether these women were seen as
being either too much influenced by men, or too little influenced, they
were always seen in relation to men. Fiona's offence was committed in
a group, most of whom were men. Her lenient sentence may well have
reflected a feeling that, as the driver of the 'getaway' car, she had
not been directly involved in the assault, but had been under the
influence of her male companions. Ann and Maureen were both perceived
to be aggressive and unmanageable, but their behaviour was aggravated by
the aggression and drinking of their husbands. Gwen, Linda, Veronica
and Ivy, on the other hand, were seen to be in need of supervision
because they lacked male support (and, by implication, male control)
(see Eaton, 1987 on bail decisions relating to women in magistrates'
courts).
Pathology
Thirteen of the fifteen women had had some involvement with
psychiatrists, although only five had conditions of treatment written
into their probation orders. Very little attention was given in the
official accounts to the gynaecological dysfunctions referred to earlier
in this chapter and such lack of concern appears to reinforce theories
that working-class women do not have the same access to the excusing
condition of 'inherent fragility' as do their middle-class sisters (cf.
Ehrenreich and English, 1973; Edwards, 1981). Much greater concern was
shown about the 'genuineness' of the women's claims to sickness and
this concern was buttressed by the elastic nature of the definition of
the 'disturbance' invoked (see Chapter Six for an expansion of this
point). As I have argued elsewhere (Worrall, 1978), the vaguer that
definition, the more likely it is that the 'incongruity' between 'woman-
hood' and 'criminal-ness' will be maintained. Pauline, for example, was
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not suffering from any clearly definable mental illness at all, yet, as
we shall see she had greater access to the excusing condition of
pathology than any of the women - possibly because she was intelligent,
articulate, personable and potentially middle-class!
One woman who received little sympathy, despite having been
hospitalised for anxiety and depression, was Ivy. She pleaded not guilty
to stealing a jar of coffee on the grounds that she was confused as a
result of recent CCI and drug therapy. Unfortunately, however, she
presented herself in court as being extremely clear and lucid, so that
she failed to convince the magistrates of her innocence. Ivy's attempt
to medicalise her own condition was negated by her failure to present
herself as 'muted'. She had been too articulate and competent and,
ironically, had thus discredited the very defence of her actions she
was attempting to make. The trivial nature of her offence also seemed
to reinforce, rather than reduce her perceived responsibility for her
actions. Had she, like Kathy, killed someone, the situation might have
been different.
Kathy killed her sister, by stabbing her with a kitchen knife. Yet
Kathy, like Ivy, was placed on probation for three years with the condition
that she receive psychiatric treatment. Kathy was originally charged with
murder but under psychiatric examination, it emerged that she may have
had a history of epilepsy. It is worth quoting in detail from the
report prepared to illustrate the effectiveness of psychiatric discourse
in rendering violent women harmless (Allen, 1987):
The circumstances of the offence are unusual. K
attacked her sister, whom usually she is very fond of.
There does not seem to be any obvious motive for the
fierceness of the assault. Her behaviour before the
act and shortly after it seems to have been relatively
unremarkable. K's family describe her as a pleasant
young woman and certainly our observations of her
while she was here was of a well-behaved, pleasant
woman. I understand that, while on bail, she has
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resumed her job. Her EEC is abnormal. It is
indicative of instability rather than frank
epilepsy. Instability of an EEC can occur in
the absence of epilepsy and can occur in about
50% of normal persons, but unstable records tend
to be found in young women of K's temperament
and level of immaturity. However, the instability
in this case is so marked and is considerably
accentuated by the consumption of alcohol.
Instability of an EEC often correlates with an
aggressive and violent behaviour. On balance,
therefore, taking into account K's previous
personality, the absence of any comparable assaults,
the suddenness and severity of the assault, the
lack of any obvious motive, her markedly abnormal
EEC, which is accentuated by alcohol, I feel at
the material time, she was suffering from such
abnormality of mind as would substantially diminish
her responsibility for her act and bring her
therefore, within the Section 2 of the Homicide Act
1957.
(119)
The charge was reduced to one of manslaughter and, in passing
sentence, the Judge said to Kathy:
'I'm not qoing to dwell on the facts. This has
been a great burden to you. This is nota case for
punishment. Everything possible must be done to
help you in the future.'
(Probation file on Kathy: 120)
Following her conviction, Kathy had no contact whatsoever with
Dr. A (see Chapter Six) despite his agreement in court to treat her. Two
years later, her probation officer (not the original one) wrote:
'K asked me about the question of Dr. A and his
lack of contact and I suggested that, as there had
been no contact with Dr. A for so long now, it was
pointless to try and resume contact with him, that
is unless K particularly wanted to see him for any
reason. Clearly K was not keen to follow anything
up in the psychiatric treatment area and I was
quite happy to go along with this. I tried to
relieve K's anxieties on this question by suggesting
that any initiative with regards to treatment would
have been made by Dr. A in the past and presumably
he sees no reason to continue contact with K. K
was quite happy with this explanation and feels that
she has no need whatsoever to see Dr. A at the time.'
(121)
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Psychiatric discourse had, it seems, enabled Kathy to get away with
murder, whilst Ivy continued to receive ECT for stealing a jar of
coffee. The reason for this, as Allen also argues (1987), is that
Kathy's crime was so incongruous with her status as a 'very typical
teenager' (Social Inquiry Report) that her status as the responsible
author of her crime had to be revoked. She had to be presented as not
intending and not understanding the consequences of her action. The
alternative explanation - namely, that a hard-working, respectable
family (according to the SIR) had produced a fratricide - was unthinkable.
Yet, in terms of management, Kathy presented the court with few problems,
for that same family could be trusted to control and contain her with
the minimum of outside intervention. Ivy, on the other hand, was more
problematic for, despite the trivial nature of her crime, there was a
congruity about her (albeit petty) criminality which indicated the
presence of agency (i.e. responsibility). Her social status as a
divorcee also suggested an absence of familial control over her behaviour.
In her case, therefore, psychiatry was employed not to reduce culp-
ability but ensure management, suggesting that the criminal justice
system is more concerned with the maintenance of social order than with
the retributive punishment of crime.
The remaining women exhibited a variety of 'symptoms' which had
been broadly classified into two categories, depending on the
profession's perception of their 'genuineness'. Pauline, Susan and
Janet were all diagnosed as suffering in some way from anxiety or
depression. All three were seen as co-operative and amenable to treat-
ment. Pauline, in particular, was regarded as a 'rewarding' case:
'She's a good person to work with, very intelligent
and you can reason things through with her - it's
one of those cases where you can put your theory
into practice - it's quite good for me.'
(Probation Officer 5 on Pauline: 184)
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The remaining women were described more negatively as 'attention-seeking',
'manipulative', 'psychopathic' and/or as having 'personality disorders',
In some cases exacerbated by 'excessive drinking habits'. Some, like
Gwen, Veronica, Eileen and Maureen, had long histories of psychiatric
treatment which was deemed to have 'failed' and they were retrospectively
re-assessed as 'malingerers'. Others, like Ann, Jean, Linda and Jackie
were seen as not amenable to conventional treatment, although Jackie was
considered suitable for a Special Treatment Unit. According to her
probation officer,
'She created and called Dr. G this, that and the
other and threatened to kill me. And they said
"This girl - she's perfect material for this Unit"!'
(Probation Officer 16 on Jackie: 278)
As Dr. A remarked (see Chapter Six), treatment of people with personality
disorder 'has to be undertaken by enthusiasts'!
Interpellating them as domesticated, feminine and sick?
It is evident from these official accounts that the routine practice
of classifying and describing female lawbreakers in particular ways has
proved inadequate in relation to the women in this study in providing
either explanations of their past lawbreaking activity or management of
their future behaviour. Far from demonstrating that they are
domesticated, feminine and sick, these women have evaded (often by their
sheer passivity) the controlling effects of such categorisation. They
have presented themselves variously as:
a) suspect or non-mothers and failed wives;
b) sexually indiscriminate and promiscuous women, unsupported and
uncontrolled (or uncontrollable?);
c) not mad enough or too mad, alcoholic and malingering.
Yet none of these women would be described as 'villains' (cf. Carlen et
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al., 1985) either. Nor are they ideologically committed to protesting
against capitalism or patriarchy. They live very mundane lives - some
seeing themselves as more 'respectable' than others, some more angry than
others, and all of them struggling in relative poverty.
How then would these women begin to describe themselves and their
circumstances?
Fifteen Women - Their Own Accounts
Thirteen women were identified to me by their probation officers as
'troublesome' women, who might, nevertheless, be prepared to discuss with
me their experiences of the criminal justice system. Of these, two
(Jean and Linda) refused to be interviewed. Jean, according to her
probation officer, was 'going through a crisis' and was preoccupied,
whilst Linda was apparently not interested in discussing her experiences.
Two other women (Susan and Kathy) both agreed to be interviewed but each
failed to keep two appointments made with me. Mention has already been
made of the trap in which these women are caught, whereby they are
rendered incapable of either refusing or fulfilling the contract which
is offered to them in the name of help. The mechanisms of resistance
which are available to them are those which inevitably invoke from their
would-be helpers moral judgments about 'unreliability', 'manipulativeness'
and 'deceitfulness'. For those would-be helpers to consider any other,
less positivistic, explanation for the women's behaviour would threaten
the 'taken-for-grantedness' of existing social relations. Failure to
keep appointments and general elusiveness characterised many of the
women who were discussed with me by their probation officers. Few of
them could be accused of deliberately failing to keep in touch (which
would constitute a breach of the conditions of a probation order) but
time and time again, women would present reasons/excuses for being unable
to keep office appointments (children's illnesses, lack of bus fares,
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repair men/Social Security visitors expected etc.) yet would also find
themselves unexpectedly called out of their homes when the officer had
arranged to call on them. Even probation officers who laid on transport
to bring women to women's groups or clubs run at their offices expressed
frustration at the numerous abortive journeys made by volunteers or
ancillary workers to women who were 'out' or whose children were suddenly
and conveniently 'poorly'. These women, like Victoire Rivière (Foucault,
1975) were the everlasting cancellers of contracts. Their potency lay in
their ability to agree to, yet to fail to honour, even the simplest
contracts about times and places of physical meetings. By presenting
constantly moving targets, such women unwittingly succeeded in outwitting
officials and evading assessment, classification and control. For some
women, their children - and their social workers, the consequences of such
elusiveness can be tragic, especially when there is real concern for
the welfare of children (cf. the Jasmine Beckford case). But whilst
women remain distrustful of those in authority who are directed to
'help' them and, furthermore, feel powerless to influence the nature of
that help, they will continue to put themselves literally 'beyond help'
and 'out of reach' by simply avoiding contact.
Nine women, therefore, agreed to be interviewed and two more, as
previously mentioned, were interviewed under different circumstances
(Fiona and Jackie). In the interviews they talked about their lawbreaking,
their personal circumstances, their attitudes to courts, solicitors,
psychiatrists, probation officers, social workers - and to themselves.
Common themes emerged from their stories - loneliness, fear, low self-
esteem, bewilderment, suppressed anger and, above all, a sense of not
being listened to, heard or understood. But there were differences and
contradictions too. Some felt they had been sentenced harshly, but were
still appreciative of the help they had received from individual
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prof;sionalli. O1Iurs fit they had been deall with leniently, despite
denying criminal intention or mens rea, in its strict judicial sense.
Lawbreaking/Deviance - The Construction of (Wo)men's Rea (cf. Cousins, 1980)
With the exception of Carol ('I'm a shoplifter': 74) the women did
not see themselves as 'real' criminals. They felt that what they had
done was either not really criminal, was a kind of 'compulsion' or had
been done out of economic necessity. In its strict judicial sense, they
denied criminal intention.
'I've not done anything really terrible. It was
just a fight that got blown up into something big.
I was done for conspiracy. I only drove the car.
There was one other girl and five boys.'
(Denial of seriousness) 	 (Fiona)
'On the form it says, "with intent to deprive
so-and-so of the aforesaid jar of coffee...."
and it didn't seem - well, I'd been in hospital.'
Denial of intent)	 (Ivy: 110)
'I defrauded my husband of his supplementary
benefit - I cashed his Giro... .1 went to the
police station myself to own up - they didn't
find out....I agreed to probation, but I didn't
think it would be two years.'
Denial of seriousness)	 (Eileen: 49)
'It was for food for my children - it wasn't
stupid things like cigarettes or drink or toys.'
(Insistence on excusing condition)	 (Veronica: 49)
'I sort of get this feeling that I've	 to get
something off the shelves - and when I've done it
and got out of the shop, I think it's great.'
Insistence on compulsion)	 (Janet: 71)
'One day my little girl... .showed me under her
mattress - £86. She said it belonged to a boy -
he wanted her to look after it. He'd said I
could borrow £30....so I borrowed it....The
police came and I explained, but they said I
should have reported it.'
(Denial of intent)
	 (Maureen: 102)
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'I didn't really think I'd done anything wrong.'
(Denial of criminality)	 (Gwen: 91)
Even Carol was indignant about the latest offence with which she had
been charged 3 , although she was pessimistic about her chances of acquittal:
Carol: 'I'm not guilty, I didn't do it, yet I'll probably
get found guilty because of my record. They look
at your record and they'll say "I don't believe
she didn't do something like that".'
AW: 'But they're not supposed to know your record
until you're found guilty.'
Carol: 'Aye, well that is true, but the judge knows
me •'
(75, 76)
Despite their denials of guilt, all of the women, like Carol,
eventually resigned themselves to being 'found guilty', partly because of
their low self-esteem and generalised sense of guilt about being a woman
and thus 'always-already' failing, but partly as a result of being
treated as though they were 'always-already' guilty. Pauline illustrates
the former:
'I expected a lot worse and, quite honestly, I
felt I deserved a lot worse - I still do.. ..I
still feel that I haven't been punished - yet
nobody else seems to.'
Fiona, Ivy and Gwen illustrate the latter:
'At court I stood between two prison officers
thinking "I'm really ever such a nice person -
I shouldn't be here." In my statement, I signed
for a lot of things I didn't say because I was
afraid. You say things, but not in the way they
put it over in court - out of context.'
(Fiona - changed plea during trial)
'They're only doing their job - the prosecuting
counsel - he's got to make it hard, hasn't he?
And I did do wrong.'
(Ivy - defended herself,
but was found guilty: 117)
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'When 1 was in the van, he told them over the
microphone that I was a prisoner. I said to
him, "I'm not a prisoner". Well, I wasn't at
the time - or was I? He said, "We've now got
the prisoner" and that upset me.'
(Gwen - arrested after throwing a brick
through her own house window)
Uncertainty about appropriate pleading was not always alleviated by
solicitors and the women expressed mixed feelings about the role of
solicitors in court. None of the women saw themselves as 'engaging the
services' of solicitors or 'giving instructions' (see Chapter Five), nor
did they feel in any way in control of their relationship with their
solicitor. Some, though, did express gratitude for their solicitor's
effort s:
'I think that the solicitor does a lot - it's
the way he puts your case over....I think that
really makes a difference....because you can
tell a story or explain things different ways
and it comes out differently.'
(Pauline: 51)
'I mean really it's not up to them - they try
their best....He was very good. I thought I'd
go down....'
(Veronica)
But even Veronica did not seem to feel very much in control of the
relationship, especially once her solicitor had engaged a barrister for
the case:
'I didn't really have much to say to him. He
just said, "Don't worry". He didn't say one
thing or the other.'
(92)
This inability to express oneself to a solicitor or barrister
featured in other women's accounts:
'He got a barrister from London but he didn't
give me any advice about the plea. The trial
went on for five days and at the end I changed
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my plea to guilty.'
(Fiona)
'I couldn't talk to him like I'm talking to
you now. I couldn't fight for myself. I
couldn't defend myself. I couldn't give him
enough evidence to go on to defend me.'
(Maureen: 102)
Maureen perceived her encounter with her solicitor as something of
an ordeal - as one more situation in which she was required to justify
herself and her actions. Like most of the women, she felt herself to be
insufficiently articulate to benefit from this 'right' to be represented.
The whole point of representation - namely, the opportunity to compensate
for nervouseness, ignorance and inarticulacy - was lost on these women,
thus providing an excellent example of the 'technology (see Chapter One)
of muting'. Women defendants are given a formal right to a space where
they can tell their story in their own words to someone who can then
reconstruct it in language which is acceptable to the court. Yet the
experience of most women is that they must alreadyhave structured their
tale in a way which is acceptable to the court. Yet again, as with their
encounters with psychiatrists, working class women experience the double
oppression of both gender and class discrimination in their dealings with
white middle-class professional men. Carol - perhaps the most articulate
of the women (but also the only black woman, which may or may not have
been significant) - challenged her solicitor by playing according to the
stated rules of the game - and suffered the consequences!:
'I don't care, I just talk to them....I tell them
the truth and own up if I've die it. Then they
advise me to plead guilty or not guilty. But he
always says with my record I'll get sent down.
don't think they should do that. I think they
should fight for you.'
(79-80)
Two of the women did not have solicitors in court. Gwen, despite
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her contact with a probation officer, appeared unaware of her right to
representa t ion:
'I think if you've never been in trouble before,
you don't know, do you?'
(85)
She did, in fact, approach a solicitor after she had been sentenced to
probation with a condition of in-patient psychiatric treatment. Not
surprisingly, she did not get much satisfaction at that stage:
'I went to a solicitor to see if he could get
me off the probation so that I could get out
of the hospital but he said there wasn't much
they could do because they couldn't do anything
but put me in hospital.'
(86)
Ivy was the one woman who had decided to defend herself, although
her reasons for doing so were not entirely clear:
AW: 'Why did you not want a solicitor?'
Ivy:	 'I don't know really....'
AW: 'Was it a question of thinking you would
have to pay'
Ivy: 'Yes, I suppose it was....My doctor did write
a letter, which I can't understand was not read
out prior to my being sentenced. I feel that
that should perhaps have been taken into
account....'
(111)
Ivy believed that her medical condition rendered her 'morally'
innocent of the offence with which she was charged but she seemed unable
to distinguish between its legal status as a defence or as mitigation.
Consequently, she had not known when to introduce her doctor's letter
into her evidence and the result was that it had been overlooked.
Perhaps more ironically, Ivy's competence in defending herself later had
negated her claim to having been confused at the time of the alleged
offence. Her failure to remain mute had been her downfall. In the end,
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she admitted reluctantly:
'Maybe I should have had a solicitor but we
had one for that other do and it never got us
anywhere.'
(115)
Many of these women's experiences are common to all defendants
(cf. Carlen, 1976). There is, however, a specific gender dimension to
their experiences which is characterised by
a) the particular social disgrace of being a criminal woman:
'It's far less acceptable for a woman to commit
a crime. A man sometimes gets a boost from it -
a woman loses any respect she had once people
know she's got a record.'
(Fiona)
b) the sense of guilt and low self-esteem which many women have about
themselves as women:
'I'm inclined to blame myself and that has a lot
to do with my state now - I'm blaming myself for
being a failure.'
(ivy: fl3)
c) the apparent difficulty which many women have in communicating what
they really want to say (if indeed they know what they really want to say)
to men in positions of authority - in this case, to solicitors and
barristers. This apparent difficulty may be not so much a failure on the
part of women to articulate their needs, as a failure on the part of men
in authority to listen to the particular mode of expression in which
those needs are being communicated.
d) the particular requirement that women who break the law must compen-
sate for their 'unfeminine' criminal behaviour by presenting themselves
as domesticated, sexually passive and constitutionally fragile.
Before turning to this last requirement and examining these women's
own account of their domesticity, sexuality and pathology, it is important
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to note that all the aspects of the gender dimension which have been
outlined have a class bias in their effects. Educated and financially
independent women, although still experiencing the stigma of criminality,
have more options in the ways that they choose to re-present themselves
or allow themselves to be re-presented. They may still suffer from a
'sense of guilt' and 'low self-esteem' but they have the articulacy and
the finances to escape the most confining of stereotypical descriptions.
Working-class women have to devise more devious escape-routes.
Domesticity
a) Motherhood
Undoubtedly and according to all concerned the most important
relationships for those women who were mothers were those with their
children. Whether or not their children were in their care, their
attitudes towards them were profoundly and inextricably bound up with
their attitudes to their lawbreaking. On the one hand, children were
cited by the women as both the cause of and the justification for
criminal activity. On the other hand they were seen by them as exerting
a restraining influence both on the women themselves and on those
sentencing them.
- Comitting crime for the children
The desire to provide material goods, which they could not other-
wise afford, for their children motivated most of the shoplifters. Some
saw themselves stealing 'essentials'; others saw their activity as a way
of providing 'extras':
'It was food for my children. It wasn't stupid
things like cigarettes or drinks or toys - you
know, rubbish.'
(Veronica: 93)
112.
'I like to keep my kids nice and I like to have a
nice house.'
(Carol: 77)
'It was Joanne's birthday and I'd gone to town to
buy some candles for her cake, and it started that
I picked up something in Woolworth's and I was
thinking "I'd like to buy this....I can take it and
nobody will know, and I can give it to her, although
I can't afford it". So I did, and then it just
snowballed.'
(Pauline: 56)
The desire to be the stereotypically good mother and provider had
led some of the women into activity which could ultimately deprive them
of the very people they sought to provide for.
- Comitting crime because of the children
For some of the women, however, the influence of their children on
their lawbreaking was more complex. Gwen's offence, for example, seems
to have been committed at least in part from a sense of frustration and
desperation about the difficulties she was experiencing in maintaining
contact with her daughter in Care:
AW: 'Can you remember why you put the bricks through
the windows?'
Gwen: 'It was everything all muddled up. It was my
neighbours and because I hadn't got my daughter.'
(84)
For Maureen, her children and their behaviour, together with her husband's
behaviour, constituted the chaotic domestic environment from which she
could escape only into crime or mental illness:
'I went into the living room and the table was
full....and I'd just put the baby down and I wanted
to rest and everybody was just gorping at the
television. So I walked in and tipped the table
up and said, "You can sodding well clean this lot
up between you - I'm not the slave here".'
(99)
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Feeling unsupported and unappreciated featured in both Maureen and
Ivy's accounts. Maureen's strongest criticism was reserved for her
daughter:
'My eldest son will....go out and buy me an extra
bag of coal. He look8 after me, he appreciates
what I'm doing for him. But my daughter - 5he
thinks I only want her for her money! Sometimes
I feel like punching her in the face, 'co g I'm
very highly strung.'
(105)
Ivy had two daughters and a son, all of whom had left home - as had
her husband. She disliked her son's girlfriend and blamed herself for
her son's departure from home at the age of 28:
'I find that Pm obsessed with losing my son -
I felt I had driven him away.'
(113)
She spoke movingly of the increasing loneliness she felt as her
family gradually left her:
'At night - you've been used to having five
people there, then it's four, then it's three,
and now it's me. I find it very hard to live
alone. Not so much in the day, but at night.
I miss the key coming and the voices.'
(113)
It had been suggested to me by some probation officers that women
often failed to face up to the 'reality' of their lawbreaking and its
consequences. A probation officer working in a women's prison, however,
argued that, for many of the women he met, providing for their families
was reality. Even when those families had disintegrated, the women
continued to define themselves in relation to them and to be, in his
words, 'rooted in relationships'. (The concept of 'rootedness' is
explored further in Chapter Seven.)
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- The effect of crime on the children
Only Carol spoke of her criminal activity having any direct effect
on her children:
Carol: 'It's embarrassing. You don't like them to know.
I mean, they know what I'm doing, but I wouldn't
take them out and let them see that I'm doing it.'
AW: 'Have any of them ever been in trouble?'
Carol: 'Joe was in trouble once - he stole some sweets.'
AW: 'What happened to him?'
Carol: 'Nothing - he was too young. But I've told them,
if they ever do anything I'll get the police.
There's one thief in the house and that's enough.
They don't need to do anything because I'm doing
it for them.'
(79)
Although Carol felt some 'embarrassment' about her children's know-
ledge of her activity, one could also sense that she took pride in
sacrificing her own reputation for her children's well-being. Her son's
foray into crime concerned her not so much because she felt she might be
setting him a bad example but because it represented 'ingratitude' and
a lack of appreciation of her as a good mother and provider.
For most of the women, however, their greatest fear was that of
losing their children as a result of their criminal activity. Carol's
attitude was thus not typical. She regarded imprisonment as an
occupational hazard and even as a 'holiday' - 'because it's a break away
from the kids'. Her children went into Care while she was in prison and
visited her regularly. She had no fears that they might not be returned
to her:
'I put them in myself and they couldn't take them
off me. I don't ill-treat them and they get
everything they want.'
(78)
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Maureen had been far less confident when she had gone to prison:
'It says "voluntary" on the papers but... .they
watch them and if they think they need "Care and
Protection", you don't get them back. I kept
thinking, "1 won't get her back". I was more
worried over losing my child than anything.'
(103)
Eileen feared that her children would be taken into Care when she went to
court because:
'My husband's in prison....I've had two broken
marriages.'
She had not responded previously to help offered by her probation
officer or psychiatrist:
Eileen: 'I didn't want any help. It's only been since
court) that I've wanted anybody to help me.'
AW: 'Did you think that your children were going to
go away.'
Eileen: 'Yes, in (court) I did - and since then I'll sit
and listen.'
(50)
Jackie had received a similar message:
'The magistrate said "We want you to sort yourself
out - we're thinking of your child - we don't want
to see you here again".'
As an inmate of a Special Treatment Unit, Jackie was separated from
her daughter during the week but allowed to go home at weekends. She
viewed the separation very much as a punishment, rather than as the
unavoidable consequence of receiving treatment in a hospital setting.
She regarded her sentence as a kind of imprisonment, from which she
could not resist the temptation to 'abscond':
'I don't want to stay here much longer. I miss
my daughter terribly. I really love her and she
loves me - she clings to me. That's why I ran off
last week. You just sit here all day listening to
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records and I think of all the things I could be
doing at home. I've got a nice home - I keep it
really clean and tidy.'
The notion that, by sitting and 'listening to records', she might
be learning to be a better mother - when she could be keeping her home
'nice' - clearly struck her as faintly ridiculous.
Fear of losing their children dictated the attitude of these women
to their Local Authority social workers. With the exception of Carol
('I need ashouldertocry on - I'm not too old for that'), those who spoke
about their social workers did so in fairly negative terms. Eileen
summarised the general view:
'I fetched 'em (children) into the world and I
didn't fetch 'em in for the Welfare to grab
hold of 'em.'
(50)
She admitted, reluctantly, that her present social worker was being
quite helpful 'because they've just got a holiday granted for my children',
but reiterated her general view:
'I always thought social workers were nasty people
who all they wanted to do was take people's
children into Care.'
Gwen also experienced her previous social workers as unhelpful,
condescending, authoritarian and in a hurry:
'Social workers don't seem to be much help - that's
why I lost my little girl....They give you the feeling
that they're doing you a favour when they're helping
you....They seem to show more authority to you.
When you tell them your problem, they're in and out,
and you're still there with your problem.'
(88)
Like Eileen, Gwen was also more favourably disposed towards her
current social worker because 'she explains things to me' and she had
also arranged for Gwen to get out of the house to a weekly activities
grwp.
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As we shall see later in this chapter, the 'alleviation of
loneliness' is one of the most important kinds of 'help' which these
women seek and expect from their social workers and probation officers.
It is also worth noting that, while probation officers were expected to
use their authority and were not resented for doing so, social workers
were only given any credit by the women when they produced specific
'goodies'. They were also more likely than probation officers to be
attributed with 'enjoying' doing controlling things, like taking children
away from home.
But although the women were fearful that their lawbreaking might lead
to their separation from their children and that they therefore needed,
at the least, to pay lip-service to reforming themselves, they were also
conscious that their status as mothers would influence sentencers in
their favour. Hilary Walker has demonstrated that attempts to blackmail
sentencers emotionally can backfire disastrously (1985: 68), but
Veronica was openly prepared to take that risk:
'They did ask who would look after (my son) if
I went down. I said I didn't know - they'd
have to have him put away in Care. That wasn't
really true - my family wouldn't have let it go
that far. But I played on that. You've got to
play on something, haven't you?'
(93)
Pauline was far less openly manipulative, but when I asked her why she
felt she had been dealt with (by her own account) so sympathetically,
she replied:
'Maybe it's the fact that I've got to support
two children. Had I been a single girl, perhaps
it might have been different. I don't know, but
I think that would sway me if I was in their
position.'
(61)
Being a mother, then, was the most important feature of these women's
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lives and the loss of their children - whether physically, through Care
proceedings, or emotionally, through arguments or simply growing up - was
the thing they feared most and which most threatened their respect for
themselves as women.
b) Wifeliness
In contrast to the importance of children, husbands were generally
discussed in far less detail and the marital relationship described in
fatalistic terms. By and large, the women appeared to expect their
marriages to be unsatisfactory. The exception was Jackie, who remained
optimistic about mending her marriage, although her romantic view of
married life bore little relation to the reality of her situation, since
her husband was in prison for assaulting her (cf. Carlen, 1983: 36):
'I've sorted my problems out and so has he. I
just want us to be dead happy together with the
baby.'
Two women had found their husbands less than supportive during their
court proceedings:
AW: 'Has your husband ever helped with your fines?'
Janet: 'No. When I had the TV licence fine, I had to
keep going back to court.'
(72)
AW: 'Did your husband go to court with you?'
Ivy: 'No....I thought that was a bit mean of him,
actually. ...I had to phone because I was getting
in a state.'
(115)
Only three of the women (Janet, Maureen and Ann) were actually
living with their husbands at the time of the interviews and two spoke
of a lack of comunication and understanding:
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AW: 'Did your husband object at all to your doing
Community Service?'
Janet: 'He doesn't know.'
AW: 'Does he know you're on Probation?'
Janet:	 'Yes.'
AW: 'Is there any reason why you don't want him to
know about CS?'
Janet: 'Well, we don't speak about a lot of things.'
(72)
'People don't realise that men go through a change
of life....If I didn't think on those lines, I'd
have thought my marriage was breaking up and I'd
be divorcing him. He doesn't take a bit of
notice of me - I could be a cabbage in that house -
and then just coming to me when he wants.'
(Maureen: 105)
Despite a long history of marital disharmony, Maureen was still
prepared to excuse her husband's behaviour as 'menopausal', although no
such pxcuses seem to have been allowed for her behaviour.
Eileen also accepted her husband's behaviour - in this case, his
violence - as a normal part of marriage, and she was very uncertain about
whether she would eventually divorce her third husband, who was in prison
at the time:
Eileen: 'We've chopped and changed our minds that much over
the past 8 months. We've been apart 12 months -
he's been in prison 8 months. At the back of my
mind is I know that if he comes home he'll hit me.'
AW: 'Do you think anyone will be able to help you with
that when he comes out?'
Eileen: 'No, I'm going to take it. If he comes out and he
feels better after hitting me, let him hit me.
That's my attitude.'
(53)
The tendency of women to blame themselves when their marriages fail
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was also illustrated in Ivy's account. Her husband left her and went to
live with her best friend:
'Mainly perhaps it was because of my fault that
he left....I can see now that perhaps I wasn't
very tolerant of him.'
(Ivy:	 113)
Ivy had known about her husband's affair for some time ('he went out
with this person three times a week') but felt guilty for criticising
him because she also 'had got a friend'. Nevertheless, it seemed that
she had worked hard to ensure that her 'extra-marital' friendship did not
interfere with her role in the home:
'That was a thing apart - my home and family
were first.'
(114)
Her husband, on the other hand, had been prepared - as she saw it - to
sacrifice his family for his affair. Her anger towards him was not
totally disguised but she had coped with her feelings largely by taking
on board all the guilt and blame for the failure of the marriage - and
had suffered the consequent loss of self-confidence:
'I used to have lots of confidence, which I don't
have now. I rely on my family - I watch the clock
until they come. This isn't me. I never knew the
meaning of the word "loneliness".'
(114)
Loss of confidence and self-esteem as a wife and mother were further
exacerbated by the fear of 'neighbourliness' - the fear of having one's
'criminality' discovered by friends, neighbours and relatives through the
dreaded medium of the local paper:
'It was in the papers eight times - I had to
cut it out. I got into more trouble because I
wouldn't let anyone come to my home. The police
kept ringing and telling me to go to the
station - I couldn't say no.'
(Fiona)
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'1 don't want anyone to know what I'm doing
t)ecatJne I know it. will be in the papers and if
Mum find8 out it will break her heart.'
(Pauline)
AW: 'Was anything in the papers?'
Ivy: 'I looked and I thought "Good grief, I hope
nothing is" - I didn't see anything.'
AW: 'Have you had any comments from neighbours?'
Ivy: 'I never told anyone.'
(114)
AW: 'Was there anything in the local paper about
it?'
Janet: 'Yes. I've had lots of comments from neighbours -
half of them don't speak to me. I lost my job
over it.'
l73)
Sexuality
Perhaps unsurprisingly, most of the women interviewed did not talk
about their 'sexuality'. Perceiving criminal activity as an expression
of a woman's sexuality is a pastime indulged in more by those who seek to
classify, judge and reform women than by those women themselves. As
Heidensohn (1985: 93) observes, 'alongside the witch, the whore is the
most potent image of female deviance', but, unlike mental illness, it
is not an identity which women themselves are ready to accept in order
to minimise their punishment.
Carol was quite clear that, whilst shoplifting was an acceptable
way to make money, prostitution was not:
'I could be a hustler, but I'm not giving my body
away, so I steal. At least I've got some pride.'
(76)
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She was also very dismissive of those social workers and probation
officers who had implied that her violent cohabitee might be meeting some
psycho-sexual need in her:
'People say "Get him out" but you can't just do that.
I've been with him seven years - and he's violent.
Did you read in the papers about a man raping a
woman at knife-point? That was him - and he got off.
That's what they call justice - he gets off and I get
sent down for shoplifting £39.'
(80-81)
Eileen insisted that accounts of her promiscuity were much
exaggerated:
'I got involved with a man in September - and
they said I was sleeping around.'
(50)
Jackie was the only woman who admitted that she was a prostitute but
she maintained her personal integrity by detaching herself emotionally
from her clients and ensuring that she went 'only so far' with them (Cf.
McLeod, 1982 . Like Carol, 'pride' was an important criterion:
'I've never had intercourse. I only give "hand-
shakes" and do kinky things. I wouldn't give them
my body or take anyone home. I've got my pride.
It's just easy money.'
For Jackie, prostitution was clearly preferable to other employment
that might be available to her:
'I've had a couple of jobs, but I've never really
needed to work. I've always had "Sugar Daddies".
I can get what I want out of men.'
As an inmate of a Special Treatment Unit, Jackie's prostitution had
been attributed to psychopathology (cf. Glover, 1969). Her own account
suggests that the explanation for her behaviour lay more in the realm of
economics than emotions. She was not, however, unaffected by the
attitudes of those close to her. Unlike McLeod's prostitutes (1982: 34)
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she had not been rejected by her family, nor had she distanced herself
from their controls. Like the other women I spoke to, she was not easy
to categorise. Her life was full of contradictions and paradoxes, as
she struggled to make sense of economic disadvantage and physical and
emotional abuse.
Pathology
Of the 15 women, only two had had no involvement with psychiatrists
and even these women referred to their own feelings in 'psychiatric'
terms, thus indicating the extent of the influence of images of
pathology in relation to female lawbreaking. Fiona spoke of the
depression she experienced following her offence, the fear of her parents'
discovering it by reading the papers and the guilt she felt when her
father died whilst the case was being processed. At the other end of
the spectrum, the 'professional' shoplifter, Carol, spoke of her stealing
activity as being almost a compulsion:
'It's just that I go into a shop and....if the
woman goes away and leaves me, I've just got to
take something....I just can't be trusted.'
(Carol: 77)
She received little sympathy, however:
AW: 'Sometimes when women get into trouble, people say
they must be sick....'
Carol: 'They're never said that to me. My social worker
says I just live too high above my means.'
(77)
Amongst the 'already-labelled' women, however, there was a surprising
reluctance to accept the 'sick role' (cf. Chesler, 1974; Procek, 1981).
Ivy and Maureen had the longest histories of mental illness and both, it
might be argued, had taken on a 'sick role' as a response to their
powerlessness in the family (Messerschmidt, 1987). Nevertheless, they
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both struggled against being defined as 'abnormal':
'I've woken up petrified at about 4.30 in the
morning And taken Valium....I get very lone'y
inside, a feeling of unreality....a feeling
of not quite being normal. (But) when I look
at it in another respect, I think, "you silly
fool, you - you're the same as anyone else".'
(Ivy:	 113)
'One day I ran out of tablets and I didn't bother
to get any more, and I slept without better -
more of a natural sleep. And I went to the
doctor and said, "I don't want any more nerve
tablets" and she said, "You what? You've had no
side effects?" and I said, "No". I haven't
taken them from that day to this. I mean, I'm
very highly strung. The house - it gets me down
....but now I don't let it get me that bad.'
(Maureen: 103)
Pauline had been diagnosed as a depressive and referred to a psycho-
therapeutic group, which she enjoyed very much ('I just trot along
because I like going!'). Nevertheless, she made a clear distinction
between herself and the other members of the group:
Pauline: 'Out of a group of about six of us, three would be
dpressives with something in common and there's
the girl with a phobia, and then there's another
girl who qets temper tantrums with her depression
and then there's me....I try to understand how they
feel but I can't really know what it's like.'
AW: 'Would you describe yourself as having depression?'
Pauline: 'No, I don't think I have depressions. I have
times when I'm upset and worried.. ..I feel rotten
about everything but that's not the same thing.'
(59)
The three women who had been classified as 'problem drinkers' (Jackie,
Ann and Veronica) all denied that their problems were either current or
chronic. Jackie claimed to have been 'dry' for twelve weeks but did not
envisage having to remain totally abstinent. ('I'm not a real alcoholic'.)
She calculated that alcohol was not problematic for her unless combined
with Ativan (a tranquilliser), to which she had been - but was no longer -
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addicted. Ann's response was almost identical:
'I used to have a drink problem, although it took
me a long time to admit it.'
She, also, had been addicted to Ativan but claimed she had not taken any
drugs for two weeks. Veronica also claimed that her heavy drinking days
were a thing of the past:
AW: 'What about the drink problem you said you had -
do you still get that?'
Veronica: 'Well occasionally - but not like I used to. I
used to be drinking all the while....Then I just
plucked up courage one day and says, "No more
drink" - and I went for about 18 months.'
(94)
These ccxwnents suggest that these women had learned that whether or
not their drinking had actually diminished denial of a drink problem
would not prevent intervention by professionals, who regard such denial
as a classic defence mechanism of alcoholism. Rather than resist such
intervention openly, they had learned to accommodate the powerlessness
of their gender/class position (Messerschmidt, 1987: 158) by admitting
the problem, but only as a past feature of their lives. By such means
they were credited with having some insight into their problems but they
also succeeded in neatly side-stepping responsibility for change, if they
did not wish to change.
After years of such evasion and passive non-co-operation, such
women had succeeded in being defined as having 'personality disorders,
not amenable to treatment'. But what had been the women's expectations
and experiences of 'treatment'? On the whole, there was a marked
disparity between what the women had expected (or wanted) of psychiatry
and how they experienced it. It is not insignificant that the woman who
had the happiest experiences of 'treatment' (Pauline) was not receiving
drug therapy. Psychotherapy - the opportunity to talk about oneself -
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was what most of the women expected from psychiatry. Those who could
identify that element in their treatment were markedly more satisfied
with their deal than those who could not. Jackie and Eileen, both of
whom had experienced the 'therapeutic community' atmosphere of a Special
Treatment Unit, had found 'treatment' reasonably beneficial. By
contrast, those who had experienced Ed, drug therapy or ludicrously
brief, curt 'consultations', had found the experiences alienating,
confusing and humiliating. The experience of Susan (a non-responder),
recounted by her probation officer, is typical of many women on probation
with conditions of treatment:
'From her description of what is happening, she
is asked if she is all right, is her family all
right, is she managing to cope, fine thank you,
I'll make another appointment. She goes for
two minutes each time and she feels she has no
confidence in the psychiatrist....She never knows
who it is she's seen, but from what I can gather,
it tends to vary a bit.'
(Probation Officer 17 on Susan: 285)
A number of the women actually claimed that they felt worse after ECT
and drug therapy than they had done before. Ivy had felt quite
disorientated after (CT:
'I would never have electric shock treatment
again - it does something to the brain. It's
helpful perhaps at the time, but it blocks out
great masses of things that have happened. But
it doesn't block out the nasty parts - if you
understand.'
(112)
'People tend to think that when you come out of
hospital that you're quite better, when in fact,
that's not always the case - it takes time to
adjust yourself. Looking back on it now - well
it's horrific. You still get this confused
state.'
(110)
Veronica had been prescribed Valium, but she had felt they were 'no
good':
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'You were losing your days all the while - you
didn't know what you was doing with them. You
was asleep all the while. That's no good for
you. So I just put them down the toilet one
day, and I've never had them since.'
(94)
Maureen, as we have seen, also decided to give up her tablets
because she became horrified by her dependency on them:
'I sometimes got left without (tablets) and I'd
cry and my eyes were red and I'd go down to
the doctor and I was ashamed to be in that state.
Then he'd give them me and I'd be all right.
But it used to give me banging heads.'
(101)
While she had been in prison, she had also experienced the humilia-
Lion (cf. Peckham, 1985) of having to queue for her medication:
'In there I was on Valium, Tryptisol, Prochlorol
and tablets for me kidneys and me bowels. Three
times a day - all that lot - can you imagine?
In fact, they called me the 'drug squad' at
the blooming clinic. Although I didn't want it,
the doctor was giving me this and I felt horrible
with girls standing behind me having two things
and I was having five things at a time.'
(emphasis added: 103)
Gwen was in hospital for 3 months, receiving Modicate injections
which seemed to make her extremely lethargic. She had few visitors and
became increasingly fearful of becoming institutionalised:
'When you don't have visitors it makes you
worse because you're getting more into the
routine of the hospital.'
(86)
The doctor had told her, she said, that the more active she kept,
the more likely she would be to be discharged. But, she explained,
'I used to do a lot of sewing and things but I
stopped doing it. He said, "If you start doing
your sewing and doing things you're more likely
to be discharged". But I got so that I couldn't
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do it - and I think that was the injections.'
(86)
Eventually, in exasperation, she found the courage to walk out, and
when I interviewed her several months later, declared that she felt 'much
better' without the injections.
Women like Susan, Ivy, Maureen and Gwen clearly experienced
psychiatry more as control and punishment than as 'treatment'. Ann, in
fact, said that she preferred prison to hospital. They were also very
fearful of the power of their psychiatrists. As working class women,
they were doubly muted in their relationships with middle-class,
professional men - by class and by gender. Susan's probation officer
illustrates the problem:
P0 17: 'I've said, "Why don't you tell him you think it's
a waste of time?".'
AW: 'That's a bit much to expect, isn't it?'
PC 17: 'Well, not in those words! But I've suggested
what she could say, but she won't, because she'll
avoid the problems....'
(emphasis added: 289)
So it is the woman, yet again, who gets blamed!
But the psychiatrist's power - and the women's fear of' it - was seen
to extend beyond the hospital and the surgery - into a) the court and
b) the home. The psychiatrist's expressed willingness to offer 'treat-
ment' was seen as an important pre-requisite for obtaining a lenient
(i.e. non-custodial) sentence. As has been seen in the case of Kathy,
even a charge of murder can result in a probation order if such an offer
is forthcoming (even if it is never honoured) (see also Allen, 1987).
Conversely, a report from a psychiatrist declaring a defendant to be
'not mentally ill' or 'not amenable to treatment' is likely to render the
defendant more liable to imprisonment than she might have been without a
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report at all. Veronica was very pessimistic after the psychiatrist had
said he thought she was 'perfectly all right':
Veronica: 'So that's when I thought I'd go down because I
didn't have very good reports.
AW: 'You hoped that he would say you needed treatment?'
Veronica: 'Yes, that's it - but he didn't. He was very nice -
but, you know - he wasn't on my side.'
(94)
Two of the women believed that it lay in their psychiatrists' power
to remove their children from them - or return their children to them.
Eileen's psychiatrist had made a rare domiciliary visit to observe her
as a mother, in her 'natural' environment:
Eileen: 'He came to the house just before Christmas - to
see the children. He'd seen me in hospital as
a patient, but he'd never seen me as a mother.
AW: 'Do you think he was able to get a good impression
of you at home?'
Eileen: 'Well, he's told me to keep my children - he's
done a report.'
(49)
Gwen's daughter had already been removed from her and she believed
that her psychiatrist would block any attempt by her to get her daughter
back:
'I was thinking of going to court, but I suppose
Dr. C only has to say he doesn't think I'm fit
to have her back, and that would be it.'
(90)
The role of the psychiatrist as a wise man - as 'father, judge and
legislator' (Cousins and Hussain, 1984: 137) - will be explored further
in Chapter Six of this thesis.
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Conclusion
Contract Avoidance: Shifting Signs or Nurturing the Confined Soul?
On the basis of the analyses presented in this chapter it is argued
that there exists a 'gender contract' which offers to women who break
the law the opportunity to neutralise the implications of their criminal
activity and minimise its punishment. The 'contract' requires that
female lawbreakers be rendered domesticated, feminine and/or sick and
such interpellation is achieved through the technology of muting. In
the context of criminal justice, muting occurs when defendants are
subjected to a formal justice which encourages self-expression but
experience this as a substantive injustice, which denies self-expression.
Just as the law applies, in theory, equally to ailciasses but the working
classes are routinely criminalised more frequently than the middle
classe c
 Box, 1983; Messerschmidt, 1987), so similarly, women have the
same formal rights to representation and medical examination as men, yet
women - and particularly working-class women - are substantively
disadvantaged. The reasons for this are that:
1 since the world of crime is male-dominated, women entering that
world are immediately threatening and likely to be labelled as failed
women;
2) the court-room is a public and 'masculine' arena where inter-
action must be audible, rationalisable and adversarial;
3 the personnel most familiar with the workings of the court are
predominantly white, middle-class, professional and male.
From their own accounts, it is apparent that the women studied here
experienced the criminal justice system as bewildering, degrading and
unjust. Yet their attempts to cope with it were characterised by
neither total acceptance nor outright rejection of the treatment they
received and the descriptions with which they were labelled. Rather,
their attempts were characterised by accommodation - by a mixture of
self-blame and suppressed anger, translated into a variety of petty
resistances and rituals which might be conceived of as either 'shifting
the signs' (Foucault, 1975) of the gender contract with a degree of
agency or, alternatively, as 'minor deviations. ...(which)....nurture the
confined soul' (Ardener, 1978: 29). These simple acts,
	 because
of the narrowness of the stage on which they are enacted, are of
absorbing interest to the characters involved, but exert little
influence on those who have the power to write the play.
Three mechanisms were employed by the women studied to 'shift the
signs of the 'gender contract':
(1) Elusiveness. By physically failing to keep appointments (and
by using legitimate domestic responsibilities and/or sickness as excuses!
reasons the women escaped control by ironicising the constraints of
femininity. At the same time, they further exploited the contradictions
of the 'gender contract' by being grateful. By expressing appreciation
for all the help that had been offered and for the sympathetic treatment
received, s me of the women escaped control by disarming their would-be
controllers. Like Pauline, they could say that everyone had been
'wonderful' - and carry on shoplifting'
(2) Making demands. The alternative to avoiding contact and being
emotionally elusive by being grateful was to make constant demands and
become a 'nuisance' to the system. Pauline's probation officer puts it
succinctly:
'If I'm not available she's very hurt and upset....
very angry because (she thinks) I should be
there....I've told her she's like a baby - wants
a feed, cries and demands it now - and that's
not reality.'
But, of course, it is reality for these women, and one way in which they
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can struggle to defy description is by demanding the attention of a
system (and a society) which claims to care but which, in fact, is
dismissive (cf. Carlen, 1983).
It could, however, be argued that these resistances and rituals are
merely 'defences of the weak' (Mathiesen, 1972), achieving little that
is constructive for women. Certainly they may succeed in confusing
others, but may it not be that the price which they pay is that they
also confuse themselves? In their efforts to avoid the contract, were
they any nearer to identifying what they did want or how they might
achieve that? In the midst of this confusion, it appeared that some of
the women were able to identify what Maureen termed 'ways round' the
contract which also produced more tangible benefits for the women
themselves:
(3) The creation of small scale pleasures: Working, Socialising
and Helping Yourself. The importance to the women's self-esteem of having
some working identity beyond domesticity was clear. Pauline said of her
part-time job:
'I don't seem to get the stresses when I'm working,
because it's an outlet.'
As will be seen in Chapter Seven, the value of Community Service for
Janet and Carol lay in the opportunity it provided to do a job well,
outside their own homes, and to receive some appreciation for it. Having
a legitimate reason for mixing with other women was also important for
some of the women. Gwen found that she benefitted from the weekly
needlework classes arranged by her social worker, partly because she
enjoyed the opportunity for creativity and partly because 'It gets me
out'. Veronica was fortunate in having friendly neighbours:
'I go to the two girls over the road, if I'm
depressed or feel like drinking. If I go and
have half an hour with them, that helps.'
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For Maureen, there was only one solution:
'You've got to face reality.... - you can face
reality if you want to. It's how you feel
inside - don't let them pull you back. And that
is what I've done and, you know, it's been
marvellous, it really has been marvellous.'
The attempts of these women to assert themselves and to take some control
of their lives were steps which the women had discovered for themselves
and they were all the more precious for that. They represented their
struggle to resist the constraints of both the ideological and the
material conditions of their existence, which converged to confine them
within domesticity, sexuality and pathology. By doing contradictory
things and exploiting the contradictions of the 'gender contract' these
women were rendering themselves 'nondescript' and could be seen as
having taken the first steps towards breaking out of such confines.
Alternatively, these steps could be seen as small solutions to vast
problems because they created more problems than they resolved, both for
the women and for those who were charged with rehabilitating them to
descriptiveness, (but who were themselves confined within contradictory
discourses - see Chapter Two).
It is a central argument of this thesis that the consequence of
'nondescriptiveness' is that women are frequently placed on probation.
This is not primarily because probation officers are any more successful
in defining these particular female lawbreakers than are any other
judicial, medical or welfare personnel, but because the discourse and
practice of probation is assumed to be capable of accommodating
nonclescriptiveness. As David Millard (1982) argues, the Probation
Service has traditionally represented 'institutionalised ambivalance'
in the criminal justice system. It has positively encouraged courts to
be uncertain. Much has happened in the past five years to challenge
that view of the probation order but little attention has been paid to
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the consequences of that challenge for women like those in this study.
The relationship between 'nondescriptiveness' and probation discourse
and practice is therefore taken up again in Chapter Seven of this thesis.
Before then, Chapters Four, Five and Six examine the ways in which
magistrates, solicitors and psychiatrists are themselves confined within
the discourses and practices which serve both to mute and to limit these
particular female lawbreakers, in their struggle to shift the signs of
the 'gender contract'.
135.
CHAPTER FOUR
MAGISTRATES: EXPFRTS IN COMMON SENSE
Introduction
In the preceding chapter, the fifteen women on whom this study is
based have been introduced. Official accounts of their circumstances
and their lawbreaking have been juxtaposed with their own accounts and
the discourses within which attempts are made to construct them as
'normal' women have been identified. It has been argued that these
discourses of femininity - domesticity, sexuality and pathology - which
together constitute the 'gender contract' have, nevertheless, failed to
describe these women adequately. Instead, they only succeed in exerting
any control over these women by rendering them muted. Within the
criminal justice system, these women are muted by being subject to a
formal justice which encourages self-expression but which they
experience as a substantive injustice which denies self-expression. In
the male-d minated world of crime, women are immediately threatening and
are likely to be labelled as failed women. The courtroom itself is a
public and arguably 'masculine' arena where interaction must be audible,
rationalisable and adversarial; the personnel most fami1iar with its
workings are predominantly white, middle-class, professional and male.
This chapter and those which follow (Chapters Four to Seven)
examine the 'chain of signification' which results in the muting of
nondescript women. Each chapter analyses the utterances of particular
courtroom personnel. It identifies the origin of their authority to know
and speak about female lawbreakers, the rules governing that speech, the
programmes, technologies and strategies which circumscribe their
practices, and the consequences of their discourses for the women in
this study. It is argued that these personnel are all agents of
signification by virtue of their privileged status within the courtroom.
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The source of that privilege is:
(a) the law itself, which defines and regulates the rights and
capacities of such agents to intervene in (and construct) the field of
social relations (episteme) in which subjects move (Hirst, 1980);
(b) the differential class-based capacities of those agents (for
example, superior education, speech, dress).
However, just as it has been contended that existing discourses about
female crime have vainly sought the 'essence' or 'truth' about female
lawbreakers, so there is a need to recognise that the doctrine of
'sovereignty' (see Chapter One) serves to mask incoherence and inconsis-
tency in the practices of what Hirst calls 'differential agencies of
decision' (Hirst, 1980: 68). The administration of criminal justice is
only one of several processes whereby particular activities arising from
particular social relations are defined and regulated in a particular way
by particular agencies within the state. It is therefore misleading
when the doctrine of sovereignty represents the criminal process as the
expression of a sovereign will.
Even in a state with a constitutional monarchy, although sovereignty
is symbolised by the monarch, it is purported to reside in 'the people',
who are represented in the law-making and law-enforcing institutions of
the state (i.e. Parliament, local councils, the courts). As Hirst argues,
'The state can thus be thought of and held to be
a unity, as a single, homogenized and hierarchized
medium, of a will that emanates from its centre.'
(1980: 69)
But there is within this representation a serious and crucial paradox.
In a democratic state, the notion of sovereignty is problematic for it
implies absolutism and totalitarianism. It is therefore necessary to
characterise sovereignty as 'accomodating difference', as being able to
balance differences of interest and opinion in a way that will render it
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ideologically acceptable to and recognisable by the majority of the
state's subjects. To do this the administration of criminal justice,
olthough defined and regulated by law, must be seen to be to some extent
independent of that law. For justice to be seen to be done the law must
be seen to be administered by agents who draw their authority from
discourses which are 'outside' and therefore beyond the control of the
law. These agents are seen to have the capacity to challenge the
absolutist tendency of the law. For example, doctors are seen to be
able to challenge the law's basic premise that all subjects are equally
responsible for their actions or equally fit to receive its punishment;
social workers are seen to be able to remind the law of its responsibility
towards the welfare and rehabilitation of the subject, as well as his
punishment; solicitors are seen to be able to preserve the rights of the
subject in the face of the seemingly overwhelming assertion of the rights
of the state; and, finally, lay magistrates and jurors are seen to be
able to safeguard the interests of the whole community against the abuse
of the power of the law by any of the other agencies of decision.
The rights of these agencies to intervene in the administration of
criminal justice are frequently represented as being inherent in the
notion of 'natural justice'. There is an assi.inption that there exists
an entity called 'the community' which, although it consists of widely
differing interests can ultimately accommodate that difference in a
natural sovereign consensus, which is reflected in the administration of
justice, rather than being constructed by it. But the rights of these
agencies to intervene are neither self-evident nor natural. They do not
inhere in any general notion of 'citizenship' or 'community'. They are
themselves defined and regulated by law. The specialists, the experts
(and this includes magistrates, as is demonstrated in this chapter) do
not possess any natural right to control, supervise or judge the actiws
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of others, nor do they have unlimited or unfettered competence (or
capacity) to do so. As Hirst argues,
'Law defines the status of the specialist practices
and sets limits to the powers of the agents and
institutions involved.'
(1980: 92)
Agents are ascribed certain statuses within the courtroom, the concept of
'status' consisting of both rights and capacities. The problematic
nature of status in magistrates' courts lies in:
a) the extent to which experts derive their status from outside
the courtroom and
b) how that status is structured or restructured within the courtroom,
i.e. what strands of 'knowledge' are sanctioned and what bits are
excluded as inappropriate. For example, it will be argued below that
whilst a woman magistrate may be recruited to ensure a 'balance of the
sexes', she is prohibited from expressing her 'femaleness' in her practice
on the Bench. Similarly, whilst a solicitor may recognise the material
aetiology of much crime, the expression of such 'knowledge' is deemed to
be 'inappropriate' to his status as a speaker of strictly legal discourse.
The probation officer, on the other hand, who is allowed to talk of
material deprivation, is deemed not to understand the complexities of
legal discourse. Thus it is possible, by fragmenting the ascribed rights
and capacities of the experts, to ensure the perpetual reproduction of
difference and contradiction in a way which renders the challenge to
sovereignty ineffective, whilst simultaneously representing that
difference as an essential characteristic of the sovereignty of 'the
people'.
What Chapters Four to Seven will elucidate are the mechanisms whereby
female lawbreakers are constructed by agents of signification within the
known parameters of existing discourse, in ways which ensure that new
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knowledge about them can be constantly rejected - not because of the
abuse of status by individual experts, but because the legitimate
exercise of status overdetermines its rejection. Whilst acknowledging
that this process of construction takes place in relation to both men
and women lawbreakers, it is argued that these two categories of subjects
are constructed differently and that acknowledgement of this difference
is itself one aspect of the 'new' knowledge which is constantly rejected.
For example, despite at least a decade of interest in the differential
treatment of women by the criminal justice system, it remains possible
in 1985 for an eminent criminologist to write what will doubtless become
a standard text for penology courses, with barely a mention of female
lawbreakers. Further, he offers the following justification in his
Preface for the omission:
'Some readers may wonder why women are not included
as a special category in (this book). If this were
a text-book of criminology they would be; the
differences between the sexes' law-breaking are an
important topic. The law of sentencing, however,
makes hardly any distinction between them....
Sentencers are said to be readier to mitigate
penalties in the case of women, although even this
tendency can be exaggerated, as Farrington and
Morris (1983) showed. On the whole, however, it
seemed best to make points of this sort in the
relevant context, and not in a rather scrappy
special chapter.'
(Walker, 1985: vi - emphases added)
Such a statement amounts to an outright dismissal of the relevance of
examining even the possibility of differential treatment of men and
women. Such a dismissal is achieved by a complex of mechanisms.
First, it is suggested that what is of real interest in relation to
women is the aetiology of their law-breaking, rather than the consequences,
interpretation and treatment of it.
Second, because the law of sentencing makes few distinctions between
the sexes, it is asserted that the practice of sentencing makes none
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either. Yet this assertion is supported, according to Walker, by a piece
of research (Farrington and Morris, 1983) which has also been interpreted
as demonstrating that the insistence on formal equality between the sexes
in conditions of material inequality amounts to discrimination.
Third, the author denies that this book is, in any case, the
'relevant context' in which to 'make points of this sort'. (Yet if not
here, where?)
Fourth, it is implied that any attempt to examine the issue would
inevitably (though why?) be 'rather scrappy'; that is, inferior to the
rest of the book which is about 'real' crime and 'real' criminals - in
other words, about men.
This chapter begins to expose the groundlessness of Walker's
arguments by analysing the utterances of lay magistrates. But it does not
take for granted the ascribed status of lay magistrates. Instead, the
chapter analyses not only what magistrates say but also the authority
which they claim for what they say and the consequences for those about
whom they say it. In short, the empirical magistrate is relocated
within a theoretical discourse. It is argued that:
Magistrates' discourse in general is constituted by the
ideology of common sense and the material conditions of a
privileged existence. Additionally, women magistrates are
required simultaneously to claim and deny similarity with
female lawbreakers.
This reconstruction is made under the following headings:
The Origin of Magistrates' Authority: The Ideology of Amateur
Justice.
The Rules Governing Magistrates' Discourse: The Appeal of Common Sense.
Gender-Neutral Justice? Magisterial Common Sense and the Woman Defendant.
Sisters in Law? Women Judging Women.
141.
The Origin of Magistrates' Authority: The Ideology of Amateur Justice
Although the roots of amateur justice go back to the thirteenth
century 'keepers of the peace', the judicial aspect of justices' work did
not assume the form that we know today until the nineteenth century, with
the passing of the Summary jurisdiction Act of 1848 (Burney, 1979).
Whilst the purpose of this Act was to formalise and regulate the power
of magistrates (for example, by establishing rights of public access
and the right of the accused to be represented by a lawyer), the
experience of surmnary justice has come to be characterised by the
sacrifice of many of the attributes of the ideology of law, legality and
a fair trial, in the interests of speed and efficiency. This sacrifice
is usually justified on the grounds that magistrates deal only with
'trivial' matters but triviality, like beauty, is in the eye of the
beholder, and may ultimately derive less from the nature of the offences
and penalties of the magistrates' courts than from the triviality in
authoritative eyes of the the defendants (McBarnet, 1981).
Despite the jaundiced view of magistrates' courts as conveyor belts
for the guilty pleas which constitute 95% of their caseload, it must be
admitted that the appointment of lay magistrates represents an explicit
statement about the need to safeguard the interests of 'the community'
against the abuse of the power of the law by 'experts', whether those be
legal, medical or social work experts. Sumary justice, it may be argued,
is not simply a quicker cheaper form of 'proper' justice; it has the
potential to be a qualitatively different form of justice, based on the
assumption that there exists an entity called 'the community' which,
although consisting of widely differing interests, can ultimately
accommodate that difference in a natural consensus.
What, then, are the characteristics and qualities required of
magistrates? In the course of interviewing magistrates, I was shown an
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'Interview Guide' for the selection of new magistrates. In this schedule
it was suggested that:
'It is necessary to....ensure a good balance of
representation on the Bench. For instance, there
must be a spread of ages, of both sexes, of socio-
economic and employment backgrounds, and even of
political persuasion, in addition to geographical
coverage, if the Bench is to be representative of
a true cross-section of the community.'
The personal qualities sought in a magistrate are those purported to
reside in the 'decent honest citizen' - 'stability, a balanced mentality,
and common sense' (Burney, 1979: 87).
The ideology of amateur justice therefore requires a minimum of
legality and expertise. The safeguard against the naked class justice
which might ensue from such an absence is the assumed existence of a
quality which crosses all barriers of class, age, race or gender - the
quality of common sense.
The Rules Governing Magistrates' Discourse
Common Sense Rules
'I like to think we use our common sense.'
(Magistrate 1 - female)
Lay magistrates are unique amongst courtroom personnel in disclaiming
professional expertise (cf. Bankowski et al., 1987). Few of the
magistrates I spoke to regretted the very limited nature of their formal
training. They had been content to learn the job by 'sitting next to
Nellie' and believed that they had at their disposal a resource more
valuable than legal, medical or sociological knowledge - the resource of
comori sense.
Magistrates appeal to comon sense in order to account for their
actions. In so doing, they make assumptions about 'what everyone knows'
to be self-evidently true (Carlen, 1976). They free themselves from any
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obligation to justify their actions on other, more 'professional' grounds.
By using the term 'common sense', magistrates make their activities
'visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practiral-purposes' (Garfinkel,
1968). They are, as ethnomethodological studies have demonstrated,
employing a procedural device which allows them to make sense of data
which has no inherent meaning or coherence. They are establishing rules
for handling such material and for minimising any challenge to their
handling of it.
One of the central characteristics of common sense is the assumption
of a 'reciprocity of perspectives' (Cicourel, 1968). As representatives
of the community, magistrates take it for granted that most 'ordinary'
people would have a similar experience of the immediate scene in question
if they were to change places with them. Consensus about law and order
issues is something which is assumed to exist amongst all decent folk,
regardless of their sex, age, class or political allegiance - regardless,
in short, of individual difference. Thus represented, common sense
becomes the metaphor for those statements which tend to be excluded as
invalid by experts and which, when uttered, tend to threaten the authority
of experts. It consists of all those crude, unrefined and challenging
statements which are unanswerable within expert discourse - like those
uttered by the magistrate who told me that she and her colleagues 'take
psychiatric reports with a pinch of salt'.
Common sense is an elusive and multi-faceted construct but its
unspoken goal is singular - the reproduction of consensus. Common sense
issensewhich is not only common because it is crude but because it is
purported to be held universally to be true and to be universally
applicable. It is common sense not only because it is the opposite of
nonsense and falsehood, but because it is 'sensed'. It is truth which is
not accessible to rational thought or argument. On the contrary, it is
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intuitive, instinctive and accessible only to the senses. It has to be
experienced. But this logically detracts from its universalisability,
for my experience is unique, as is yours. Yet, despite this acknowledged
difference, its appeal remains in its claim to be stating that which can
be recognised by everyone as describing truthfully their own lived
experience and which can always-already be inscribed upon the lived
experience of others.
'Comon-sense has its own necessity; it exacts its
due with the weapon appropriate to it, namely an
appeal to the "self-evident" nature of its claims
and considerations.
(Heidegger, 1949 in Burton & Carlen, 1979)
Comon sense may thus be portrayed comfortingly as the safeguard of
the criminal justice system, the champion of freedom, the check on expert
power. In a democratic society, if justice is no longer majestirial
(Hay, 1975) then at least it is not dictatorial. Its administration
appears to have become a very practical project - a matter of face-to-face
interaction and negotiation. The meaning of justice is reduced to the
individual consciousness of thousands of actors who daily play the
courtroom game. Conversely, the abstract concept of justice is
perceived as being no more than the aggregate of these atomistic inter-
actions.
legal Rules and Gender-Neutral Justice
But the administration of criminal justice is not a game (Carlen,
1976)and the legal and procedural rules governing it are not freely agreed
upon by the participants. Certain personnel are given more authority to
define than others and certain accounts have more credibility than others.
The common sense which magistrates claim to be universally recognisable by
all citizens is, rather, a specific discourse sanctioned by law and
elevated in practice to the status of 'expertise'. In short, majestirial
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justice has been replaced by magisterial common sense.
Carlen (1976) has argued that legal rules are portrayed as being
homogeneous, unproblematic, external, inevitable, essential and eternal.
In other words, they are portrayed as 'holding good' over time, across
localities and, more significantly, across the social divisions of class,
gender and race. Legal rules are therefore assumed to be gender-neutral
and the processing of female lawbreakers - with very few exceptions -
viewed as unproblematic. (Admittedly, only women can solicit or commit
infanticide, but then only men can comit rape or gross indecency.)
Magistrates are not, therefore, encouraged routinely to demonstrate
awareness or take account of differential circumstances and experiences
arising from the social construction of masculinity or femininity. The
following quotation illustrates the way in which magistrates can reconcile
notions of formal gender-neutrality with substantive gender-inequality by
portraying the latter as an irregular feature of women's lives, rather
than as the regular feature which, in reality, it is:
'W men are treated no differently from men, except
where there are domestic circumstances.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
Magisterial Coivinon Sense and the Woman Defendant
Magisterial comon sense is characterised by a denial of expertise
coupled with a claim to authority for statements which are assumed to
reflect public moral consensus. Despite explicitly disclaiming any legal,
medical or sociological understanding of crime, magistrates implicitly
draw selectively from all these and other perspectives in the construction
of their own privileged discourse. It is a discourse within which three
key myths may be identified as having important consequences for women
defendants:
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1. Through the process of self-disqualification magistrates simultaneously
deny and claim authority for what they say; the consequence for women
defendants is that they are rendered always-already invisible, inaccessible
and unknowable (yet forever known).
2. Through the invocation of the ostensibly gender-neutral concept of
individual merit magistrates simultaneously generalise and deny the
possibility of generalisation; the consequence for women defendants is
that they are rendered intractably heterogeneous.
3. Through the privileging of personal life experience magistrates
simultaneously claim and deny similarity with defendants; the consequence
for women defendants is that they are rendered like-yet-not-like women
magistrates.
Self-disqualification and the Invisible Woman Defendant
'I've dealt with very few women.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
Although women still constitute a small proportion of all defendants
appearing in courts, I found only one magistrate who was aware of any
increase in their numbers of recent years. On the whole, it still seems
to be women defendants' scarcity that characterises their image in the
minds of magistrates - they are underrepresented. It is hard to believe,
for example, that the following statement by a woman magistrate could
possibly be factually accurate:
'I've been a magistrate for ten years and I think
I've only had three or four women appearing before
me.'
(Magistrate 3 - female)
Other magistrates were less extreme in their estimates but, as Pat Carlen
(1983) found in Glasgow, most prefaced their remarks with disclaimers:
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'I'm not very helpful on women, I'm afraid.'
(Magistrate 4 with 18 years' experience - female)
'For some unknown, unexplained reason, my personal
dealings with female offenders have been extremely
limited.'
(Magistrate 5 - male)
Nine out of the twelve magistrates interviewed explicitly disquali-
fied themselves from being competent to speak about women defendants.
Those with relatively few years' service felt they lacked experience,
whilst those with longer service implied that women defendants were too
few to justify generalisation anyway. Thus it was made clear that
whatever views might subsequently be expressed by the interviewee, these
were based on no more than anecdotal evidence and were emphatically not
to be taken as authoritative statements.
So the first manifestation of magisterial comon sense in relation
to women defendants is an expressed emphasis on self-disqualification,
consequent on perceived lack of experience. That lack of experience
results from limited time in the job ('I've only been doing this work
for five years' , limited access to the material being studied ('I deal
mainly with juveniles and domestics'), or the elusiveness of such
material ('We don't see many women here'). In other words, women
defendants are not recognised by magistrates because they are invisible.
Alternatively, it might be argued that women defendants are invisible to
magistrates because they are not recognised as being 'real' criminals.
Women are 'out of place' in court (Worrall, 1981) and are routinely 'not
seen'. Those who do draw attention to themselves as a result of 'unusual'
offences, behaviour or personal circumstances are always-already marked
out as 'unfeminine'.
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Individual Merit and the Intractably Heterogeneous Woman Defendant
'You can't generalise - every case must be treated
on its own merit.'
(Magistrate 6 - male)
'In my opinion, it is important to stress that every
case brought before a magistrate is different, due
to the circumstances and background of the
defendant, whether they are male or female. I
believe that my judgment is based much more on the
individual rather than their sex.'
(Magistrate 7 - female)
'Every case is treated on its own merit - it's
such an individual thing.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
'Every case is treated individually and can never
be "generalised"....I would again stress that
every case must be treated on its own merit.'
(Magistrate 8 - female)
Since so few are 'seen' by them, it follows that magistrates claim
to be wary of generalising about women as a category of defendants. A
further contribution to this caution is made by the sentencing principle
of individualised justice (Pearson, 1976; Edwards, 1984). The practice
of seeking the most suitable sentence for a particular defendant has the
effect of depoliticising the personal circumstances of those appearing
in court. This effect becomes exaggerated in relation to women, since,
as has been seen in Chapters Two and Three, femininity is constructed
within the private and personal confines of domesticity, sexuality and
pathology. Even when women defendants are 'seen', they are not recognised
as sharing, or having in common, any conditions of existence that might
explain their lawbreaking activity - they are rendered intractably
heterogeneous.
The process of individualisation is ostensibly gender-neutral but
serves, in practice, to reinforce gender distinctions. If each case is
treated on its own merits - so the argument goes - it is not possible to
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generalise on the grounds of age, class, education or any other socio-
economic factor, including gender. Yet this is precisely what magistrates
do. Despite their denials they do demonstrate a sociological under-
standing of women's position in society and of the stereotypical role
expectations of women as wives and mothers. Some magistrates are
conscious of the oppressive nature of such role expectations but they are
also conscious of the contradictions between this sociological under-
standing and the formal gender-blindness of the law. The law does not
allow for the social construction of legal subjects. In order to reconcile
the contradictions between legal and social construction, the moral
concept of merit is invoked. The appeal to merit is one which is seen to
supercede these contradictions, for it is an appeal to the discourse of
morality - of right and wrong, good and bad. These are truths which are
held to be self-evident. Whether a defendant is a man or a woman, it is
assumed that the qualities of goodness and badness, the notions of
culpability and mitigation, free-will and determination, are also gender-
blind. Moral attributes, such as selfishness, callousness, responsibleness
and consideration, are deemed to be universally recognisable and con-
sensually definable. But the concept of 'merit' is itself socially
constructed within the ideologies of what constitutes 'meritorious'
conduct and these ideologies are themselves gender-related. What is seen
to constitute selfish and irresponsible behaviour in a man differs widely
from what is seen to constitute such behaviour in a woman. The
differential tolerance of drunkenness in men and women is but one example
of this (Otto, 1981).
Magistrates, in comon with the rest of us, are faced with the
problem of induction - how and when to move from specific to general
statements. The problem is exacerbated, however, because they feel
expressly discouraged from using theory to bridge that gap or to redefine
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the problem as being one of deduction. The construct of 'individual
merit' allows generalisations to be made at precisely the same time as the
possibility of their being made is denied. It provides the means whereby
magistrates can reconcile (or close the gap between) the specificity of
their own personal experience and the demands of their role. It enables
them to act and speak in ways which are just and equitable - that is,
generalisable. Thus the individualised, or intractably heterogeneous,
woman defendant is a myth, for, despite their denials, magistrates
routinely generalise about the women who appear before them.
Privileging Personal Life Experience and the Feminine Woman Defendant
'I feel sad to see a woman in the dock, but I put
it out of my mind.'
(Magistrate 6 - male)
'I do find difficulties ic this avea. The
appearance of a woman in court still upsets me a
little....I have to force myself to take an
objective view, which I admit would come much
more easily when trying a male offender.'
(Magistrate 7 - female)
Closely linked to the construct of 'individual merit' - indeed, it
may be seen as the opposite side of the same coin - is the mechanism of
'privileging personal life experience'. Magistrates are encouraged to
regard their own life experience as 'privileged' in the sense that they
are expected to draw on their own experience to inform their judients.
Thus their own personal life experience is ascribed special status within
the courtroo,. when the personal life experiences of other personnel are
considered irrelevant to the task in hand.
Most magistrates were only too aware of the dilemas posed by this
expectation that they were like-yet-not-like the defendants with whom they
dealt and they felt under an obligation to 'make sense' of their practices.
Some (both male and female) admitted feeling personally distressed by
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women defendants but felt obliged to suppress that instinctive response.
One magistrate implied that her own personal problems might have resulted
In her responding sympathetically to such women but she added, 'I can
switch off when I go into court'. The irony of such comments is that,
whilst magistrates are exhorted to use their common sense and trust their
intuition (conditioned, as it must be, by their life experience), certain
responses, nevertheless, have to be excluded, controlled or modified in
the search for 'objectivity'. Thus 'objectivity', which in most
discourses would be taken of necessity, to include logical, rational
argument and to exclude sensation, is somehow accommodated within
magisterial common sense, without posing a threat to it. This is possible
because what is being spoken of is not, in fact, objectivity but consensus.
What magistrates felt the need to suppress were those responses which they
perceived to be unacceptable to their colleagues. They were the
responses which might detract from or threaten consensus.
The privileging of personal life experience also allows magistrates
legitimately to challenge the assessments of those engaged in professional
discourses - to act as the Other intruding into the claims of sovereign
knowledge, (although, as I have already asserted, this act is a
masquerade, for magisterial common sense is itself a discourse). Never-
theless, magistrates are conscious of their power:
'I sit two weeks out of three on Wednesdays - I
don't like playing God too often.'
(Magistrate 1 - female)
She was alone in expressing reservations about this aspect of the role,
and another magistrate argued that:
'One is very dependent on the information one is
given, or is revealed, at the time of trial.'
(Magistrate 8 - female)
thus implying a certain powerlessness. Again, magisterial common sense
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allows for the reconciliation of such a contradiction - the simultaneous
exercise of power and its denial. It is not therefore surprising that
professional discourse - in particular, psychiatric and social work - met
with inconsistent responses. Dependence on reports which buttress common
sense discourse was acknowledged:
'I do appreciate a good overall report, physical,
intellectual, emotional and social. I have found
that well written, in depth reports can help
tremendously when considering sentence.'
(Magistrate 7 - female)
Psychiatric reports which comfortingly reassure magistrates that
'normal' women do not commit crime, and which conveniently reduce criminal
activity to female biology are welcomed:
'I would expect that psychiatric reports would
be of great help in sentencing women, due to the
points I have mentioned (about strains and
tensions of family life). Also, to the health
problems which are particularly relevant to
being a female. In saying this, however, these
reports and Social Inquiry Reports are of great
value in both men and women.'
(Magistrate 3 - female)
But the right to view the quality of that information through the
filter of magisterial common sense was considered the magistrates'
privilege and reports which challenged such a right were likely to be
dismissed. The merits or demerits of such information appeared to be
assessed according to a) personal knowledge of the author (cf. Carlen,
1976) and b) the extent to which the authority of the utterances could be
recognised or, as Edwards puts, the 'correct anticipation of "observers'
rules" (1984: 145). Thus experts may be ignored if they sound either
insufficiently or excessively 'expert':
'We take psychiatric reports with a pinch of
salt - we have to accept that they are the experts,
but some of the things they say are a bit way out -
we use our common sense.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
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As June Huntington (1981: 74) says:
'Even when an occupation has a relatively
undisputed "authority to know" its claims may
still be weak because the public denies any need
for that particular area of knowing. This would
appear to be the case with psychiatry.'
Probation Officers may be ignored if they appear too sympathetic towards
the defendant, and thus fail to meet the requirement for all courtroom
personnel to appear to be judicious:
'We find that probation officers sometimes bend
over backwards towards a defendant - we don't
always follow their recommendations.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
But personal acquaintance is very important:
'Social Inquiry Reports are excellent from
probation officers - and social workers. But
social workers don't give verbal evidence
well. We get to know probation officers - we
need to get to know social workers.
Psychiatrists - I know AA, and BB is a close
friend, so I trust them. But some from X -
well, CC always talked about sex - it was
ridiculous. I don't know DO, but she made a
bad impression on magistrates early on. She
seemed drunk - but she couldn't have been, in
her position.'
(Magistrate 4 - female)
It is essential that both reports and their authors are, therefore, (re)
presented in a recognisable way:
'Some magistrates don't like being told what to do
in reports - there are ways of putting things.'
(Magistrate 4)
Telling a magistrate what to do has the appearance of detracting from the
dignity or 'majesty' of the law and reducing the process to one of
personal conflict. But discovering the rules which will guarantee the
authority of the object of professional discourse to this particular
readership is a formidable task, for the very ground on which such rules
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should be based is constantly shifting. To 'each case on its own merit'
might well be added, 'each report received according to taste'. But is
the process quite so unpredictable and arbitrary?
The strategy employed by magistrates to accommodate their conflicting
responses to women defendants was one of targetting women into two groups -
those who it could be agreed merited compassion and those who did not.
The binary stereotyping of women defendants is well documented but its
strategic value to magistrates has been less well examined. In order to
act, despite the contradictions in their practices, magistrates draw on
their own life experience to decide whether or not they can define or
recognise the conditions which appear to explain or excuse women's
criminal activity. The key components in this targetting process are
a) the extent of woman's domestic responsibilities, b) the extent to which
her appearance, demeanour and life-style accord with sexual 'normality'
and c) the extent to which her problems can be pathologised and 'treated'.
In short, the woman defendant is constructed within the discourses of
DOMESTICITY, SEXUALITY and PATHOLOGY.
a) Domesticity
'Women are treated no differently from men, except
where there are domestic circumstances - that's
only natural.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
Two different arguments were propounded for the consideration by
magistrates of women's domestic responsibilities, although these were
frequently conflated. Firstly, domestic problems were seen to explain
or excuse female crime (which, of itself, was assumed to be unnatural).
Women might be reduced to breaking the law either directly by insuffer-
able husbands ('Women aren't naturally criminal - it's the men that force
them into it'), or indirectly by the pressures of family life:
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'A married woman, and especially a mother, is the
keystone of the family and is subject to great
strains and tensions, particularly if in a "one
parent family" situation or when the husband is
unemployed. This could push a woman into crime
particularly, in my opinion, shoplifting or
attempting to obtain benefits to which she would
not be entitled.'
(Magistrate 8 - female)
Domestic problems may also lead to alcohol abuse which, in turn, was
recognised as an explanation of crime - provided either that treatment
was being sought (and the problem could thus be pathologised) or that
the shaky hand was still rocking the cradle! (cf. Curlee, 1968 in Otto,
1981).
'A woman stabbed her husband in a pub recently -
we were lenient because she was going to have
treatment for her alcohol problem.'
(Magistrate 6 - male)
'Alcoholism is increasing in women. We dealt with
a woman who was drunk in charge of a child in a
pub. I thought - it's better than leaving the
baby at home''
(Magistrate 4 - female)
Secondly, domestic responsibilities were also important in the
mitigation of sentence. The effect of a sentence on a woman's family was
often considered more important than the effect on the woman herself.
Imprisoning women with children was agreed to be a very last resort,
primarily because of the consequences for the children:
'Trying and sentencing a mother has its problems
for me because I look at her situation, taking
into account the effect upon her family.'
(Magistrate 7 - female)
'In cases where women have in their care babies
or young children, I feel that magistrates explore
every possible sentence other than imprisonment.'
(Magistrate 8 - female)
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Despite this, there are some 1600 children with mothers in prison (NACRO,
1986) and thai is not, perhaps, surprising when one considers the irony
of this remark from one woman magistrate:
tlhe governor at one women's prison told me once,
"Women should come here for at least six months,
then we can train them to be good mothers and
they're grateful".'
Motherhood, per se, does not protect women from imprisonment and
magistrates do not take kindly to women whom they perceive to be 'black-
mailing' them with their domestic responsibilities (Walker, 1985). The
issue in question is whether or not the defendant is a good mother, that
is, conforming to conventional, middle class expectations of appropriate
motherhood and wifeliness (Edwards, 1985). Mothers who commit crimes
are, almost by definition, bad mothers who need training to be good
mothers. Ironically, such training may require their removal from the
site of mothering to a site of punishment. In order, on the one hand, to
disrupt the sequence of mothering minimally, 'punishment' should be kept
to a minimum. On the other hand, to improve the technical quality of
mothering, 'training' needs to be extensive. Pat Carlen (1983) discovered
that these ironies are not lost on those women who experience them and
that their typical response was not one of conspicuous gratitude.
b) Sexuality
'A woman in charge of an office who cooks the books
gets no sympathy from me - I treat her like a man.'
(Magistrate 9 - male)
The corollary of marking positively (Ardener, 1978) women defendants
with domestic responsibilities is marking negatively those without them.
Within this latter category, two groups appeared to receive little
sympathy from magistrates. Young single women who committed offences in
company posed a threat to conventional images of femininity and challenged
157.
magistrates' authority:
'They don't give reasons - just shrug their
shoulders.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
Such 'dumb insolence' was not expected from women defendants since it did
not accord with stereotypical expectations of women as guilt-ridden and
anxious to please. Defiance manifested in dress, posture or speech is
typically a masculine attribute and women who displayed such an attitude
risked alienating magistrates whose personal life experience did not
equip them to 'identify with' such a lack of femininity.
Similarly, older women in positions of authority in their work were
unlikely to be viewed as meriting compassion. Like women magistrates,
they had entered a public world dominated by men. Whilst their
aggressiveness and competitiveness were seen as more legitimate than the
defiance of younger defendants, the price they had to pay for breaking
the law was that of being treated (by implication more harshly) 'like a
man'.
Criminal activity that could not be attributed to domestic
responsibility tended to be viewed as an expression of sexuality or, more
specifically, a lack of femininity. Certain crimes were identified as
'women's' crimes. Shoplifting, soliciting, Social Security fraud and
embezzlement could be recognised as gender role expressive (Edwards 1985).
Other crimes were less acceptable:
'I think that perhaps in the past, women did receive
more sympathy from courts than men, but with the
increasing number of women appearing for various
crimes, particularly those usually committed by men,
I think their attitude is changing.'
(Magistrate 8 - female)
As Heidensohn (1985: 94) observes, 'offences which have apparently
nothing to do with sexuality are - when committed by women - transformed
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into expressions of female sexuality or the lack of it'.
c) Pathology
'We ask for reports more often on women - they
often have problems of "change of life" or
medication.'
(Magistrate 6 - male)
Closely associated with the image of women defendants as 'sexual' is
a further assumption that they are 'sick'. As we have seen, magistrates
are fairly sceptical about psychiatric diagnoses and, consequently, those
I interviewed did not feel they had come across much 'proper' mental
illness amongst women defendants. Nevertheless, the ascription of what
might be described as 'sub-psychiatric' medical conditions to women
defendants was widespread.
It has been argued in Chapters Two and Three that, in the construction
of femininity, the 'normal' female body and mind are perceived as being
pre-disposed to malfunction. Menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and the
menopause all result in 'hormonal imbalance' - a phrase which connotes
that women may themselves be 'imbalanced' during those times. This
principle of 'periodicity' (Luckhaus, 1985) implies that there are times
when the mood and behaviour of even the 'normal' woman is likely to be so
adversely affected by her biology that any subsequent criminal activity
may be regarded as at least partially consequent on it and excused by it.
The dilemma posed for lay magistrates is that of assessing the eligibility
of a woman defendant for inclusion in this 'excused' category. Is this
particular woman 'genuinely' unbalanced and disturbed or is she a
malingerer? Because of the 'periodic' nature of her alleged disturbance,
it is quite possible for any woman to appear 'normal' in court whilst
claiming that she was 'abnormal' at the time of her offence. To resolve
this socio-legal conundrum, magistrates have to rely on information
supplied by 'experts' in medical and social inquiry reports. But
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magistraten reserve the riqht to use their common sense to evaluate the
information provided by experts and even when the expert has a
relatively undisputed 'authority to know' - as a psychiatrist undoubtedly
does - his claims may still be weak because common sense denies any need
for that particular area of knowing (Huntington, 1981). Information
from general practitioners and probation officers was generally accorded
more respect by magistrates than that from psychiatrists:
'Older women give medical reasons, produce a doctor's
certificate. We have to take that into account
because doctors don't write those lightly.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
'I think we pay more attention to what the
probation officer says than the psychiatrist -
they seem to state the obvious.'
(Magistrate 1 - female)
The discourse of pathology reinforces beliefs about the natural
contrariness of women and about women being 'at the mercy of their raging
hormones' Luckhaus, 1985).
IlTçlications for Sentencing
Although magistrates believed that they tried hard not to send women
to prison, they were not enthusiastic advocates of alternative disposals.
Domestic responsibilities were seen to preclude most women defendants
from doing Community Service and one magistrate expressed a novel
variation on that theme:
'Community Service is usually done in someone's
spare time - women don't have any!'
(Magistrate 6 - male)
This comment could be seen as reinforcing a view expressed to me by a
probation officer responsible for selecting candidates for Community
Service, that a woman might be rejected where it was felt that her
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husband would object to her being out of the home on a Sunday and thus
impose additional domestic pressure on her. Alternatively, it could be
seen as reflecting a deeper concern about the justice of requiring
society's largest group of unpaid workers to perform even more 'voluntary'
work as punishment (Dominelli, 1984). Women's lack of financial
competence also embarrassed magistrates (Carlen, 1983) and presented
difficulties in the imposition of fines. The absence of an independent
income frequently meant that a woman's fine would have to be paid by her
husband, although some magistrates felt this to be no bad thing, especially
in the case of television licence offences.(1)
'In some cases it should be the husbands in
court - when it's TV licence or leaving the
wife without money.'
(Magistrate 10 - male)
Unsurprisingly, the sentence most favoured by magistrates for women
was the probation order, since this offered the least disruption to a
woman's domestic situation and enabled her problems to be individualised
and pathologised. Probation was invariably advocated on 'welfare'
grounds Eat n, 1985) and little consideration seemed to be given to the
implications of such a sentence for a woman's position on the sentencing
'tariff'. Recent attempts by the Probation Service to raise the tariff
weighting of probation orders and render them credible as direct alter-
natives to custody for more serious offenders (Home Office, 1984) were
implicitly regarded as irrelevant to women, who were assumed to be
characteristically 'one-off' offenders rather than recidivists (Pearson,
1976). The consequence for women who do reoffend, however, may be to
(2)
escalate their progress up an already truncated tariff 	 towards a
custodial sentence, regardless of the severity (or lack of severity) of
their offences.
Together, the discourses of domesticity, sexuality and pathology
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provide a complex of excusing and mitigating explanations of female crime
which was accepted fairly uncritically by the male magistrates I inter-
viewed. The women magistrates, however, appeared to experience a much
greater degree of ambivalence and discomfort in relation to women
defendants and this was recognised by one or two of their more perceptive
male colleagues:
'Women offenders are different physically and
emotionally - more complex. I don't understand
them as well as women magistrates do. But women
magistrates are sometimes harder - perhaps they
feel that women who offend have let the side down.'
(Magistrate 6 - male)
Sisters in Law? Women Judging Women
Women magistrates are socially constructed within a number of
discourses, in such a way that they can claim to be both similar to (for
the purposes of special and authoritative understanding) and different
from (for the purposes of sentencing) women defendants. They may be
located within two definitional sites. Firstly, as women in positions
of authority over other women, they may be regarded as 'wise women'
(Heidensohn, 1985: 167). Alongside women prison officers, women nurses
and women social workers (including women probation officers), they stand
between the demands of the patriarchal state and the mass of women on
whom those demands are made, translating 'expert knowledge' into 'common
sense' for the consumption of the always-already failing women (Hutter
and Williams, 1981) (see also Chapters Two and Three). Secondly, as
magistrates they are part of the complex machinery of control (Carlen,
1976; Pearson, 1980), which characterises 'amateur justice' (Burney, 1979).
The deconstruction of the 'women judging women' complex therefore involves
the excavation of a number of layers of social relations. The foundation
of the relationship lies deeper than moral outrage consequent on a sense
of womanhood betrayed
	 and spotlights the interplay of class and gender
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issues in the courtroom.
Images of Women Magistrates
'We're told that we're representing the Queen, and
I think some of them feel they need to look like her!'
(Magistrate 11 - female)
'None of us women magistrates wear hats - we're
unique, I think! I won't wear one. I get confused
in a hat. My head gets hot and I get hopeless.'
(Mrs. Christian Annersley, in Blythe (1969) Akenfield, p. 251)
It is not difficult to conjure up a mental picture of a 'typical'
woman magistrate (cf. Pearson, 1980). She is white, middle-aged to
elderly, middle - or upper-class, the wife of a local dignitary or a
retired headmistress. She may or may not have children of her own but
she knows how they should be reared. She will invariably have 'done good'
and wear a hat! Yet, as Mrs. Annersley's account of her work indicates,
this was not a totally accurate picture even twenty years ago. Whilst
the women I interviewed could all be described as 'typical' in their age,
class and background, they were neither rigid nor ignorant in their
opinions and gave the impression of wanting to understand crime and women
criminals in particular. They recognised that their personal life
experience was privileged, in the socio-econoinic sense of the word, and
that this sometimes restricted the usefulness of 'privileging' that
experience in the sense of using it to inform their judgments. They were
certainly not incapable of sympathising and identifying with the problems
experienced by the women appearing before them but, at the end of the day,
they felt obliged to regard women defendants as 'not like us' because the
consequences of any alternative interpretation were too painful to
contemplate. Those consequences would threaten the all-important notion
of consensus to which magisterial common sense is committed. Over-
identification by women magistrates with the oppression of women
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defendants might oblige women magistrates to challenge the dominance
of thrir male colleaqties on the Benrh. So whilst a woman magistrate may
be recruited to ensure a 'balance of the sexes', she is prohibited by
the imperative of consensus from fully expressing her 'femaleness' in
her practice on the Bench. The 'knowledge' about women defendants which
she is authorised to have by reason of her own status as a woman magistrate
is rendered inferior and inappropriate by reason of her subordination
to male magistrates. If 'real' criminals are men, then 'real' magistrates
are also men, and the women who invade the public space of the courtroom
in positions of power and authority are expected to emulate the qualities
of reason, 'objectivity' - and sexism - demonstrated by their male
colleagues.
What then are the conditions which determine relationships which
women magistrates have a) with their male colleagues and b) with women
defendants'
Achieving Consensus and the Simultaneous Recognition and Denial of
Difference
'We think of ourselves as a nice team.'
Mrs. Christian Annersley)
Lay magistrates are selected both for their differences and for
their ability to 'get on' with each other. They are, in theory at least,
expected to demonstrate that they are:
'moderate, fair and conscientious: decent people
picked for their ability to get on with other
decent people.'
(Burney, 1979: 212)
Yet, precisely because magistrates are encouraged to rely on their own
experiences and senses, the scope for conflict between them would, at
first sight, appear to be considerable. An outsider might question the
extent of material and ideological difference existing between magistrates
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(Hood, 1962; Baldwin & Bottomley, 1978) but there is a high level of
'felt' or perceived difference amongst magistrates themselves.
'We get a wide spread of occupations on our Bench.'
(Magistrate 1 - female)
Yet though this view was endorsed by most magistrates I interviewed they
all put emphasis upon the relative ease with which consensus was
achieved, despite these differences. Difference was recognised but only
to be cast aside!
'I venture to suggest that this is one of the
strengths of the Bench - that it is comprised of
men and women of different opinions who
eventually make a unanimous decision.'
(Magistrate 12 - female)
'We usually all agree. I've not been in a
situation of real conflict.'
(Magistrate 8 - female)
The point here is that, whilst magistrates normally sit in threes - a
system de igned to accommodate the expression of differing opinions -
they routinely experience the system as one of agreement or consensus.
This is particularly significant for women magistrates who feel prohibited
from even expressing certain of their instinctive responses because they
may be 'too personal' and 'too individualised' to be acceptable to their
male colleagues. Such inhibition led one woman magistrate to protest
(too loudly'
'We have a wonderful relationship on our Bench -
we don't mind whom we sit with. There's no
different between men and womer on the Bench -
the women can be just as fierce.'
(Magistrate 2 - emphasis added)
Thus women magistrates who can sublimate or deny their womanhood are
celebrated, for magisterial common sense, the guardian of public
morality can thus claim to be gender-neutral in practice and in law. But
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gender-neutrality is a myth and the imperative of consensus ultimately
robs magisterial common sense of the power that might result from genuine
gender conflicts. The guardians of public morality are either men, or
those women who will accept a male-defined consensus. The only personal
life experience which is, in reality, given special status or authority
in the courtroom is that of male magistrates. It is not then surprising
that women magistrates exercise caution in their judgments of women
defendants.
Women Defendants: Like-us-yet-not-like-us
Whilst the male magistrates I interviewed were relatively content
to attribute female crime to domestic strains and responsibilities, the
women magistrates tended to expect women either to accept their lot and
make the best of it, or to be more 'rational' and discriminating in the
remedies they sought. There was no lack of understanding of the
difficulties:
'I was on a baby-battering case. With all my
children, I know what a strain it must be
without a supportive husband....'
(Magistrate 4 - female)
but these were not accepted as excusing conditions. Another woman
magistrate echoed the sentiment:
'I can understand a young mother without a
supportive husband getting desperate - but not
hitting little babies. Why don't they take it
out on their husbands?'
(Magistrate 3)
Why indeed? One may well ask. The dilemma for these magistrates was
that their own experiences, on which they were relying, did not equip
them fully to understand the woman defendant because common sense does
not allow for different material circumstances. Yet they felt unable to
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go beyond that experience to recognise the validity of generalisable
statements about power relations within the family. Magisterial common
sense requires that the unspoken common condition of this contradiction
(namely, power relations) be excluded, or at least only partially expressed.
Thus, in the last instance quoted the magistrate recognises the power
relation between mother and child while refusing to acknowledge the
effectivity of that between husband and wife.
Even more ambivalence was expressed by women magistrates about the
attribution of the criminal activity of women to their biology. In this,
they were not expressing concern about the dangers for all women of the
'medicalisation' of women's behaviour, nor were they arguing that such
reductionism
'impugns the integrity of the female actor,
stripping her action of cultural and political
meaning and anaesthetising the social and economic
origin and conditions in which that action takes
place.'
(Luckhaus, 1985)
Rather, such conditions were excluded because the magistrates had not -
or claimed to have not - experienced such conditions for themselves:
'Menopause is used frequently as a defence - I'm
not very sympathetic. I tell my male colleagues,
I'll let them know what really happens when it
happens to me....Pre-menstrual tension - my girls
don't seem to suffer....'
(Magistrate 4 - emphases added)
'As a woman and mother of three grown-up daughters,
I believe that women have to recognise and accept
any variations in their behaviour due to the
menstrual cycle, and not use this as an excuse.'
(Magistrate 12)
The ability of women defendants to touch very primitive emotions of
sadness and sympathy in women magistrates is a taboo subject. It is not
something to be shared and examined, but to be hidden away and denied
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hernune it i too threatening to the dominant ideologies about crime,
justice and masculinity.
Discussion about women defendants was thus foreclosed by women
magistrates with the symbolic phrase, 'I can understand but....' The
shared condition of female experience was recognised but such a
recognition represented the challenge of the Other - the disruptive
intrusion of an alternative, non-legitimated mode of lived experienced.
Such a challenge must be confronted and controlled. So the moment of
recognition passes and the space for negotiation opened up by the
challenge is re-closed.
The women magistrates I spoke to were not the female equivalents of
'Disgusted, Tonbridge Wells'. They were women who felt confused about
the extent to which they could claim to understand other women. They
were women who often did understand, but who did not trust their own
understanding. They seemed to feel acutely that they were living in a
man's world and that they must locate themselves in a symbolic universe
of meanings that were empirically grounded in male, rather than female
experience.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that the relationship
between magistrates and defendants is constructed within a discourse of
comon sense which, despite its inherent paradoxes and discontinuities,
is represented as a consistent and coherent unity. Although magisterial
common sense may appear to challenge and transgress 'expert' discourse,
it is in fact a competing discourse of 'expertise'. In relation to women
defendants, it is characterised by a three-fold myth:
1. That magistrates are disqualified from knowing anything about women
defendants because knowledge accrues through experience and, since women
defendants are always-already invisible, they are inaccessible to the
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annoen HrId therefore unknowuble (yet forever known).
2. That magistrates can never generalise about women defendants
women, because the law is blind to differences of gender (as of class,
age, race etc.); they treat every case 'on its merit' and see women
defendants as intractably heterogeneous.
3. That magistrates can always reach a consensus about women defendants
both because of, and despite the social, economic, political or,
specifically, gender differences of their personal life experiences, these
differences being hailed (at the point of recruitment to the Bench) and
denied (at the point of judgment) in the interests of justice.
These judicial myths have been challenged and it has been argued that:
1. All magistrates act 'as though' they have knowledge of women
defendants, that knowledge emanating from cultural stereotypes of
appropriate female behaviour and being reinforced by their own socially
and discursively privileged personal life experience.
2. All magistrates invoke the ostensibly gender-neutral moral concept of
merit to justify treating women defendants qua women differently from
male defendants, since meritorious conduct in men and women is
differentially defined.
3. Women magistrates suppress their empathetic understanding of women's
position in society because, having entered the masculine world of the
criminal justice system by virtue of their womanhood, their ability to
sustain their authority and credibility within it is dependent on their
denial of that womanhood. The judging of women by women magistrates is
seen to be doubly authoritative because women magistrates can root their
claim to an authoritative understanding of female lawbreakers in the
paradoxical claim that (with female lawbreakers) they themselves share a
biological experience common to all women without using it as an excuse
to break the law.
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Nevertheless, the analyses of this chapter suggest that a greater
understanding of women defendants by the magistracy might be achieved if
women magistrates felt more confident - and were allowed - to express
their genuinely differing perspectives and opinions. The structure for
such a richness and variety of contribution exists; what is lacking is
the will to experience the discomfort of conflict, especially when the
mechanism for achieving an apparent consensus - the appeal to and of
common sense - is so readily available. Women magistrates, like women
defendants, are socially constructed within the discourses of
domesticity, sexuality and pathology. The evidence of this chapter suggests
that though women magistrates and women defendants may indeed be 'sisters
in law', subject to a common gender oppression, they are not yet able
to fully recognise each other because of:
a) their class differences and
b) the judicial ideology that claims that law is both class and gender
neutral.
The judicial method for handling some of the inequalities outlined
in this chapter is the mechanism of legal representation and Chapter Five
will examine the assertion of one (male) magistrate that:
'It's easier when women are represented - or
have husbands with them.'
(Magistrate 10)
The chapter takes as its starting point the assumption that legal repre-
sentation is in the interests of all defendants because solicitors are
more likely to anticipate correctly the rules governing magistrates'
perceptions of understandable behaviour than are the defendants themselves.
Solicitors' explanations of conduct are assumed to be 'legally effective
rather than merely socially exculpatory' (Edwards, 1984: 145). In
Chapter Five that assumption will be challenged. It will be argued that:
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1. in order to be 'legally effective' in relation to female lawbreakers,
solicitors need to make life 'easier' for magistrates and
2. this necessitates the utterance of explanations and mitigations which
are seen to be 'socially exculpatory' in the sense that they reinforce
existing stereotypes of female behaviour rather than educating
magistrates to a greater understanding of female lawbreaking activity.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SOLICITORS: EXPERTS IN RE-PRESENTATION
Introduction
In the preceding chapter it has been argued that female lawbreakers
are confined, targetted and programmed by the discourse of magisterial
common sense which is employed by lay (i.e. apparently non-expert)
magistrates in the courtroom. This discourse is one link in the chain of
the socio-legal signification of female lawbreakers and its chief
characteristic is the simultaneous recognition and denial of the 'authority
of the personal'. The appeal of and to magisterial common sense enables
magistrates, and in particular female magistrates, to describe female
lawbreakers 88 simultaneously 'like us' and 'not like us', as different
yet not different. The elevation of magistrates' own personal experience
to a privileged status allows them to qeneralise from that experience
whilst claiming to treat each case 'on its own merit'. It allows them to
distinguish between 'explanation' and 'excuse' by reference to the tacit
rules and conventions governing their own everyday activity, on the
assumption that such rules self-evidently pertain to everyone. Included
within those rules is a very strong sense of 'knowledge' about the
appropriate physical, emotional and social state of the 'normal' woman
who is, by definition, a non-criminal woman. It was argued that the
ostensibly non-expert status of magistrates, which is presumed to be the
moral safeguard of the whole system of 'magistrates' justice' is in
effect a masquerade. That magistrates develop their own 'expertise' in
public morality affords little comfort to those women who have failed in
their socially prescribed role as the chief guardians of private
morality.
One of the conclusions drawn from interviews with magistrates was
that their lack of professional 'expertise' left them feeling personally
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uneasy about the 'presentation' of female lawbreakers. The inconsistencies
and contradictions in women's accounts and circumstances were uncorn-
fortable, embarrassing and distressing for maqistrates. They therefore
looked to psychiatrists and probation officers to ease their discomfort
but were sceptical of what they heard, fearing that they might be
deceived as much by the experts as by the criminals. No such scepticism
was expressed in relation to solicitors. The intervention of solicitors
was invariably welcomed, since it was seen to emanate from a profession
serving a neutral law and therefore to be of benefit to both magistrate
and defendant.
This chapter, therefore, identifies the specific ways in which
solicitors intervene to represent (or re-present) female lawbreakers. It
does so by analysing information from eight solicitors (six of whom were
interviewed and two of whom sent written responses to the letter in
Appendix II). It is argued that:
Solicitors' dircourse is constituted by the ideolog) of legal
representation which requires solicitors to repackage female
lawbreakers according to typifications of 'normal' women which
can be discursively recognised by 'magisterial common sense'.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows:
The Origin of Solicitors' Authority.
The Rules Governing Solicitors' Authority.
Gender-Neutral Representation? The Ideological and Material
Pre-conditions for the Construction of (Wo)men's Rea.
Solicitors' Competence: 'Women Offenders are Needy, Greedy or Sick'.
Solicitors' Performance: The Staging of Women's Re-presentation
within the Discourses of Domesticity, Sexuality and Pathology.
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The Origin of Solicitors' Authority
Under the	 al Aid Act 1974 s.29(1), legal representation is made
available to anyone involved in criminal proceedings 'where it appears to
the court desirable to do so in the interests of justice', and if it
appears that the defendant is unable to meet the full cost of such
representation. The decision to grant Legal Aid rests with the court and
there is a wide variation across the country in the proportion of
applications that are refused (Levenson reported in New Society, February
1982, p. 232). However, the granting of Legal Aid does not necessarily
mean that legal representation is free. At the end of a case, magistrates
have the power to order defendants to make a contribution towards their
legal representation, taking their means into account (Legal Aid Act,
1982 s.7). There remains, therefore, an uncertainty about the material
'price of representation' and that uncertainty is sufficient to deter
those who may be unsure of the value of such representation. This
element of deterrence is, of course, institutionalised in the Legal Aid
pr ceedings, on the assumption that anything which is available free of
charge is open to abuse. In practice, as with the provision of all
state financial assistance, it is often those most in need and least
likely to abuse the system who are deterred. In an attempt to demystify
the process of legal advice and to help defendants evaluate their need for
repres'ntation in a more informed way, 'duty solicitor' schemes have been
established in recent years. The objective of such schemes is to provide
quick and easy access by defendants to a solicitor free of charge, in
the hope that a little advice prior to a court hearing may both ease
defendants' anxiety and clarify their need for further involvement by
the profession. The scheme also helps to speed up court proceedings and
reduce even further the time available for defendants to 'put their case'
directly to the magistrates. Thus the provision of a 'duty solicitor'
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(and the provision of 'duty probation officers'), has contradictory
consequences. By making solicitors' discourse more accessible to
defendants one is simultaneously providing a genuine service and
reinforcing the necessity for that service. Consultation with a lawyer
about the most effective packaging of oneself in court (or is it merely
about the packaging that will ensure the most efficient running of the
court's business?) is no longer a desirable option but an obligation,
departure from which requires justification.
Legal representation in the magistrates' court, therefore, is not
typically a process of defending accused people against their accusers
since, even with representation, at least 75% of defendants appear to
plead guilty (Bottoms and McClean 1976: 105). It is rather a process of
defending the court against the unacceptability of the layperson's common
sense, which is perceived to to 'out of place, out of time, out of mind
and out of order' (Carlen, 1976: 104) and consequently a dangerous
intrusion in the proceedings. Representation is, therefore, a strategy
whereby the non-legitimated account (the Other) of the defendant is
confronted, controlled and rendered 'normal'. The 'common sense' of the
defendant's account does not accord with magisterial common sense because
the latter has been elevated to the status of 'expertise', whereas the
former remains unrecognisable within the courtroom. The use of identical
vocabulary masks the significant difference of the 'like-us-yet-not-like-
us' paradox which indefatigably confronts the magistracy. The role of
the solicitor is to occupy that gap between the defendant's account and
the magistrates' recognition of that account. The solicitor's task is to
negotiate the precise route whereby that gap is closed. It is a task
which requires both authority and skill. Solicitors' discourse claims
its authority from the precision of the language of statute but, 'the
general principles of English law are not to be found in the statute book'
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(Burton & Carlen, 1979: 56). The dominant mode of legal reasoning in
English courts is that of a 'common law approach', ostensibly characterised
by the rigid principle of 'stare decisis' - the binding authority of
precedent. Nevertheless, the law in practice (as manifested in
solicitors' discourse) is paradoxically flexible. If legal reasoning
were as rigid as the doctrine of precedent suggests, there would be no
need for the eloquence and rhetoric of lawyers, for 'the facts would
speak for themselves'. Consistency and continuity would be the over-
riding objectives. In reality, 'it is often difficult to be sure just
which features of a case were the decisive ones' (Pitkin, 1972 quoted in
Burton and Carlen, 1979). Legal reasoning more commonly seems to be
characterised by inconsistency and discontinuity. Some writers have
argued from an interactionist perspective (e.g. Bottoms and McClean, 1976),
that solicitors have the power to either clarify or fog the law (cf.
Dickens, 'Bleak House') and thus contribute to, or prevent, the negotiation
of an ultimately attainable justice, which accords with a form pre-
existing in nature (viz, natural justice). Others (e.g. Carlen, 1976;
McBarnet, 1981) have argued that 'justice' is no more and no less than
the name we give to that which is (re)produced by the law, within the
institutions of the law. The power of the solicitor does not lie in
some machiavellian skill to distort the 'truth'. Nor does it lie simply
in the symbolic interaction between individual solicitor, individual
lawbreaker and individual magistrate. The power of the solicitor is
institutionalised in the paradox of the common-law approach for s/he
theorises at the interstices of legal rigidity and judicial flexibility.
If judges and magistrates see themselves as 'mediat(ing) justice via a
legality of which they are the evolutionary embodiment' (Burton & Carlen,
1979: 55), then solicitors see their own articulation of legal reasoning
as an essential contribution to that process of evolution.
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The Rules Governing Solicitors' Discourse
Solicitors' discourse is a self-conscious, spoken discourse - an oral
intervention. The unspoken goal (Desire) of this discourse is the
'normalisation' of the defendant through a process which packages and re-
presents (renders programmable) the defendant as a coherent unity which
is recognisable by the magistracy. Normalisation is the process whereby
an illegal action, and the person who commits that action are re-presented
as 'typical' (Sudnow, 1965). The circumstances surrounding the action,
the characteristics and motives of its perpetrator, the consequences for
the victim, all have to be located within categories that are already
known and recognised. Norrnalisation, then, consists of particular
practices of inclusion and exclusion, and the skilled task of the
solicitor involves anticipating and controlling the variety of possible
consequences of these practices. Tacit rules govern these practices but,
whilst these rules are understood by solicitors and magistrates they are
rarely explained to the defendant. These tacit rules (resembling Gordon's
'practices of exclusion' (1977: 15)) are as follows:
1. The defendant is disqualified as a speaker - his/her account is
rendered mute (Ardener, 1978).
2. Certain topics are prohibited or redefined. More specifically,
a) 'Poverty' is a prohibited topic because it is a social, rather than
a legal category. The law does not recognise wealth or its lack as in
itself relevant explanation of crime. Magistrates respond to mitigations
of poverty with comments such as, 'No-one is poor nowadays' or,
alternatively, 'Many people are poor but they don't all turn to crime'.
b) 'Need' is the permitted redefinition of' poverty because it implies
both relativity (and is thus open to personal interpretation and judg-
ment) and individual inadequacy ('need' is a subjective experience,
whereas 'poverty' implies a measure of objective assessment).
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3. Certain statements are rejected as illegitimate. More specifically,
a) Explanations of 'sickness' cannot be employed if an offence is
either serious and 'unnatural' or petty and 'natural' ('typical', 'normal');
b) Explanations of 'need' cannot be employed where the effect of such an
explanation would be to attribute blame to the magistrates, as
representatives of the community, or to imply that the alleviation of
that 'need' lies within their (or the community's) power.
Although this process of normalisation may be directed primarily
towards the protection of the court, it is also perceived as a process
which protects defendants from themselves and their own natural
inclinations to bargain for their liberty - even by admitting guilt. As
Heberling (1978) observes,
'Uppermost in the mind of the defendant is the urge
to freedom, the desire to extricate himseu1 Trom
this uncomfortable situation.'
Compelled by this 'instinct', few defendants consider the long-term
consequences of admissions of guilt and the role of the solicitor as
protector is acknowledged, although the practice of 'plea-bargaining'
(that is, informally securing promises of sentencing discounts for
defendants who originally wanted to plead 'not guilty') has raised funda-
mental questions about the nature and justification for legal representa-
tion (Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Baldwin & McConville, 1977).
Nevertheless, all these practices are justified ultimately on the
grounds that defendants have chosen to engage the services of a
solicitor. Contracts have been entered into freely via the fiction of
'giving instructions' and defendants are presented as remaining the
knowing subjects/authors of their own discourses. In reality, they have
become the objects of another discourse. They have given permission for
their statements to be rendered iterable and subject to the kinds of
rules I have outlined. They have lost control of their readings, whilst
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retaining a faith in the myth of remaining in control.
Solicitors do not talk about making assessments (as, for example, do
social workers, probation officers and doctors) - they talk about 'taking
instructions'. The implication is that they, as servants, articulate
with confidence and competence in public that which the defendant has
said nervously and haltingly in private. But what in fact happens is
that a privileged discourse is constructed from the broken utterances of
the powerless. Discontinuity is rendered continuous, contradiction
rendered coherent and fragmentation rendered unified. A grid is placed
over the circumstances and emotions of the defendant and a recognisable
reading obtained. In short, an assessment is made.
Having thus assessed the defendant, the solicitor is then required to
assess the magistrates whom s/he is addressing. The tacit injunction
which governs solicitors' discursive performance (i.e. the way in which
the above rules are employed) was described to me thus by one solicitor:
'You get to know your bench - you play to the audience.'
'Getting to know your bench' involves speculation about the way in
which defendants are perceived by magistrates. It involves taking
account of magisterial common sense; it also involves taking account of
those factors which magistrates themselves deny are influencing them,
but which solicitors recognise all too well as being influential. Those
factors - commonly referred to as 'extra-legal' - include class, race,
age, wealth and political allegiance.
Gender-Neutral Representation? The Ideolo9ical and Material
Pre-Condjtions for the Construction of (Wo)mens' Rea
So far, this chapter has discussed the origins of solicitors' power
and has identified the general rules which govern its manifestation.
The arguments presented apply equally to male and female defendants and
do not in themselves constitute evidence of discrimination against female
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lawbreakers. The strategy of representation targets and programmes both
men and women, but it does so in different ways, within different
discourses. This chapter analyses the utterances of solicitors in
relation to female lawbreakers and argues that, despite using the paradigm
of service (e.g. taking instructions), solicitors' discourse renders
female lawbreakers muted. The rules and definitions available to
solicitors require them to construct women in legal discourse in terms
of their exclusion from 'male' categories of behaviour and motivation.
By her location within the discourses of domesticity, sexuality and
pathology, the female lawbreaker can be understood or re-presented as a
'non-male' lawbreaker - as someone who fails to fit into or falls short
of accepted, 'normal' explanations of (male) criminal behaviour. As
Frances Heidensohn observes (1985), 'they are not so much... .in no-man's
land as in too-much-man's land'.
The construction of female lawbreakers within the discourses of
domesticity, sexuality and pathology by judicial, medical and welfare
personnel is a unif)lng theme of this thesis, but one of the unique
contributions of solicitors to this construction is their authorisation,
within legal and judicial discourse, to recognise the guilty mind. The
term 'recognise' is not used here to imply any positivistic imperative to
search out 'the truth'. On the contrary, the ideology of legal
representation releases the solicitor from any such moral obligation.
The relationship between solicitors and their clients (whether male or
female) is determined by the legal condition that solicitors must suspend
any inclination to disbelieve what their clients say. Legal representation
is constructed as being morally neutral; law)ers are engaged for their
technical expertise - for their knowledge of the law and their ability to
articulate the application of its principles to a particular case. Their
desire to obtain a favourable outcome for their clients stems from
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professional disinterestedness and not from any personal commitment to,
or even belief in, the client's reading of events. 'Recognition' here
refers to the process whereby solicitors construct a coherent unity (viz.
mens rea) out of the contradictions that surface from efforts to address
the Other of legal discourse, namely, the organisation of the difference
that constitutes the 'guilt/innocence' distinction.
The distinctive nature of the organisation of that difference in
relation to women is that women are both ideologically and materially pre-
conditioned to accept the description of 'guilty'. Ideologically, many
women experience a generalised sense of (moral) guilt consequent on their
perception of themselves as failed wives and mothers, a perception which
(see Chapters Two and Three) emanates from discourses which construct
women as always-already lacking (that is, as being NOT MEN). This all-
pervading sense of guilt predisposes some women to accept readily that
certain of their specific actions can/should be described as 'guilty' acts
which, by in,lication, require punishment. Pauline provided an example
of such reasoning:
'I expected a lot worse and, quite honestly, I felt
I deserved a lot worse - I still do. I've said this
to Dr. C many times - I still feel that I haven't
been punished. At the back of my mind I feel,
"I've got off very lightly".'
(54)
The ideological conditions which predispose some women towards an
admission of legal guilt are reinforced by the material conditions
surrounding their appearance in court. A decision to plead guilty may be
influenced by any or all of the following material considerations:
1) Inability to resist police questionning (Dell, 1971).
2) Likelihood of being remanded in custody if a 'not guilty plea is
entered (Home Office, 1983; NACRO, 1983) and the consequences for any
children.
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3) Likelihood of being a 'first offender' and therefore ignorant of
procedures and rights.
4) The particular difficulty of prostitutes proving their innocence
where it is only their word against that of the police (McLeod, 1982).
5) The sheer lack of 'guts to stand up in court and put her case'
(Dell, 1978:	 107).
6) The desire to 'get it over with' in order to avoid the feared
stigma of publicity which might damage relationships with family and
neighbours.
Thus, immediate concerns about the delays and adjournments which
inevitably rerult from entering pleas of 'not guilty' may outweigh any
consideration of possible future discrimination consequent on acquiring
a criminal record. Suzanne Dell (1971) arqued that access to 1eqaL
repre entation appeared to reduce the tendency to plead inconsistently
(that is, to plead guilty when one believes oneself to be innocent). The
evidence from my interviews with solicitors did not support this optimism.
On the contrary, most of the male solicitors seemed more ready to agree
with Pollak that, women's criminality was more likely to be masked by
their innate deviouness than to be unjustly or inappropriately attributed
to them:
'It's sometimes difficult to convince women that
they are in the wrong. They say "I forgot" and
sometimes plead "not guilty", but they're always
found "guilty".'
(Solicitor 1)
'I have the impression that quite a high proportion
of the embezzlement type of offence (cooking the
books) is committed by women and it is
exceptionally hard to convinced them that they are
in fact guilty.'
(Solicitor 2)
'I doubt if there are many "first offender" shop-
lifters - only "first time caught".'
(Solicitor 3)
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Implicit in these remarks is the assumption, outlined above, that
the 'normal' woman pleads guilty because she feels guilty (and it is
unnecessary to clarify wheiher that sense of guilt is general to being
woman or specific to the behaviour in question). It may also be related
to the irrational assumption that because most normal women do not
appear in court on criminal charges those who do must be real criminals -
that is, they must have comitted not only this crime but several more
before. Consequently, the woman who denies guilt is abnormal. Ironically,
however, the woman who appears too ready to admit guilt - and lacks the
more general sense of moral guilt - is also deemed abnormal:
'Female crime is less hidden nowadays - women
are less ashamed to admit to it - they are
more liberated.'
(Solicitor 3)
Given this apparent presumption of guilt, it is not perhaps
surprising that some of the women in this study were sceptical of the
value of representation. As was seen in Chapter Three, Carol was unhappy
about her solicitor's reluctance to defend her (as opposed to mitigating
for her and Ivy preferred to try and defend herself. Maureen blamed
herself for being unable to give her solicitor enough evidence for a
defence. Underlying these accounts was a common concern amongst the
women that they were unable to communicate what they really wanted to say
in a way that would be listened to, heard and recognised by their
(predominantly male) solicitors. The prospect of attempting to justify
one's actions (indeed, one's existence) to a man whose education and
background may be such as to place him well beyond the class of person
with whom she would normally have any social dealings whatsoever, let
alone of any intimate nature, may be simply too daunting to contemplate.
Finally, and more prosaically, women may be discouraged from engaging
a solicitor because of the expense. The cost of legal representation may
183.
appear prohibitive to a woman who, though without income herself, may be
married to a man whose income excludes him from receiving free Legal Aid.
It may be a particularly daunting prospect if such cost is likely to
fall on a husband whose response to her predicament is not conspicuously
supportive (see Chapter Three).
Solicitors' Competence: 'Women Offenders are Needy, Greedy or Sick'
Just as magistrates tended to disqualify themselves as competent
speakers about female lawbreakers on the grounds that such women are
'invisible' by reason of their numerical insignificance and that
magistrates are therefore inevitably 'inexperienced' in dealing with them,
so a number of solicitors initially minimised the difference in courts'
(and, by implication, their own) treatment of male and female lawbreakers.
'I would say there is no difference between the
sexes so far as verdict is concerned. I cannot
think that there is any other differencein this
connection and, for example, I do not feel that
a woman would be fined either more or less
heavily. The difference is only noticeable over
the question of deprivation of liberty.'
(Solicitor 4)
'From a prosecution point of view I cannot see that
there are any particular problems associated with
prosecuting women. From a defence point of view I
think that the only problem which does arise
occasionally is in connection with the "menopausal
shoplifter" who may find giving instructions to a
male solicitor embarrassing.'
(Solicitor 5)
'I find no difference between men and women in taking
instructions except where "sensitive' t
 mitigation is
involved - for example, menopause or pregnancy.'
(Solicitor 1)
On further enquiry, however, it became apparent that the process of
'normalising' female lawbreakers involved solicitors in defining or
describing them as being located within a restricted number of gender-
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specific categories in relation to a) the nature of their offences,
b) their motivational explanations and c) their appropriate treatment.
The nature of their offences
The normalisation process begins with the recognition of the offence
and there is evidence that solicitors see female lawbreakers primarily as
shoplifters and, to a lesser extent, as fraudsters.
'So many of the shoplifting cases involve women
and follow the same pattern (middle aged, on nerve
tablets, mind on other things, no previous
convictions). One is left with the feeling that
although most are quite properly convicted of
theft it is somehow a "different" offence. They
would never remotely consider any other form of
dishonesty - and yet steal from a shop.'
(Solicithr Z - writtec sie
'You quite regularly come across them in shoplifting
cases because women don't commit that many other
kinds of crime - you don't get many women burglars
or many who are involved in violence - it's mainly
theft, quite a lot of social security frauds.'
(Solicitor 6: 1)
Such observations would seem to be confirmed by the official
criminal statistics (Box, 1983: 166). Shoplifting is the only offence
which is apparently committed by equal numbers of men and women but the
explanation for this is by no means self-evident. The presence of women
in shops and, to a lesser extent, social security offices, is far more
'congruous' than at the scene of burglaries or public brawls (Worrall,
1981). Surveillance of women, therefore, tends to focus on the former
locations and if women do indeed have their 'mind on other things', they
may be careless enough to make their theft obvious to skilled observers.
(Alternatively, having their 'mind on other things' could be interpreted
as negating any intent to steal and therein lies a significant dilemma
for solicitors.)
In less congruous locations, however, a certain expeditious 'blind-
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ness' seems to afflict witnesses and the police. Even when women burglars
and muggers are 'seen', the assumption remains that, if they are
accompanied by men, they cannot be as dangerous as their male companions:
'Women's different treatment starts before court.
The police don't prosecute women in joint offences
if the men plead guilty. They want to get the
women home - for example, in cases of receiving
stolen goods.'
(Solicitor 4)
'Women have been involved with men in burglaries
and the police haven't bothered to prosecute the
women. I can't give you names, of course, but it
definitely happens. They only want "the men".'
(Solicitor 7)
The rightful place for 'normal' women is in the home and the myth persists
that women don't (or can't) burgle. But the Pollak myth of masked female
criminality is discredited when women on their own, are seen committing
serious offences and these may consequently be over-reported (Hindelang,
1979) because of the 'incongruity' between their actions and the 'normal'
behaviour of women. One arena where the violent woman is taken very
seriously is the domestic:
'If you have a wife who beats her husband, that's a
very extraordinary state of affairs, and is looked on
as the exception rather than the rule.
	 I prosecuted
one not very long ago where the woman had stabbed her
husband and obviously the first thing you look at is
psychiatric problems.'
(Solicitor 6: 2 - cf. Allen 1987)
Women who use weapons to assault their husbands or boyfriends are often
depicted in court as engaging in cold-blooded and pre-meditated action
(Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Edwards, 1984). To counteract such images, and
thus to 'render them harmless' (Allen, 1987) solicitors have to redefine
motivation, as in the example given, in terms of 'psychiatric problems'.
Yet the women themselves often see their action as self-defence or perhaps,
more accurately, as self-preservation (for, in law, self-defence must be a
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response to an immediate threat of harm, whereas assaults on husbands or
boyfriends may be the result of cumulative threats or assaults over a
period of time and thus, strictly speaking, lack the requisite element of
spontaneity). As Carlen found (1983: 42):
'They justified their own extreme acts of violence
on the gronds that legitimate and effective protest
was not open to women.'
Had women learned (or had they the physical strength for) the more
culturally acceptable forms of violence, such as punching, kicking and
wrestling, they might not have resorted to more extreme and lethal forms
of assault.
Another blow to the myth of masked female criminality is struck by
those unchivalrous men who are themselves under threat of imprisonment:
AW: 'Do you ever feel that women are actually
taking the blame for offences that have been
committed by men?'
Solicitor 6: '1 have known situations where the husband is
on a suspended sentence and it's the meter -
that's the classic. It does happen, yes. But,
by and large, it's only cases in the domestic
environment that you can do that - not in a
burglary, if he's caught redhanded. If you're
both in the supermarket, you can take the whole
blame and say he didn't know, when he probably
did - or the DHSS cheque that's forged....'
(7-8)
Their motivational explanations
The acceptable (and thus recognisable) motivational explanations of
female crime both differ from and are more rigidly categorised than those
of male crime. Solicitor 8 put it succinctly:
'Women offenders are needy, greedy or sick!'
Explanations of 'need', 'greed' and 'sickness' are 'offender-specific',
in the sense that they are rooted in the personality and pathology of the
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individual, offender. By contrast, explanations of male crime have become
increasingly 'offence-' and 'situation-specific' (e.g. McGuire and
Priestls 1985), thus testifying both to the greater social acceptability
of male crime and the greater willingness of courts to consider a variety
of motivational accounts in the cases of male lawbreakers.
Ironically, however, although such 'offender€pecific' explanations
appear to be concerned with the uniqueness of each offender, their homely
familiarity absolves both speaker and listener from the obligation to
investigate further the account of any individual women lawbreaker. It
is already assumed that all accounts will ultimately fit into one of
these categories, from which can be automatically deduced the 'correct'
response. Not only is it assumed that all accounts will ultimately fit,
but it is also assumed that there is no disagreement about the criteria
for categorisation. Solicitors and magistrates have no difficulty in
'knowing' in which category to place a particular account - even though
there may seem to be times when solicitors may feel they ought to
challenge such assumed 'knowledge':
'It isn't really a doctor they need - it's a
cheque book.'
(Solicitor 6: 1)
The implication of such a challenge would be that the boundaries between
the 'needy', the 'greedy' and the 'sick' are not as clear and self-
evident as one might like to believe. But the utterance of such a
challenge contains within it its own source of remedy and absolution,
for it allows the recognition of an economic explanation of crime, whilst
simultaneously absolving both speaker and listener of the consequences
of such recognition. It may be obvious that it is a cheque book which
is needed but it is equally obvious that neither the speaker nor the
listener is in a position to provide it and the solicitor will only
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irritate the meqistrate by suggesting otherwise. The recognition of 'a
chqu 1)00k need' is extra-judicial. It is not a excusing condition and
must therefore be represented as 'a doctor need'. Thus, solicitors
discover that the redefinition of need as sickness serves to ease both
their own and magistrates' discomfort. But the effectiveness of such
redefinition is also dependent on the perceived severity of the illegal
action. The more serious an offence is perceived to be, the more likely
it is that its motivation will be accounted for in terms of 'sickness',
provided the nature of the offence remains compatible with the essential
'nature' of womanhood. If, however, the crime is perceived to be both
serious and 'unnatural', its motivation may well be accounted for in terms
of inherent wickedness of 'greed'. But the motivational rationale of
'greed' is not only employed in relation to 'serious, unnatural' offences.
A petty offence (such as the stolen Yorkie bar cited below) may not be
considered worthy of categorisation as a symptom of either 'need' or
'sickness'. It may be considered worthy only of contempt and thus fall,
by default, into the category of 'greed'. This particular example also
demonstrates the power of the vocabulary of food in relation to women.
A Yorkie bar is self-evidently not a necessity. It is an un-needed
luxury, the motivation for whose acquisition can only be rendered under-
standable in terms of 'greed', with its inference of 'self-indulgence' and
'selfishness' - an inference which is anathema to the acceptable image of
women as 'selfless' and 'self-sacrificing'. Greed, therefore, need not
be demonstrated only in serious offences - larger-scale thefts or frauds.
Greed is the category into which all motivational accounts fall that
cannot be recognised in alternative terms. Greed is the category which
invokes contempt rather than sympathy and justifies punishment rather
than treatment. It is the category which releases the speaker and the
listener from any inordinate struggle for justice, for it is assumed that
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that no response to greed can be inherently unjust - all that has to be
decided is the classical consideration of proportion. Justice in
response to greed is thus transformed from a qualitative to a quantiative
issue.
Their appropriate treatment
In the light of these restrictions on the categories of offence and
motivation within which female lawbreakers could be 'appropriately'
located by solicitors, it is not perhaps surprising that they should
also be seen as requiring gender-congruent treatment - that is, treatment
which attends to their 'sickness' or 'needyness'.
As will be seen, the solicitors I spoke to expressed considerable
ambivalence about the use of strictly 'medical' mitigation in relation to
women. They recognised its benefits (as they saw them) but they were also
conscious that its reception by magistrates could be miscalculated and
their own credibility damaged as a result. But they expressed no such
reservations about what might be described as a 'sub-medical' mitigation,
with its emphasis on individual 'needyness', (and inadequacy). Such
mitigations frequently result in the making of probation orders:
'Women are proportionately more likely to be placed
on probation than men; in 1982 they made up 12 per
cent of those sentenced by the courts, but 30 per
cent of these placed on probation.'
(Walker & Beaumont, 1985: 69)
But, as Walker argues, this does not necessarily indicate leniency. It
is true that Community Service is rarely used for women (5% of all such
orders made in 1982 were on women - Home Office, 1983) and most solicitors
saw it (or said that magistrates would see it) as an inappropriate
disposal for women. Equally solicitors were reluctant to recommend fines,
because they often did recognise the reality of many women offenders'
poverty. The probation order, therefore, was the disposal most favoured
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by solicitors and this appeared to be so for two reasons. Firstly, in
the event of the women's exclusion from the 'socially exculpatory' and
'legally effective' (Edwards, 1984) category of 'sickness', the probation
order provided an alternative route whereby responsibility for her
actions could be removed from the woman. Secondly, that the probation
order would provide an appropriate arena in which the woman could be
encouraged to talk. (The implication here was that the appropriate arena
was the private domain of the home, rather than the public domain of
the courtroom, where it was considered inappropriate for women to talk.)
'I wouldn't put responsibility for the offending
on her mental make-up at all. I think to shove it
on to psychiatry is taking the back door. I would
much sooner shove it on to probation, because I
think the anxiety can be alleviated just as well
by sitting and talking, as by taking half a dozen
pills every day.'
(Solicitor 6: 12)
By reconvnending probation orders, solicitors thus exhorted women to talk
in private for the purposes of transforming themselves into 'normal'
women but not to talk in public for the purposes of justifying themselves
or challenging the stereotyping of women. Thus the process of
normalising female lawbreakers through solicitors' discourse rendered
them muted.
Solicitors' Performance: The Ste
the Discourses of Domesticity, Se
of Women's Re-presentation within
1
Since the majority of people processed through the courts are from
the working classes (Box, 1983), it is perhaps unsurprising that
defendants (both men and women) are encouraged to view their own speech
as inferior and in need of translation in order to be understood. As
Bernstein (1971, quoted in Carlen, 1976) has argued, their restricted
linguistic code serves to reinforce only the form of the social relation-
ship in which they find themselves. 'Access to an elaborated code will
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depend on access to specialised social positions within the social
structure', (Bernstein, 1971, quoted in Carlen, 1976: 103). In the
courtroom elaborated code is made available only to the experts.
As was seen in Chapter Three, women are further subordinated,
partly because they are already subject to the ideological pressures of
gender role stereotyping outside the court and partly because of the
arguably 'masculine' characteristics of the courtroom. Firstly, the
public nature of the courtroom and its communications, reflecting
distinctions between 'male' (public) and 'female' (private) space, may
seem especially oppressive to women. Secondly, the adversarial nature
of English court proceedings (with its accompanying vocabulary of
'fighting', 'winning' and 'losing') may be seen as irrelevantly
aggressive by women. Hence, the expectation of women defendants is not
merely that what they say about themselves requires translation, but
that they do not have anything to say about themselves. This is perhaps
hardly surprising. Since women are seen as 'behaving' rather than
'acting' when they break the law, and since they are seen to be
incapable of thinking and making decisions, it is reasonable to assume
that they need to be explained, rather than to explain. (The fact that
more trouble is not taken to ensure that women are represented, however,
suggests that courts are not really very interested in listening to
explanations, preferring rather the comfort of unchallenged assumptions.)
The task of the solicitor in muting the female lawbreaker is to
construct an acceptable account from those explanations which are
'speakable' and to erase from the record those which are 'unspeakable'.
In practice, this involves explaining female lawbreakers to the court as
normal, feminine women who:
a) ideologica1	 deserve sympathy (the appeal to chivalry) because
explanations of their lawbreaking are seen to be congruous with 'what are
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supposed to be their natural, biologically-determined socio-sexual roles
and destinies' (Carlen, 1985: 10);
b) materially (pragmatically) compel leniency because they can be viewrd
as 'wives, mothers and sex-objects designed for the satisfaction of male
desire' (Carlen, 1985: 10).
'I do find that Courts are most reluctant to
sentence female offenders to terms of imprison-
ment, particularly when the offender has
children and that it is far easier to persuade
a Court to give a female offender a second or
even third chance than it is in the case of male
offenders. On reflection, whilst in some cases
this may be as a result of natural sympathy, in
other cases it may simply be that the Court is
recognising the reality of the situation in that
if mother is sent to prison children will have to
be taken into care.'
(Solicitor 5 - written response, my emphases)
The reluctance of courts to imprison women which Solicitor 5 claimed to
'find' (implying a positivistic discovery of the 'truth') reflected,
rather the Desire of his own discourse which required him to re-present
women within the dominant discourses of femininity - the discourses of
domesticity, sexuality and pathology. But the women in this study con-
stituted a threat to this discourse, since they represented the Other
which had to be confronted and controlled.
Domesticity
Solicitors place great emphasis on the construction of female
lawbreakers as family members, in particular as wives and mothers, with
responsibilities that render them deserving of both understanding and
sympathy (in relation to the motivation for their offences) and of
leniency (in relation to their treatment).
'Courts recognise the importance of the "competent
mother" mitigation. With men it's less important;
a magistrate will say, "I accept that your client
is a paragon of virtue - when he is not robbing his
employer! "•'
(Solicitor 8)
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'Women often have stronger circumstantial mitigation
than men - for example, domestic stress.'
(Solicitor 3)
'I use children in mitigation for women but not for
men.'
(Solicitor 1)
'I think the trappings of being a female offender can
sometimes get sympathy, such as having a couple of
children who will go into Care if anything happens
to you.'
(Solicitor 6: 6 - emphasis added)
But the 'trappings of being a female lawbreaker' do not always or only
trap courts into sympathy and leniency. They also provide a trap for the
woman herself. As Hilary Walker (1985: 68) argues, courts can sometimes
feel that women are trying to blackmail them by 'sheltering' behind their
children and can consequently respond in a deliberately punitive way
towards the women. As was seen in Chapter Three, there is also
increasing evidence that mothers who do not live in nuclear families
are less likely to receive sympathy than those who do:
'Judicial misogyny....results in single women,
divorced women and women with children in Care
(being) more likely to receive custodial sentences
than women who, at the time of their court
appearances, are living at home with their
husbands and children.'
(Carlen, 1985: 11)
It has been further argued (Dominelli, 1984) that women are sometimes
given less credit for their domestic responsibilities than are those few
men with such responsibilities who appear in court (presumably as a
result of being 'abandoned' by 'abnormal' women):
'Society's expectation is that women should just
"get on" with their domestic responsibilities and
rely on their own resources for doing so.'
The trap of domesticity is that at the same time as women are being
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exhorted to provide for their families many are denied access to legitimate
means of provision. By resorting to illegitimate provision they often
exclude themselves from the very descriptive category in which they seek,
and are exhorted to desire, inclusion:
'CM has a long record, cohabits in overcrowded
conditions, has a baby and is pregnant. She was
on a suspended sentence. She shoplifted to sell
goods for money to pay debts. I thought it was a
marvellous thing to do, but the courts had no choice
but to send her down.'
(Solicitor 7)
Those for whom crime is a rational, if socially unacceptable, response
to the conditions of poverty with which society expects them to contend
are debarred from articulating such a logic:
'But when they're got no money - well, they often
say to you, "Well, I'll have to do it again" -
and where do you go from there? You can't really
say that in court. But there's no psychiatry
there - it's a deliberate choice - "I've done it
to pay the milkman" - or whatever.'
(Solicitor 6: 11)
And therein lies another trap. By offering a rational explanation
of her action, which is perceived to be both 'in order' (insofar as it
is believed and 'out of order' (insofar as it is illegitimate), the
defendant excludes herself from the possible benefits of psychiatrisation.
Finally, the ideal of middle-class domesticity traps a particular
class of women whose deprivation itself overdetermines their 'suitability'
for punishment. Solicitor 4 summarised it thus:
'The wife of an estate agent, receiving stolen
goods - respectable, sheltered upbringing, good
wife and mother. The court would think that
prison would be so shattering, they'd keep it to
a minimum. Whereas, a girl brought up on (a
particularly notorious council estate), knocked
about by her parents and her husband - she'd need
a longer sentence to make any impression!'
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Respectable, middle-class wives and mothers are assumed to be so sensitive
that they will be reformed by a minimum of punishment (or no punishment
at all). Working class women are perceived to be tougher (more like
men?) and therefore need to be treated more harshly if any impression is
to be made on them, on the grounds that punishment is the only thing
'people like that' understand. Such arguments are reminiscent of medical
discourse in the 19th century (Ehrenreich and English, 1979) and the
politics of the differential treatment of sickness amongst middle-class
and working-class women. Middle-class women and those with husbands
and children are seen to be more amenable to non-judicial social controls
and less in need of the controls of the criminal justice system, which are
reserved for those who are outwith the 'normal' traditional social
controls (the workplace for men; the family for women). Deprivation of
such controls is seen to produce a different 'type' of woman - a depraved
woman who is incapable of making moral choice and is therefore in need
of more direct techniques of behaviour modification to control her. The
'suitability' of such women for punishment is, however, reinforced by a
contradictory argument which implies that, despite (or perhaps because
of - see Dobash & Dobash, 1979, on the 'appropriate victim') being
victims of abuse, these women have made choices. Middle-class magistrates
find it hard to understand the material circumstances which restrict
the choices of such women (for example, the lack of a car forcing a
woman to walk alone at night, or the absence of alternative accommo-
dation forcing a woman to return to a violent husband). Instead, these
women are seen to have chosen to contribute to their plight by their
'imprudent behaviour' (Pattullo, 1983) and therefore to be at least
partially responsible for its consequences.
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Sexuality
Solicitors appear to have fewer inhibitions than other court
personnel when it comes to exploiting the overtly sexual impact which
female lawbreakers may have in court, although this is not an aspect of
representation that they would discuss openly with the women themselves.
Solicitor 7, demonstrated that 'getting to know the bench' includes
taking account of both the gender and age of magistrates and theorising
about their likely perceptions and expectations of women, based on an
understanding of gender power relations within society:
'Courts are very chauvinistic towards women,
always softer. If it's a young woman, I think
the male magistrates fancy her; if she's older,
it's domestic responsibilities. Some of the older
women take a moralistic attitude towards
prostitutes - "look what sort of woman she is".
Some of the younger women magistrates are genuinely
concerned about young prostitutes - they want to
get to the bottom of what makes them do it.'
Older men are expected to regard young women primarily as sex objects
and the recent increase in awareness of the ideological determinants of
incest (or 'father-daughter rape'; Ward, 1985) suggests that even the
most paternalistic of magistrates cannot escape that reading of his
attitudes. In this way, solicitors reinforce the image of the female
lawbreaker as 'whore', an image which is, as Heidensohn explains (1985:
93) complex and distorting. It is an image which constructs all non-
conforming behaviour by women as a reflection of their sexuality. For
example,
'Offences which have apparently nothing to do with
sexuality are - when committed by women - trans-
formed into expressions of female sexuality or the
lack of it.'
(Heidensohn, 1985: 94)
But there are risks attached to placing too much reliance on this
image, for certain expressions of sexuality may threaten to render male
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magistrates impotent:
'You can get women who cry and cry and that can
embarrass men magistrates and upset them and put
them off their flow or whatever.'
(Solicitor 6: 6)
If the defendant is an older woman, this fundamental manifestation
of power through the construction of women as legitimate objects of
sexual desire is overlaid by the ideology of familialism which constructs
less attractive or else accessible women as legitimate objects of
'husbandly' respect, pity and protection - or chastisement (cf Box, 1983).
Familialism thus endows male magistrates with the possessive right to
maintain such women in powerless and dependent positions by either
chivalrous or punitive means. Women magistrates, as we have seen, are
faced with the 'like-us-yet-not like-us' conundrum in dealing with
female defendants. Are such women potential sisters and daughters or
do they constitute a 'breed apart', whose law-breaking is personally
insulting Dominelli, 1984)? Even when female magistrates appear
genuine in their concern about young prostitutes, the explanations that
seem to as ist them in getting 'to the bottom of what makes them do it'
are invariably individualistic and frequently pathological, (see
Chapter Seven p. 264-5).
Pathology
The third ideology that dominated solicitors' discourse in the
muting of the female lawbreaker was that which allowed her to be re-
presented as 'sick'. The extent to which that sickness could be used
as a defence negating intent (as opposed to a factor in mitigation) was
limited, especially if specifically gynaecological dysfunctions were
involved (see Chapter Two). 1 In a discussion about the relevance of
pre-menstrual tension, Solicitor 6 argued that much would depend on the
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seriousness of the alleged offence. For a serious offence, such an
avenue would need to be explored:
'But you can't use the same argument over a Yorkie
bar. On paper, as an academic exercise, I think it
is just as right and important that the right
decision is made, but at the practical level - and
that's what your client is interested in - he's not
interested in mens rea or aclus reus - he wants you
to get the best result for him (sic!) - and
sometimes it's not going to be all that easy to
get the lady doctor from London to come down and
give her menstrual research for a stolen Yorkie bar.
In a way it's not right, because if she's not guilty,
she's not guilty, but the number of adjournments,
the times she'd have to see the doctor and probably
have to share with her confidences that she might
not be pleased to share... .1 think, at the end of the
day, we've got to weigh it all up and ask, "Well are
we just causing more trouble?" Put it to her, by all
means but if she says no, then I think you've got to
accept that. In a way, maybe she knows what's best
for herself.'
(4-5)
Most of the solicitors I spoke to, however, saw the presentation of a
'medical' mitigation (as opposed to defence) as one legitimate way of
'playing to the audience'.
'I would say that there is a more often a
'medical" aspect to the case involving a
female offender rather than in the case of a
male offender.'
(Solicitor 5)
'....so many of the shoplifting cases involve
women and follow the same pattern (middle aged,
on nerve tablets, mind on other things, no
previous convictions)... .so many of the women who
are defendants are at that time of life when it is
felt that reports ought to be obtained to
establish their needs.'
(Solicitor 2)
This invariably involved obtaining remands for the preparation of
medical reports, although there was disagreement about whether or not
medical reports were asked for more frequently on women than on men.
Gibbens, Soothill and Pope (1977) did find gender differences in selection
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for medical remands, but these correlated with types of offence:
'The male sexual offender was more frequently
selected for a medical remand, whereas for rarer
female offences (burglary, fraud and forgery) the
proportion of medical remands was comparatively
high.'
(1977: 17, my emphases)
They did not, however, accept that this difference was related to any
ideological perceptions of certain crimes being incongruous with the
'natural' female role:
'As these offences are often comitted by young
female drug addicts the comparatively high figure
is unlikely to reflect a belief that medical
treatment was useful for the offences per se.'
(1977: 20)
The study of Cibbens et al. (1977) also found differences between
men and women in respect of psychiatrists' attitudes towards the remand.
86% of the requests for reports on women were considered 'reasonable',
compared with 76% for men. Flowever, only 5% of the women, compared with
11% of the men were regarded as having severe symptoms of mental disorder
on examination. Women did, however, have a higher incidence of drinking
problems and drug abuse, 'and more were regarded as having a personality
disorder in addition' (1977: 95). This may be why psychiatrists
assessed women as being less reliable prospects for outpatient treatment
than men. 49% of the women compared with 45% of the men were regarded
as 'definitely unreliable' and that difference was significantly
increased (55% of the women, compared to only 24% overall) when con-
sidering only remands on bail. For women remanded in custody, the
'unreliability' assessment dropped to 35% compared with 45% overall.
(The study, unfortunately, does not directly compare women with men at
this point, but the inference must be that women are more likely than
men to be remanded in custody if on-going medical treatment is thought
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likely to be necessary.)
Solicitor 6 gave a very different reading to female defendants'
alleged unreliability. She did not accept that women had a higher
incidence of drink and drug involvement and argued that their so-called
'unreliability' was a feature of something else:
'A lot of them haven't got the time to start doing
outpatient treatment - certainly not in-patient
treatment. They have so many responsibilities
outside.'
(10-11)
This 'unreliability' was indicative rather of an enforced self-reliance.
Women 'need to be stronger, because they haven't got the money or the
opportunities to get the crutches'. Nevertheless, despite recognising
that 'if they'd been born into a comfortable lifestyle, they wouldn't
necessarily offend' (my emphasis on the recognition of necessity) she
still described these women's response to their circumstances as one of
depression and 'hysteria', requiring help for which 'a lot of them rely
on their own CPs'.
Thus, despite solicitors' explicit recognition of the material and
economic determinants of much female crime, the myth that criminal women
are mentally ill, emotionally disturbed or in some other way abnormal is
tenacious. Solicitor 8 gave me this succinct advice:
'Be suspicious of women who say they don't need
help.'
His belief that 'women are more ready to see psychiatrists than men'
confirms Gibbens, Soothill and Pope's finding (1977: 64-5) that
psychiatrists regarded women on bail as more amenable than men. By
comparison with men remanded on bail, women were rated
'as much less hostile, somewhat less sullen, more
anxious and friendly and willing to discuss their
problems.'
(ibid)
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This could be accounted for by the fact that the woman offender
'is more ]ikely to seem alarmed and to appeal for
help to the psychiatrist, especially if he is a man.'
(ibid)
The picture is very different, however, if the woman is in custody. She
may still seem alarmed but this is now manifested in anger and
irritability, 'showing much more violence to staff and other inmates than
do male offenders'. Gibbens et al. reflect that this 'clearly highlights
the problem of whether one obtains a truer picture of basic character-
istics during an interview in custody, or on bail' (1977: 65 - emphasis
added). Less positivistically, it seems to raise the question of the
extent to which custodial remands contribute towards the construction
of mental disorder.
Solicitor 8 prided hicself on obtainin9 ys*iatic
particular psychiatrist (Doctor A) prior to a court hearing to avoid
defendants being remanded in custody, his reasoning being that:
'Only the scum of the medical profession works in
prisons - interviews consist of shouting through
the door, "Are you all right?".'
This particular solicitor had a very high reputation with defendants
and probation officers (confirmed by my interview with Pauline) for
'caring' about female defendants. Even when prosecuting, he often
'slipped in' cases involving women when press reporters were having tea-
breaks so that the risk of publicity was minimised, or would openly ask
them not to report a case (and usually succeed). He was the epitomy of
Pollak's 'chivalrous' man yet, ironically, it could be argued that the
outcome he obtained for his women clients was not always to their
advantage, for he claimed that magistrates always followed Doctor A's
recommendations (which usually included some form of treatment). Yet
we have seen in the preceding chapter that magistrates are sceptical of
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psychiatrists and this particular psychiatrist enjoyed a very mixed
reputation in the courts. One can only surmise, therefore, that it was
the solicitor's eloquence and high standing that achieved results and
that consequently his female clients were more likely to end up
receiving psychiatric treatment than were the clients of his colleagues.
Other solicitors were less eager to obtain medical reports prior
to a request by the court, partly because of the risk of not being able
to reclaim the expense through Legal Aid, (a risk, as we have seen, which
might be greater with women than men) and partly because of a fear of
miscalculating the effect of presenting a medical mitigation. The danger
of 'taking a sledge-hammer to crack a nut' was voiced by a number of
solicitors and this was associated with the embarrassment that a woman
was expected to experience at having to declare such problems. One
solicitor said he was prepared to use the word 'menopause' but felt
unhappy about spelling out any more details:
AW: 'Is it the mystique of the term that proves a
better defence than spelling out a woman's
emotional and social conditions - how she
feels'
SoliCitor 4: 'Possibly. You certainly get less questionning
by using the medical terms. Would the client
appreciate being emotionally exposed in the way
you suggest?'
AW: 'You mean there's a danger of "overkill"?'
Solicitor 4: 'Exactly. But I take your point. The best miti-
gation for a first offender is to stress the
shattering effect of court proceedings, the
humiliation of family and friends knowing - and
that's true - so, in a way, I suppose you
shouldn't need anything else.'
A number of issues are conflated in this exchange. Firstly, there
is an acceptance of the power of particular (preferably medical) words -
a power which may be reduced if the word is deconstructed and its
components made explicit. This accords with the paradoxical attitude
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of magistrates to experts which was demonstrated in the preceding
chapter. The use of over-technical language may be rejected by
magistrates as 'unrealistic' and mystifying. On the other hand, the use
of 'common sense' language can be seen as insulting, on the grounds that
'we don't need an expert to tell us that!'. Steering a course between
the presentation of new, unfamiliar knowledge which is threatening, and
appearing merely to restate what is 'always-already' known is the
solicitor's particular skill. Secondly, there is an (unacknowledged)
concern that whilst medicine has the authority to provide a defence to
an allegation of crime, social and economic conditions have only had conferre
on them the authority sometimes to mitigate punishment. By tailoring his
representation to the woman's circumstances and assumed sensitivities,
the solicitor overlooks the possibility that she may, in law, be
innocent. He appears to prefer the compromise of removing the woman from
the more contentious site of medical explanation and relocating her in
the site of familial need, whilst retaining her status as hapless,
guilt-ridden victim of her own uncontrollable impulses. Additionally,
family and friends are portrayed as the 'real' sufferers, who have been
betrayed by this woman, rather than as the possible source of her
misery - the constraints and pressures against which she may be
protesting.
The pressure on a woman to construct an explanation of her action
which will appease her family was recognised by Solicitor 6, who argued
that solicitors had to assess the consequences of colluding with such a
course. The myth of 'providing a service' and 'taking instructions'
remains, and solicitors were reluctant to acknowledge the extent to which
they control the staging of women's representation:
'You've always got to remember just how far your
lady is prepared to go. She may feel that it is
far more degrading to go into a witness box and
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tell them all those type of details than to just
get it over. Quite regularly all they want to do
is get it over anyway - they don't think about
the weight of the conviction - and I think you've
got to respect their wishes and if they are not
prepared to bare their private lives for what they
class as a very minor matter, and one which they
feel they can somehow square with the family, then
they could always go away and say, "I didn't really
want to talk about all those details" which gives
them a safety net as well. You see quite often
it's not "Well I admitted that I was responsible
for this" but "I admitted it but it was just to
save myself telling them all those other bits".
So in those circumstances, they wouldn't find it
such a pressing need to weigh up the differences.
If it's a more serious matter, like murder, you
have to put a bit more pressure on them and say,
"When you look at what you're facing, your
embarrassment about your menstrual cycle pales
into insignificance - you've got to pull yourself
together and fight for this".'
(4)
This would again seem to confirm Edwards' suggestion (1984: 197)
'that the nature of the offence for which a defendant is charged is
likely to have a considerable impact on whether or not a medical report
is requested'.
Elsewhere (Worrall, 1981) I have argued that 'medical' mitigations
in respect of female lawbreakers rarely claim to be concerned with
clinically definable mental illness. Apart from references to
'depression' most solicitors seemed to associate medical reports and
psychiatric treatment with gynaecological conditions which are arguably
'normal' - pre-menstrual tension, pregnancy, the menopause. In other
words, the normal woman is likely to be viewed as abnormal. But the
extent to which such abnormality should be considered to excuse criminal
behaviour is a dilemma which has existed in legal discourse since 1914
when Annie Smith (Criminal Appeal Reports 11, 36) was convicted of'
murdering her 2½ year old child. She appealed against conviction on the
grounds of provocation, claiming that she was more susceptible to
provocation by her child because she was pregnant. Counsel argued that
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'a pregnant woman is not quite normal'. The judge was not impressed and
dismissed the appeal, stating that, since Smith was not insane, she knew
what she was doing.
Since that time, there has developed a test in cases where provocation
is claimed. It is known as 'the reasonable man' test. Provocation can
be claimed if the behaviour referred to would be such as would provoke
'the reasonable man'. In Bedder (1954) it was held that a man who
murdered a prostitute because she taunted him about his impotence could
not claim provocation, since 'the reasonable man' is not impotent!
Following from this, in Camplin (1978), Lord Simon of Glaisdale argued
that, whilst the term 'reasonable man' must be assumed to include 'the
reasonable woman', the fledder finding must 'preclude the jury from
ennsiilrrinq that Ihe rn'cused was, say, pregnant' or, presumably, under-
going menstruation or menopause.	 Such conditions, it was maintained,
must fall into the category of 'personal idiosyncracy' rather than
'universal quality'. In 1982 when the case of' Smith alias Craddock
eventually reached the Court of Appeal, it was decided that pre-menstrual
tension
'....was "wholly unacceptable" as a defence to any
crime. Under British law evidence of PMT can only
be introduced as an extenuating factor or in
mitigation of sentence or as evidence of diminished
responsibility (1982 CIR 531).'
(Edwards, 1984: 85)
The degree, therefore, to which 'the reasonable man' recognises 'the
normal woman' is dependent not on the strength of proof of any antecedent
material condition but on the material consequences of that recognition.
The foremost question to be answered is 'What if....?' What if PMT is
recognised as a defence? What are the consequences likely to be? They
are likely to be the victory of the Other, the re-qualification of women
as tellers of their own stories and as Other than NOT MAN. On the other
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hand, what if 'feminine conditions' are recognised only in mitigation?
Such rc'coqriition would allow for the management of the Other, for its
very recoqnition would be a step towards its exclusion from legitimate
discourse. Such is the trap in which the female lawbreaker is caught.
The effectiveness of medical discourse lies in the recognition of
'feminine conditions' as simultaneously 'universal qualities' and
'prrsonal idionyncracics', thus allowing the management of female law-
breakers without conceding authority (or, indeed, authenticity) to their
accounts.
Conclusion
In this chapter it has been argued that solicitors constitute an
important link in the chain of the socio-legal signification of women
lawbreakers. By re-presenting the woman to the court, they are concerned
both to protect the woman from her own tendencies to present herself in
an 'unacceptable' way and to 'normalise' the woman and her actions so
that she and they may be presented in a form that is 'recognised' by the
court. In carrying out this task, solicitors are mindful of certain
rules and conventions governing their representation. The woman's story
must be packaged in such a way that her plea of 'guilty' is received
without discomfort by the court and her own account of events must be
reconstituted or muted. She herself is disqualified as a speaker of
her own story and a certain 'hierarchy of credibility' pertains to the
explanations offered for her actions. 'Sickness' is the favoured
explanation for offences that can be categorised as 'serious but natural'
(i.e. congruent with images of femininity) or 'petty but unnatural',
and comitted by 'respectable' women. 'Need' is an acceptable
explanation if the offence is 'petty but natural' and if such an
explanation does not imply that 'society' (as represented by the court)
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is to blame. Poverty per se is never an acceptable explanation.
Offences which are either 'serious and unnatural' or 'petty and
unnatural' are likely to be explained in terms of 'greed' or wickedness,
especially if committed by 'unrespectable' women, namely, working class
women or women with so-called unconventional lifestyles.
In order to secure the best possible position in that hierarchy for
their clients, but without damaging their own professional credibility
solicitors adopt a strategy which is ostensibly characterised by the
paradigm of 'service'. By using the vocabulary of service ('client',
'taking instructions' etc.) solicitors perpetuate the myth of defendant
choice and power. Becau'e of the material and ideological constrainis
on women in society, such vocabulary is particularly ironic in relation
to female lawbreakers.
Within this context, solicitors employ a variety of tactics which
include recognising when gender-related explanations may or may not be
acceptable: the stance of moral neutrality (which renders the 'truth' of
an account irrelevant and avoids the need to recognise gender-related
injustices); 'getting to know the bench'; and 'playing to the audience' -
all of which tactics involve simultaneously acknowledging and reinforcing
ideologies about the 'normal' woman.
Underpinning these ideological conditions governing the relationship
between solicitors and female defendants is the economic condition of
women's particularly precarious ability to pay for legal representation.
The readiness of solicitors to utilise 'off the peg', ready-make packages
for women lawbreakers may be attributed as much to economic as to
ideological considerations.
Thus solicitors construct female lawbreakers within the ideologies of
domesticity, sexuality and pathology. Women defendants are re-presented
as family members, as sexual objectives and/or as sick. Even those for
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whom ;uch constructions bear no relation to reality cannot escape the
power of these ideologies. Their only alternative is to be constructed
in terms of their exclusion from these 'socially exculpatory' and 'legally
effective' (Edwards, 1984) categories. It has been argued that these
categories emanate from a socio-legal belief in the fundamental
'normality' of MAN. They constitute concessions to those defendants who
suffer the misfortune of being NON-MALE. Exclusion from these categories,
therefore, renders the 'nondescript' female lawbreaker neither MALE nor
NON-MALE. Thus we return to Lombroso's monstrous 'double exception'.
It has been argued that solicitors play an important role as the
'gate-keepers' to psychiatry and social work. The next two chapters will
explore the role of psychiatrists and probation officers in this chain of
signification.
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CHAPTER SIX
PSYCHIATRISTS: EXPERTS IN TREATABILITY
Introduction
In the two preceding chapters, it has been suggested that attitudes to
psychiatric discourse amongst members of the magistracy and the legal pro-
fession are ambivalent. Decisions to privilege psychiatric utterances are
made on the basis of non-medical factors such as the severity of the offence
involved, personal knowledge of the psychiatrist and the extent to which the
authority of the utterances can be recognised. Even when authority is
ascribed to such utterances, there may remain some scepticism about the
'need to know'.
In this chapter, therefore, psychiatric discourse in relation to
criminal activity will be deconstructed and psychiatrists' competence to
assess, classify, control and transform female lawbreakers examined. This
will be done by analysing information drawn from interviews with six con-
sultant psychiatrists (and one written response to the letter in Appendix
II), an interview with a corTmJnity psychiatric nurse and a day visit to a
Special Treatment Unit catering specifically for 'personality disorders'
attached to a psychiatric hospital. It is argued that:
Psychiatrists' discourse is constituted by the ideology of
forensic medicine, which requires and authorises them to make
wide-ranging medical, moral and judicial judgments of female
lawbreakers in order to render them describable for the purposes
of recognition by magisterial common sense. At the same time,
this ideology makes women's eligibility for treatment both
ideologically and materially dependent on a far narrower range
of gender-stereotyped classifications.
It will be argued that:
(1) far from being a search for scientific 'truth', psychiatric assessment
constitutes a programme of power which presupposes a knowledge of the
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field of reality in which it intervenes and renders reality in the form
of objects that are programmable (that is, treatable - or not);
(2) despite attempt8 to present itself as a coherent and unified discourse
psychiatric discourse is fragmented and contradictory, governed by a set
of rules which is inconsistent and elusive. This set of rules
facilitates the inclusion and exclusion of female lawbreakers in and from
psychiatric diagnosis and/or treatment, not on recognisably 'medical'
grounds but on the basis of their programmability as potentially coping
women. Such programmability is dependent on the extent to which their
pathology can be described as congruent with the expert construction of
them as being 'normal' women within the complementary discourses of
domesticity and sexuality. Where such congruity does not exist (for
example, where the 'marginalised' dysfunctions of gynaecology and
personality disorders are diagnosed) female lawbreakers are muted. They
are constructed by psychiatrists as being not only outwith psychiatry
(that is, beyond the reach of the discourse of pathology which requires/
compels medical intervention) but also - and more importantly - outwith
domesticity and sexuality. Consequently, the need for treatment is
declared - by psychiatrists - to be subordinate to the need for social work
and/or penal intervention. Forensic psychiatrists, who both arrogate to
themselves and are 'authoritatively charged with' (Carlen, 1986) 'the
legal, judicial and moral management of lawbreakers' can claim a
transferability of expertise which permits them to speak with equal
privilege in judicial and social work discourses. Whilst this 'psychiatric'
claim to privilege affects both male and female lawbreakers, it will be
argued that the unique constellation of ideological and material pre-
conditions which determine the relationship between psychiatrists and
particular female lawbreakers results in the making of a specific
contribution to the chain of signification of nondescript women. The
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rest of this chapter is organised under the following headings:
The Origin of Psychiatrists' Authority
- Probation and Psychiatry
The Rules Governing Psychiatrists' Authority: The Ideological
and Material Pre-conditions of Treatability
Gender-Neutral Medicine? The Construction of Ordered Women
- Recognisable Parole
- Redefining Sickness as Needyness
The Origin of Psychiatrists' Authority
Legislation privileges psychiatric discourse at a number of stages
in the judicial process and authorises it to intervene in decisions
about both culpability (how responsible was the defendant for his/her
actions' and management (how should s/he be treated?). Table 6.1 sets
out the powers of the court in relation to offenders who appear to be
mentally abnormal or disordered. None of these powers, however, is
mandatory. Ultimately, psychiatrists are no more than expert advisors to
the court, whose influence appears to depend on their ability to
establish themselves in court more as 'wise men' (Foucault, 1965) than
as men of science. Psychiatrists are expected to enter into what Prins
(1985) has called a 'helpful collusion' with the court, passing moral as
well as medical judgments on defendants:
AW: 'Do you find that the courts always follow your
recomendat ions?
Dr. A: 'Always - no; almost always - yes.'
AW: 'And is that so whether or not you are recommending
treatment?'
Dr. A: 'This is largely a matter of whether they have got
to know you. They have known me for a very large
number of years and, rightly or wrongly, I have a
reputation for knowing what I'm doing - and if I
think a person is a villain and there's nothing
wrong with him, I say so quite unequivocally.'
(13-14)
212.
TABLE 6.1:
MENTAL DISORDER IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS -
POWERS OF THE COURT
L[GISI.ATION RELATING TO DISORDER
AT TIME 01 OFFENCE
1. Special verdict - not guilty
by reason of insanity. Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964
s. 2.
2. Diminished responsibility
Homicide Act 1957 a. 2.
3. Infanticide
AT TIME OF TRIAL
1. Transfer before trial.
2. Unfit to plead. Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act
1964 s. 4.
AT TIME OF REMAND
1. Remand to hospital for
reports M.H.A. 1983 a. 35
2. Remand for treatment s. 36.
3. Interim Hospital Order a. 38.
EFFECT
Hospital Order with restrictions.
(see below)
Reduces murder to manslaughter -
increases sentencing discretion.
Hospital Order with restrictions.
Hospital Order with restrictions.
One medical opinion. 28 days and
renewable to 12 weeks. Consent
required for any treatment.
Two medical opinions. 28 days
and renewable.
Two medical opinions. 12 weeks
and renewable to 6 months.
AT TIME OF SENTENCE
1. Hospital Order Mental Health
Act 1983 a. 37.
2. Hospital Order with restric-
tions. Mental Health Act
1983 s. 41.
3. Probation Order with condition
of psychiatric treatment.
Powers of Criminal Courts Act
1973 s. 3.
Two medical opinions. 6 months
and renewable. Discharge by
Responsible Medical Officer.
Two medical opinions. Fixed time
or unlimited. Discharge by Home
Secretary or Mental Health Review
Tribunal.
One medical opinion. In-patient
or out-patient. Time fixed or
length of Probation Order.
Consent required.
4. Guardianship M.H.A. 1983 s. 7.	 Nearest relative or Approved Social
Worker. 6 months and renewable.
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TABLE 6.1 (cont'd)
LEGISLATION	 EFFECT
AFTER SENTENCE
1. Transfer to hospital from	 Same as Hospital Order s. 37.
prison M.H.A. 1983 s. 47.
2. As above with restrictions	 Can be returned to prison or
s. 49.	 released on licence.
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Such moral judgments are possible within psychiatric discourse because
a) there is no agreement within psychiatry about the nature of 'mental
illness' and b) there is no agreement about the relationship between
'mental illnes8' and criminal activity. Increasingly (as for example,
in the cases of Peter Sutcliffe (Prins, 1985) and Mirella Beechook
(Guardian, 1 May 1987)) courts appear to reject the assertion that 'mental
disorder' negates intent to commit a crime, thus placing a question mark
over its effectiveness in reducing culpability. Even if a court does
accept that a defendant is, by reason of 'mental disorder', less culpable
than otherwise, this does not logically dictate whether s/he should be
treated more leniently (because s/he is more deserving of sympathy and
in need of protection from the full wrath of the law) or more harshly
(because s he is likely to be less amenable to non-punitive measures,
dangerous and in need of control). Consequently, the allocation of
'mentally abnormal offenders' directly to sites of medical jurisdiction
(that is, through Hospital Orders or into the care of Social Services
departments through Cuardianhsip Orders) is by no means assured. On the
contrary, whilst psychiatric discourse has inseminated the whole of the
judicial and penal process (Carlen, 1986), its claim to authority emanates
as much from its power to exclude defendants from treatment as from its
power to admit them to it.
Psychiatrists' authority is, however, itself subject to political
and economic restriction. Even when a consultant is willing to offer a
hospital bed, staff unions may veto tIat decision on the grounds that they
cannot manage potentially violent or 'dangerous' patients (Benn, 1985).
Hospitals are not legally obliged to make places available to courts and
the provision which enables courts to summons Regional Health Authorities
to explain their refusal to accept a patient is very rarely used.
In this political climate, Special Treatment Units, such as one
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visited in this study occupy a crucial role. Their willingness to
accept for treatment those whom other psychiatrists have rejected as
untreatable makes them potentially atiractive propositions for courts.
However, as will be seen, they consider that they have to be very
selective as well - partly for ideological reasons (only the 'right' type
of personality disorder is considered suitable) but partly because they,
like ordinary hospitals, lack secure accommodation and cannot manage
the most difficult offenders. A further restriction on the success of
the Unit, it was argued, was the absence of community psychiatric nurses,
which was seen to account for the poor provision of after-care and the
consequent need for frequent re-admission.
For many years the need for intermediate provision for mentally
disordered offenders in the form of Regional Secure Units has been
acknowledged. Following the Butler Committee Report (1975), the
government allocated £14 million for the creation of one unit in each
Regional Health Authority, providing a total of about 1000 beds. To
date, barely a fraction of that number has been provided, and the NHS
has been accused of diverting the money to other projects, to finance
pay awards and to pay VAT bills (Benn, 1985).
One of the conrequences of this stagnation of provision for
mentally abnormal offenders is that in preference to making Hospital or
Guardianship Orders courts frequently resort to what has come to be
termed the 'psychiatric probation order s - probation orders which include
a condition that the defendant receive psychiatric treatment as either
an in-patient or an out-patient. An examination of the history and use
of this provision demonstrates the uneasy relationship which now exists
between psychiatric and probation discourses.
216.
Probation and Psychiatry
Courts have always had wide powers of discretion in dealing with
trivial offences where there is doubt about the offender's 'mental condilior,'
The Probation of Offenders Act 1907 did not even require the Court to
proceed to conviction:
'1. (1) Where any person is charged before a
court of summary jurisdiction with an offence
punishable by such court and the court is
satisfied that the charge is proved, but is of
the opinion that, having regard to the character,
antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of
the person charged, or to the trivial nature of
the offence, or to the extenuating circumstances
under which the offence was comitted, it is
inexpedient in inflict any punishment, or any
other than a nominal punishment, or that it is
expedient to release the offender on probation,
the court may, without proceeding to conviction,
make an order either -
i) dismissing the information or charge, or
ii) discharging the offender conditionally on
his entering into a recognizance, with or without
sureties, to be of good behaviour and to appear
for conviction and sentence when called on at any
time during such period, not exceeding three years,
as may be specified in the order.'
Provision was also made for such offenders to be supervised by
Probation Officers s.2(1)) whose duties included both surveillance and
befriending:
s4• It shall be the duty of a Probation Officer,
subject to the directions of the court -
a) to visit or receive reports from the person
under supervision at such reasonable intervals as
may be specified in the probation order or, subject
thereto, as the probation officer may think it;
b) to see that he observes the conditions of his
recognizance;
c) to advise, assist and befriend him, and, when
necessary, to endeavour to find him suitable
employment.'
The Mental Deficiency Act 1913, 'to make further and better provision
for the care of feeble-minded and other mentally defective persons' gave
the courts very similar powers, although confined to those whose defect
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was dcmed to have hi'en apparent 'from an ear]y age':
'2.(1) A person who is a defective may be dealt
with under this Act by being sent to or placed
in an institution for defectives or placed under
guardianship.
b) if in addition to being a defective he is
a person....
ii) who is found guilty of any criminal offence....'
The 1913 Act also introduced more precise definitions of mental
deficiency, abandoning the older term of 'lunatic'. Three categories,
'idiot', 'imbecile' and 'feeble-minded' described various degrees of
the condition now termed 'subnormality' but a fourth category fore-
shadowed the construct of 'psychopathy':
'1(d) Moral imbeciles; that is to say, persons
who from an early age display some permanent mental
defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal
propensities on which punishment has had little or
no deterrent effect.'
These two Acts represent, in embryonic form, the dilemma which has
since developed regarding the disposal of those who are defined as
mentally abnormal and have committed an offence. As Walker and McCabe
(1973: 79 point out, the central concern has not been the strictly
legal one of responsibility at the time of the act but the comparative
expediency of psychiatric and penal disposals after conviction. The use
of traditional legal devices, such as special verdicts (M'Naghten Rules),
diminished responsibility and charges of infanticide account for an
insignificant proportion of the disposals of mentally disordered
offenders (see Table 6.2)
The Criminal justice Act 1948 made it possible for courts to include
specific conditions in probation orders, thus raising the question of
whether a probation order was still 'instead of sentencing' the offender
(s3.1). The specific conditions that could now be included were those of
residence (sl.4) and treatment for a mental condition (s4). A medical
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701
559
114
99
1
(23)
41
226
122
16
15
218.
TABLE 6.2:
DISPOSALS INFLUENCED BY PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE. 1981
H
	
F
Psychiatric probation orders
in-patient
out-patient
Hospital orders
without restriction on discharge
with restriction: Special Hospitals
NHS Hospitals
0
()(1)
Insanity defence	 (')	 (0)
Infanticide
Hosp. order (no restriction) 	 -	 (2)
Probation	 -	 (7)
Supervision (juvenile)
	
-	 2
Diminished responsibility manslaughter
Conditional discharge
	
0	 1
Hosp. order (no restriction)	 (9)	 (3)
Hosp. order (with restriction)	 (21)	 (5)
Probation	 (3)	 (7)
Prison determinate)	 20	 0
Prison (life)
	
11	 3
TOTAL	 1742	 426
Transferred from prison to hospital
before or during sentence
	
105
Transferred from prison to hospital
at date of release	 15
(1) Bracketed figures excluded from total, being already included in
figures above for hospital orders or probation orders.
Guardianship orders
Found unfit for trial
Ref: Walker, N. (1985: 324).
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practitioner was to give evidence that 'the material condition of an
offender is such as requires and as may be susceptible to treatment'
(s4.1) but is not such as to justify being certified under the Lunacy
Act 1890 or the Mental Deficiency Act 1913. The offender was to be
required to undergo treatment for up to twelve months as either a resident
or non-resident patient of a medical institution or under the direction
of a specified medical practitioner (s4.2).
The primary concern of this Act was not the treatment of mental
illness or deficiency, but the prevention of crime and s4 was designed to
reinforce a penal measure, rather than ensure the hospital attendance of
an offender. Section 3.1 of the Act makes the purpose of conditions
clear:
'....a probation order may in addition require the
offender to comply during the whole or any part of
the probation period with such requirements as the
court, having regard to the circumstances of the
case, considers necessary for securing the conduct
of the offender or for preventing a repetition by
him of the same offence or the coninission of other
offences....
Thus, an obligation was placed on the medical profession
'to extend its scope beyond the treatment of mental
disease and the care of mental defectives into the
field of personal conflicts within the sphere of
normal mental life. In the administration of
criminal justice, medical psychology is no longer
restricted to the negative function of determining
the limits of criminal responsibility, but has
become part of preventive medicine by contributing
to a rational classification of offenders and to
the design and application of methods of remedial
treatment of social deviants.'
(Grunhut, 1963: 6)
Grunhut himself is able to separate the behaviour from the state of
mind:
'It would be the aim of medical treatment to reach
a state in the patient's mental condition where
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ordinary probation casework could be pursued with
prospects corresponding to those in normal probation
cases.'
(1963: 29)
Nevertheless, he recognises a fear amongst Probation Officers that
the new psychiatric probation order was, in practice, being (mis)used 'to
induce offenders who could not be 'certified' to undergo what was
virtually compulsory treatment' (Walker and McCabe, 1973: 67). And,
perhaps more importantly, underlying that fear was the 'exaggerated
expectations of the general public' (Grunhut, 1963: 29) and the
judiciary that psychiatry could reduce crime where surveillance and
befriending (the traditional probation tasks) had failed.
Prior to the Mental Health Act 1959, psychiatric probation orders
provided sentencers with an apparently useful compromise between penal
and medical measures. However, the spirit of the 1959 Act required that
offenders considered to be mentally disordered should, wherever possible,
be dealt with by medical measures. Section 60 of the Act provided not
only for offenders to be admitted to hospital, but also for them to be
supervised within the community by the Local Authority Social Services,
rather than by the Probation Service, under a Guardianship Order. Although
certain restrictions applied to the use of Guardianship Orders (in the
case of psychopaths, they had to be under 21 years old),
'It is intended to supplement community care on
an informal basis in cases where powers of control
over the patient are needed for the patient's own
welfare or for the protection of others.'
(NAMH Guide to the Mental Health Act 1959, 1969)
At the time, Max Grunhut's study of Psychiatric Probation Orders was
in progress and so no guidance was issued regarding the respective uses
of Guardianship and Psychiatric Probation Orders. When Grunhut's study
was published, it concluded that,
221.
'Probation will still be used where there are
prospects that the offenders' mental condition
can improve in a comparatively short time.'
(1961:	 51)
In fact, Guardianship Orders were hardly used at all and the Butler
CommittPe (Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, 1975)
clearly felt that they should be used more:
'It is our view that guardianship orders offer
a useful form of control of some mentally
disordered offenders who do not require hospital
treatment....we would encourage the development
of closer liaison between the courts and the
social services departments of local authorities.'
(s15.8)
The Mental Health Act 1983 has attempted to make Guardianship Orders
more attractive to both courts and local authority social workers by
enhancing the status of the social workers (only those 'approved' can be
involved) and by restricting the scope of the order to include only
specific requirements such as residence, attendance for treatment or
training, and accessibility to the patient by a doctor. The more wide-
ranging obligations of providing care and support are no longer part of
the order. (The age restriction on psychopaths has, however, been
removed.
Despite this attempt to shift more responsibility for those described
as 'mentally disordered' towards the social services departments, the
psychiatric probation order has survived the Powers of the Criminal
Courts Act 1973 virtually unaltered (s.3) and the Mental Health Act 1983
with barely a mention. It remains the order most frequently used by the
courts in dealing with mentally disordered offenders whose offences are
of a relatively trivial nature (Walker, 1985). Yet the criteria for its
use and non-use are far from clear. The original aim of this thesis was
to study only those cases where women had been made subject to such an
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order but it quickly became apparent that the imposition of such orders
had little to do with any 'objective' assessment of a woman's need for
psychiatric help. Consequently, the inclusion (or not) of conditions ot
psychiatric treatment in probation orders made on female offenders is
now itself an object of discourse in this thesis, rather than an already
given characteristic of the women studied.
The Rules Governing Psychiatrists' Discourse: The Ideological
and Material Pre-conditions of Consultancy
As has been seen, psychiatrists are afforded a privileged status
within the criminal justice system but they have no right of access to
courts. They may speak only at the request of magistrates, solicitors
and probation officers and what they say has to be expressed in a form
which is recognisable within the discourses of magisterial common sense
(as described in Chapter Four), re-presentation (as described in Chapter
Five and strategic working as will be described in Chapter Seven).
That recognition is dependent less on their legal powers (which, though
extensive, can only be invoked at the discretion of 'non-experts') than
on their ability to enter a 'helpful collusion' which eases magistrates'
discomfort in relation to the organisation of the difference which
constitutes the 'culpable not culpable' and 'treatable/punishable'
distinctions. Courts require psychiatrists to present themselves as
'wise men' who have the power (that is, the authority plus the knowledge
plus the material means) to create order out of disorder.
One might almost argue that forensic psychiatrists are themselves
muted! But psychiatric discourse is not dependent for its survival and
privilege on its recognition by judicial and penal discourse; it draws
its real power from elsewhere - from the ideologies and material conditions
of medicine and the health services. If courts have the right to reject
psychiatric discourse, then psychiatrists are under no obligation to
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recognise 'the putative legal subject - s/he, who having (or not) the
capacity to know better, breaks the law' (Carlen, 1986). Thus the
subject of forensic psychiatry's inquiry is 'forever elusive'. The
conditions under which legal subjects are recognised by psychiatry are
governed by the rules of consultancy - a strategy which perpetuates the
myth of the authority of diagnostic input coupled with an absence of
responsibility for the consequent outcome. As Nils Christie has said:
'Recently there has been over-emphasis on
using medical personnel for the diagnostic
stage. A maximum of energy i8 used for giving
advice to the courts and little is left for
treatment.'
(Wolstenholme and O'Connor, '1973,
quoted in Carlen, 1986)
At the time of these interviews, the Mental health Pct, 193 eas
being introduced and with it the formal 'treatability' criterion which
requires that, before making a hospital order in respect of an offender
suffering from psychopathic disorder or mental impairment, it must be
satisfied that medical treatment is 'likely to alleviate or prevent a
deterioration of his condition'. The expressed purpose of this criterion
was to prevent the compulsory incarceration of mentally handicapped and
other 'abnormal' people simply on the grounds that they were 'abnormal'
if they were neither dangerous nor being actively medically treated. It
has also been argued that it is wrong to make an offender who is
considered untreatable subject to a hospital order, release from which
depends on response to treatment (Ashworth and Gostin, 1984). The
effects of the criterion, however, have been contradictory. As has been
demonstrated in previous chapters, the term 'personality disorder' is
used simultaneously to include and exclude the lawbreaker in and from
psychiatric discourse. It is the mechanism by which the parameters of
this discourse can be rendered infinitely flexible. It enables the
psychiatrist to assess and judge, without obliging him to treat. It
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permits him to elevate personal preferences to the status of scientific
utterances:
'Well some of them are not treatable. You have to
decide in terms of age and behaviour and other
factors whether there are symptoms that you can
modify. With some people who have longstanding
personality disorders that have become entrenched
and intractable you have to face the fact that
there is nothing you can do. This is the general
approach to everyone - men and women - you have
to be very selective. That's the approach of the
new Mental Health legislation - that they've got
to be treatable.'
(Dr. D: 34)
Nurse A, however, felt such 'scientific' argument to be spurious:
'Labels like that don't mean anything - they
don't mean anything to me. I've been listening
to them for 13 years. The criteria for
diagnosing something like that is so vague and
subjective that one person will be diagnosed as
personality disorder by one psychiatrist,
someone else won't diagnose it as that. If I
was referred someone like that I might use the
terms but when you are actually dealing with
someone it goes out the window - although you
are obviously still influenced by it - and I
would look more at what they are doing, rather
than looking at this label and saying "For this
label you do such-and-such". Labels are put on
people because the medical world likes to have
things cut and dried, and there are certain
treatments for certain labels.'
(47)
And certain non-treatments for certain labels!
Dr. A was prepared to refer 'personality disorders' to a specialist
'if they can convince me they would cooperate'. But he added:
'I myself never undertake treatment of people with
personality disorder, largely because it has to be
undertaken by enthusiasts, who are interested in
this, and what's more, who have a specialised unit
with staff nurses and social workers who have a
similar orientation.'
(13)
Selectivity and enthusiasm were identified by these psychiatrists as the
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key pre-requisites for engaging with personality disorder. Selection
for treatment appeared to be dependent, not on specific criteria, but on
ability to render oneself 'convincing' - that is, presumably, 'likeable'
and not too anti-8ocial in one's habits! When asked about the criteria
used for admission to the Special Treatment Unit, Nurse B replied:
'They have to function on the ward - be able to
talk - not violent under pressure - not too
depressed - mustn't drink on the ward. We take
anyone who wants to come except those of low
intelligence, those who are clearly mentally ill
and the extremes of violent or sexual crimes
because we lack a secure unit.'
One gained the impression of a very select clientele indeed!
The formal 'treatability' test applies only to defendants diagnosed
as suffering from psychopathic disorder or mental impairment, and not
those diagnosed as suffering from other forms of mental illness. However,
orders made on the latter are subject to review after six months and
only renewed if the defendant's condition is 'treatable'. This has
resulted in an informal 'viability' criterion (Ashworth and Costin, 1984),
the ideology of which has permeated the diagnosis of all defendants who
are referred for psychiatric assessment.
It appeared to be the case that two rules governed the nature of the con-
sultancy offered to the courts by the psychiatrists interviewed in this
study and it is argued here that, whilst these affect both male and
female defendants, it is possible to identify gender-specific dimensions
to each. These rules which govern a psychiatrist's view of the
'appropriateness' of a referral, his diagnosis and his readiness (or not)
to accept responsibility for treatment are:
1. The paradigm of mental illness from which the psychiatrist's
terminology was selected, and
2. The extent to which the psychiatrist succeeded in redefining
'evidence' of sickness (which he accepted as his domain) as 'evidence'
226.
of social need (which he ascribed to the domain of social work/probation).
Identifying the gender-specific implications of the rules governing
psychiatrists' discourse is a task which is both easy and elusive. It
is easy in the sense that, since women dominate the official statistics
of psychiatric treatment, it could be argued that the rules outlined so
far in this chapter are applied routinely primarily to women rather than
men. As Allen (1986) observes, 'the female is not the "special" but the
normal form of the psychiatric patient'. On the other hand, medicine,
like law, views itself as 'gender-neutral'. With the marginalised
exception of dysfunctions emanating from gynaecological disorders, its
categories do not recognise distinctions of gender per se. Exposing
the 'unspoken "she" of psychiatry....behind the bland "he" of the
psychiatric textbooks' (Allen, 1986) is, therefore, a difficult task,
especially if one wishes to avoid the pitfall of arguing that there
exists a 'patriarchal complicity in the apparent mental morbidity of
women', which is constitutive of psychiatry (rather than contingent to
it) - an argument which Allen (1986) persuasively demonstrates to be
untenable.
Despite this dilemma, it is possible to identify from the information
obtained from the psychiatrists in this study some indications of
specific mechanisms which permit them to describe most of their female
patients as 'normal' women (that is, with a 'normal' propensity for
sickness). Those mechanisms, however, serve concomitantly, to ensure
that the particular women in this study are excluded from that category
and are thus rendered nondescript.
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Gender-Neutral Medicine? The Construction of Ordered Women
Recognisable paradigms
Some psychiatrists acknowledged that they and their colleagues
might be committed to different 'models' of mental illness and that this
would materially affect their diagnoses and interventions:
'There are two basic schools of psychiatry - those
who believe that a psychotic illness is medical
and those who believe that it is an extension of
something else. I happen to be towards the
behaviour model rather than the medical model, and
I talk about schizophrenogenic situations rather
than somebody who has got something wrong with
their mid brain. So you have to start by knowing
what sort of a person I am professionally.'
(Dr. B: 27)
Certain paradigms were also seen to be more acceptable to courts than
others:
'If you use terms like "depression", "obsession"
and "schizophrenia" you don't get cross-examined,
but if you start using psycho-analytical terms,
talking about a "subconscious wish to be
punished", that's not acceptable. I had a
woman recently who was fined for shoplifting,
but went out and did it again ininethately - as
though she wanted more punishment. But you can't
say that in a report.'
(Dr. C)
The prohibition of psycho-analytical discourse from the utterances
of psychiatrists in court could be viewed as having a gender-specific
effect on the assessment of female lawbreakers. As has been seen in
Chapter Two, psycho-analysis can be viewed as a challenge to the
clinical model of psychiatry and, as such, has been used by feminists
to offer 'alternative' therapy to women (Eichenbaum and Orbach, 1982).
Despite the limitations of feminist therapy (Allen, 1986), its
exclusion from 'respectable' psychiatric diagnosis places yet one more
restriction on the range of categories within which female lawbreakers
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ran leqil imniely he deneribed.
One psychiatrist who admitted to working psycho-analytically
(Dr. B) suggested that there was an additional dimension of class to
this restriction. He believed that the female lawbreakers that he saw
were likely to be from social classes 3, 4 and 5, whereas:
'We have a professional department (nearby) where
they head their letters, "Forensic Psychiatry" and
all that sort of thing. Your polite (middle class)
lady who is filling her knickers with goodies from
Woolies is likely to be sent to very proper
psychiatrists elsewhere, whereas hack psychiatrists
like myself wouldn't see her.'
(22)
It would appear possible to infer from this that the effectiveness of
paradigms differs according to the social class of the referred woman.
The 'respectable' 'middle class' woman may be described as 'depressed'
(clinical model) and treatable by drug therapy - that is, capable of
being 'rendered undepressed' (Dr. A). Alternatively, she may be described
in terms of her 'cry for help', 'sense of guilt', and her 'wish to be
punished' or to 'commit social suicide' (psycho-analytical model). Such
a description will normally be made within a relationship of benevolent
paternalism:
'Many would prefer to be in prison. We're too
kind here - no structure. But it would be
irrational to punish in those circumstances,
wouldn't it?'
(Dr. F)
For such women, the vocabulary of punishment can be introduced as safely
symbolic. For the working class woman, however, there is a real danger
that courts may take it literally and that the answer to Dr. F's
rhetorical question may turn out to be a resounding 'No!'.
The invocation of conflicting paradigms of mental illness also poses
difficulties when deciding the appropriateness of referrals to
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psychiatrists. Nurse A was not convinced that the right people were
being referred:
'What tends to happen is that we get people
referred for what I would say are the wrong
reasons and the wrong type of people, i.e. the
type of problems that I would say I could deal
with best tend not to get referred. This is
often a fault of people not being assessed
properly in the first place. Things like
neurosis - a lot of people wouldn't identify it
as neurosis. A patient might go along to a G.P.
complaining of aches and pains or irritable -
complaining of the signs and symptoms of anxiety
or stress - and there's a tendency that it's
treated with tablets, rather than sitting down
and looking at why is the person like this -
it's not an illness - why is the person
behaving like this. People tend not to get
referred for this kind of reason - they are
referred because they are ill, whatever that
means....'
(Nurse A: 40)
Because the parameters of what might constitute mental illness (and
hence an 'appropriate' referral) are drawn so widely, it becomes essential
within psychiatric discourse that there exist a person with unchallenged
authority to decide what does constitute mental illness in any given
case. The turning of a collection of disparate symptoms into the
intelligible signs of a disease by the trained gaze of a doctor is central
to the task of clinical analysis. As loucault (1973) argues, the
indispensable power of the doctor to describe a disease emerged in the
18th century when medical science began to reject the 'essential'
paradigm of disease (that is, the belief that there existed an 'ideal
form' of disease, whose whole was greater than the sum of its
symptomatic parts). In its place was established a paradigm within which
'symptoms do not by themselves announce the disease: they are turned
into intelligible signs....by a trained observer' (Cousins and Hussain,
1984:	 160).
The gender-specific implication of this is that many of the qualities
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ascribed to the 'normal' woman are also viewed as constituting
'intelligible signs' of mental disorder. When to this is added the
statistical abnormality of female lawbreaking, the relationship between
criminal activity and mental disorder in women seems over-determined.
Dr. D explained that approximately 25% of the referrals his forensic
unit received were women. In reply to my comment that this seemed high
in comparison with their rate of offending, he said:
Dr. D: 'Yes, but as you are aware, they have a higher
psychiatric morbidity - or are thought to have.
Carol Smart (1976) makes observations about
that.. . .(laughs)
AW: 'Do you feel that all the referrals of women are
appropriate?'
Dr. D: 'Yes, almost all of them. I mean, what she says
is nonsense. What she says is that men can't
understand women getting into trouble unless they
can interpret it in psychiatric terms. That's
rubbish. In fact, relatively few get into
trouble....When they do, it's because they are a
very disturbed group.'
(29)
In the light of such connents, it is unsurprising that most of the
psychiatrists viewed most of the referrals of female lawbreakers as
'appropriate':
'When a woman offends, the usual reaction is, "I
wonder what's wrong with her". When a man
offends, it's a different reaction. So in that
respect the referrals are appropriate, insofar
as everyone is worrying about what has gone
wrong with this poor woman!'
(Dr. B: 21)
'Women usually do suffer from treatable
disorders - usually depression. They suffer
more functional disorders than men - with men
it's more inadequacy, low intelligence and drink.'
(Dr. C)
Yet, having said that most referrals of women were appropriate,
psychiatrists still reserved the right subsequently to redefine those
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same symptoms as being beyond their competence to treat:
tlhe women I see at (the Probation Hostel)....
almost without exception, are, loosely, personality
disorders or rather late developing adolescents,
rather than being psychotic or severely mentally
ill. But occasionally, the staff there find their
behaviour so bizarre or worrying that they wonder
whether they are psychotic. But I don't think I've
found a psychotic person there for two years now.'
(Dr. B: 20)
'Diagnosis is very important for women. There are
far fewer of them offending - that's a cultural
thing - but they are much worse. Very few offenders
are mentally ill - many have personality disorders.'
(Dr. C)
'I would have sazd....about 50 per cent of the
women either don't suffer from a treatable mental
disorder or the disorder is in the form of psycho-
pathic traits, or personality disorder, and in
that event it's a moot point whether there is
treatment as such.'
(Dr. A: 13)
Redefining sickness as needyness
In psychiatric discourse the notion of 'treatability' has been
turned on its head. In order to render themselves treatable, potential
patients have to satisfy certain social criteria. Conversely, if
psychiatrists decide that they will not or cannot treat a defendant,
they can redefine the symptoms of mental disorder as symptoms of some-
thing else - in particular, as symptoms of social, rather than medical
need. The consequence has been that psychiatrists have partially
appropriated the paradigm of 'anti-psychiatry' whilst failing to vacate
the site of privilege which is an essential pre-condition of that
discourse. They have claimed the right to redefine mental illness as
'problems of living' (Szasz, 1965) but have not simultaneously
disqualified themselves as expert speakers. On the contrary, they have
transferred their expertise to a competing discourse - that of social work.
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Only one psychiatrist appeared to appreciate the irony of adopting this
position:
'"Is it to this man's disadvantage to go to
prison?" I don't like being asked that. It's
to everyone's disadvantage but ii isn't any
more important coming from a psychiatrist.
I used to think I could do everyone's job -
I'm learning my limitations as I get older.'
(Dr. C)
But even Dr. C. still considered himself competent to enter social work
discourse by making recoriinendations that defendants would 'benefit from
the support of a sympathetic probation officer.'
Psychiatrists retain their power as overseers of social work in the
criminal justice system by redefining evidence of sickness as evidence
of needyness. The specific mechanism employed in relation to the non-
descrpt woman is that, having been defined as an 'appropriate' referral
for pcychiatric assessment, she is then constructed by psychiatric
discourse not within the discourse of pathology but within the discourses
of domesticity and sexuality. She is described as needing not psychiatric
but social work intervention. Dr. G's assessment of Maureen (taken from
her file) illustrates the point:
'1 am more convinced every day that her problem
is basically a marital one. I think that, as a
psychiatrist, I have very little to offer this
lady. Most of her problems are social ones.'
As has been seen, one of the ways in which psychiatrists redefine
female lawbreakers is by arguing that they are personality disordered
rather than being 'really' mentally ill. A second way, however, is to
redefine dysfunctions arising from gynaecological disorders as being
'just' forms of stress. It has already been argued in Chapters Four and
Five that magistrates and solicitors are sceptical of explanations that
attribute criminal behaviour to such disorders and so, it seems, are
psychiatrists:
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'I think that this is a fashionable bandwagon
to jump onto and that PMT - where is exists -
is simply another form of stress. You can be
depressed with PMT and shoplift or break your
child's arm or you can get depressed and break
your child's arm because you have arthritis or
because your husband's out drinking. I don't
think, by and large, it differs from any other
form of serious stress and, of course, when you
write a report and there are extenuating
circumstances - things you think should be con-
sidered in sentencing, not when considering
guilt - then it is fair to say, "This women is
depressed because of PMT, or she has arthritis
or her husband is always beating her or
whatever...." It's just a form of stress.'
(Dr. A: 17)
'I have a few cases where shoplifting has been
associated with pre-menstrual tension - not
very many. I think it is occasionally and
rather rarely associated with uncharacteristic
behaviour. It's not common. It's been vastly
overrated in the last year or two in its
importance. I've had a few rare cases - a
murder case - I seem to remember that the woman
was controlled on hormonal drugs and she wasn't
taking them. It was known that in the pre-
menstrual phase she used to behave very
strangely and aggressively and that was a case
of significance. But I wouldn't put the
explanation in terms of PMT, but rather in
terms of the mental and emotional disturbance
that happens at that time, one of the causes
of which might be pre-menstrual tension. But
I think it's asking for trouble to try explain
it away simply on PMT. It's just rare cases
where it has very bizarre effects - but in
relation to the number of people who suffer
from PMT it's insignificant.'
(Dr. D: 33)
Dr. D is recognised as an authority on infanticide and his expressed
views therefore both reflect and reinforce judicial attitudes:
'The wording of the Infanticide Act (1938)
requires it to be shown that the woman
suffered from a disturbance of the mind due
to the fact that she had not fully recovered
from the effects of childbirth or lactation
and I think there is perhaps a slight hardening
of view that it was not because they had not
recovered from childbirth or lactation but that
they suffered from depression anyway - then it
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would be dealt with as manslaughter, although
the outcome will be the same. It's rare for
them to be sent to prison - they're nearly always
put on Probation.'
The substitution of socio-economic discourse (in particular, the
vocabulary of 'stres8') for gynaecological discourse might be welcomed
by some feminists. For instance, Susan Edwards (1984) has argued that
female lawbreakers should resist attempts to reduce their behaviour to
their biology. Yet, as O'Donovan (1984) has indicated, such changes of
orientation amongst professionals still raise problems for women. The
removal of gender-related excusing conditions in the face of continuing
material inequality between the sexes may increase rather than reduce
discriminatory practices. The argument that 'men, too, are subject to
the social stresses of rearing children, particularly if unsupported by
women' (Edwards, 1984: 96) does not logically invalidate the differential
treatment of women in circumstances that are materially and specifically
different (after all, men do not produce babies and if a woman says
childbirth has certain effects on her, why should that statement be
declared self-evidently invalid?). Equally, whilst child-rearing is
undoubtedly stressful for both men and women, in reality, the 'unsupported'
father is likely to receive more sympathy in any case than the
'unsupported' mother, who is presumed to have 'natural resources' of
'maternal instincts' to help her survive adverse social conditions
(Dominelli, 1984: 101). The substitution of one discourse for another
does not necessarily alter the power relationship between the
describer and the described, nor does it guarantee any greater degree of
control by women over their own destiny. Psychiatrists still arrogate
to themselves competence to explain female lawbreaking behaviour and to
judge culpability as well as treatability.
Ironically, women who are accepted as being 'treatable' are often
viewed as using domestic 'stress' as an excuse for not cooperating. As
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has been seen in Chapter Five, psychiatrists tend to view female
lawbreakers as 'unreliable' about keeping appointments. At the Special
Treatment Unit, one of the nurses told me:
'Most women are here for marital problems,
alcohol or drug abuse (that is, usually
prescribed drugs). They are no particular
problem on the unit, although some use their
children, as an excuse for not settling.'
Nurse B felt that:
'Women could use the Unit more but they don't
really want to make the decisions that will
change their situations.'
Dr. C echoed this:
'Women use domestic responsibilities as an
excuse for not coming into the Unit - they look
for any excuse to avoid the issue.'
(my emphasis)
Women, therefore, are blamed for not seeing 'the issue' as being
that which psychiatrists describe as being 'the issue'. 	 But this is
hardly surprising, since the women so described have in reality been set
yet another trap. Their attempts to demonstrate their maternal competence
to the court are now used in evidence against them - apparently
indicating a lack of co-operation, an unwillingness to undertake
'treatment'.	 The dilemma is further compounded when one begins to
consider the 'treatment'.
The Unit is run on the lines of a therapeutic community, which means
regular group meetings and patients are allowed to go home at weekends.
The average stay, according to Dr. C
'if they survive the first week, is about
2 months - sometimes four.'
Such an experience would appear to be well-suited to the needs of women
who might otherwise be at risk of imprisonment, provided they could make
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the necessary child-care arrangements. However, there was evidence that
the regime in the Unit served to reproduce the very familial roles which
patients had, for one reason or another, found intolerable outside:
'You couldn't get a greater mix of social
misfits, but it works. There's no great secret -
it's Just like an extended family - we play family
roles....'
(Nurse B)
What happens at the Special Treatment Unit is therefore located both
discursively and physically (weekdays spent in hospitals, weekends at
home) at the interstices of medico-psychiatric, familial and penal
discourse. The expectation that, as 'social misfits', they can never-
theless be 'fitted' into family roles in a medical setting to which they
have been sent by a judicial authority reproduces for female lawbreakers
the very descriptive trap which they have sought, through their
lawbreaking, to avoid. It seems, therefore, that whatever benefit women
might obtain from the experience of communal living provided at the Unit
will continue to be limited by its discursive location and the very real
material problems of retaining a 'weekend home' and being a 'weekend
mother'.
It could be argued that at the Special Treatment Unit, that
psychiatry has laid claim to what is basically an experiment in communal
living. Nevertheless, here, as with all psychiatric treatment ordered
by a criminal court, it seems to be professionals other than
psychiatrists who carry the main responsibility. Psychiatry's desire to
oversee social work has two consequences for probation officers.
Firstly, probation officers frequently have to accept recommendations
for probation made by psychiatrists. The following are by no means
uncommon recommendations in psychiatrists' reports:
'In my opinion, and with respect to the court,
should she be found guilty of the offence with
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which she is charged, her best interests might
be served by close and strict probationary
supervision.'
(Unknown psychiatrist reporting on Jean,
who, at this stage, had not even been
found guilty!)
'I feel the family as a whole could be helped a
great deal by an experienced probation officer
or social worker.'
(Dr. A reporting on a client of Probation
Officer 14)
From personal experience (confirmed by interviews with probation officers),
it was evident that Dr. A had, over the years, enraged generations of
probation officers by persistently claiming expertise in assessing
suitability for probation.1
Dr. D assured me that hi8 relationship with probation officers was
very much 'a team matter':
'I would never make a recommendation for probation
without talking to the probation officer - I
would never make a recommendation against the
probation officer's view - it's quite inappro-
priate.'
(31)
Nevertheless, one probation officer recounted with delight an incident
in which Dr. D had done precisely that and had been challenged by a
magistrate:
'He had suggested probation with a condition of
psychiatric treatment. The stipendiary magistrate -
bless his cotton socks! - had said, "That's all
very well, Dr. D, but shall we let Probation have
a look at it?".'
(Probation Officer 21: 156)
The extent to which probation should be advocated strategically for
women, on the grounds of 'sheer humanitarianism', is explored in Chapter
Seven. Here, the task has been to demonstrate the power of psychiatry
to intrude into a discourse which is not its own (namely, the discourse
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of social work) and to appropriate in the name of 'consultancy' both
the paradigms of social, rather than medical, needyness and the personne]
of social work. The following remarks by Dr. A illustrate the extent to
which probation officers are viewed by psychiatrists as providing a
service for the benefit of psychiatry:
'Basically, I would have said that going into the
Probation Service is not something that is very
prestigious, on the one hand, or likely to make
your fortune, on the other. And therefore I would
have thought that 9 out of 10 probation officers
are into this because they want to help and are
enthusiastic. In the main, they are very co-
operative - I find them very helpful people to
deal with. Just occasionally, I find that the
information they come up with is a little thin
but then some of them have enormous caseloads
and not much time to do it....By and large, I am
struck by the frequency with which they come to
the same conclusion as mine, quite independently.'
(17-18)
Magistrates and probation officers often interpret this congruity of
conclusion as being more indicative of a lack of expertise on the part of
psychiatrists than of any unexpected medical expertise on the part of
probation officers! Nevertheless, psychiatrists arrogate to themselves
the right to assess defendants and view probation officers' 'knowledge'
in this area as being inferior in the sense that it exists to reinforce
the Imaginary of psychiatric discourse. When it comes to treatment,
however, probation officers find that their expertise is elevated and
afforded greater respect.
The second consequence of psychiatric oversight is that psychiatrists
ppear to defer to probation officers' greater expertise in the management
of the mentally disordered.
There is evidence (Gibbens, Soothill and Pope, 1977) that, once
psychiatrists have made their assessments, they are not conspicuously
enthusiastic about carrying out their reconinendations, especially if, as
in recommendations for probation orders with conditions of treatment,
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these are supposed to involve joint work with probation officers.
Psychiatrists show a reluctance to become over-involved in 'court order'
cases because, as Lewis (1980: 26) observes, 'the notion of "enforced
compliance" upsets some psychiatrists':
'I am often reluctant to treat people who are
subject to court orders as I feel that for the
patient to benefit he has to be committed to his
treatment....I have not noticed any difference
between men and women with regard to this.'
(Dr. E - written response)
'Most patients on court orders 1 see only once in
2 or 3 months - and I stand by for emergencies.
I think the probation officer does most of the
work - I just support and monitor progress.'
(Dr. F)
In Kathy's case, Dr. A apparently felt under no obligation to see a woman
convicted of manslaughter at all, even though he had given an undertaking to
a Crown Court that he would see her. Kathy killed her sister and was
convicted of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility,
having been remanded in custody and given an EEC test, the results of
which were abnormal. The prison doctor had felt that this required
further investigation and treatment and, at court, Dr. A had agreed to
see Kathy as an out-patient. Directly as a result of this undertaking,
the judge embarked on the 'exceptional course' of placing her on probation.
She was never seen by Dr. A. Once Kathy had been rendered harmless by
psychiatric assessment (Allen, 1987), treatment was presumably
unnecessary and she could be left safely in the hands of the Probation
Service.
There seems to be an assumption that once a probation order has
been made most of the 'real' work will be done by the probation officer,
to the degree that psychiatrists seem to adopt a fairly cavalier attitude
about even informing probation officers that they are no longer treating
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a patient/client. In the light of the following remarks, it is perhaps
not surprising that it took Kathy's probation officer two years to
realise that she had never been seen by Dr. A:
AW: 'And if you were considering discharging a patient,
would you automatically contact the probation
officer, or would you expect them to contact you
for that kind of information - or for progress
reports?
Dr. A: 'It would depend. Sometimes they write with a
progress report and ask "what do you think?" but
the commoner sequence of events is that if I'm
treating somebody, whether or not they are subject
to supervision, then the GP gets a discharge
letter and one aims to send a copy to the social
worker for the area or the probation officer, so
they are informed.'
(18)
This would seem to confirm Lewis' findings (1980) that there exists
considerable disagreement about the respective roles of the psychiatrist
and the probation officer.
It is by no means self-evident that probation officers would welcome
greater involvement by psychiatrists. Dr. B's attempts to demystify his
role as consultant to a hostel catering for women on probation had met
with a mixed reception. Initially, he had attempted to act as a
consultant for the hostel staff, rather than as a specialist for dealing
with difficult residents:
'I got to know the staff there quite well and the
work I did with them was not with the clients they
had resident, but with the staff and the way the
staff related with the clients, and I really ran
psychotherapy enabling the probation officers there
to work with the clients rather than seeing the
clients myself as a specialist. But that changed
about two years ago when the girl in charge left and
a new warden took over. Her perception of a con-
sultant is not so much someone that you consult
with about your work but who is a specialist who
treats people who, for one reason or another, are
showing difficulties.'
(19-20)
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An interview with the 'new' warden confirmed that she did not view the
running of psychotherapy groups for hostel staff as 'consultancy' but
rather as an unjustified imperial expansion. She did not accept Dr. B's
claim that:
'All I do is to try and encourage individual
therapists, whether they are nurses, domestics,
aecretarie8, doctors, whoever, to use whatever
personal skills they have in their personality
to try and teach patients that they can get on
with other people.'
(28)
She saw his interventions as intrusions into social work discourse. Far
from seeing Dr. B as acknowledging their expertise, the warden saw him
as attempting to turn her staff into patients themselves! He was seen
to have laid claim illegitimately to a competing field of expertise -
that of social work.
Conclusion
In this chapter it has been argued that forensic psychiatrists make a
unique contribution to the 'chain of signification' of female lawbreakers
by constructing them as treatable (or not) not only within psychiatric
discourse, but also within social work and penal discourse. The origin
of psychiatrists' transferable authority rests on their paradoxical
relationship with other courtroom personnel. The legally defined powers
of psychiatrists to assess, judge and manage lawbreakers are wide-
ranging but entirely discretionary. The invocation of these powers is
dependent on the extent to which psychiatrists and other personnel are
prepared to enter into a descriptive and prescriptive collusion in
relation to the organisation of the difference which constitutes the
'culpable/not culpable' and 'treatment/punishment' distinctions.
It has been argued that the women in this study have been muted by
psychiatrist because they have been subject to a formal psychiatry which
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purports to be essentially gender-neutral but which they have experienced
as being substantively discriminatory. The gap between the ideological
claims (Imaginary) of psychiatric discourse and the range of
unlegitimated interpretations of the women's behaviour (Other) which
they seek to contain (Symbolic) is foreclosed in a number of ways.
1. By invoking the female domination of the official statistics of
mental illness to demonstrate that even 'normal' women are prone to
mental instability, those women who deviate from normal gender expecta-
tions by breaking the law are viewed as doubly prone to such instability.
2. By invoking a clinical paradigm of mental illness most
psychiatrists are committed to the use of restricted and rigid
categories of diagnosis which are frequently experienced as incongruent
with the lived realities of these women. Alternative paradigms which
construct mental illness as the product of unresolved internal conflict
(psycho-analysis) and/or problems of living (anti-psychiatry) are
largely ejected from the site of assessment because they represent the
Other which threatens to re-open the gap between the Imaginary and the
Symbolic.
3. By invoking and then turning on its head the notion of
'treatability', psychiatrists claim authority to redefine evidence of
sickness in these women as evidence of needyness. This is demonstrated
in two particular ways. Firstly, those who deviate from 'normal'
femininity are constructed as having personality disorders rather than
being 'really' mentally ill. Secondly, those who suffer gynaecologically
based disorders are redefined as being 'just' subject to a particular
form of stress (which is itself deemed to be gender-neutral).
Consequently, nondescript women fall both within and without the
domain of psychiatry. Psychiatrists retain their authority to assess
and judge them but, by redefining their 'sickness' as needyness, they
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simultaneously deny responsibility for treating them. Despite this,
they retain their oversight of those social workers and probation
officers whom they then charge with the women's 'treatment'. The next
chapter explores the consequences for probation officers of the 'helpful
collusion' entered into by psychiatrists, solicitors and magistrates,
which so frequently results in nondescript women ending up on probation.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
PROBATION OFFICERS: EXPERTS IN WORKING STRATEGICALLY
Introduction
'Psychiatrists have never said that she's
strictly a mental case. They'd say "severe
personality problems, who'd benefit from the
attention of an experienced probation
officer"....I think the Service is trying
to carry her as much as they can....and
trying to, you know, keep the worst of the
courts' powers away from her.'
(Probation Officer 1: 141-2 - male,
emphasis added)
'She didn't need psychiatric treatment in my
opinion. I went along with it because I hadn't
been in the Service very long and I didn't have
the confidence to challenge the psychiatrist -
I'm not sure how I'd go about that even now.
What I would really have liked to have done was
to write back to the atipendary magistrate and
say, "I don't agree - I don't think this woman
needs probation...." but I didn't! Even the
stipendary magistrate, when he summed up, made
some remark that he didn't go along with the
mental problem, but that out of sheer
humanitarianism he would go along with the
probation order. But there was nothing to do
in that order.'
(Probation Officer 2: 157 - female,
emphasis added)
In Chapter Six, it was argued that the psychiatric assessment of
female lawbreakers is less dependent on the clinical identification of
medical symptoms than on moral judgments about a woman's ability to
'cope', indications of which are sought through an examination of her
domestic situation, her sexuality and her class position. It was further
argued that psychiatrists are subject to a discourse which legitimates
them as 'wise men', with authority and expertisewhich is transferable
from psychiatric discourse to criminological, penal and social work
discourses. These two characteristics of psychiatry work together to
ensure that women who break the law and who are psychiatrically assessed
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end up on probation if they are muted or in prison if they are more
overtly troublesome (Carlen, 1983) - but rarely in hospital.
This chapter takes up the themes of Chapter Three, which decon-
structed the accounts given of themselves by fifteen women and their
probation officers. It demonstrates that most probation officers have
'nondescript' women on their caseloads and experience exasperation at
their elusiveness, their demands and their 'deceptiveness' as well as
the rewards of helping them find 'ways round' the gender contract. In
sum, it argues that probation officers experience the frustration of
working within a discourse which circumscribes their authority to define,
and restricts their responses to, these women. When to that discourse
is added the frustrion of working with resources perceived to be
inadequate, psychiatrists perceived to be uninterested and social
workers perceived to be morally judgmental, probation officers are
frequently left feeling that such intervention as is authorised within
probation discourse is both contradictory and, ultimately, ineffective.
In this chapter therefore, it is argued that:
Probation Officers' discourse is constituted, on the one
hand, by the competing discourses of magistrates, solicitors
and psychiatrists who, having failed to describe these
women adequately within their own discourses, so often reach
consensus about the competency of probation officers to
describe them. On the other hand, probation officers'
discourse is constituted within social work ideology,
which requires and authorises them both to care for and
control women as key figures in the maintenance of the
nuclear family (whether or not the women are, in fact,
members of such families).
I
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Chapter Three outlined the discourses of domesticity, sexuality
and pathology within which the femininity of the women in this study is
constructed. The extent to which the women were able to exploit the
contradictions of those discourses was examined and the implications for
their relationships with their probation officers of that discursively
circumscribed struggle hinted at. Most probation officers feel that some
of these women 'should not be on probation' but most accept that, in the
absence of an alternative discourse which might enable them to be
described accurately (that is, as severely socially disadvantaged and
with a legitimate claim to adequate financial provision and accomodation),
the role of the probation officer as a supportive listener and advice-
giver is the best available, and not an inappropriate one. On the
grounds of 'sheer humanitarianism', most probation officers do not
ultimately object to 'carrying' their 'nondescript' female lawbreakers.
This chapter analyses information obtained from interviews with 29
probation officers, most of which were tape-recorded and may be examined
in transcription in Volume 2 of this thesis. The material is here
analysed under the following headings:
The Origin of Probation Officers' Authority.
The Rules Governing Probation Officers' Discourse: The
Ideological and Material Pre-conditions of 'Alternatives to Custody'.
Gender-Neutral Probation? The Management of Material Inequality
and Discursive Contradiction.
The Logic of Working Strategically: Identifying the Contradictory
Effects of the Gender Contract.
The Practice of Working Strategically.
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The Origin of Probation Officer8' Authority
Probation Orders
'Probation officers are required to supervise
and to "advise, assist and befriend" the offenders
placed under their care by the courts, and....
the success of supervision turns on the ability
of the individual probation officer first to
gain the offender's confidence and then to work
with him (sic) to overcome some of the problems
which may have given rise to the offence.'
(Home Office, 1986c: 31)
A court may make a probation order for between six months and three
years on any adult defendant if it considers that it is 'expedient to
do so' and with the defendant's consent. Consent implies a willingness
to 'co-operate with his (sic) supervising probation officer as regards
reporting, receiving visits and heeding the advice given to him' (Home
Office, 1986: 31). Legally, the probation order retains its status as
a measure to be used at the court's discretion 'instead of sentencing',
although it has been possible, since the 1982 Criminal Justice Act, to
appeal against the making of an order. Officially, however, the probation
order 'stands outside the normal tariff' (Home Office, 1986c: 32).
According to Millard (1982), the probation order is (and should continue
to be) the mechanism whereby courts can institutionalise their
ambivalence (and, by implication, the ambivalence of the community)
towards certain offenders. It allows a court to say to a defendant:
"We are uncertain about what you deserve and
what you need. Although we cannot be completely
merciful with you, we do think you need some kind
of help."
(Millard, 1982: 291)
In a 'morally pluralistic' society, Millard argues, where 'no-one is sure
any more who ought to be punished and who ought to be helped', the
probation order represents an attempt to manage the 'built-in unresolvable
tension between the need for repression on the one hand and a commitment
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to mercy on the other' (1982: 291). The consequences of this tension
for probation officers are examined in the next section of this chapter.
Additionally to the basic conditions of a probation order, courts
have the power to include requirements of medical treatment (see Chapter
Six), residence (normally at an Approved Probation Hostel) or attendance
at a Day Centre, the purpose of the latter being 'to divert people on
probation from a pattern of re-offending by involvement in practical
and positive tasks under the supervision of probation staff' (Home Office,
1986c: 35). Finally, since 1982, the court has also had the power to
include a 'negative requirement' that an offender refrain from a
specified activity for a certain period. Strong opposition from the
Probation Service, on both moral and practical grounds, has meant that
such powers have been rarely used and it has now been acknowledged
officially that probation is not 'designed to provide a framework for
the imposition of predominantly coercive requirements: its primary aim
is to develop an individual's capacity for self-control' (Home Office,
1986c: 35).
In 1983, approximately 38,000 probation orders were made in England
and Wales (Home Office, 1986c) and over 80% were completed successfully
(that is, ran to full course without further conviction, discharged early
for good progress or discharged early by the substitution of a
conditional discharge). In the remainder of orders, offenders were
'breached' (that is, returned to court) as a result of either committing
further offences or failing to comply with the requirements of the order.
Only about 3-4% of orders are 'breached' for the latter reason and the
reluctance of probation officers to engage in such proceedings is
generally attributed to the lack of interest shown by courts and the
counter-productiveness of the exercise in terms of the officer's
relationship with his/her client. Kirwin (1985) argues that clients are
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normally only breached if they have actually 'disappeared without trace
fairly early in the order', in which case the officer needs to cover
him/herself. Lawson (1978), on the other hand, argues that breach
proceedings seem to be used productively by experienced male officers
in cases of non-reporting and unnotified change of address with the
effect of restoring the credibility of the probation order (by which is
presumably meant its authority and controlling influence) and improving
the client's response to it. Having been 'breached', an offender may
be fined or given an Attendance Centre order (in which cases the
probation order may be allowed to continue) or, alternatively, s/he may
be sentenced for the original offence in some other way.
Since the mid- 1970s there have been marked changes in the
statistical characteristics of the 'typical' probation order. From 1972
to 1979 there was a dramatic decline in the use of probation orders by
courta (from 33,000 to 27,000), followed by a steady increase to 40,000
in 1984 (Home Office, 1986b). Although half of those orders have always
been made for offences of theft and handling, there has been an increase
in the numbers of orders made for offences of burglary and violence.
There has been a steady increase in the number of previous convictions
held and custodial sentences experienced by those placed on probation.
Perhaps the most dramatic change has been in the length of probation
orders, as indicated in Table 7.1:
TABLE 7.1:
LENGTH OF PROBATION ORDERS ()
1972	 1978	 1984
3 years	 25	 4
2 years	 64	 56
1 year	 11	 34
6 months (introduced 1978)
	
2	 6
(Source: Home Office, 1986b)
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The official picture of the probation order, therefore, is of a
measure which is being used:
a) increasingly by the courts;
b) for more serious offences;
c) for offenders with more previous convictions;
d) for shorter periods of time, and
e) as one of closer surveillance.
In other words, the probation order has developed from being an alter-
native to sentencing to being an 'alternative to custody'. The implica-
tions of the 'alternatives to custody' discourse for probation practice,
particularly in relation to female lawbreakers, are examined in the next
section of this chapter. One of the layers in the foundation of that
discourse, however, was the introduction in 1972 of Comunity Service
orders and this section concludes with the official account of this
provision, which served tg reinforce the changing nature of probation
discourse in the 1970s and 1980s.
Cosaunity Service Orders
A court may impose a ColTinunity Service order of between 40 and 240
hours, to be completed within 12 months, on any consenting offender
over the age of 16 years, for whom suitable work is available. By
requiring the offender to 'perform unpaid work on behalf of the community'
(Home Office 1986c: 41), such orders are seen primarily as a means of
a) depriving an offender of some liberty - in the form of his/her time,
and b) exacting some reparation (albeit indirectly) for the harm presumed
to have been done to the community by the offender. The measure was
initially intended to be a direct 'alternative to custody' (that is,
based on an assumption that it is possible to assess by some objective
criteria that some offenders, if undiverted, will go to prison).
251.
The involvement of the Probation Service in such orders, however,
made it inevitable that 'through subsequent custom and practice, the
order has come to be regarded as a sentence in its own right' (Home
Office, 1986c: 41). The inevitability of this process was due to the
ineluctable comitment of traditional probation discourse to the
rehabilitation of the offender through the personal influence of the
probation officer, which made it difficult for officers to adapt to a
role which might be concerned exclusively with the provision and
supervision of work. If, as Millard (1982) suggests, this commitment is
reinforced by the courts' views of probation officers as people who permit
them to be uncertain, it is perhaps not surprising that the Comunity
Service order has become almost as versatile a sentencing option as the
probation order.
In 1983, nearly as many Community Service orders were made (35,000)
as probation orders and a similar number (5,500) were subject to 'breach'
proceedings. Of these, approximately half were dealt with by immediate
imprisonment, most of the remaining offenders being fined and ordered to
continue their original order.
This section has established the legal origin of probation officers'
authority. The construction of that authority within probation discourse
is now examined and the rules governing that discourse extrapolated.
The Rules Governing Probation Officers' Discourse: The
and Material Pre-conditions of 'Alternatives to Custod
'Working as a probation officer is a funny way to
make a living. The job involves struggling to
solve problems with no apparent solution and
trying to reconcile conflicting interests....
When confronted with the range and seriousness of
the social and economic problems affecting their
clients, probation officers often feel powerless
and ineffectual.'
(Walker and Beaumont, 1981: 1)
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The juxtapositioning of 'official' and 'practice' accounts of
probation officers' work was perhaps the most significant contribution
to the process of knowing about the Probation Service made by Walker and
Beaumont's socialist critique of it (1981). By adopting this methodology,
they highlighted the 'dissonance' experienced by probation officers as a
result of 'the simultaneous containment of objectives which are to some
degree in conflict' (Harris, 1980). Harris argues that probation
officers experience three kinds of dissonance in their work:
a) moral dissonance, resulting from conflicting ideologies about
the purpose of probation;
b) technical dissonance, resulting from discouraging empirical
evidence about the effectiveness of probation in reducing criminal
behaviour, and
c) operational dissonance, resulting from tension inherent in
managing the 'care and control' aspects of the daily probation task.
Moral dissonance
'The fundamental aim of probation is to uphold
the law and protect society by the probation
service working with the offender to improve
his (sic) behaviour.'
(Home Office, 1986c: 31)
'A fundamental conclusion of our analysis is that
probation officers are paid to do a particular
job for the state and that this role is generally
supportive of capitalism.'
(Walker and Beaumont, 1981: 160)
Probation discourse, in common with other social work discours, has
been forced to accommodate attacks on the 'rehabilitative ideal' from
critics of both the political right and left. On the one hand, loss of
confidence in the treatment approach to deviance control (e.g. Allen,
1959), coupled with the rising influence of interactionist and Marxist
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theories has increased scepticism about the justification for executive
discretion and led to a call for a return to 'fairer' tariff-based
sentencing. On the other, the ideology of the 'new right' has sought to
buttress individualism, familialiem and nationalism by encouraging the
stigmatisation of 'outgroups' and emphasising the need for social
discipline (Walker and Beaumont, 1985). The resulting experience of
dissonance by probation officers has been due in part to the juxta-
positioning of three contradictory discursive elements:
a) the reconstruction and dismissal of 'treatment' as little more than
'compulsory persuasion' (Raynor, 1978);
b) the fear that intervention - in whatever form - by 'helping' agencies
may serve to amplify and exacerbate a deviant's problems rather than
ameliorate them, and
c) the apparent desire of 'coawnon sense', hailed by the 'new right', to
see offenders more strictly supervised and called to account.
Technical dissonance
Martinson (1974) concludes that empirical evidence 'gives us very
little reason to hope that we have in fact found a sure way of reducing
recidivism through rehabilitation'. Two now infamous studies of the
mid-1970g served to confirm the doubts of many probation officers about
the efficacy of probation in relation to reconviction rates. Phillpotts
and Lancucki (1979) concluded that first offenders placed on probation
were more likely to be reconvicted than if they had been dealt with in
some other way and that young adults (17-21 year olds) on probation had
higher than average reconviction rates, regardless of their previous
records. Whilst the former finding could be taken to support either
deviancy amplification theory or a more common sense interpretation that
first offenders selected for probation are likely to be those about whom
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court8 feel pessimistic anyway, the latter conclusion was more
unambiguously discouraging for probation discourse. Even more discouraging
were the results of the IMPACT experiment (Folkard et al., 1976) which
compared the responses of probationers allocated to low intensive case-
loads with a control group given normal supervision. The final report
concluded that there was little overall difference between the two
groups in terms of reconviction rates; if anything, the control group
did slightly better. This analysis overlooked the fact that certain
types of offenders did do better under intensive supervision in relation
to other 'social' criteria (that is, in relation to problems seen as
more amenable to social work intervention). This was particularly true
where the probationer had been able to identify his or her own problems
and was well-motivated towards change. The tautology of this justifi-
cation for supervision is, however, obvious. Probation officers appear
to be good at the things which they choose to define as the things at
which it is important to be good!
Operational dissonance
It has been argued that probation discourse has traditionally
managed the tension between the caring and controlling aspects of the
daily probation task by invoking the 'family metaphor'. The probation
officer is constructed as a 'firm but kindly uncle (sic), giving the
errant child the benefit of a long experience of life and so putting
him (sic) on the right road' (Harris, 1980: 172). More recently,
probation discourse has attempted to construct several different paradigms
of probation which might enable probation officers to 'make sense' of
the lived reality of their ideological and material conditions of
existence. These models may be summarised as follows:
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1. Controlism. Rooted in a positivistic belief in the possibility of
identifying objectively those offenders who are 'destined' for custody,
this model accepts as legitimate the role of the Probation Service in
making provision for the disciplined containment of such offenders in
the community. Evidence of this model includes:
- the (unimplemented) recommendation of the Younger Report (1974)
to give probation officers the power to detain offenders for 72 hours
if they seemed likely to commit a further offence;
- the introduction in 1972 of Community Service and Day Training
Centres;
- the Kent Control Unit, which has been described as a 'non-
residential prison' (Raynor, 1985: 48);
- the concern of the 1982 Criminal Justice Act to remedy, through
its Schedule 11 provisions, the legal loophole exposed in the Rogers v.
Cullen case which held that attendance at a Day Centre (as opposed to
a Day Training Centre) could not be regarded as a breachable condition
of a probation order;
- the production in 1984 by the Home Office of its 'Statement of
National Objectives and Priorities' for the Probation Service, the
first objective being stated as the provision of realistic alternatives
in the community for those offenders most likely to be imprisoned.
2. Socialism. At the other extreme is the model advocated by Walker and
Beaumont (1981, 1985) which is characterised by 'oppositional and
defensive' work and 'non-oppressive' help. In an effort to challenge
those features of society which serve to disadvantage clients of the
Service, probation officers are exhorted:
- not to communicate capitalist ideology to clients, for example,
not to nag the unemployed, nor to confirm sexist and racist stereotyping
either of or by clients;
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- through union activity (NAPO) and in cooperation with other state
employees, to resist changes within the agency and society which put
resources into policies that restrict client choice.
Officers in sympathy with this model find themselves opposing many of
the coercive provisions of recent legislation, though some would justify
cooperating with their implementation as a means of exposing the role of
the Probation Service as an Ideological State Apparatus (Aithusser 1971).
The challenge of socialism has undoubtedly been one of the most
significant features of the development of NAPO since the mid-1970s and
the following remark by Nigel Walker (1985: 288) is indicative of the
way in which traditional probation discourse has felt obliged to
accommodate the Other of 'socialist practice':
'Many probation officers, however, who believe
in socialist probation practice are also
genuinely committed to helping their clients.'
(emphases added)
3. Separatism. Two versions of this model exist.
In the first, it is argued (Harris, 1977; 1980) that, since probation
officers appear to be good at social work but ineffective as crime-
reducers, they should concentrate on the former, offering a 'court-based
social work service' distinct from any schemes of community-based
punishment, which would be someone else's responsibility. In the second,
it is argued (Bryant et al., 1978) that, whilst probation officers can
fulfil both care and control functions, these should be clearly
delineated and there should be an emphasis on client choice. The control
function is executed by the use of reporting 'pools' and clients have a
choice about receiving any further help. This second version has been
implemented in many Probation areas with varying degrees of reported
succes8.
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4. Occasionalism. It- might be argued that most probation officers do
not brinq to thnir work no conservative a perspective as that of
'controlism' nor so radical a perspective as that of 'socialism', nor
yet so obsessive a need for clarity as that implied in the 'separation'
model. Nigel Walker (1985) argues that probation discourse is based
on what might be termed 'occasionalism', by which is meant that probation
officers use the occasion of a person'8 conviction as an opportunity for
looking after his or her welfare. Within 	 probation discourse this
approach has become known as the 'non-treatment' paradigm, following
Bottoms and McWilliams' (1979) call for the abandonment of the medical
model of probation. They suggested the substitution of the vocabulary
of 'help' for the vocabulary of 'treatment', so that, for example:
DIAGNOSIS becomes SHARED ASSESSMENT and
NEEDS (defined by probation officer) become TASKS (collaboratively
agreed).
The emphasis in work with offenders is laid on negotiation, responsibility
and informed choice. The power differential between worker and client
is deliberately played down and faith is placed in the compelling logic
of rational argument to influence both court and client. Clearly, since
the offender is held responsible for his actions, he may have to face the
fact that his choices are limited and that the nature of his freedom may
have to be negotiated with the court. But within this model, such
limitations are compatible with the offer of realistic help rather than
so-called treatment by experts.
This model has become very popular in probation discourse for two
reasons. Firstly, it seems to offer some resolution of the problem of
dissonance steming from probation officers' need to make sense of their
work in an increasingly punitive criminal justice system. Secondly, it
is compatible with what, in practice, many probation officers feel they
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have always done anyway. Th imaqe o probation as pseudo-medical
treatment has always been more powerful in theory than in practice.
Kirwin's (1985) modest account of what probation officers actually do
illustrates the point, and the 'non-treatment' paradigm provides
justification in the eyes of many for continuing such practice.
The consequences of dissonance: Working Strategically
'We should eschew the phrase "alternatives to
custody" for that acts subliminally to suggest
that custody is the real answer and produces an
expectation that we will supply a kind of custody
in the community.'
(Lacey, 1984)
As a result of the discourse of 'Alternatives to Custody', probation
officers are trapped not only within the competing judicial discourses
of magistrates, solicitors and psychiatrists but also by competing
interests within their own professional discourse. Probation officers
are constantly faced with the dual dilenina of defining the appropriate
'moment of intervention' and defining the appropriate 'nature of
intervention' in relation to any given potential client. That decision
is always made as a result of a professional assessment of the relation-
ship between client need, agency resources and client motivation (that
is, the extent to which the client's expressed desire to change is
judged by the probation officer to be 'genuine' and the extent to which
s/he is judged to have the capacity to benefit from the help available).
That assessment must then be translated into language which is 'accept-
able' to the court. The defendant must be represented in a form which
is recognisable by solicitors, psychiatrists and, above all, magistrates.
The medium, or 'programme' (see Chapter One) through which this is done
is the Social Inquiry Report.
Traditionally, probation officers have claimed authority for SIRs
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on the grounds that they contain recommendations of 'expertly selected
treatment based on scientific diagnosis' (Raynor, 1985). Nowadays,
however, probation officers are more modest in their claims:
'Any opinion expressed in the report about the
appropriateness of some form of contractual
sentencing....should be offered to the court
as a plausible alternative to the retributive
tariff sentence....The important issues are what
the offender is prepared to do, whether and how
far the social work agency is able to help him
do it, and what assurances the court will require
from both parties.'
(Raynor, 1985: 153)
The consequences of the dissonance created by the discourse of
'Alternatives to Custody' is that probation officers have been forced,
as they see it, to work strategically. In other words, they believe
that, in order to get the 'best deal' for their clients in an imperfect
judicial world, they may have to compromise, or indeed sacrifice totally,
their higher principles of justice and equality. Consequently, their
authority becomes governed by the following rules:
1. The requirement simultaneously to recognise (in order to claim
authoritative understanding of the offender) and deny (in order to make
'realistic' recommendations to the court) the conditions of social and
economic disadvantage in which many offenders exist.
2. The requirement simultaneously to intervene (in order to prevent
recidivism) and not to intervene (in order to prevent recidivism);
3. The requirement simultaneously to care for the offender (implying
an attempt to increase his/her choices in the interests of personal
growth) and to control the offender (implying the restriction of choice
for the protection of society).
The implications of these rules for female lawbreakers are now
examined.
Men (%)
	
Women	 (%)
71
	
29
32
	
9
17
	
34
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Gender-Neutral Probation? The Management of Material Inequality
and Discursive Contradiction
Women on Probation and Community Service Orders
The official penal profiles of men and women placed on probation
and Community Service orders differ markedly, as can be seen from
Table 7.2:
TABlE 7.2:
CHARACTERISTICS OF PROBATION AND COMMUNITY
SERVICE ORDERS ON MEN AM) WOMEN, 1983
Probation Orders
Orders made
Previous custodial experience
No previous convictions
Couunity Service Orders
Orders made
	 95
	
5
Previous custodial experience
	
42
	
19
No previous convictions
	
11
	
21
(Source: Home Office, 1986c)
In relation to the official crime rate for women, which is 15-20%
of the overall crime rate, the following tentative conclusions might be
drawn from the above table:
Female lawbreakers appear to be
a) over-represented on probation and under-represented on Community
Service Orders;
b) placed on both probation and comunity service at an earlier stage
in their criminal 'careers' than men.
Each of these statements might be interpreted in a number of ways and
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the particular explanation selected by the various discourses which
attempt to describe female lawbreakers has its own contradictory implica-
tions for defining the 'moment' and nature of probation intervention in
the lives of nondescript women.
This study was carried out in 1983, before the Home Office produced
its Statement of National Objectives and Priorities for the Probation
Service (1984). The purpose of this document was to encourage the
Probation Service to toughen its image and set its sights firmly on
providing 'alternatives to custody' for those 'high risk' offenders who,
by reason of the nature or extent of their criminal behaviour, were in
danger of imprisonment. One implied consequence of this attempt to
redefine the 'appropriate' probation client was the rendering
'inappropriate' of a large number of female lawbreakers, whose offences
were generally trivial, 'one-off' affairs (Eaton, 1986) - the women who
were traditionally put on probation, according to one probation
officer:
'....because the magistrates don't know what to
do....Most of the women I've got are very low
key - there's not much there to do....They
wouldn't have gone to prison. Most of them are
first offenders - and very minor offences.'
(Probation Officer 3: 171, 173 - female)
As a result of SNOP, the 1982 Criminal Justice Act and the subse-
quent policy reviews undertaken by most Probation Services (Statements
of Local Objectives and Priorities or SLOP), one would have expected a
reduction in the numbers of women being placed on probation and an
increase in the numbers of their previous convictions. The 'Probation
Statistics, England and Wales, 1984' (Home Office, 1986b) indicate that
the numbers of women placed on probation have indeed declined - from
11,660 in 1982 (32% of all probation orders) to 10,990 in 1984 (27% of
all probation orders). Statistics of previous convictions are less easy
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to interpret, since annual figures for women alone are not consistently
available. There is clear evidence that the percentage of all
offenders on probation with no previous convictions has declined (22 in
1982, 19 in 1984) and that the percentage with previous custodial
sentences has increased (23 in 1982, 27 in 1984), lending weight to
the argument that probation is moving steadily 'up tariff' as a penal
disposal. The percentage of male offenders on probation with no previous
convictions was lower (15%) in 1984 than the overall figure and the
percentage with previous custodial sentences higher (34%). One can,
therefore, deduce that, whilst more women with fewer previous convic-
tions than men are being placed on probation, the pattern may be
changing. Statistics of geographical variations are also available,
although, again, not in relation to women alone. It would appear, for
example, that in Staffordshire (the area where this study was undertaken)
more offenders with no criminal records (29% of all orders in 1982, 24%
in 1984) are placed on probation than is the national average, whilst
fewer with previous custodial sentences (24% in 1984) are placed on
probation. In Greeter Manchester (where I currently work), however,
the reverse is true, the figures being 14% and 25% respectively in 1982,
13% and 36 in 1984.
The conclusion that may be drawn from these figures is that, whilst
the penal profiles of the women in this study, who were placed on
probation in 1983 in Staffordshire, may not have been representative of
the penal profiles of all women placed on probation in Staffordshire at
that time, they are likely to have become increasingly representative of
women placed on probation since that time and in other areas of the
country. The stereotypical descriptions of women who are placed on
probation as being middle-aged, middle-class and menopausal have only
ever been accurate in relation to a tiny proportion of female probation
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clients. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, as with
men, the majority of the female lawbreakers who are processed into
'criminal women' are young (the proportion of older women placed on
probation is slowly declining), poor and with a history of deviant, if
not specifically delinquent, behaviour (Carlen, 1987).
A caseload survey which I helped to undertake in a probation office
in Greater Manchester in 1986 appears to confirm this. The survey
compared the profiles of women on probation in 1986 with those on
probation in 1981. In 1981, of 42 women on probation, 18 had no
previous convictions. Although the number of women on probation in 1986
was similar (49), only 11 had no previous convictions and 20 had four
or more previous convictions (compared with 13 in 1981). In both years,
the majority of women on probation were under 30 years old and over 50%
were under 25 years old.
Whilst the officers involved in the survey felt able to congratulate
themselves on moving successfully 'up tariff' in relation to women, in
accordance with the spirit of the 1982 Act, SNOP and SLOP, two nagging
concerns remained for them:
1. In the absence of suitable alternative provision what will
happen to those women 'in need', for whom single, trivial acts of
offending represent their only available means of entry into the world
of welfare provision?
2. If such material and/or emotional need remains unmet, is there
a very real danger that the first-time female lawbreaker will become a
recidivist?
 On reading the results of the previously mentioned survey,
one woman officer commented drily, 'I bet they are the same women five
years on'! In other words, she was implying that, whilst probation
officers might appear on paper to be making more efficient use of their
limited resources, they may simply be working less effectively and
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making less impression on their clients than ever.
The 'Alternatives to Custody' debate has been constructed within
probation discourse in such a way as to ensure that it both ignores and
is irrelevant to female lawbreakers. This is not because women are not
sent to prison; clearly, they are - and in increasing numbers (Home
Office, 1986c). But the current debate ignores the complexity of the
route that leads them there. It does this is two ways. Firstly, it
renders the majority of female lawbreakers invisible by constructing
them as 'not recidivists'. Secondly, it renders a minority of female
lawbreakers highly visible by assuming that their presence in prison
demonstrates either their dangerousness or their incorrigibility,
rather than demonstrating the inadequacy of the discourses within which
they are so constructed. This study demonstrates that increasing numbers
of female lawbreakers are trapped by a judicial need to fit them into
one or other of these categories.
As has been seen, the 'programme' through which probation officers
assess or categorise defendants in ways which are recognisable to
courts is the Social Inquiry Report. Although this study has not
specifically examined reports on women, it has sought to offer an
analysis of the discourses within which they - and psychiatric reports -
are authorised, written and received (that is, read, and acted upon or
rejected . It has been argued that female lawbreakers are rendered
'programable' (that is, presented as in need of, motivated towards and
capable of benefitting from the resources of the Probation Service)
through their construction within the discourses of domesticity,
sexuality and pathology. The trap for probation officers who might want
to construct female lawbreakers within alternative discourses (such as
the Women in NAPO group in Manchester, who experimented with the
inclusion of a standard paragraph on women's poverty in reports on
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prostitutes)1) is that, in an arena where such stereotypes dominate,
they run the ri8k of seriously disadvantaging their client. Hence many
officers justify their continued writing of gender-stereotyped reports
on the grounds that they are working strategically in their clients'
best interests.
But strategic working does not end in the courtroom. This chapter
continues by examining the consequences of this 'dissonance trap' for
probation officers in their daily work with the 'nondescript' women who
are so frequently placed under their supervision. It is argued that,
in relation to such women, probation discourse is characterised by:
1. recognition of the contradictory effects of the 'gender contract' -
the ideological and material conditions within which many women clients
are located;
2. a sense of frustration/powerlessness, provoked by:
a) the apparently self-destructive contract avoidance behaviour of some
women c]ients and
b the apparent indifference of professionals, officials and politicians
who are perceived to have the power (that is, the authority plus the
expertise knowledge plus the material resources) to bring about
effective change in the lives of these women;
3. an occasional sense of achievement when:
a) in the absence of an alternative discourse within which to work,
the contradictions of the gender contract are exploited (in probation
discourse termed 'working strategically') to the benefit of some women
clients (though, inevitably, to the detriment of others?) or
b) some women are enabled to find non-self-destructive 'ways round' the
gender contract.
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The Logic of Working Strategically: Identifying the Contradictory
Effects of the 'Gender Contract'
The starting point of this analysis is a comment made by a male
probation officer working in a women's prison. He was asked whether he
agreed with the view of a previously interviewed female probation
officer that women evade reality more than men and that prison helps
them to face up to the consequences of their behaviour. He replied:
'For some women, reality is provision for their
families. I have found that women in prison are
on the whole more realistic than men....and
perhaps they suffer more from the fact that they
are rooted in relationships.'
(Probation Officer 4: 182 - male -
emphasis added)
Who does and does not have the authority to define what constitutes
'reality' for female lawbreakers is one of the central questions which
has to be addressed by any analysis of the gender contract. Magistrates,
solicitors, psychiatrists and probation officers claim to have such
authority but the women themselves are muted and their definitions of
reality subjugated. Being 'rooted' might be translated in authorised
discourses as being securely surrounded by conditions conducive to growth
but in the womens' discourse as being immovably transfixed in a position
of some danger (as in 'rooted to the spot').
Most probation officers recognised that many of the women had
committed crimes because they were 'desperate' for money (Probation
Officer 5: 183 on Pauline) and that they could be viewed as 'not really
criminal when it comes to the point - not to that extent' (Probation
Officer 6: 204 on Eileen). But the relationship between poverty and
criminal activity was often more complex than that and this gave rise
to attitudes of wariness on the part of would-be sympathisers. Probation
Officer 7 explained what happened to Jean on her release from her prison
sentence for baby-snatching:
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'She'd been given a house....by the Housing
Department - that had been arranged by the Social
Services - and she shoplifted. She shoplifted a
baby bath, would you believe, and maternity
clothes and a number of other things. The
policewoman was very, very sympathetic, until
she got back to the house and realised how much
other stuff she'd got, which was probably also
shoplifted,	 and I can tell you, I wasn't
very nice to her (i.e. to Jean).'
(217)
Deprived of her own family and punished for snatching someone else's
(see Chapter Three), Jean had resorted to 'providing' for her next baby,
which she knew was likely to be removed from her at birth. Initially
the object of official sympathy, she rapidly became the object of
official anger when the extent of her 'provision' became apparent. Yet
the conflicting pressures resulting from giving this woman a home and
setting up expectations of her as a mother whilst also planning to
deprive her (possibly for very understandable reasons) of that antici-
pated family do not seem to have been appreciated.
The extent to which the families in which some of the women lived
could be held to be actively responsible for some women's criminal
activity was also recognised. Lack of appreciation, a sense of injustice
and having to cope with 'chaos' were all proposed as factors
precipitating the commission of crimes particularly by middle-aged and
older women. Probation Officer 8 spoke of a widow who chose to plead
guilty to shoplifting 'to get it over with t , although the officer felt
she might have had a defence to the charge:
'It's the saddest case I've ever come across.
Her family meant everything to her but they
didn't have the same regard for her.'
The subsequent probation order provided an opportunity for the probation
officer to undertake 'grief counselling' with the woman - a valuable
service but, it might be argued, one which should not have required the
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catalyst of a criminal conviction to obtain. Probation Officer 5
described a woman whose husband had left her for a younger woman
(cf. Ivy in Chapter Three). Ethel was on probation for the theft of a
chicken valued at £2:
'She's a sad little lady who has just had all
the spirit knocked out of her....But she's a
very upright woman - she thinks it's terrible
that her husband should be allowed....She got
herself into a state....and she had to sit
there and not be able to defend herself about
what he'd done to her. And she put her coat
on and went out and thought "Why should I pay
for this chicken?".'
(194)
This apparently irrational behaviour arising from a sense of powerless-
ness in the face of injustice has been described elsewhere (Carlen,
forthcoming 1988) as the 'Sod It' Syndrome, and it is evidently not
confined to young, overtly troublesome women. Probation Officer 5 cited
a further example of a woman whose crime could be viewed as a response
to years of being 'a dish-rack and a door-mat':
'She's now got a grown-up family....and she's
going through the unhappiness of the children
not supporting her. They don't do the jobs in
the house, they don't help as much as she feels
they should. She feels she's providing a home,
and why should she?'
(194-5)
But perhaps the most vivid description of the damaging effects of
the family came from Probation Officer 9 in her discussion of Maureen's
chaotic family situation. The following are excerpts from her
interview:
'Maureen, although she's cast as the non-coper, is
the coper, and she copes by comitting offences,
to try, in her way, to get them out of trouble.
But all she manages to do is get herself into
trouble. The family do survive while she's away,
and they have very little regard for her really.
Maureen's been diagnosed over the years as
schizophrenic, personality disordered - it's
usually been those sorts of labels that have
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been bandied about - or "subject to anxiety
attacks". I mean, I don't know what you do
with a label when you've got it. She certainly
does get very anxious about things....and she
can see that she is over-reacting, but still
isn't able to stop over-reacting....The family
have gotten almost to "Oh, she's off again" and
collude with each other in isolating Maureen
as the problem. In effect, the problems are
family-based, rather than all centred in
Maureen.'
(222)
Within social work discourse, such an assessment has a sound basis in
the theory of Family Therapy (e.g. Barker, 1986), but the likelihood of
the officer being able, in practice, to intervene in this family in the
way she would have liked was remote, for two reasons. Firstly, the
ideology of the family still succeeds in holding the working-class mother
responsible for any chaos which surrounds her:
'Maureen is chaotic (and) it does tend to
generate chaos around her. Because it's the
woman in that situation, it has far more impact
on the family at large than if it was a man....
Perhaps at's because the woman is the one who
is always cast as the one who should do the
coping and the managing and the looking after
of the children. When men become ill, they
become almost like another child for the
woman to cope with, but the man doesn't seem
to cope very well when it's the woman who is
ill. It's like a cultural (thing) - with that
particular generation - Women's Lib had no
impact at all.'
(224-5)
Secondly, both the psychiatrist and the social workers involved accepted,
and thus reinforced, an assessment of the situation in which Maureen
was identified as the problem:
'Social Services labelled her as a "bad
mother"; the psychiatrist just sees her as
"the patient"; husband just sees her as "a
failed wife and mother" - nobody has
actually spoken to Maureen as a woman, as
a person in her own right.'
(226)
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The demand for the woman in a family .to be the one responsible for
bringing about change was also illustrated by a probation officer who
was supervising both a husband and a wife on probation. It was clear
that his expectations of what could be achieved in work with the two
clients varied greatly. His overall aim in the case was to improve
communication between the couple but the focus was primarily on the wife:
'I've got her practising telling him specifically
where she is going and talking to him about it
when she comes back....He is more reporting as a
probationer. He comes in and we play a game of
pooi or something like that.'
(Probation Officer 10: 230 - male)
Mary Eaton (1986) found that when probation officers were preparing
social inquiry reports on men, they used home visits to meet and assess
significant others (usually women) in the men's lives, whereas such
visits in the cases of women were used to see what kind of home they
maintained. Probation officers are also more keen to involve the female
partners of men under supervision than the male partners of women.
Implicit in this practice is the assumption that it is women who should
influence and bring about change in relationships. A probation officer
working at a Day Centre, whose clientele (as with all Day Centres) was
predominantly male, told me:
'We are also attracting wives....or girlfriends
of men who are clients. Some females (here) are
not clients and are as near to volunteers as
possible.'
(Probation Officer 11 - male)
By the term 'volunteers' he was referring to the Service's 'voluntary
associates' who befriend clients and assist in other ways without
payment. The use of the term in this context, however, seems somewhat
ironic, given the level of choice which these women probably had within
those relationships,, The nature of that relationship was also heavily
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circumscribed. The 'volunteer' might very easily be reconstructed as
the 'whore' if she overstepped the bounds of correct behaviour in this
male domain, as the officer continued to explain:
'They may have a boyfriend who is at the
Centre....that boyfriend may change from week
to week, but they will tend to relate to a
particular man. One or two of the women will
tend to relate to a number of men. We've had
suspicions, for example about the activities
of one of our females....about using us as a
sort of picking up spot.'
(246)
So, in order to be welcomed as a respectable influence at the Centre, a
woman must be seen to be attached to one particular man at any one time -
almost, it seems, to be identified as 'someone's property' rather than
'lost property', since the latter becomes a threat to the good order and
smooth running of the establishment.
When such relationships founder, it is again often the woman who is
blamed. She is seen as exploiting the relationship for her own ends -
as seducing/manipulating the gullible, vulnerable man. Probation Officer
22 described one of his female clients thus:
'Last year, through relationships with men,
she went to the south of France and Holland,
and she goes away for weekends. When there
is somebody there showing interest in her and
she's provided with money and support she can
be quite presentable and she's quite a live
wire.'
(309)
To which one is tempted to reply, 'Aren't we all?'. But the probation
officer continues:
'Much of her life is based on deception....and
she's certainly one of the most untruthful
people I've ever met. And because she is so
unreliable in what she says, she doesn't form
relationships that last. She tends to abuse
friendships. So we keep going round in
cycles - she gets a friendship, she abuses it,
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she loses it, and she's down to rock bottom
again.'
(305-6)
The 'rooting' of largely unemployed, working-class women in
relationships thus produces a paradoxical 'reality' in which:
1. They are expected to be 'providers' for their families but are denied
the material resources with which to provide in a socially and legally
approved manner.
2. They are held responsible for any dysfunction within their families
and also for bringing about positive change in those families. This
means that, whilst they suffer the stigma of being the 'identified
patient' (or 'client'), they are not allowed to enjoy the 'benefits' of
being ill.
3. Whilst they are expected to be stabilising influences on their way-
ward male partners, any attempt to reap satisfaction for themselves from
these relationships is interpellated as 'abuse' of the relationship.
Probation Officers are not unaware of these paradoxes, but find
themselves powerless to offer alternative definitions of 'reality'.
Since, in order to act as probation officers, they have first to define
a situation within their own professional discourse, they often need to
categorise (describe) their women clients in stereotypical ways.
Probation Officer 13 sumarises the predicament in describing her own
attempt to 'make sense' of one woman client:
'The choices are either to see her as a good
woman, caring for her family but suffering from
psychological disorder which causes lapses into
anti-social behaviour, or, bluntly, to see her
as a liar and a thief, who attempts to con her
way out of difficult situations. The truth is,
no doubt, in the grey area between.'
Within the confines of such tensions, probation officers see
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themselves as offering what support, advice and befriending they can,
often using their limited time and material resources in imaginative
and caring ways. Time after time they recounted situations where they
felt they had gone beyond what was strictly required of them
professionally to provide help for these women, or to try and introduce
some interest and variety into their seemingly mundane and unrewarding
lives. Time after time, however, they felt their attempts had been
thwarted - partly by lack of cooperation from other professionals, but
very often by the apparent indifference of the women themselves and/or
the intractable nature of their problems. Probation Officer 14 told me
in desperation about one women:
'I feel I've had to wash my hands of her -
I used to go twice a week.'
The relentlessness of this level of demand, with little evidence of
discernible progress was but one of the frustrations which probation
officers experienced in working with 'nondescript' women and these
frustrations will now be considered in more depth.
Contract Avoidance - Losing Modes? (cf. O'Dwyer and Carlen, 1985)
The feelings of most officers seemed to be summed up in this coment
by Probation Officer 22:
'The demands have been considerable and the input
has been high - the rewards so far not very great.'
(308)
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that officers could identify many male
clients of whom this could also be said, the additional frustration in
working with women is the even greater rarity of 'breach' proceedings
consequent to non-compliance with the conditions of supervision. Only
one officer could recall taking breach proceedings against a woman and
that was in an extreme situation:
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'The reason the order was breached was that
she refused to come in - entirely.'
(Probation Officer 16: 273 - male)
Officers tend to feel more powerless in relation to female clients:
'With women I never feel I have as much
authority. Men seem to think, "If I don't
report, I could go to prison", whereas
women realise that courts don't like
sending them to prison. I think they pick
that up, don't they?'
(Probation Officer 15: 271 - female)
Such a coment also illustrates the ambivalence felt by many probation
officers about the degree of agency which can be imputed to women in
their contract avoidance. Here, as in many other remarks, officers
imply that the women deliberately and consciously (even if furtively)
refuse to fulfil the obligations they undertook in court. In this, they
reflected all those discourses (outlined in Chapter Two) within which
women are constructed as being more devious than men. The manner of
the delivery of these remarks was, however, frequently heavily ironic,
in the sense that, whilst officers often felt that such behaviour was
deliberate, they also recognised that it was their own frustration that
had given them a sense of persecution and that the choice of response
to supervision available to the women was often extremely limited.
The mechanisms whereby these women avoided the 'gender contract'
implicit in supervision were often ultimately self-defeating in that
they failed to produce any sense of satisfaction or achievement for
either the women or those who sought to help them. Such mechanisms
could be described as 'defences of the weak' (Mathiesen, 1972) and
identified as mechanisms of:
a) Elusiveness.
b) Demand.
c) Deviousness.
d) Refusal.
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ri) F1II'ive,1Pn3 - I ikn n butterfly
The commonest complaint about women on probation was their inability!
refusal to keep appointments. The following comments were typical:
'I have difficulty getting them to report.
The majority I have to visit at home - I'd
never get them in.'
(Probation Officer 15: 270 - female)
'She's unreliable, doesn't keep appointments
and shows disinterest (sic).'
(Probation Officer 22: 310 - male)
'I talked to her basically about what
probation was....to see if she'd be
willing to come in. She made it a joke -
"Oh, don't you have to come here?".'
(Probation Officer 16: 274 - male)
But home visiting had its problems as well. Probation Officer 5 talked
about a voluntary associate who called 'religiously' every week on one
young woman and her cohabitee:
'They know what time she's coming - and
they go out''
Mother of her female cikents 'loved' her to visit but:
'She has her daughters visiting her on a
Tuesday which is the day I visit. She did
say she would change their visiting day,
but never has and I don't kno'.. ho'.. w*th it
is a protection.'
(Probation Officer 5: 191-2 - female)
This officer felt that the woman concerned was very unhappy but was
fearful of discussing this openly with the officer and was using her
daughters' visits to avoid becoming too involved in a relationship where
self-disclosure was expected.
But elusiveness consists of more than mere physical avoidance of
contact. Many probation officers became frustrated by the women's
276.
failure to tell them things which the officers considered to be important
to discuss. For example, Probation Officer 5 told me how Pauline had:
'shoplifted, been arrested and taken to the
police station, went home in an absolutely
distraught state, rang the Samaritans, told
them about me but couldn't ring me.'
(185)
This inability/refusal to engage in what was seen to be appropriate self-
disclosure or confession (without which officers felt impotent to offer
help within the discourses available to them) was one of the modes of
behaviour which was categorised as 'not responding' to supervision. The
following conents were typical:
'She doesn't respond.'
(Probation Officer 5: 197)
'I really don't know where I am with this
girl.'
(Probation Officer 7: 214)
'I'm hardly able to have any influence on her
life because she's like a butterfly.'
(Probation Officer 22: 307)
in these situations, probation officers feel that the women 'go through
the motions' of adhering to the conditions of their probation orders but
lack conriitment to changing their behaviour or attitudes. Evidence for
this is seen to exist in the apparent readiness of the women to use
family responsibilities as excuses for non-engagement - or mutedness.
Beryl (see above) was conveniently being visited by her daughters every
time her probation officer called; Jackie (see Chapter Three) was accused
by her officer of being 'not beyond using Zoe (her baby daughter) as an
excuse for going (home)' and thus failing to cooperate fully with the
treatment at the Special Treatment Unit. Probation Officer 15 described
another young woman who 'seems to have a lot of insight into herself'
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but who, it W59 found on further examination, was simply repeating
things that her mother had said to her:
'I don't think she has any of her own self-
identity. She seems to have the identity that's
given to her by other people. When I hear her
talking, I think, "That'8 her mum" because I know
her mum and I know the way she speaks, and she's
just repeating "parrot" what her mum says.'
(267)
The absence of 'self-identity' amongst the women was another
feature of their 'rootedness' and their 'mutedness'. The women appeared
to be defined - and to define themselves - in relation to other people
and how they believed that other people viewed them:
'She is trying to find her own identity, but
can't. She's struggling because she's got
these conflicting things all the time.'
(Probation Officer 15: 269)
Given 'these conflicting things', it is perhaps not surprising that the
women sometimes seemed indecisive. Jackie's inability/refusal to make
up her mind about reconciling (or not) with her imprisoned husband led
her probation officer (16) to declare in exasperation:
'I don't think she really knows what she
wants.'
(277)
The effect of this indecisiveness and lack of 'self-identity' was to
leave probation officers feeling that they could never do any
'preventive' work with women. They rarely reached a stage where they
felt that the women were able to anticipate problems or develop reliable
coping strategies which might help to forestall crises:
'She's extremely mixed up and it's difficult
to find a plan of action for her. You're
always working from crisis to crisis.'
(Probation Officer 10: 233 - male)
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'What you do at the point of crisis and how
you resolve it doesn't lead her to understand
how it developed and how it can be prevented.'
(Probation Officer 22: 308 - male)
b) Demands - Like a baby
Having to respond constantly - and sometimes exclusively - at the
point of crisis, without being able to help clients develop their own
strategies for coping with and preventing future crises, in accordance
with the accepted model of 'crisis intervention' work (e.g. O'Hagan,
1986) is very wearing and actually creates a state of crisis in the
worker him herself. As was seen earlier, some workers eventually respond
by withdrawing altogether because the level and nature of the demands
become too great. Before that point is reached, probation officers seem
to go through two phases of work with these women. Firstly, they try
'to be around for the moment that she needs you' (Probation Officer 22:
308). They tolerate the physical avoidance and the lack of commitment,
they persist in trying to build up a relationship of trust because they
know that, sooner or later, the women will need someone to turn to:
'You often get men on probation without
seeing any specific problem, but with women,
it's chaos - they're almost all like that.
But they tend to be not very forthcoming to
get help....If things really get to a crisis
(they) come in, so in that respect it is
worthwhile.'
(Probation Officer 15: 270-1 - female)
This probation officer was implying that the 'Alternatives to
Custody' debate had resulted in men frequently being placed on probation
because of their position on the 'tariff' (that is, because the nature
of their offence or the number of their previous convictions placed them
at risk of imprisonment). Women were still being placed on probation
because they were viewed as being 'in need'. Consequently, a reluctance
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on th part of some women to demonstrate dependence on their probation
officer was seen as of more significance than a similar reluctance on
the part of men. Having nurtured that dependency, however, the
officers then find that the demands of the women for an 'instant response'
(Probation Officer 5) become difficult to control:
'If I'm not available she's very hurt and
upset - very angry because (she feels) I
should be there....She's like a baby - wants
a feed, cries and demands it now - and that's
not reality.'
(Probation Officer 5: 189 on Pauline)
Once again, the issue of who has the right/power to define 'reality'
intrudes. This officer felt that she was fortunate in that Pauline was
viewed as 'a good person to work with, very intelligent and you can
reason things through with her'. Most officers did not feel they could
say this of the women they worked with - and even this officer was
uncertain about the extent to which this 'insight' actually resulted in
changed behaviour:
'She still hasn't got the answers as to why
she shoplifts but she feels she's getting a
bigger understanding of herself.'
(189)
cce obton orders are time-limited, there comes a point when
the dependency has to cease. The stage of 'trying to wean her off'
(Probation Officer 9) (the mammillary metaphor again) requires a re-
definition of the problem of elusiveness:
'I'm spacing the contact a bit more and trying
to give her lots of encouragement and pats on
the back.'
(Probation Officer 9: 226 on Maureen -
emphasis added)
But there is a further frustration in working with 'nondescript'
women which exacerbates both their elusiveness and their demands. That
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further frustration arises from a feeling amongst probation officers
that the8e women, far from being hapless victims, are rather 'stubborn
and devious' (Probation Officer 17: 286 - female).
c) Deviousness - Men con, women manipulate
Probation officers frequently describe themselves as 'being
manipulated' by their women clients. The comparable term used in
relation to male clients is 'being conned' and most officers pride
themselves on their ability to detect men who are 'trying it on' or not
telling the truth. It is apparently more difficult to detect such
behaviour in women because it appears to take the form of selective truth
telling, rather than outright 'lying'. Women, one is given to understand,
are particularly adept at representing the truth in ways which compel
workers to act against their better judgment. The technique employed
appears to be one of saying what the worker wants to hear (conceding a
çint, agreeing with an argument, expressing gratitude, promising to
change etc.) but making those concessions conditional on securing
certain responses from the worker. Whilst all relationships are, to
some degree, marked b'y manipulation, tIe dissonance and consequent
frustration provoked in probation officers by 'nondescript' women is
due to their ability, despite being 'chaotic' and 'inadequate', to
exploit the contradictions in the gender contract. Probation officers
know that official discourse obliges them to buttress any desire on the
part of these women to undertake approbated feminine roles, however
passively or apparently disingenuously that desire is expressed.
Challenging such expressions would involve the officer in confronting the
Other of the woman's self-defined reality and openly acknowledging the
inadequacies of the Imaginary of existing definitions. The only
alternative is to reconstruct such women as always-already manipulative -
and therefore dismissable. The following remarks from a probation officer
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responsible for placing clients in Community Service projects illustrates
the point:
'She was stroppy in the initial interview,
telling us what she was and wasn't going to do
and we got trapped into going along with it.
She's manipulated us - her offences were
"false pretences"!'
(Probation Officer 18: 294 - male)
Because many women commit offences defined as acts of 'deception', there
is an assumption that the women themselves are deceptive. Constructing
women as always-already deceptive (cf. Pollak, 1950) then makes it
impossible for officers either to define reality in relation to these
women or to accept their own definitions of reality. Thus, they remain
forever unknowable. The consequence of this for officers was that,
even where they were concerned about particular aspects of their clients'
lives, they did not feel able to address these openly because they felt
they could not assume that the women were being truthful. Three
examples illustrate this. Probation Officer 5 was concerned that one
woman client was engaging in prostitution. She described the woman as:
'Rather an unknown quantity. Lives in a
flat on her own and is the subject of much
neighbourhood gossip and accusation about
having men up there. I suspect there's
some truth in it, but of course she denies
it. So I can never work with her on that
one.'
(192-3 - emphasis added)
Probation Officer 17 was concerned that one of her clients was anorexic:
'I've done what I can but she's quite
stubborn and devious - that's the wrong
word. I don't mean evil - but she will
cover up when she's not eating. She'll
say, "I'm eating more than I was" - which
means she's not!'
(286)
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Probation Officer 7 had just received a letter from a woman client,
saying that she had been sexually abused by her father, but the officer
was unsure how to respond:
'Gillian is very attention-seeking....you
can never tell whether she's telling the
truth or not.'
(213)
This seems particularly ironic when there is now a public campaign to
encourage women to bring such abuse to the attention of the authorities!
Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of this perceived deviousness
was the unpredictable moodiness of the women, which seemed to make any
notion of planning meaningless and often served to sabotage attempts at
cooperation between different agencies working with the same woman:
'One minute she's all lovey dovey and the next
minute she's up in arms slating everybody - she
doesn't like the social worker, she doesn't like
you - and this is how it goes.'
(Probation Officer 6: 201 on Eileen)
'Sandra is a manipulative lady who plays off one
agency against another. Caution and discretion
are needed in dealing with her.'
(Probation Officer 3: 172)
Such 'playing off' of workers and agencies against each other may be
seen as an example of the 'nondescript' woman's ability to exploit the
often contradictory interests which, as has been seen, these agencies
have in her.
Deviousness was seen as a mechanism requiring a greater degree of
agency than either elusiveness or making demands. Manipulative women
were viewed as being quite powerful and their behaviour provoked anger
amongst officers rather than indulgence or understanding. Feeling used
or exploited by the women, probation officers either became wary of
making any sort of commitment to, or on behalf of, these women, or they
283.
adopted what might be termed a 'mother superior' stance, in which they
regarded the women as children needing firm but loving handling. Either
way, the women's behaviour was stripped of any meaning it might have in
relation to the inappropriateness of the discourses within which the
probation officers were struggling to assess them.
d) Refusal
Defiance, assertiveness, decisiveness were not common characteristics
of 'nondescript' women, but one or two examples were given by probation
officers of women who appeared to reject openly the help that was
offered to them. Jackie, as has been seen, nearly lost her chance of
a probation order when she (albeit apparently jokingly) refused to agree
to attend office appointments. Probation Officer 1 had gone to a great
deal of trouble to persuade a fine default court to reduce one of his
client's fine and compensation order, only to find the woman far from
grateful:
'I've never known compensation costs be
squashed like that - absolutely amazing.
She came out....with £20 odd (to pay) at
a pound a week - and she objected!'
(146)
Probation Officer 19 (male) had undertaken the even more time-consuming
job of finding a choice of no less than three alternatives which he saw
as solutions to a client's accommodation problems, including a place in
a probation hostel:
'I wanted her to go to the hostel but she
refused all three (alternatives). She said
to the magistrates, "Please send me to prison".
After an adjournment, they sent her to prison!
She got a six month sentence, during which
time she lost two months' remission for bad
behaviour - throwing plates and hitting other
women, and generally being disruptive.'
(298)
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Probation Officers wr'r frequently at a loss to understand such self-
defeating behaviour yet, as O'Dwyer (O'Dwyer and Carlen, 1985) has
suggested, the line between surviving and failing to survive in
situations of oppression is a very narrow one. These women were
engaging in the emotional/social equivalent of 'cutting up'. Unable to
'hit back' at the system, they internalised their responses to its pains
and tensions and self-mutilated in an attempt to remain independent of
others' inroads upon them.
Women like Mandy certainly would have presented problems to probation
hostel staff with whom I spoke. In 1983 there were only four probation hostels
catering exclusively for women and I visited two of these (as well as
one mixed bail hostel). The obvious problem in providing hostel
accommodation for women is the need to provide accommodation also for
their children. Two of the hostels I visited had some rooms for women
with children and one catered exclusively for women with children.
Neither hostel was short of places and the main reason given for lack of
referrals was the reluctance of many women to make the voluntary decision
to move away from their home areas, even though the alternative might
be prison.	 Staff at both hostels maintained that they had to deal
with a lot of psychiatric problems and that medical back-up was
inadequate. At the time of this study, both hostels appeared to attempt
to provide for the women an experience of a substitute family, which
involved both substitute mothering of them and instruction to improve
the quality of mothering	 them. Since that time, I understand that at
least one of the hostels has attempted to provide a regime which
focusses more on raising the consciousness of the women to their own
needs as individuals and on increasing their assertiveenss to meet those
needs through cooperation with each other. At both hostels, however,
pessimism was expressed about the lasting effect of any benefit gained
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at the hostel when the women returned to inadequate accommodation and
support in the community.
Relationships with courts, psychiatrists, solicitors and social workers
On the whole, probation officers were irritated by the attitudes
they encountered from court personnel and fellow professionals. They
felt that sentencers were sometimes the authors of extraordinarily
contradictory discourses. Probation Officer 7, for example, had been
horrified when she discovered the reasoning behind Jean's two year
prison sentence for stealing a baby for twenty minutes:
'I only recently read the transcript from the
trial - it was quite horrifying....The judge
actually sent her to Styal because there would
be more opportunity for her to look after other
people's children. Isn't that appalling?'
(215-6)
Such logic, however, would have made sense to a judge whose common sense
understanding that women 'need' to be mothers would have been
paradoxically reinforced by legal and psychiatric discourse which had
constructed Jean as 'needing' discipline. The existence of a setting in
which Jean could actually practice to be a mother, under strict
supervision and on other people's children, must have seemed an
obvious solution to this woman's apparent twin needs for control and
restoration to femininity.
Probation officers also felt that solicitors were often lacking in
professional integrity, that psychiatrists were often indifferent and
egocentric and that social workers were simply obstructive. Cooperation,
on the occasions when it was identified, was treasured as a rare
commodity, usually won through hard-fought battles or teeth-gritting
sycophancy. Two cases illustrated these points vividly.
Mandy, the woman who had asked magistrates to send her to prison
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(see above), was later convicted of arson with intent to endanger life,
an offence which can carry a life sentence. At the Crown Court, Dr. G
reported that 'she was a p8ychopathic personality....too dangerous for
him to admit to his clinic and he had made arrangements for the forensic
psychiatrist from Broadmoor to interview her' (recounted by Probation
Officer 19). The probation officer felt that this recommendation was
too extreme and that there must be other places Handy could go to. The
solicitor agreed and promptly sought a second opinion from another
psychiatrist:
'He wrote a report Baying that she was a
psychopathic personality, that prison would
do no good for her, certainly Special Hospital
would do no good for her and as he didn't
know of any other hospitals that would be
interested, probation in the community was
the best thing he could suggest. So we'd got
two psychiatrists, the second doing a white-
wash at the request of the solicitors who
were paying him privately - not that I can
ever prove that'
A was seen in Chapter Six, psychiatrists routinely invoke the rules of
'treatability' to legitimate the non-treatment of defendants diagnosed
as suffering from psychopathic disorders. The barrister subsequently
tried to persuade the probation officer to endorse the recommendation
for probation and, when the latter refused the request, refused to submit
any psychiatric reports at all. The probation officer continued:
'I felt she needed hospital treatment but it
seemed that the community was not prepared to
provide any of the resources that this sort
of person requires. I left it at that and
she got a three year sentence.'
(302)
Gwen's offence of throwing a brick through her own window hardly
put her in the same league as Handy. The magistrates, however, wanted
a psychiatric report and were threatening to remand her in custody in
order to obtain it. Probation Officer 2, who was on court duty that day,
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W88 concerned about this, discovered that Gwen had received psychiatric
treatment in the past and set about contacting the local psychiatric
hospital. When she eventually got through to the appropriate consultant,
the following conversation ensued:
'So I say, "Gwen X - is she known to you?"
"Ah yes", he said, "What's the trouble?"
I said, "She's committed this offence - it's
only a minor offence, but the magistrates
want medical reports and it means that unless
you can take her, she will go to prison."
So there's silence at the end of the phone.
"And why do you think she shouldn't go to
prison, Mrs. C? Don't you think it might do
her good?" I was so horrified at this that
I said, "No I don't think it will do her
good!" I forgot for a minute that I was
speaking to this God-like man. "I see one
of my tasks as keeping the inappropriate
out of prison and I actually think this
lady is inappropriate." And he started to
laugh and he said, "I just wanted to see
whether you had a good reason."
(161)
Gwen had also had dealings with Social Services because her daughter had
been taken into Care and had been placed with foster parents in
Sheffield. In theory, she still had a right of access to her daughter,
but in practice, Social Services were fairly obstructive. When Gwen
was placed on probation, officer 2 made an effort to get access organised
and she managed to arrange for the daughter to be brought from Sheffield
during the school holidays. This apparently worked well, although the
social worker was not happy about it and a further attempt at a similar
arrangement foundered. However, the social worker did agree, very
grudgingly, to take Gwen to the station to catch a train to Sheffield.
In the event, the social worker was late, Gwen missed her train and
didn't get to Sheffield until 4.30 in the afternoon. The child was
taken away at 5.15. Probation Officer 2 claimed that Social Services
were also being very unhelpful in not allowing Gwen to use their
facilities for social activities, although she was quite clearly
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recognised as being mentally ill. She felt that, as soon as Gwen was
placed on probation, Social Services had refused to have any further
responsibility for her.
The stories of Gwen and Mandy illustrate the iatrogenic nature of
their treatment. Both were subject to properly authorised welfare
intervention yet their nondescriptiveness had over-determined their
failure. The discourses within which they had been constructed had
failed to legitimate the Other of their own definitions of reality and
had thus provided for them a definitional trap into which they could not
fit but from which they could not escape. Victims of the system's
inability to categorise them, they had, in reality, been set up to fail.
In this situation, probation officers frequently saw themselves as
hostages to fortune, the provision of the 1983 Mental Health Act that
hospital admission should only take place when treatment is available
having been turned on its head to sanction psychiatrists making their
actual diagnoses of mental illness fit the available treatment.
"There is nothing we can do for her; therefore,
there is nothing wrong." I'm afraid I've got a
bad impression of (psychiatrists). If they
don't think they can do anything, they say
there is nothing wrong (and) they recommend a
probation order.'
(Probation Officer 10: 240 - male)
The dilemma facing probation officers was clearly expounded by Probation
Officer 16 in a discussion about the Special Treatment Unit. On the
one hand, he was sceptical both about the treatment on offer, which was
based on 'keeping people talking', and about the very brief time that
people were required to be resident:
'In the nicest possible way, they are just
waffle groups. Now that can be very useful
over perhaps a year, but in a couple of weeks,
what good does it do anybody?'
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On the other hand, he felt compelled to make use of the facility for
two reasons:
'One is the possibility that she could get
treatment that I couldn't possibly give her -
the feeling that I can't handle this, it is
beyond me....There is a cry for help -
from me - about what to do with the case.
The other is a ploy, because you know that
even if the treatment does her no good at all,
providing she spends a respectable amount of
time there, it's not too painful for her and
it's a lot less bad than prison.'
(280)
In other words, he felt the need to work strategically. But ploys have
a nasty habit of backfiring, especially if there are any further court
appearances:
'I think what they'll view her as is someone
who's been given the best help available in
the area and failed to use it....the
reconinendation is two-edged in that it saves
them this time but will crucify them next
time.'
(281)
Contract Avoidance - Winning Modes?
Elusiveness, demands, deviousness and refusal constitute what have
been described elsewhere as 'losing modes' (O'Dwyer and Carlen, 1985).
But there were rewards as well for probation officers working with
'nondescript' women. Obvious progress might be hard to detect, but those
officers who were content to set modest goals often found that they were
offering a much needed service, which was consistent with the Probation
Service's motto, 'Advise, Assist and Befriend'. Most of the women I
spoke to impressed me as being 'reluctant converts' to probation. They
had been initially suspicious, or even downright fearful, of being on
probation. They had, however, come to see that there were benefits to
be gained either by paying lip-service to the idea of probation (although
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these were likely to be viewed as the 'manipulators'), or by accepting
what they perceived to be a genuine offer of friendship and help from
another individual who was 'nice', who had access to certain resources,
and who was coincidentally designated 'probation officer'. As
Kevin Kirwin (1985: 39) observes:
'Being treated in a normal humane manner is
often a pleasant surprise for....clients....'
Maureen had been very conscious initially of the stigma (to a non-
criminal) of being 'on probation':
'At one time, I'd never speak to anyone who'd
been on probation, but I've found out there's
ways they can advise you to save you getting
into trouble.'
(104)
Gwen was afraid that, in addition to the control exercised over her by
her doctor, she would now be under surveillance by agents of the
criminal justice system:
'I was very frightened of probation - I felt as
though I was being owned by the police....I
felt as though my life wasn't my own.'
(89)
Gwen had feared that being on probation would mean that she would have to
forego the 'right' and the 'capacity' to 'own' herself - that is, to
define her own actions in the future. Such remarks also serve to explain
why some women (like Handy above) prefer to go to prison.
But these women, along with most of the others, appeared to have
been 'won over' by the 'helpfulness' of their particular probation officer.
The process had started in court where, as Margaret Powell (1985: 18)
has stated, probation officers have traditionally been expected to
'offer immediate help - or at least a calm and clear explanation - to
distressed and uncomprehending' defendants. Indeed, several of the
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women expressed appreciation at the presence of their probation officer
in this bewildering setting:
'I could look at Mrs. C and think there was a
familiar face.'
(Ivy:	 111)
'If it wasn't for Mrs. C, I would have gone to
Risley.'
(Gwen: 84)
Later on in the relationship, 'helpfulness' was defined by the
women in two ways: firstly, material help and secondly, non-intrusive
listening and advice-giving. In other words, the kind of help which
the women looked for and appreciated most from their probation officers
consisted of money (or at least help in obtaining it) and befriending.
Occasionally, of course, there was some confusion about which of
those two kinds of help was being offered and which asked for - as in
this exchange between Ann and her probation officer (20 - female). The
latter was clearly referring to Ann's alcohol, drug and marital problems,
whilst Ann's concerns were more immediate:
PD: 'Tell us before things get desperate, then we
might be able to help.'
Ann: 'I want help - I really need some bedding.'
Such an exchange illustrates the social worker's ubiquitous dilemma
about 'presenting' and 'underlying' problems. The basic social work
skill of 'active listening' is premised on a sceptical approach to what
people	 they need and how they explain their own behaviour. It is
assumed that people either do not always mean what they say (conscious
or unconscious defensiveness) or, if they do mean it, they do not
understand their own capacities, resources and limitations. At its
worst, 'active listening' by social workers has involved the total re-
construction of what a client has said, in terms which fit the particular
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ideological framework to which the worker is committed (whether that
framework be traditionally psychotherapeutic or radically political -
see, for example, Corrigan and Leonard, 1978). At its best (see for
example Egan, 1986: 79-93) it involves the social worker in a respect-
ful and sensitive endeavour to help the client understand her/his own
paradoxical responses to pretty intolerable material and emotional
situations, and develop strategies for action to improve those
situations.
Kirwin (1985: 41) argues that probation officers frequently use
their distrust of 'presenting problems' to justify refusing to undertake
'mundane' tasks for clients, such as 'hocicc3 aM '.ri.tthq tci the DRSS.,
housing departments and fuel boards or arranging nursery places'. Such
'mundane' tasks, however, may be daunting for women who are already
lacking in confidence and self-esteem. A willingness by probation
officers to use their professional authority and credibility (not to
mention their telephones and postage) to negotiate with officialdom on
their clients' behalf was certainly appreciated by the women, especially
if there was 'no strings attached', as this excerpt from Veronica's
interview illustrates:
AW: 'Have probation officers been of any help to
you?'
Veronica: 'Yes, they're a good help. I only have to
ring up and they'll come down - I don't have
to go up. It's very rare I've been up - and
they've always left me - even though I'm on
probation, they've not been "at" me.'
AW: 'In what ways have they been able to help?
Has it been someone to talk to, or with money?'
Veronica: 'Well, with bills - they're sent them off to
Social Security - they're done all the
writing and sorted it out.'
AW: 'When you had your drink problem, did they
suggest you joined any groups for people with
drink problems?'
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Veronica: 'No, not really - they let me make my own
decision.'
(95-6)
For some probation officers, the need to do 'mundane' things for clients
was seen as a stage through which they had to go in order to help clients
to be more self-confident:
'She will take advice, lean on you, allow you
to do things for her that she isn't capable
of doing for herself and also....you can....
tell her exactly what to do, with the con-
fidence that she will go and do it. She may
not totally understand what you've told her to
do, but she'll do it! She's good that way.'
(Probation Officer 10: 229 - male)
Apart from giving, or helping to obtain, material assistance, the
most important function served by probation officers - according to the
women - was that of alleviating loneliness. Being available, having time
to listen, helping to find 'ways round' (Maureen: 104) - this was the
service women wanted from their probation officers.
For Maureen and Ivy, who already saw themselves as burdens on their
own families, a sympathetic and disinterested listener was invaluable
in preserving the remnants of family support:
'I can tell her anything....You can't tell
your children - you've got to tell someone
who's not involved. You don't want to foist
your troubles on your family because they
won't come and see me. They'll say, "Oh,
crikey - neurotic" - which perhaps I am.'
(Ivy: 116)
'I like to come and talk to Mrs. C. It's
somebody to talk to and it's better than
going blabbering and shouting your head off
in the house.'
(Maureen: 105)
Corrigan and Leonard (1978) might argue that, by befriending, probation
officers are merely pandering to the ideology of the family, still
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allowing family members to channel all their problems on to 'mum', who
then gets a probation officer to help her, instead of working with the
whole family, 'helping them to understand the tremendous contradictory
pressures placed upon them by the economic structures of capitalist
society' (1978: 29). To which many probation officers would no doubt
reply, 'It's all right for you to talk' (Cohen, 1975) and continue with
the one aspect of their role which is both congruent (that is, lacks
dissonance) and appears to be rewarding to worker and client:
'I think she needs human company, I honestly
do.'
(Probation Officer 1: 150)
'At least it gives her another adult to
share her problems with.'
(Probation Officer 5: 195)
'It's one of those cases where you can put
your theory into practice. It's quite good
for me - I get lots of feed-back from her.'
(Probation Officer 5: 185 on Pauline)
Ihe building up of this relationship of trust, however, takes time.
Pauline was experiencing her third probation order:
'I really value what Mrs. C says to me. I
trust her implicitly....that may be because
I've known her for years. In that way I feel
I'm luckier than other people. They perhaps
are only Just getting to know their probation
officer properly when the probation order is
up. I've found that now it's like an old
friend and I know what she's like, so that now
I trust her.'
(60)
Eileen had known her probation officer even longer:
'I've been involved with Miss D since 1968....
when I was 14. She's been a great help -
she's been involved 15 years - we've got an
understanding. But it's only since
September that I've been willing to listen to
their point of view.'
(50)
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Probation Officer 6 wrily endorsed this view of the relationship:
"At least I'm listening", she says. That's
progress!'
(204)
In the efficiency-conscious Probation Service of the 1980s, such a
lengthy nurturance, leading to such equivocal results, could hardly be
justified as the most cost-effective use of officer resources! And
there is, of course, no guarantee that such hard-won trust and under-
standing will actually prevent further criminal activity. As far as
Pauline was concerned, the opposite seemed to be the case. Soon after I
interviewed her, she committed a further offence and prosecution was
only avoided because a) she was already on probation and receiving
psychiatric treatment and (perhaps more significantly) b) the police-
woman involved had lost the relevant till receipt!
Some officers, however, did have confidence in their ability to
reduce women's lawbreaking activity:
'Women tend to offend when they've got a crisis,
so you can justify (probation), can't you? You
can find reasons why they may have offended and
you can say, "If this woman was given help, we
think we could prevent her offending". I've
never had any women who've carried on offending
once they're on probation.'
(Probation Officer 15: 271 - female)
Janet would have agreed with that sentiment. She felt that being able to
contact her probation officer (21 - male) helped her to resist the
temptation to shoplift and that this was more important in this respect
than the Community Service which she was also doing:
AW: 'Do you think that CS is helping you not to
get into trouble again?'
Janet: 'I don't know. I've had the craving, but when
I do, I come down and see (Probation Officer
21).'
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AW: 'So in terms of keeping out of trouble, it's
more helpful to come and talk to M?'
Janet: 'Oh yes.'
(70)
A third way in which probation officers might be said to be of
help to nondescript women was through enabling. Enabling consisted of
providing the women with the kind of environment in which they could
actually achieve something for themselves. What they achieved was not
within the control of the probation officer - and sometimes it was not
what the officer had originally intended. Nevertheless, the crucial
characteristic of such provision was that it created a space in which
the women were empowered to make some genuine choices, albeit within
heavily circumscribed limits. In a small way, it allowed the women to
'shift the signs' of the gender contract in ways which were not, for
once, self-defeating. This provision took a number of forms:
1. Specialist facilities. Women on probation were offered access
to specialist facilities, but on a voluntary basis, rather than as a
condition of their probation orders. They were then free to make what
use they could of them, without being threatened with breach proceedings
or losing the custody of their children:
'Kathleen went to the Alcohol Unit and she
lasted there a week and then she discharged
herself. But - she hasn't drunk since. That
was two months ago - so she's done very well.'
(Probation Officer 15: 271 - female)
2. Voluntary work. Women on probation were enabled to do 'voluntary'
work. Whilst one might argue that such 'servicing' work reinforces
rather than challenges gender stereotyping, it was clear that one thing
which many of these women suffered from was a lack of appreciation.
Being offered the chance to do something that they were good at and be
praised for it was very important in developing their self-confidence:
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'Social Services run a day centre....they
bring old and handicapped people in....That's
been very useful for Maureen, because she
feels that she's useful and that's helping
her confidence. It also absorbs some of that
energy which is splattering around - it gives
it more structure.'
(Probation Officer 9: 226 on Maureen)
Thus it proved possible for probation officers to exploit the contra-
dictions of the gender contract - or to work strategically - though the
fact that they were also saving the state money whilst helping to keep
the women themselves poor must not be overlooked!
3. Community Service. The logical extension of this was to allow
women to do 'voluntary' work in order to discharge their obligations to
the court. The issue of the appropriateness of Community Service for
women is a vexed one (Dominelli, 1984) but there was no doubt that the
two wn I interviewed who had served such orders had not only
thoroughly enjoyed their work, but had experienced a sense of achievement
as well. Having admitted that she never paid fines, Carol said:
'The only thing I think they should give is
ColTinunity Service, because then 	 don't have
to fork any money out and they don't have to
fork money out (for prison). And I like
working....I don't mind cleaning - I'll clean
the whole house for you as long as you
appreciate it.'
(81, 78)
Janet also enjoyed the work she was doing on Community Service (helping
at the coffee bar in a 'drop in' centre for the over 60s):
AW: 'Are you on your own when you're doing CS?'
Janet: 'Yes.'
AW: 'Do you prefer it like that or would you prefer
to be with other people who are doing CS?'
Janet: 'I don't know - I've never met anyone else who's
doing CS.'
AW: 'Do you have a supervisor with you all the time?'
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Janet: 'She pops in from time to time - she's all
right.'
AW: 'Are you managing to do your hours regularly
or are you having to have time off?'
Janet: 'I'm doing them regularly.'
AW: 'I should think you'll be finished soon at
that rate?'
Janet: 'Well, I'm stopping on.'
AW: 'That will just be on a voluntary basis, will
it?'
Janet: 'Yes.'
AW: 'You're really enjoying it then?'
Janet: 'Yes.'
(69)
On the other hand, one probation officer responsible for placing women in
Community Service schemes felt that women fared better when they were
not asked to do 'women's work':
'Certainly my experience is that we have
less trouble with women when we just place
them on a project and they turn out on Sunday
with a team (of men), than when we continue the
practice....of trying to tailor-make situations
to fit the woman.'
(Probation Officer 18: 293-4 - male)
He did, however, feel that women might feel 'more comfortable' if such
teams had women supervisors (of whom there were apparently plenty) -
'because of things like toilet arrangements, which are sometimes a bit
difficult on site'.
There is, therefore, a dilemma for the probation officer who wants
to resist the prescriptive description of her/his female clients within
the discourse of femininity. As can be seen from these accounts, many
women are not seeking to break out of the ideologies that confine them
to domesticity, sexual passivity and sickness. Rather, they want to
have the worst effects of those ideologies alleviated. The most
appreciated probation officers were those who worked strategically to
obtain material help, those who befriended in a one-to-one relationship
and those who provided part-time work opportunities which were role-
appropriate (so that the women could feel confident in doing them well),
relatively private and autonomous (so that the women did not feel
conspicuous or stigmatised) and, above all, appreciated! But individual
solutions do not provide the alternative material and ideological
discourses within which women can constitute themselves differently -
only collective political and policy solutions can do that. The
apparently dysymetrical relationship between the personal and the
political is the trap in which probation officers are also caught, as
will be seen in the next section.
The Practice of Working Strategically
As might be expected, it was easier for probation officers to say
what was wrong with their existing ways of working than it was to 'read
off' from their own criticims what was needed to improve things. When
asked what they felt might ideally help the women with whom they were
working, the range of responses was fairly limited.
Home management assistance
The desire to help women cope better on their woefully inadequate
incomes prompted several officers to argue that there was a need for
home management/budgetting courses:
'She needs a home management course - showing
her how to cook. I've been to her house and
seen her with tins of potatoes, and what she's
paid for those would buy 101bs of potatoes and
a cauliflower or something. But everything
was tinned. It's the kind of home where she'd
get up and spend £1 on cakes for the kids for
breakfast, when she could have bought bread,
eggs and so on for the same money. You'd need
a lot of time to get that across and show her.'
(Probation Officer 3: 174 - female)
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'I've always felt that what a lot of the women
need is social skills/home skills training -
some sort of conditions to attend day centres.
Sort of basic child-rearing skills and how to
play with your kid and manage on small budgets.'
(Probation Officer 12: 264 - female)
Many probation officers expressed frustration that a woman might actually
be freed to live a marginally more fulfilling life if she could make
some simple decisions differently. Since they saw themselves as power-
less to effect any radical change in her economic situation, effecting
small, 'marginal' changes was seen as crucial to a woman's survival and
a legitimate part of 'working strategically'. However, such patronising
attitudes, riddled as they are with stereotypical assumptions and moral
judgments about the ways in which working-class women do and should live,
run the same risk as does the encouragement of women to do voluntary work
(see above). Ultimately, by allowing women's economic oppression to
legitimise the restriction of their choices, such well-intentioned
efforts serve to reinforce rather than alleviate that oppression.
Survival skills
Other probation officers recognised the problem of defining women's
needs in stereotypical ways. There exists a fairly wide variety of
provision of social (i.e. 'survival') skills training, especially in
day centres, but such groups are always dominated by men. Women are
rarely expressly excluded but, understandably, few have the interest,
confidence - or social skills - to participate, especially when faced
with the following kind of attitude:
'One of the problems is that we have a rule that
the centre is, officially, for sixteen plusses.
Women have brought babies in occasionally;
during the summer, young children would be
brought in and we've tolerated that. We've
turned a blind eye, but we wouldn't encourage
that.'
(Probation Officer 11: 249)
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There have always been 'prisoners' wives' groups' run by the Probation
Service but these have been premised on the concept of women being
attached to men (who are the 'real' clients) and have focussed on how
the women can cope alone until the return of their hu5bands/cohabitees.
There have always been women who have found, through such groups, that
they can cope better without their man, but this has been viewed
traditionally as a slightly embarrassing side-effect of the groups.
The idea of regarding women as people 'in their own rights' with
their own survival needs requiring specialist separate provision, is a
relatively new and controversial one. In 1983, Probation Officer 11 was
still weighing up the pros and cons of such a move at the day centre:
'I think there are women who wouldn't perhaps
want to come into the day centre for all kinds
of reasons but would want to come into some
kind of specialist provision....If it becomes
a moms and toddlers group....then obviously
that will tend to preclude women who haven't
got kids, but if it becomes a women's group,
some of whom happen to have kids, then that is
a different emphasis altogether. I think we
were tending to look at moms and toddlers,
especially from the point of view of "children
at risk", with moms who are finding it diffi-
cult to cope with kids and the moms who have
been to court for child abuse.'
(249-50)
So, yet again, it looked as though the needs of others were likely to
dominate provision for women. The fact that increasing numbers of young,
poor women are persistently offending does, however, present a challenge
to probation officers, who have not hitherto given any serious considera-
tion to separate provision for women.
Earlier intervention
Probation Officer 1 spoke of his concern that women who shoplifted
were often allowed to appear in court two or three times before being
offered the help of a probation order. Whilst he understood the desire
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to keep women 'down tariff', he felt that such reasoning illustrated
probation officers' lack of confidence in their ability to help women
stop offending. The debate about the relative merits of earlier or later
intervention by welfare agencies is one which both extends beyond
considerations of gender and has tended to ignore gender. Much work
has been done, for example, on the implications for recidivism amongst
juveniles (for which read 'boys') of early formal intervention (Rutter
and Giller, 1983; Rutherford, 1986), but the assumption remains that,
since women are not typically recidivist, such debate is largely
irrelevant. As has been seen, however, some women are caught reoffending.
But the 'developmental approach' (Rutherford, 1986) to juvenile justice
is irrelevant to adult women lawbreakers for at least two reasons:
1. Unlike juvenile boys, they are unlikely to 'grow out of' crime.
2. Unlike juvenile boys, they compromise a muted group in society, with
neither the self-image, social networks nor material wherewithal to
become successful, dominant citizens, as it is implicitly assumed juvenile
boys have the potential to do.
The ideology of radical non-intervention is dependent on the
existence of apposite, but hitherto unrecognised, informal resources in
the conmiunity which will, once recognised and mobilised, serve to support
the delinquent through the 'bad patch' into responsible adulthood and
citizenship. It is not the task of this thesis to argue that such
ideology fails to take account of the material circumstances and prospects
of many working-class youths. It is important, however, to highlight the
inappropriateness, in the wake of 'Alternatives to Custody' discourse,
of adopting a blanket policy of later rather than earlier intervention
in relation to all client groups. The challenge in relation to female
lawbreakers is whether early intervention can empower women to take more
control over their lives or whether it inevitably restricts their choices
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and place8 them at greater risk of custody.
A major political decision
Probation Officer 4 felt that he could only envisage improvement
in the women's situations coming about as a result of a 'major political
decision' and he felt that he had to supplement his work in the Probation
Service with direct political work. His analysis incorporated gender
and class considerations:
'I think one of the major problems is a need to
rationalise our whole financial approach to the
family. When you consider the cost of keeping
people in prison, I think that a simple financial
subsidy to the family would reduce many crimes of
provision - there tend to be very few middle-
class offenders in prison.'
AW: 'You'd say that was true of women as well?'
'Yes. I take the view that the middle classes
seem to be able to contain their problems
because they have the financial means to do so,
whereas families who don't have those means
find that their behaviour tends to spill over
into the community.'
(Probation Officer 4: 181-2 - male)
The challenge implicit in these remarks is whether probation officers
should actively support political campaigns to improve the economic
position of women in society.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to deconstruct the interweaving, and at
times conflicting, discourses which circumscribe the work of probation
officers with 'nondescript' women. It has demonstrated that probation
officers recognise that, whilst such women cannot be 'quite labelled'
(Probation Officer 1) or defined within the discourses of domesticity,
sexuality and pathology which constitute the 'gender contract', they are
nevertheless 'rooted in relationships', and trapped by the contradictory
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effects of that 'rootedness'. In their endeavours to defy description
and avoid the 'gender contract', 'nondescript' women employ mechanisms
which are interpreted by probation officers as elusiveness, demands
deviousness and (though rarely) refusal. These mechanisms are regarded
by probation officers as being self-defeating or losing modes of
behaviour which lead the officers to experience feelings of frustration
and powerlessness. Similar feelings are engendered in probation
officers by solicitors, psychiatrists, social workers and magistrates
who, they feel, not only fail to appreciate the restricted range of
legitimate responses available to working-class, poor women, but who,
through their own discursively circumscribed practices, actually restrict
even further the choices available to these women.
In the absence of alternative discourses in which to describe these
women and thus render them eligible for alternative modes of help, it
has been argued that probation officers provide a service of 'sheer
humanitarianism' which has some, albeit limited potential, both to
alleviate the worst excesses of penal, psychiatric and social work
discourses. That service also opens up the possibility of employing
alternative mechanisms for avoiding the 'gender contract', thus offering
new choices to 'nondescript' women to engage in twinning modes' of
behaviour.
It has been argued that, whilst it is not possible to 'read off'
specific reforms for probation officers' practice from the analysis of
this chapter, several issues have been identified which suggest that
there exists a dual dilemma for probation officers in making decisions
about both the 'moment' and the nature of intervention in relation to
'nondescript' women. Such issues are relevant not only to the practice
of probation officers but also to the practice of all those 'experts'
with whom this thesis has been concerned. The final chapter will conclude
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thesis by presenting in summary form the common and the conflicting
ments that characterise expert discourse in relation to 'nondescript'
en and by discussing some of the implications for probation officers.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
NONDESCRIPT WOMEN: SUMMARY OF THESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite an increasing interest in the 'women and crime' question,
there are still few empirical studies of women's experience of the
criminal justice system. Of those studies that do exist, few include
accounts given by female lawbreakers themselves. This study, therefore,
has attempted to break new ground by systematically examining 	 such
accounts. It then compares the women's definitions of their problems
with those of the various judicial and welfare personnel charged with
their care and control. By identifying the rules governing the various
discourses within which female lawbreakers are routinely constructed,
the thesis discovers the gaps, contradictions and coherences in existing
professional claims to know about such women. Consequent on that
analysis the thesis constructs a new object of discourse - the
Nondescript Woman - who constitutes the Other of existing discourses,
and whose challenge to those official discourses has to be constantly
erased by professional techniques that result in the women being muted.
The arguments developed in this thesis are now summarised chapter
by chapter.
The Introduction described how this empirical study arose from
my professional concern as a probation officer about the small, but
disproportionately demanding group of women clients who elude the
official descriptions which traditionally render female lawbreakers
recognisable within available judicial, social work and medical
discourses.
The aim of the study has, therefore, been two-fold - to draw
attention to the needs of one particularly neglected group of lawbreaking
women and to describe the ideological and material conditions which
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ren(JPr them nondescript.
The thesis of this study is that 'nondescript women' are a muted
group within the criminal justice system. They are subject to multiple
discursive oppression which is subtle and sophisticated. Their oppression
is dependent not on their active and constant domination by one group
(men) in society but by the inability/refusal of a number of authorised
definers or agents of signification (who may empirically be either men
or women) to hear or listen to comunicalions which are incongruent with
professionally legitimated modes of expression about female conditions
of existence. Consequently, the women are disqualified as speakers
about their own condition and are, instead, strategically constructed
as the progremable objects of professional discourses. Despite this,
it has been argued that nondescript women are also those women who
attetçt to resist such construction by exploiting the contradictions of
those discourses. Whilst much of that resistance is individualistic,
inconsistent and self-destructive, it has the important effect of under-
mining the authority of official discourse and keeping open the
possibility of the creation of new knowledge about these women.
Chapter One outlined the theoretical framework - that of discourse
analysis - within which the process of knowing about female lawbreakers
is located within this thesis. As opposed to dealing with questions
of 'truth', this thesis has struggled with the process of signification
and the position within that process of the speaking subject. A
bricolage of concepts and analytical tools drawn from a number of writers
was used to discover some of the criminal justice system's structural
elements whence emanate the authorisation of claims 'to know' about, or
to describe female lawbreakers.
The choice of methodology resulted from a concern to reject
positivistic notions of truth as unchanging, monolithic and sovereign.
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This concern led initially to a study of symbolic interactionism and its
exposition of the development of the Self through the acquisition of
language. However, symbolic interactionism's emphasis on consciousness
and the normality of consistence, coherence, unity and integration in
the adult personality failed to explain the ubiquity of contradiction
and conflict in any terms other than those of individual pathology.
Syrolic interactionism's inability to take account of personality as
the product of social relations which are themselves the product of
structural inequalities in society rendered the framework ultimately
inadequate for the purposes of this study.
The importance of the contribution of structural linguistics to the
study of social practices lies in the emphasis it places on the form,
rather than the substance of signs (practices) and their relationship
with each other within a system. By accepting that the relationship
between what is described (the signified) and its description (the
signifier) is inherently arbitrary, it becomes possible to explore how
meaning is socially ascribed to that relationship, what rules govern the
organisation of difference (that is, what is seen to distinguish the
signified from the non-signified) and the effects of that organisation.
It then becomes apparent that the freedom of the speaking subject to
endow her words or actions with meaning is constrained. She is no
longer the centre of meaning or knowledge. Words and actions acquire
socially effective meanings which exist independently of the particular
subject who uses those words or engages in those actions.
Since the speaking subject is thus 'de-centred' and no longer has
an automatic right 'to know', the question is then 'Who has that right?'.
The legacy of epistemology is the desire for sovereign thought.
Consequently, those who, by reason of their social advantage, represent
knowledge as 'an ideal, continuous, smooth text that runs beneath the
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multiplicity of contradiction8, and resolves them in the calm unity of
coherent thought' (Foucault, 1972: 155) are authorised to define or
describe those who, by reason of their social disadvantage, articulate
only a broken, contradictory account of reality. By contrast, discourse
analysis proposes that knowledge/power is a ubiquitous force which is
generated continuously within the relations of the social body. Its
project is to deconstruct (or unhitch the lack/desire couple which appears
to render that which is absent present) sovereign or privileged
description, demonstrating that not only do those discourses relate
paradoxically to each other, but they contain within themselves
discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, lacunae, which remain unspoken or, if
spoken, always-already subordinate.
To ensure the infinite continuity of discourse, its boundaries have
to be demarcated by practices of exclusion such as the prohibition of
certain topics, the disqualification of certain individuals as speakers
and the rejection of certain statements as illegitimate. Practices of
exclusion ensure that certain definitions of reality are 'recognised' or
designated as the 'truth'. This poses the epistemological problem of
the relationship between ideology and knowledge, a problem which has
been transformed by discourse analysis into one of recognition.
Central to this process of transformation is the notion of contradiction.
The search for continuity, consistency and rationale in the development
of scientific knowledge has been replaced by 'a battle about the status
of truth and the economic/political role which it plays' (Foucault, 1976:
14 - emphasis added). The abandonment of the battle to establish the
truth opens the way for the reintroduction of the subject and an
exploration of the way in which the individual is constructed through
language so that she can act. At this point, it becomes possible to
rehabilitate Freud, since the notion of the Unconscious becomes important
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in understanding the role of ideology in the construction of self-image
or identity.
For Mead, the moment of Self-recognition is a moment of acquisition.
It is the moment at which the infant experiences herself as an integrated,
unified whole. By contrast, for object relations theorists, the
acquisition of language (the Symbolic) is a moment of loss, when the
subject misrecognises herself. The price of the representation of an
apparently unified self (the production of the Imaginary) is the denial
of contradiction and the consequent splitting off or loss of the Other -
those non-legitimated forms of lived experience which thereafter forever
dictate the paradigms from which the speaker selects, in order to exert
control over them. The relationship between ideology and knowledge can
therefore be redefined as the relationship between the closure of the
Imaginary and the inexhaustible creativity of the Symbolic. The
production of knowledge becomes dependent on the maintenance of space
between them.
The Desire (or unspoken goal) of discourse is the closure of that
gap and the consequent ejection of the Other. This is achieved through
progranines, technologies and strategies of power. Programes presuppose
a knowledge of the field of reality in which they intervene and render
reality intelligible in the form of objects which are programable. In
this study, professional assessments are examined as programmes of
power. Technologies are those mechanisms whereby programmes produce
effects; in this study, the technology of muting is examined. Strategy
is an opportunistic and expedient means of exploiting the social field
of intervention; in this study, the concept of strategy is used to
analyse professional practices.
The programmes, technologies and strategies by which the gap between
the Imaginary and the Symbolic is conventionally closed serve to give
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meaning or signification to the subject and her acts. Nevertheless, the
subject does have some power to transgress. Negativity is the subject's
(albeit discursively circum8cribed) power to resist assumptions of
homogeneity. The extent to which nondescript women actively defy (refuse)
description is one of the central questions of this thesis.
Female lawbreakers are constructed as targets upon which power is
inscribed and their lawbreaking activity is read as the property of a
unified self. Statements about them which reinforce notions of essence
and unity are privileged as authoritative; those which do not reinforce
such notions are excluded as 'common sense'. The organisation of this
distinction depends on the power of the agent of signification; assessment
may be defined as that which is recognised as rendering the female
lawbreaker 'normal' as either a woman or a criminal and as that which
successfully controls the challenge of the Other.
Chapter Two indicated how a number of distinct yet interweaving
discourses have attempted to lay claim to knowledge about troublesome
women. Each discourse, characterised by its historical and physical
setting, its code or mode of expression and its non-discursive practices,
has sought to locate the 'not quite normal' woman within its own
theoretical site. Each has drawn on fundamentally positivistic theories
of female crime which have posited the existence of a homogeneous group
of women who can be distinguished from other women by essential qualities
other than their lawbreaking action - qualities which may be analysed
ahistorically. These discourses may be summarised as follows:
1. Criminological
Theories of female crime have traditionally constructed the female
lawbreaker variously as essentially unfeminine (that is, under-
determined by her biology), essentially feminine (over-determined by
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biology), role-playing (under-socialised), 'feminist' (liberated from
normal social constraints) or feminist (victimised by man-made law).
By contrast, a relatively new tradition of criminological discourse,
within which this thesis locates itself, has sought to explore the
specific experiences and circumstances which result in particular
female lawbreakers being constructed as abnormal criminals and abnormal
women. It seeks to bring to particular account those discourses which
variously define female lawbreakers as born, socialised or victimised
into crime.
2. Judicial
The unifying theme of existing literature on women offenders and
the courts is whether or not they are treated more leniently than their
counterparts. Evidence increasingly suggests that, when account is
taken of the fact that women generally are criminalised for fewer and
less serious offences than men, they are not subject to preferential or
chivalrous sentencing. It has, however, been argued that concentration
on the end product of sentencing masks other inequalities of treatment
throughout the judicial process. In particular, the ideology of the
family, which occupies a dominant position in court proceedings, results
in considerable emphasis being placed on the domestic responsibilities
of women. Additionally, courts have been advised to be specifically
vigilant for any signs of mental disorder in women defendants. This
thesis is about the negotiation by female lawbreakers of a space within
which to define themselves and their actions. It explores the mechanisms
which some women have employed to resist a total pitch invasion by a
judicial discourse which recognises only those excusing conditions that
are located and fixed within domesticity, sexuality and pathology.
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3. Penal
Official rhetoric looks to the day when the imprisonment of women
is a redundant practice. However, recent developments in the government's
prison building programme and the steady increase in the numbers of
women imprisoned over the past fifteen years do not suggest that such a
vision has any foundation in reality. Women appear to cope less well
with imprisonment than men and two explanations are offered for this.
Firstly, it is argued that women withstand the stresses of prison life
less well than men - that they are 'normal' women put under abnormal
strains. Secondly, there is the view that women's prisons house only
the most highly disturbed female lawbreakers who should, in an ideal
world, be treated in a psychiatric hospital.
Despite officially expressed unease, the imprisonment of women would
seem to serve a purpose of disciplining the behaviour of those women who
have demonstrated that they are beyond the care or cure provided by
welfare and medical professionals. But it has been argued that the
'caring society' is often a 'dismissive' one, not offering the care it
professes. Whilst the women in this study have not yet been dismissed
by that society, this thesis argues that the nature of the help they
receive is often based on injunctions identical to those of penal
discourse: 'discipline, medicalise nd feminise' (Carlen, 1983).
4. Gynaecological
The realisation that the internal processes of the female body are
crucial to, yet beyond the control of, men is something which provokes
fear and a desire to contain, to limit and to punish. But the ideology
of the 'normal abnormalities' of menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth and
the menopause has become so effective in restricting women's perceptions
of themselves and thus controlling their behaviour that it rarely needs
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to be restated explicitly. Women who suffer gynaecological dysfunctions,
or who reject the controlling influence of the reproductive cycle become
problematic and potentially out of control. Some may find a solution
which absolves them of responsibility for their behaviour by retreating
into mental illness or vaguely defined sub-psychiatric conditions such
as pre-menstrual syndrome or menopausal depression. Those who do not
have the 'decency' to accommodate their biology in this way are subject
to a more punitive discourse which involves explanations of sexual
depravity, for which they themselves are considered responsible. This
thesis attempts to identify the rules whereby behaviour is normalised
through its reduction to biology. It is argued that the appe tc
gynaecology as an excusing condition is characteristically available to
the snormale (white, wealthy?) woman. The poorer woman may not have
access to such an appeal but may, ironically, subsequently be defined
as 'abnormally abnormal' - and therefore responsible.
5. Psychiatric
Official rates of mental morbidity are considerably higher amongst
women than men. Traditional explanations of this difference assume
that women are either inherently more predisposed towards mental
instability, or are assigned social roles which are less satisfying and
more stressful than men. Ironically, however, whilst women are readily
diagnosed as suffering from psychiatric disorder, their treatment denies
them the status of a sick person. This is demonstrated in the expecta-
tion that they continue to 'cope' with personal and family responsibilities.
It is also demonstrated in the diagnostic category of psychopathic or
personality disorder which is, by definition, often untreatable.
Instead, a person so diagnosed is held responsible for her actions and
deemed to need either social work intervention or a discipline setting.
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Much has been written about the controlling nature of psychiatric
discourse, but attacks on traditional psychiatry emanate from differing
medical, moral and political interests, so that it is not possible to
identify 'anti-psychiatry' as a unitary concept. Nevertheless, the
traditions of the 'anti-psychiatry' schools and the historical/archaeo-
logical approach of Foucault have in comon the attempt to make 'madness'
a relative concept whose meaning is dependent on the specific conditions
of time and place in which it is located. Relatively little attention,
however, has been paid to the home and work environments which might be
most relevant to an understanding of the construction of women's sanity
and insanity. This thesis argues that it is only those women who are
seen as basically powerless, safely gender-socialised and whose
behaviour is perceived as of little social significance, who can be
allowed the reduction of moral responsibility implied in the redefinition
of their behaviour as 'disordered'. Psychiatric discourse accepts
responsibility only for those female lawbreakers who can be constructed
as dull and insignificant, but potentially coping.
6. Psychoanalytic
The discovery of the unconscious and its influence on the
construction and organisation of sexuality has been used both to
prescribe and proscribe the socialisation of women as wives and mothers.
Feminists have both accused Freud of an ahistorical phallocentrism which
reinforces the oppression of women and hailed him as identifying the
myth which facilitates the ideology of masculinity and femininity. Of
particular significance to the construction of femininity is the
recognition by women that they are lacking (castrated) and that
development into normal womanhood requires a transformation from active
to passive sexuality and a transference of affection from mother to
father. The 'normal' woman comes to believe that her own desires and
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needs cannot be expressed other than through service to others -
primarily men, but also children. Women are always already NOT MEN and
the experience of being female is that of being not male. This absence
of maleness is manifested in two opposing sets of expectations,
revolving around the socially ambiguous status of dependence.
Femininity is characterised, on the one hand, by self-control and
independence and, on the other, by lack of control and dependence.
Feminist psychotherapeutic practice has provided the leverage for
examining the association between being a woman and feeling inferior or
abnormal in our society. Nevertheless, it has been argued that it has
very little to say to women, like those in this study, who suffer very
real economic and educational deprivation. This thesis argues that
exhorting such women to cease to serve and to reclaim the conflict of
sexuality, in the absence of appropriate material (not just emotional)
support, is likely to lead to their construction within judicial and
penal discourse as being in 'need' of a discipline setting.
7. Social Work
Social work discourse is very powerful because it is overseen by
psychiatric discourse, reinforced by diffuse legal powers and has served
the political programmes of both left and right wing governments. The
traditional social work method of casework appropriates psychoanalytic
theories and individualises social problems. People are poor and
underprivileged because they are personally inadequate and the victims
of defective upbringings. Social work seeks to remedy this by
buttressing the nuclear family and, in particular, targetting the
woman-as-mother as the key site of intervention. Social workers are
authoritatively charged with monitoring standards of motherhood and
with supervising women who, like those in this study, are seen to be
deficient mothers. This requirement of domestic competence is
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legitimised by a 'knowledge' of child psychiatry and role psychology
which is claimed by privileged (predominantly male) professionals and
mediated by (predominantly female) semi-professionals. These are the
'wise women' who, in addition to translating 'expert knowledge' into
'common sense' for the consumption of the always-already failing woman,
also provide an authoritative role model of normal womanhood. The
female client who challenges the state's definition of her and attempts
to take control of her own life is labelled 'anti-authoritarian',
'aggressive', 'problem mother', or 'castrating'.
Radical social work writing has emphasised the political nature of
social problems but, until recently, has shown little appreciation of
women's opporession. Feminist social work has begun to emerge as a
discourse which seeks to link the personal and the political by stressing
the ambiguity of the family. It has begun to examine both the ways in
which women's needs and problems are defined, and the criteria for the
allocation of social work resources. One of the surfaces through which
such an analysis emerges is the mechanism of 'consciousness raising'
which has offered both female clients and female social workers
opportunities to examine their experiences as women. The extent to
which a feminist analysis of social work can directly inform social work
practice and its organisation within statutory agencies remains, however,
a matter for debate. Despite their powerlessness and vulnerability,
women such as those in this study are often viewed as the perpetrators
of harm to members of society who are even more vulnerable - namely,
children. They are the women who appear to act with sufficient agen
to exclude themselves from the category of the 'genuinely' powerless
and victimised.
It has been argued that the unspoken Desire of the discourses
outlined in this chapter - the search for the essentially normal woman -
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has failed. The prescriptive descriptions of the discourses have failed
to converge and there remains an unappropriated space in which this
thesis has aimed to construct a new object of discourses - the
Nondescript Woman.
Chapter Three introduced the fifteen women on whom this study is
based. Official accounts of their circumstances and their lawbreaking
were juxtaposed with their own accounts and the discourses within
which attempts are made to construct them as 'normal' women were
identified. It was demonstrated that the discourses outlined in
Chapter Two overdetermine the pedagogic and pathologising dimensions of
the routine descriptions of female lawbreakers. It was argued that the
female lawbreaker is routinely offered the opportunity to neutralise
the effects of her lawbreaking activity by implicitly entering into a
contract whereby she permits her life to be described or re-presented
primarily in terms of its domestic, sexual and pathological dimensions.
The effect of this 'gender contract' is to strip her lawbreaking of its
social economic and ideological' dimensions in order to minimise its
punitive consequences. Whilst many female lawbreakers accept this deal
and some reject it outrightly, there exists a group of women who appear
to be on the margins of all categories and thus elude the controlling
influence of prescriptive description. Furthermore, it was argued that,
by exploiting the material and ideological conditions that are pre-
conditional to this 'nondescriptiveness', this particular group of women
resists the oppressive nature of stereotypical descriptions and
prescriptions.
The fifteen women in this study were predominantly working class,
poorly educated and living in conditions of poverty. Most had no income
other than Social Security Supplementary Benefit and most, for various
reasons, were bringing up children on their own. With one exception,
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all the women were the subjects of Probation Service files. They had
been assessed and classified, not simply in terms of their lawbreaking
activity, but in an endeavour to 'make sense' of the multitude of
'facts'which constituted their official lives. Certain dimensions
featured strongly in these official accounts, others were notably
absent. Domesticity, sexuality and pathology were prominent; class and
race barely mentioned. Yet the routine practice of interpellating
female lawbreakers as domesticated, feminine and sick appeared to have
been proved inadequate in relation to the women in this study in
providing either explanations of their past lawbreaking activity or
management of their future behaviour. These women had presented
themselves variously as:
a) suspect or non-mothers;
b) indiscriminate and promiscuous women, unsupported and uncontrolled
(or uncontrollable?);
c) not mad enough or too mad, alcoholic and malingering.
The women who were interviewed described themselves in rather
different terms. Most of them did not see themselves as 'real'
criminals. They felt that what they had done was either not really
criminal, was a kind of 'compulsion' or had been done out of economic
necessity. in its strict judicial sense, they denied criminal
intention, but they resigned themselves to pleading or being found
guilty, partly because of their low self-esteem and generalised sense
of guilt about being a woman and thus always-already failing, but partly
as a result of being treated as though they were always-already guilty
by judicial personnel. The following gender dimensions of the women's
experiences in court were identified as:
a) the particular social disgrace of being a woman criminal;
b) the sense of guilt and low self-esteem which many women have about
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themselves as women;
c) the apparent difficulty which many women have in communicating what
they really want to say to (or getting listened to by) men in positions
of authority in court;
d) the particular requirement that women who break the law must compensate
for their 'unfeminine' criminal behaviour by presenting themselves as
domesticated, sexually passive and constitutionally fragile.
In relation to this last requirement, the women described their
circumstances rather differently from their official biographers.
Those who were mothers saw their motherhood as being profoundly and
inextricably bound up with their attitudes to their lawbreaking (rather
than being incompatible with it). On the one hand, they saw their crime
as being either an attempt to provide for their children, or as an
attempt to draw attention to the intolerable pressure of losing children
(through admission to Care or simply through their growing up and leaving
home) or being treated with contempt by them. On the other hand, the
fear of losing their children was, for some women, the biggest single
restraining influence on their lawbreaking. Yet others were prepared
to exploit what they saw as the reluctance of courts to imprison
mothers. Husbands or partners were considered far less significant
than children, being generally dismissed as unsupportive and, in some
cases, the cause of the women's lawbreaking. They certainly did not
accept any definition of themselves as promiscuous or indiscriminate
in their sexual relationships. They were also reluctant to accept
the 'sick role'. Despite having histories of involvement with
psychiatrists, none of the women saw themselves as mentally ill and
few felt they had benefitted from the 'treatment' they had received.
(It was not therefore surprising that many had been officially redefined
as 'personality disorders, not amenable to treatment'). Those who had
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experienced forms of psychotherapy (with the opportunity to talk about
themselves) spoke more positively of their treatment than did those
who had experienced drugs, ECT or brief, curt 'consultation8'. These
latter treatments had been seen as alienating, confusing and humiliating.
But the power of the psychiatrist both in the court and over social
workers was recognised by the women. The psychiatrist's expressed
willingness to offer treatment was seen as an important pre-requisite
for obtaining a lenient sentence; his approval was also seen as crucial
if the women were to retain the custody of their children.
It was argued that the discourses of femininity which together
constitute the 'gender contract' have failed to describe the women in
this study adequately. instead, they only succeed in exertinc acw
control over these women by rendering them muted. Within the criminal
justice system, these women are muted by being subject to a formal
justice which encourages self-expression but which they experience as
a substantive injustice denying self-expression. In the male-dominated
world of crime, women are immediately threatening and are likely to be
labelled as failed women. The courtroom itself is a public and
arguably 'masculine' arena where interaction must be audible,
rationalisable and adversarial; the personnel most familiar with its
workings are predominantly white, middle-class, professional and male.
From their own accounts, it was apparent 	 that the women
studied here experienced the criminal justice system as bewildering,
degrading and unjust. Their attempts to cope with it were characterised
by accomodetion - by a mixture of self-blame and suppressed anger,
translated into a variety of petty resistances and rituals which miit
be conceived of as either 'shifting the signs' (Foucault, 1975) of the
gender contract with a degree of agency or, alternatively, as 'minor
deviations... .(which).. . .nurture the confined soul' (Ardener, 1978).
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The mechanisms employed by the women to 'shift the signs' were
identified as:
a) Elusiveness;
b) Making demands;
c) Small scale pleasures: 'working', 'socialising' and 'helping
yourself'.
It was argued that the consequence of this 'nondescriptiveness' is
that women like those in this study are frequently placed under the
supervision of probation officers because the Probation Service is
assumed to be capable of accommodating nondescriptiveness. For probation
has traditionally represented 'institutionalised ambivalence' in the
criminal justice system and has positively encouraged courts to be
uncertain (Millard, 1982).
Chapters Four to Seven examined the 'chain of signification' which
results in the muting of nondescript women. Each chapter analyses the
utterances of particular courtroom personnel. It identifies the origin
of their authority to know and speak about female lawbreakers, the rules
governing that speech, the programmes, technologies and strategies which
circumscribe their practices, and the consequences of those official
discourses for the women in thi8 study. It is argued that these agents
of signification acquire their privileged status within the courtroom
from:
a) the law itself and
b) the differential class-based capacities of those agents.
Chapter Four deconstructed the discourse of magisterial common sense.
The origin of magistrates' authority was located in the ideology of
amateur justice which requires a minimum of legality and expertise.
The 8afeguard against the naked class justice which might ensue from
such an absence is the assumed existence of a quality which crosses all
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barriers of class, age, race or gender - the quality of common sense.
Magistrates appeal to common sense in order to account for their actions
and, in so doing, they make assumptions about 'what everyone knows' to
be self-evidently true. Common sense is portrayed as the safeguard of
the criminal justice system, the champion of freedom, the check on
expert power. But, far from challenging and transgressing expert
discourse, it was argued in Chapter Four that magisterial common sense
is a competing discourse of expertise, which confines, targets and
programmes female lawbreakers. Under the guise of gender-neutrality,
magistrates produce and safeguard consensus in relation to the
processing of female lawbreakers by portraying legal rules as homogenous,
unproblematic, external, inevitable, essential and external. Their
discourse is characterised by three key myths which have important
consequences for women defendants:
1. Through the process of self-disqualification magistrates
simultaneously deny and claim authority for what they say. In fact,
magistrates act 'as though' they have knowledge of women defendants,
that knowledge emanating from cultural stereotypes of appropriate
female behaviour and being reinforced by their own socially and
discursively privileged personal life experience. The consequence for
women defendants is that they are rendered always-already invisible,
inaccessible and unknowable (yet forever known).
2. Through the invocation of the ostensibly gender-neutral concept of
individual merit magistrates simultaneously generalise and deny the
possibility of generalisation. The consequence for women defendants
is that, though they are rendered intractably heterogeneous, magistrates
can use this concept to justify treating women defendants qua women
differently from men defendants, since meritorious conduct in men and
women is differentially defined.
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3. Through the privileging of personal life experience women magistrates
simultaneously claim and deny similarity with defendants. The
consequence for women defendants is that they are rendered like-yet-not
like women magistrates. The judging of women by women magistrates is
seen to be doubly authoritative because women magistrates can root
their claim to an authoritative understanding of female lawbreakers in
the claim that they themselves share in a biological experience comon
to all women without using it 88 an excuse to break the law. Thus
biology (rather than class or race) is both hailed and denied as the
prime determinant of the social construction of culpability and
responsibility.
Chapter Five deconstructed the discourse of legal representation.
The role of the solicitor was described as being to occupy the gap
between the defendant's account and the magistrate's recognition of
that account, negotiating the precise route whereby that gap is closed.
The origin of solicitors' authority was located in the paradox of the
coiiinon-law approach to legal reasoning which requires them to theorise
at the interstices of legal rigidity and judicial flexibility. The
unspoken goal (Desire) of this discourse is the 'normalisation' of the
defendant through a process which packages and re-presents (renders
programable) the defendant as a coherent unity which is recognisable
by the magistracy. This process consists of particular practices of
inclusion and exclusion, governed by tacit rules that disqualify the
defendant as a speaker, prohibit certain topics (specifically, poverty)
or redefine them (as 'need') and reject certain explanations as
illegitimate. These practices of professional assessment are justified
by the perpetuation of the myth of client choice (illustrated by
notions such as that of 'taking instructions').
The rules and definitions available to solicitors require them to
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construct women in legal discourse in terms of their exclusion from
'male' categories of behaviour and motivation. One of the unique
contributions of solicitors to the signification of female lawbreakers
is their authorisation to recognise the guilty mind. Ostensibly a
gender-neutral concept, the organisation of the guilt/innocence
distinction has different meanings for men and women. Ideologically,
many women experience a generalised sense of (moral) guilt consequent
on their perception of themselves as failed wives and mothers. This
perception predisposes some women to accept readily that certain of
their specific actions can/should be defined as 'guilty' acts requiring
punishment. This may be reinforced by a variety of material conditions
surrounding a woman's appearance in court which influence her decision
to plead guilty.
The process of normalising the female lawbreaker therefore consists
of repackaging her story in such a way that her plea of guilty is
received without discomfort by the court and her own account of events
is reconstituted and muted. This involves defining the nature of the
offence as 'normal' female crime, its motivation as a 'normal' female
explanation (that is, need, greed or sickness) and its appropriate
treatment as the 'normal' disposal for women (that is, probation).
Solicitors experience some discomfort when required to consider
explanations of sickness which relate to women's biology and prefer to
avoid these unless the offence concerned is 'serious but natural' (that
is, congruent with images of femininity) since such explanations
present a challenge to the well-established jurisprudential concept of
the 'reasonable man'.
Underpinning the ideological conditions governing the relationship
between solicitors and female defendants is the economic condition of
women's particularly precarious ability to pay for legal representation.
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The readiness of solicitors to utilise 'off the peg', ready-made
packages for female lawbreakers may be attributed as much to economic
as to ideological considerations.
It was argued that solicitors construct female lawbreakers within
the ideologies of domesticity, sexuality and pathology. Female
lawbreakers are re-presented as family members, as sexual objects and!
or as sick. Even those for whom such constructions bear no relation
to reality cannot escape the power of these ideologies. Their only
alternative, therefore, is to be constructed in terms of their
exclusion from these 'socially exculpatory' and 'legally effective'
categories (Edwards, 1984). The consequence of such construction is
that they are perceived to be 'suitable' candidates for the disciplinary
setting of custody.
Chapter Six deconstructed the discourse of forensic psychiatry.
Legislation privileges psychiatry at a number of stages in the judicial
process and authorises it to intervene in decisions about both the
culpability and the management of offenders. But its powers are not
mandatory and psychiatrists have no right of access to courts. They
may speak only at the request of magistrates, solicitors and probation
officers and what they say has to be expressed in a form which is
recognisable within the discourses of magisterial common sense, re-
presentation and itrategic working. That recognition is dependent less
on their legal powers than on their ability to establish themselves in
court more as 'wise men', willing to enter into a 'helpful collusion'
about the organisation of the 'culpable/not culpable' and 'treatable!
punishable' distinctions. That collusion involves turning on its head
the notion of 'treatability' which features so significantly in recent
mental health legislation. It was argued that psychiatrists have
partially appropriated the paradigm of 'anti-psychiatry' whilst failing
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to vacate the site of privilege which is an essential pre-condition of
that discourse. They have claimed the right to redefine mental
illness as 'problems of living' (Szasz, 1965) but have not simultaneously
disqualified themselves as expert speakers. On the contrary, they have
transferred their expertise to a competing discourse - that of social
work/probation.
The relationship between psychiatry and probation is historically
of long standing and the so-called 'psychiatric probation order' remains
the most frequently used measure for dealing with mentally disordered
offenders whose offences are of a relatively trivial nature. Yet the
criteria for its use and non-use are far from clear and the inclusion
(or not) of conditions of psychiatric treatment in probation orders
made on female lawbreakers has been open to discourse analysis in this
thesis rather than an already given characteristic of the women studied.
Two rules appear to govern the nature of the consultancy offered
to the courts by psychiatrists:
1. The paradigm of mental illness from which the psychiatrist's
terminology is selected, and
2. the extent to which the psychiatrist succeeds in redefining
'evidence' of sickness (which he accepts as being his domain) as
'evidence' of social need (which he ascrib to the domain of social
work/probation).
It was argued that the women in this study have been muted by
psychiatrists because they have been subject to a formal psychiatry
which purports to be gender-neutral but which they have experienced as
being substantively discriminatory for the following reasons:
1. By invoking the female domination of the official statistics of
mental illness to demonstrate that even 'normal' women are prone to
mental instability, those women who deviate from normal gender expecta-
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tions by breaking the law are viewed as doubly prone to such instability.
2. By invoking a clinical paradigm of mental illness most psychiatrists
are committed to the use of restricted and rigid categories of diagnosis
which are frequently experienced as being incongruent with the lived
realities of these women. Alternative paradigms which construct mental
illness as the product of unresolved internal conflict (psycho-analysis)
and/or problems of living (anti-psychiatry) are largely ejected from the
site of assessment.
3. By invoking and then turning on its head the notion of 'treatability',
psychiatrists claim authority to redefine evidence of sickness in
these women as evidence of needyness. This is done in two particular
ways. Firstly, those who deviate from 'normal' femininity are
constructed as having personality disorders rather than being 'really'
mentally ill. Secondly, those who suffer gynaecologically based
disorders are redefined as being 'just' subject to a particular form
of stress (which is itself deemed to be gender-neutral).
Consequently, it was argued that nondescript women fall both
within and without the domain of psychiatry. Psychiatrists retain
their authority to assess and judge them but they simultaneously deny
responsibility for treating them. Despite this, they retain their
oversight of those social workers and probation officers whom they then
charge with the women's treatment.
Chapter Seven deconstructed the discourse of probation. The
origin of probation officers' authority was located primarily in the
legal status of the probation order as a measure to be used at the
court's discretion instead of sentencing. According to Millard (1982),
it is the mechanism whereby courts can institutionalise their
ambivalence towards certain offenders. Of recent years, however, it
has come to be used by the courts more frequently as an 'alternative to
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custody' for 'high risk' offenders. A more recent source of authority
for probation discourse is the legislation governing Community Service
orders.
It was argued that the rules governing probation discourse are
conflicting and result in a probation officers experiencing a sense of
dissonance. The contradictions between the traditional rhetoric of
'advise, assist and befriend' and the modern rhetoric of 'alternatives
to custody' produce moral, technical and operational dissonance (Harris,
1980). Attempts to ease this dissonance have resulted in the
construction of several different models of probation practice:
- controlism, with it8 acceptance of the role of the Probation
Service in making provision for the disciplined containment of 'high
risk' offenders in the community;
- socialism, with its emphasis on 'oppositional and defensive' work
and 'non-oppressive' help;
- separatism, with its emphasis on drawing a clear distinction
between the caring and controlling elements of probation officers' work;
- occasionalism, with its emphasis on negotiation (with both court
and offender), responsibility (of the offender for her/his actions and
their consequences), informed choice (by the offender) and the
abandonment of the medical model of treatment.
However, the consequence of dissonance for most probation officers
is that they feel forced to work strategically. In order to get the
'best deal' for their clients in an imperfect judicial world, they
accept that they may have to compromise their higher principles of
justice and equality. Their authority thus becomes governed by the
following rules:
1. The requirement simultaneously to recognise (in order to claim
authoritative understanding of the offender) and deny (in order to make
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'realistic' recommendations to the court) the conditions of social and
economic disadvantage in which many offenders exist.
2. The requirement simultaneously to intervene (in order to prevent
recidivism) and not to intervene (for fear of amplifying deviance
through stigmatisation and thus failing to prevent recidivism).
3. The requirement simultaneously to care for the offender (implying
an attempt to increase his/her choices in the interests of personal
growth) and to control the offender (implying the restriction of choice
for the protection of 8ociety).
Female lawbreakers are statistically over-represented on probation
orders and under-represented on Community Service orders. They also
appear to be placed on both types of order earlier in their 'criminal
careers' than men.
It was argued that strategic working in relation to nondescript
women is characterised by:
1. Recognition of the contradictory effects of the 'gender contract'
which trap nondescript women in a paradoxical reality in which:
a) they are expected to be 'providers' for their families but are
denied the material resources with which to provide in a socially and
legally approved manner;
b) they are held responsible for any dysfunction within their
families and also for bringing about positive change in those families.
This means that, whilst they suffer the stigma of being the 'identified
patient' or 'client', they are not allowed to enjoy the 'benefits' of
being 'ill';
c) whilst they are expected to be stabilising influences on their
wayward male partners, any attempt to reap satisfaction for themselves
from these relationships is interpellated as 'abuse' of the relationship.
2. A sense of frustration/powerlessness, provoked by:
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a) the apparently self-destructive contract avoidance behaviour of
some women clients, which is characterised by apparent elusiveness,
demands, deviousness and refusal, and
b) the apparent indifference of professionals, officials and
politicians who are perceived to have the power to bring about effective
change in the lives of these women;
3. an occasional sense of achievement when:
a) in the absence of an alternative discourse within which to work,
the contradictions of the gender contract are exploited to the benefit
of some women (through help in obtaining money and the alleviation of
loneliness) or
b) some women are enabled to find non-self-destructive 'ways round'
the gender contract (for example, voluntary use of specialist facilities,
voluntary work and Comunity Service).
Chapter Seven concluded by recording that when probation officers
were asked what they felt might ideally help the women with whom they were
working, the range of responses was fairly limited. They included:
- home management assistance;
- survival skills;
- earlier intervention by helping agencies;
- a major political decision.
These suggestions are nowconsideredin more detail and form the basis of
the discussion, 'Implications for Practice' with which this thesis
concludes.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE?
'The best working strategy is to assume, for
perfectly concrete sociological reasons, that
most of the time there will be incongruence,
lack of fit, contradictions, paradoxes.'
(Cohen, 1983: 127)
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The aim of this thesis has been to provide a critique of the
various discourses which lay claim to knowledge about female lawbreakers.
It has been argued that the medical, judicial and welfare personnel whose
job it is to assess, judge, defend, treat and punish nondescript women
are confined by the ideological and material conditions of their jobs in
the following ways:
1. Magistrates' discourse in general is constituted by
the ideology of comon sense and the material conditions
of a privileged existence. Additionally, women magistrates
are required simultaneously to claim (for the purposes of
authoritative understanding) and deny (for the purposes of
authoritative attribution of culpability) similarity with
female lawbreakers.
2. Solicitors' discourse is constituted by the ideology of
legal representation which requires solicitors to repackage
female lawbreakers according to typifications of 'normal'
women which can be discursively recognised by 'magisterial
conmion sense'.
3. Psychiatrists' discourse is constituted by the ideology
of forensic medicine, which requires and authorises
psychiatrists to make wide-ranging medical, moral and
judicial judgments of female lawbreakers in order to render
them describable for the purposes of recognition by
'magisterial common sense'. At the same time, this ideology
makes the women's eligibility for treatment both
ideologically and materially dependent on a far narrower
range of gender-stereotyped classifications.
4. Probation officers' di8course is constituted, on the one
hand, by the competing discourses of magistrates, solicitors
333.
and psychiatrists who, having failed to describe these
women adequately within their own discourses, often reach
consensus about the competency of probation officers to
describe them. On the other hand (and simultaneously)
probation officers' discourse is constituted within a social
work ideology which requires and authorises them both to
care for and control women as key figures of the nuclear
family (whether or not the women are, in fact, members of
such families).
)lte the complexities and contradictions of these competing discourses,
Ir consequences for certain female lawbreakers are consistently and
bematically oppressive. A recognizable (though not definable) group
remale lawbreakers is therefore consistently muted for the following
30n8:
1. Nondescript women are subject to multiple discursive
oppression and knowledge about them is consequently
subjugated to typifications of 'normality' articulated
by 'experts'.
2. As speakers about their own condition, these women
are disqualified because of their inability and/or
refusal to articulate the paradigms of domesticity,
sexuality and pathology which dominate explanations of
their behaviour.
3. Nondescript women are strategically constructed by
judicial, medical and welfare personnel as the programmable
objects of discourse and then subjected to technologies
which regulate their minds and bodies through power relations
which are local and imanent. They are effectively offered
a contract which promises to minimise the consequences of
their criminality by rehabilitating them within the dominant
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discourses of femininity.
4. Resistance to such description tends to be individualistic,
inconsistent and, in some senses, self-destructive. Never-
theless, such resistance has the important effect of undermining
the authority of official discourses and keeping open the
possibility of the creation of new knowledge about them - both as
women and as lawbreakers. By exploiting the contradictions
in the material and ideological conditions that render them
'nondescript', these women are able to wrest a limited
degree of power from the dominant groups by whom they are
mu ted.
But critique has its limitations (Rose, 1987) and, as Cohen (1983:
126) argues, whilst we should not be deceived by appearances, neither
;hould we bc ubi'ucd with di'hiuiikiny. ltiis [lies is liai loukcd al the
tellers of the tales - 'their distinctive structural position, vested
interests, preferred language' (Cohen, 1983: 129) but, in so doing,
has also attempted not to lose sight (or site) of the project itself. A
considerable number of professionals co-operated with this research, at
least partly in the hope of learning some ways of improving their
practice with female lawbreakers. It would be of little comfort to them
for me to say, 'I have discovered the contradictions in what you say,
I have unearthed the rules and structures which explain why you say it,
I have demonstrated its consequences for others, but ultimately you have
no alternative because the discourses available to you allow you to
speak and act no differently'.
Such pessimism about the possibility of change is not, however,
wholly justified. To demonstrate the inextricable link between power
and knowledge is not to imply that the only relationship that can exist
between 'experts' and those they define is one of domination and
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submission. The recognition that 'the power of expertise installs a new
type of relation between authority and its subjects' (Rose, 1987: 74),
coupled with an understanding of power relations as local and immanent
allows for the possibility of a redistribution of power - albeit in an
uneven and paradoxical fashion. Precisely because of the variety and
competitiveness of expert discourses, it is possible to exploit
contradictions and work strategically in ways which need not oppress.
Because, as Rose asserts, 'pluralism is more than a myth' (1987: 73)
it is possible for nondescript women to be empowered by experts, although
the ways in which this can be done do not sit easily under ideologically
'sound' banners. For, as Cohen (1983) argues, one ideology can be used
to support quite different policies and one policy can be supported for
very different ideological reasons. There are no easy answers, but
there are some difficult and compromising value decisions to be made by
professionals at both an individual and policy level. Although these
issues appear to fall primarily within the domain of probation officers,
change cannot be effected by this group alone without compatible changes
of understanding, attitude and practice by magistrates, solicitors and
psychiatrists.
Agenda for Change
1. The strategic use of social inquiry reports as programmes of power.
The routine emphasis on the role expectations of 'normal' womanhood
in reports on female lawbreakers disadvantages those women who are
stereotyped in the following ways:
a) The 'non'-mother or 'bad' mother.
b) The 'tough' or 'bad' daughter.
c) The non-victim of misfortune.
d) The 'non-discriminating' and/or 'promiscuous' woman.
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e) The separated or divorced woman.
f) The sexually unconventional woman.
g) The 'not mad enough' woman with the personality disorder.
h) The 'too mad' woman with the history of 'failed' treatment.
1) The 'selfish' alcoholic or junkie.
j) The gynaecological 'malingerer'.
How, then, can the stereotyping of women in reports be challenged
without disadvantaging them further? Social inquiry reports are inescapabi
individualised documents and any attempt to take account of the social
and economic disadvantage of whole classes of defendants is funda-
mentally incongruous with the project. Nevertheless, report writers
could ask themselves two basic questions when preparing reports on
women:
i) Can I (and do 1 wish to) represent this woman as a stereotypically
'normal' woman? In answering this, it is necessary to consider not only
the short-term benefits for this woman (for example, a 'lenient'
sentence, the possibility of offering badly needed help immediately)
but also the long-term costs for this women (Can she fulfil the conditions
of a probation order? What can be recommended if she reoffends?) and
the costs for other women (Is the next woman client being condemned to
prison because she may not be so 'normal'? What is being conveyed to
the courts in general about 'women who offend'?).
ii) Is there any alternative way of representing this woman which cuts
across the stereotypes of domesticity, sexuality and pathology? Many
motivational explanations of crime which are routinely accepted as
'legitimate' for men are still not so readily accepted for women. The
myth that women who break the law do so for fundamentally different
reasons from men pervades both 'chivalrous' and extreme feminist positions.
The following explanations of crime should feature more significantly in
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all reports (that is, in reports on women as well as men):
- poverty;
- social isolation/boredom;
- peer group pressure;
- rebellion;
- learned behaviour (that is, the behaviour based on experience
that crime has both obvious and less obvious rewards);
- immediate or long-term provocation (the latter being possibly
more significant for women);
- lack of fulfilment and lack of access to legitimate channels of
success;
- assertiveness (that is, an attempt to take control of one's life).
The making of recommendations in reports on women requires consideration
of broader issues about what the Probation Service can and should be
providing for women who appear before the courts.
Before moving to these considerations, two points need to be made
in relation to the legal representation of women and their referral for
psychiatric assessment. Firstly, probation officers should always
ensure that women understand their right to representation and, if at
All possible, have access to a sympathetic female solicitor. Although
probation officers are not allowed to recommend specific solicitors,
establishing informal link8 with local solicitors (both male and female)
who are sympathetic to the kind of representation outlined here should
be encouraged. Secondly, where they have the choice, probation officers
should think very carefully indeed before referring any women for psychiatric
assessment. This study suggests that there is very little which psychiatry
has to offer most female lawbreakers which cannot be offered more
effectively and in a less stigmatising fashion by probation officers
themselves.
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2. Deciding the moment of intervention.
As has been discussed in Chapter Seven, the debate about the
relative merits of earlier or later intervention by welfare agencies is
one which both extends beyond considerations of gender and has tended
to ignore gender. It would be comforting to regard the insights derived
from work on juvenile delinquency as being directly transferable to work
with women. Undoubtedly many women have been placed on probation in the
past for petty first offences because they are seen to be 'in need' and
undoubtedly this has served to escalate them up the tariff into custody
if they do reoffend. The development of policies which delay inter-
vention by the Probation Service until second or even third court
appearances must be welcomed, if only on a carefully monitored
experimental basis. But that monitoring should explicitly include
consideration of the availability of other less stigmatising resources
in the coninunity and the acceptability of these alternatives to the
women themselves. As many critics of the decarceration movement have
pointed out (e.g. Scull, 1983; Cohen, 1983) the ideal of community
provision bears little relation to its reality and 'community care'
frequently means no more than the shunting of deviants from the caseload
of one agency to another. If this is indeed the case with female
lawbreakers (as this study suggests), it may be necessary for the
Probation Service to consider the unpalatable fact that women who break
the law as a result of material, social or emotional need are not likely
to receive help from any other agency or group than itself. In which
case, the Service needs to consider how it can intervene, rather than
delay intervention, in order to forestall the amplification of female
deviance.
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3. Deciding the nature of intervention
Intervention in relation to female lawbreakers must be considered
on two broad fronts - direct provision for women by the Probation Service
and policy campaigns directed at the judiciary, the medical profession
and the government.
The current lack of direct provision by the Probation Service for
those women who, by virtue either of the frequency of their lawbreaking
or their failure to fit the stereotypes, are at risk of custody is
totally inexcusable. There is no reason why any woman should go to prison
unless the nature of her offence is so serious that the public either
requires protection from her or needs to express its abhorrence of her
actions. It is imperative that the Service gives urgent attention to
separate provision for women in the following areas:
a) Day centre facilities. In particular, consideration needs to be
given to running 'offence-focussed' groups for women, similar to those
already running for men, to look specifically at the factors precipitating
the decision to act criminally. The content of these would undoubtedly
be very different for women and might involve assertiveness training and
skills in working/campaigning with other women. It would be consistent
with the spirit of this study for such provision to be offered on a
voluntary basis rather than as a Schedule 11 condition of a probation
order.
b) Community Service schemes. The potential of Community Service as
an alternative to custody for women has been inexcusably neglected and
such neglect has finally come to the attention of the Home Office (1986d)
which, at a meeting in December 1986 with the Association of Chief
Officers of Probation, expressed its concern about the relatively large
number of women serving short custodial sentences and the very small
proportion (3%) of Community Service Orders made on women. Provision for
340.
school-hour working, creche facilities and all-female projects (which
does not mean that the work itself has to be 'women's work') all need
to be investigated seriously.
c) Communal living. Traditional probation hostels do not seem to meet
the needs of many female lawbreakers because they are situated away from
the communities where the women have their albeit limited social networks
and/or because they tend to be run in ways which reinforce the very
familial roles and relationships which they have sought, through their
offending, to e8cape. Modest experiments which allow women to live
together and/or share child care need to be encouraged by probation
officers and, where nece8sary, negotiated with local Housing Departments.
More radically, schemes which allow women to live together away from
their children for a period (without the stigmatising process of being
labelled as 'unfit' mothers) should be considered.
Direct provision by the Service for women who are not at risk of
custody is more difficult to justify within the rhetoric of 'Alternatives
to Custody'. Nevertheless, as this study has indicated, the efforts of
probation officers, on a one-to-one basis, to obtain money for women
clients, open doors to new opportunities for them and simply (though
unfashionably) befriend them meets a need which is clearly expressed by
the women themselves. Where those same women can be directed towards
other, non-statutory, sources of help and support, this is obviously
preferable for their self-esteem, but, in the absence of alternative
provision, such work by probation officers should not be undervalued.
It does, however, have its limitations and can only be justified in the
long-term if it is coupled with pressure from the Service for broader
social, economic and judicial reforms.	 It might be argued that
probation officers can (and should?) legitimately campaign for all of
the following reforms:
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1. The increase of Supplementary Benefit and wage levels so that, whilst
some may still choose to do so, no woman needs to engage in prostitution.
2. Universal nursery (and care for the elderly) provision, so that no
woman need be prevented from working outside the home by domestic
responsibilities, nor be dependent on such responsibilities as her only
source of self-esteem.
3. Reforms of the system of fining and its enforcement, so that fines
are always proportionate to income and more imaginative ways are found
of dealing with default than by imprisonment.
4. Decriminalisation of certain petty offences which disproportionately
affect women; for example, soliciting, television licence offences,
failure to pay library fines.
Whilst all these projects would be of particular benefit to women,
all would have equally beneficial results for men, who undoubtedly also
suffer (different) injustices within the criminal justice system.
Li. The need for training in sexism awareness and non-sexist practice.
Ultimately, discussion of the issues outlined above will be sterile
unless those engaged in the discussion are prepared to examine the
acquisition of their own gendered identities and the impact of their own
life experiences on their attitudes and professional practices. It is
at this point that the ideological and material conditions governing the
experiences of the women in this study can be linked (or not) to the
experiences of all women. The ideology of femininity defines the
experiences of all women, but differences in material circumstances
enable some women to resist the consequences of those definitions more
successfully than others. Women probation officers, magistrates,
8olicitors and psychiatrists need to be encouraged to recognise what they
have in comon with each other and with women clients, defendants and
patients. They also need to accept their differences and the limitations
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of what they can offer, Likewise, male professionals need to be
encouraged to explore the ways in which they might be able to empower
women clients, defendants and patients by consciously resisting the
reinforcement of the gender stereotyping of the behaviour of both men
and women.
Finally, the fundamental object of this thesis has been neither to
apportion blame to 'experts' for their 'failures' to encapsulate
lawbreaking women in expert discourses, nor to 'celebrate' the women's
resistances to those discourses as being essentially liberative. Rather,
it has been to suggest how both 'experts' and women lawbreakers are
struggling to make sense of the contradictions between formal criminal
justice in particular and substantive social justice in general. The
'Nondescriptiveness' of certain female lawbreakers is one product of
that struggle.
343.
CHAPTER NOTES
CHAPTER TWO
1. Hereafter, the use of the terms 'offender' and 'offending' should
be taken to refer specifically to 'lawbreaking' and not - unless other-
wise stated - to offences against other non-criminal social norms. The
term 'action' is used in relation to lawbreaking in preference to the
term 'behaviour' because it is assumed that lawbreaking can only be
conceptualised within a social context which gives meaning to physical
behaviour and therefore needs to be distinguished from it. It is to the
exploration of the nature and implications of that meaning for specific
women in specific situations that this thesis is addressed.
2. Commenting in 1983 on a gathering (at which I was present) of female
probation officers (some avowedly feminist) who were - barefoot in a
heat-wave - discussing female offenders, a psychiatrist (who must remain
nameless) said (jokingly, of course?), 'It's amazing how many aggressive
women have second toes longer than their first!'
3. The Mental Health Act 1983 defines a psychopathic disorder as 'a
persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including
significant impairment of intelligence) which results in abnormally
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct' (s. 1 (2)).
'In practice, psychopathic disorder is not
regarded as a specific clinical condition;
rather the presence of the disorder is inferred
from evidence of anti-social behaviour. Thus the
definition is a tautological one in that it
implies a disorder originating from anti-social
behaviour, while purporting toexplain the
behaviour	 the presence of the disorder. As a
result the label "psychopathic" has been applied
to a wide variety of people who have nothing in
common except some sort of anti-social behaviour.
There is no clear, consistent and rational
distinction between offenders who are labelled
psychopaths and sent by the courts to hospital
and habitual offenders who are sent to prison
without any psychiatric label.'
(Gostin, 1983: 3-4)
Under the 1983 Act psychopaths will only be admitted to hospital when
treatment is expected to improve or prevent deterioration of his or her
condition. The burden of demonstrating treatability (and thus controlling
admission) will fall upon the hospital authorities.
CHAPTER THREE
1. At the time of these interviews in 1983, I was not myself as acutely
conscious of racism as an issue to be considered in the treatment of
offenders as I have since become and did not, therefore, raise it in any
of my discussions. I now see this as an obvious weakness in the study.
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2. Probation officers quoted in this thesis are identified by the same
numbers throughout. The numbers appearing after quotations refer to the
page numbers in Volume 2 of this thesis, which consists of transcripts
of tape recorded interviews and other information from case files.
3. The day after the interview I went to court to hear Carol's case.
She pleaded not guilty, but the outcome of the trial was a foregone
conclusion. The only witnesses called were the store detective, the
arresting officer and Carol. In his opening remarks, the prosecuting
solicitor stated that 'The store detective recognised Miss McC' and the
arresting officer, when reporting his interviews, used her first name,
indicating familiarity. Carol herself, in her statement, had said,
'The store detective thinks I did it because I'm a shoplifter'. The
defending solicitor made a brave attempt to direct the bench to the
evidence of the case, claiming that 'past dealings' with his client had
prejudiced the store detective against her, so that she was 'expecting
an incident' and was interpreting all Miss McC's actions in that light.
He later admitted informally 'I must say I've never argued before that
the prosecution's case is so strong that it must be wrong!'. Carol was
found guilty and the case was adjourned for Social Inquiry Reports.
CHAPTER FOUR
1. Most magistrates made an almost automatic link between fines and
television licence offences and several expressed concern that women were
discriminated against in respect of this particular offence, since they
were often the ones at home during the day when detector officials called.
Television was seen by magistrates as 'part of the family' and women
tended to receive sympathy for what amounted to an additional domestic
responsibility.
'A lot are women on their own - they need the
television for company and just can't afford the
licence - and we always ask if they are
pensioners. We try to keep the fine down.'
(Magistrate 2 - female)
'A lot are women. Television is a necessity
for single parent families.'
(Magistrate 4 - female)
'A lot are women but we hope the husband helps
out with the fine.'
(Magistrate 6 - male)
See notes to Chapter Five for further discussion of this point.
2. There are no detention centres for women and very few attendance
centres or Intermediate Treatment schemes; young women serving Youth
Custody sentences are also frequently mixed with older women prisoners.
3. This relationship has been largely neglected by the literature about
magistrates' courts, although two recent articles have intimated that it
may have some special significance (Farrington and Morris, 1983;
Dominelli, 1984). In both articles it is suggested that women magistrates
may be less lenient than their male colleagues in their sentencing of
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women and that this punitive disposition may be attributable to a sense
of affront. Women who break the law, it is argued, are censured by
women magistrates for their 'betrayal' of womanhood. I had not
originally expected the sex of magistrates to be a factor of any
significance in this study but the differing responses to women defendants
of the eight women and four men interviewed suggested that it might be.
Although the sample is very small, the interviews took place against my
background of regular contact with magistrates during eight years of
work as a probation officer.
4. In my experience as a probation officer, and during these interviews,
I encountered few male j magistrates who expressed blatantly sexist
attitudes of the kind sometimes reported as being expressed by high
court judges (e.g. Pattulo, 1983). Most erred on the side of chivalry.
As one solicitor put it to me:
'They are the kind of men who still give up their
seats to women - if they weren't, they wouldn't
have got on the Bench.'
5. In an unpublished paper about her study of gender, the magistracy
and sentencing practice in Leeds, Dominelli (1986) argues that women are
underrepresented on benches, are 'relatively new to the job', and feel
'deskilled and disempowered' by being 'subjected to continuous scrutiny'
by the 'Court-Establishment'. I think that this analysis is too
simplistic. The process whereby women in court - both magistrates and
defendants - are muted (Ardener, 1978) is a complex one and there is
evidence from other arenas wherewomen are the recipients of help, advice
or services, that a simple increase in the numbers of women in positions
of authority will not guarantee a better deal. As Dale and Foster (1986)
observe, women entering traditionally male professions require tremendous
courage and comitment to stand out against the barrage of institutional
and cultural assumptions which face them.
CHAPTER FIVE
1. Sensitivity to gynaecological mitigations appears to be selective.
Menopause and pregnancy may mitigate a shoplifting offence but not,
apparently, a motoring offence, where women are regarded as asexual:
'Women motorists are treated the same as men....
There's not much difference in sentencing between
men and women.'
(Solicitor 8)
Motoring is evidently a world which women must enter on men's terms or
not at all. There may be a number of reasons for this. Magistrates'
sentencing discretion is more restricted in this area and it is normal
practice to standardise sentences in a particular court on a particular
day, regardless of the characteristics of individual defendants. The
same, incidentally, applies to television licence offences but the
inequity of this practice is more readily acknowledge - possibly for the
reasons indicated in the following table:
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TABLE 5.1:
COMPARISON OF THE GENDER-RELATED DIMENSIONS OF TWO OFFENCES
OFFENCE
MOTORING	 TELEVISION LICENCE
DIMENSIONS
MATERIAL	 Car ownership still	 Now recognised as a
assumed to be a status	 'necessity' for some
symbol of the relatively	 of the 'deserving'
affluent, regardless of
	
poor (e.g. widows and
gender.	 isolated, many of
whom are women).
IDEOLOGICAL	 Motoring world is
	 Television is part of
public and	 the private world of
'masculine' (e.g.
	 the home, where
images of speed,	 women's presence is
aggression, competi-	 legitimate.
tion). Women con-
structed as dangerous
intruders in this world.
MORAL	 Moral culpability	 Despite trivial natur
notoriously lacking.
	 of offence, still
Therefore, less need to	 seen as one involving
utilise women's 'sense 	 moral culpability.
of guilt'.	 Therefore, women's
'sense of guilt'
relevant.
Economically, ownership of a motor car is still something of a status
symbol and it may be assumed that car drivers, of either sex, are
relatively affluent. Television, as we have seen in the previous
chapter, is now recognised to be a necessity for some poor people - the
widowed and others isolated through no 'fault' of their own. Ideologically,
the world of motoring is part of the 'public' world, dominated by images
of masculinity - speed, aggression, and competitive achievement. A
woman enters this world at her peril, conforming to man-made standards,
or being dismissed as 'a woman driver', whose femininity, far from
constituting an excusing condition, is constructed as a physical danger
to other (and, by implication, more legitimate) road users. By contrast,
television is part of the 'private' world of the home, where a woman's
presence is recognised as legitimate. Finally, motoring offences
notoriously lack any element of moral culpability (witness the
euphemistic redefining of manslaughter as 'causing death by reckless
driving' and the consequent reduction of typical sentences). The need
to induce a 'sense of guilt' is therefore perhaps less pressing and an
appeal to gender-related sources of' such emotions unnecessary. No such
sense of moral neutrality appears to be attached to the absence of a
television licence, despite the fact that it can surely be argued to
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carry only the most tenuous of moral imperatives. The ironic consequence
of these distinctions is that gender-specific mitigations may be
perceived as relevant if a woman fails to ensure that her husband buys
a television licence, but not if she fails to buy a road fund licence.
CHAPTER SIX
1. A case from my own work as a probation officer illustrates this
point. A menopausal shoplifter, who otherwise would undoubtedly have
received a conditional discharge, was persuaded by her solicitor to
obtain a pre-court report from Dr. A, who recommended that she be placed
on probation. There followed two years of embarrassment and humiliation
for us both, while I (at that time being no older than her own daughter)
visited her in her spotless middle-class home and imposed a psycho-
analytic reading on her lawbreaking act, relating it to her 'sense of
guilt' about letting down her kind, hard-working husband and her clever
daughter who had Just left home. This is not to argue that some women
in those circumstances cannot benefit from being on probation, but that,
by allowing the decision to be made by a psychiatrist, the 'help' that
is offered and experienced is circumscribed by its mislocation within a
discourse of pathology and treatment.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1. The following paragraph has been experimentally included in all
Social Inquiry Reports on prostitutes written by some female probation
officers in Greater Manchester:
'In the current economic climate there are few
opportunities for women to improve their financial
position above that of supplementary benefit. The
levels of supplementary benefit are carefully fixed
at a bare subsistence level and so any unforeseen
or additional expense can lead to real hardship.
Within, our experience, women today attempt to copy
by any one or combination of a number of means such
as: denying themselves necessities like food;
formal or informal loans; missing payments for
fuel or rent; or by involvement in some form of
dishonesty. A substantial minority of women
within this position choose prostituting,
helping to perpetuate the existence of what is
often referred to as "the oldest profession".'
(Gill Stewart and Elizabeth Hall, Women in NAPO,
1985 unpublished)
2. The hostel catering for women with children cited three further
reasons for their low level of referrals:
1. Co-ordination with and persuasion of Local Authorities
regarding children in Care.
2. Persuasion of relations caring for children to allow the
mother responsibility for the child.
3. Co-ordination with Court hearings.
METHODS APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
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METHODS APPENDIX I
Introduction
The interviews on which this thesis is based constitute a case
study. The term is used here to mean a detailed examination of material
(in this instance, statements about attitudes and practices relating to
a particular group of female lawbreakers) which I believe demonstrates
the operation of a general theoretical principle (namely, the power of
discourse). The selection of interviewees was not random, nor is it
claimed that those selected were necessarily representative of the wider
population of their profession or status. They were chosen not in the
expectation that their statements would be typical, but that they would
provide compelling illustrations of (or challenges to) my theoretical
propositions.
The justification for this methodology is rooted in the particular
approach to the question of 'generalizability' which has been implicit
throughout the thesis. Generalization through probability theory has
been rejected in favour of generalization through theoretical production.
I have not sought to argue that I have found sufficient examples of the
coexistence or correlation of two or more characteristics in my sample
to justify asserting their coexistence or correlation in a wider popula-
tion. I have not, for example, argued that, because the majority of the
magistrates in this sample claimed to have little experience of dealing
with female defendants, it is therefore probable that most magistrates
would make a similar claim. I have argued instead that such claims
illustrate the theoretical construct of 'self-disqualification' - a
construct which I believe capable of offering some insight into the
attitudes and practices of magistrates. I have then attempted to
identify the specific ideological and material conditions necessary for
the production and reproduction of such a construct.
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The validity of such an approach depends on the logic of its con-
ceptual relations and on its basis in an articulated theoretical
framework (in this instance, that of discourse analysis). As Mitchell
(1983) has argued, the inferential process involved in extrapolation
from individual case studies is one of analytic rather than enumerative
induction. (Nevertheless, as he points out, much confusion has arisen
because of the misconception that extrapolation from statistical samples
can dispense with such logical inference.)
It is not the purpose of this appendix to argue that the
methodology used in this thesis is better than its alternative, but
that it is valid and appropriate to the data studied. The adoption of
a case study approach has allowed an examination of some depth and
sublety and has facilitated the cross-referencing of statements. It
has been possible (albeit to a limited extent) not only to compare the
views of interviewees in relation to the general issues of this study,
but also, more concretely, their views of each other. This has produced
an important multi-perspective dimension to the study. Further, it
has not been necessary to accept or dismiss the statements of
interviewees respectively as either universal 'truths' or idiosyncracies.
Rather, they have been regarded as opportunities for the critical
analysis of the social, political and economic context which makes such
statements both possible and ineluctable. Researchers, as Taylor (1979)
has argued:
'....do not regard the remarks they collect
and typify as constituting some essential
truth: they are rather impelling rhetorical
statements which, when collectively evaluated,
can be seen to derive their persuasive potency -
that is, their situational truth - from their
context, from the often complex, overlapping,
ironic relationships which they bear to other
culturally "true" vocabularies of motive.'
(Taylor, 1979: 153)
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Method
For this study, I gathered a number of statements from the
following sources:
1) Interviews with the following 60 people who had experience of
working with women lawbreakers:
- 29 Probation Officers (working in probation offices, hostels
and prison)
- 9 Solicitors
- 12 Magistrates
- 7 Psychiatrists
- 4 'Miscelleanous' individuals e.g. a psychiatric community
nurse, an ex-prison officer, a couple of court clerks.
2) Interviews with 11 female lawbreakers subject to probation
investigation, probation orders or community service orders, 9 of whom
had also experienced psychiatric assessment or treatment.
3) Notes from the case records of these, and other, female
lawbreakers, made available to me by probation officers.
This is how I collected statements analysed in Part Two. I
approached approximately 100 people; the ways in which I approached them
and their responses are explained below.
a) Probation Officers
I was given permission by the Chief Probation Officer of
Staffordshire to approach any staff within two Assistant Chief Probation
Officer areas (there are four in all in Staffordshire) - one entirely
urban and one a mixture of the urban and rural. I examined the
statistical returns for these two areas for the month of August 1982
(the most recent statistics available when I began my research) end
identified those probation officers who carried either any cases of
women subject to probation orders with psychiatric conditions or four
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or more women subject to supervision of any kind of criminal offences.
I supposed (not always correctly!) that officers in the latter category
might have a particular interest in working with women lawbreakers,
since there is at least some element of choice exercised by officers in
selecting their own cases. A total of 37 officers fell into those
categories (out of 62 in those areas). Letters (see Appendix II) were
sent to all 37 and 28 agreed to be interviewed. One additional officer
sent written comments in reply to my letter. Of the 28 interviewed, 3
did not wish to be recorded on tape but the remaining 25 agreed to
*
this also.
1 also contacted probation officers working in five hostels catering
for women and two women's prisons in the region. I received positive
responses from three hostels and four officers working in prisons.
Interviews with probation officers varied in length from 30-90 minutes.
(In respect of one interview in a women's prison, I was restricted in
the questions I could ask and had been refused permission to discuss
specific cases. This indicated to me that any request for access to
prison officers, had I desired it, would almost certainly have been
refused.)
b) Magistrates
Access to magistrates was obtained through the good offices of a
friendly magistrates' clerk with whom I had worked in the past. He
identified for me a total of 18 magistrates who were members of a local
Probation Committee and had attended a meeting which I had addressed on
the subject of 'Female Offenders'. Letters (Appendix II) were sent to
all 18. Of these, 4 sent written comments in reply and 8 agreed to be
interviewed. None of these interviews was tape recorded. Two of them
took place in workplaces, where taping would not have been possible.
* The transcripts of most recorded interviews are available in Volume 2;
some were of too poor a quality to be transcrbied in full, and notes
were taken from replays of these.
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The rent were conducted in homes, where 'serious' discussion was
interspersed with 'chit-chat', coffee, lunch and visitors; a request to
tape would hove ocrmed almost disrourti'oun, I felt.
c) Solicitors
I wrote to 9 solicitors, with whom I had worked as a probation
officer (Appendix II). Of these, 2 sent written coriwnents in reply and 6
agreed to be interviewed. Only one interview (with the only female
solicitor) was taped. One of the other interviews was conducted over
an expenses paid lunch, whilst the other interviewees impressed me as
either too intimidating or too intimidated to be asked!
d) Psychiatrists
I wrote to a total of 8 consultant psychiatrists, some known to me
from previous contact in the Probation Service and some recommended to
me by other interviewees. I had not expected a positive response from
this group and was therefore pleasantly surprised when one sent written
coments and 6 agreed to be interviewed. Of these, two specialised in
forensic psychiatry and the remaining 5 were general psychiatrists. Of
the 6 interviews, 3 were tape-recorded, one declined to be taped and the
remaining two were not asked, because I was clearly being 'fitted into'
a busy day and interruptions were likely to be frequent.
e) Miscellaneous Interviews and Contacts
A small number of other interviews were conducted and contacts
attempted. A psychiatric community nurse working with an interviewed
probation officer agreed to give a tape-recorded interview. Two
psychiatric nurses working in a women's prison agreed to be interviewed
during my visit. Three magistrates' clerks agreed to be interviewed
(two of them in a joint interview). A letter placed in a local
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newspaper (Appendix II) produced a response from an ex-prison officer
(female) as well as an ex-offender (see below). A letter placed in
'Probation Journal' (Appendix II) produced replies from three interested
serving probation officers but, unfortunately, follow up questionnaires
were not returned. Finally, I interviewed the organiser of a voluntary
counselling service for women charged with shoplifting.
f) Female Lawbreakers
The only realistic way of gaining access to this group was through
their probation officers; (a letter in a local newspaper elicited only
one response). At the end of each interview with a probation officer, I
discussed the possibility of interviewing one or more of the women they
had discussed. I had prepared a letter (Appendix II) which I asked the
officer to give to the woman concerned, explaining the purpose of my
research and inviting her to be interviewed. She could return the
letter either directly to me or via her probation officer. I offered
to see her at home or at a probation office and assured her that her
probation officer could be present, or not, as she wished. If s/he were
not present they would not be told about the details of the interview.
During interviews, it became clear that a number of officers did not
want me to interview their clients. Reasons commonly given were about
practicalities ('It's difficult to pin her down'), recent crises ('She's
in a real mess at the moment and won't want the pressure'), ignorance
('She wouldn't understand who you are or what you're doing') and
relationships ('She's very suspicious'). It was perhaps understandable
that 'recommended' clients were those with whom the officer felt s/he
had established at least an element of rapport and trust. It takes more
than a little courage to expose to 'scientific' gaze those relationships
where mistrust, hostility and disappointment seem to be the overwhelming
characteristics. I was also sensitive to the fear (tactfully
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nexpressed) that I might ruin carefully worked-at relationships.
In the event, 15 women were identified as 'appropriate' but only 10
iere eventually interviewed (plus the one who responded to the newspaper
letter). Of the remaining 5, two failed to keep appointments (one on
two occasions). In the other 3 cases, the officers, after initially
agreeing to approach the women, later felt they could not do so because
of 'new crises'. Of the 11 interviews finally conducted, B were tape-
recorded. One of the remaining interviews was conducted in a cafe, one
on a hospital ward and one in the unavoidable presence of other people
who were not fully aware of the purpose of my visit but would have
become very suspicious if I had produced my tape recorder!
In total, then, I conducted 71 interviews, ranging in length from
15 minutes to 2½ hours. Of those, 41 were tape-recorded, and 31 later
transcribed. Notes were made at the time of, or very soon after, the
remaining 30. In addition, 8 people sent written comments in reply to
my letters. 24 people either declined to be interviewed or failed to
respond to my request.
APPENDIX II
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University of Keele
LUTER TO WOMEN
Department of Law
Keels, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG
Telephone: Newcastle (Staffs) (0782) 621111
Telsx 36113 UNKUB 0
Dear
I am writing to ask if you would help me with some research I am doing at
Koele University. I am talking to women who are on Probation, or Comnunity
Service Orders, to see what they expected to happen when they went to court
and what they think about what has happened to them since then. Mr ICosh
has given me permission to write to you but if you do not want to take part
in this research, that is entirely up to you - it will, not affect your
Coiuni ty Service reports. However, if you do agree to see me, I understand
that the time you spend will, be counted towiirds your Order.
If you are prepared to help me, please complete the slip below and give it to
Mr Kosh. I vi].], meet you at your nearest Probation Office or at your home
and there will not be anyone else present, unless you wish. Anything you tell
me will be treated confidentially.
'Thank you very much for reading this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Anne Worral],
• S • • S • S • S S • S S S • S • S S S • S • • S S S • • •
I a. willing to help with your research.
You y see me at _________________ Probation Office, r at my home
(cross out whichever does not apply)
Th. most convenient times to a.. me are:
Signed . . . . • . . . . . . . . .
Address . . . • . . • . . • . . . • • • • • • • • • • •
	
• . . . . .....
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Unlversfty of Keele
LETTER TO MAGISTRATES
D.partmsnt of Law
Ks.l., Staffordshire, 5T5 5B0
Thiiphon.: Newcastle (Staffs) (0782) 621111
TiIsx 38113 UNKIJB G
Dear
The Deputy Clerk to the Justices, Mr.A	 , has r4nd1y given me your name,
.5 I understand that you attended a talk I gave in September last year on
"Female Offenders". I believe I mentioned then that I am continuing my
research into this subject as a postgraduate student at Keele. I have been
interviewing a number of Probation Officers, solicitors and women
offenders, but would be most grateful to hear the views of magistrates
who have some experienc, of dealing with women.
I as wondering, therefore, whether you would be prepared to spare me a
little time (15-30 minutes would suffice) to discuss any, or all, of the
following question..:
1. In your experience, are there particuler problems associated with
trying and sentencing women?
2. In jour .xpuienc., would you expect Social quiry Reports and
Peynhiatria Reports to p1ay a greater or lesser part in sentencing
women than men?
3. In your .xperi.nc., do courts treat women more or less sympathetically
than men, or does it vary - in which case - how?
I am available to come and see you most days between 9.30 a.a. and 3.30 p.s.,
but I appreciate that this may not be the most convenient time of day for
you. If it is more convenient, I would be happy to "catch" you in a free
moment at the Magistrates'Court, or, alternatively, I would be grateful for
any written comeent. on the above points. Obviously, any views you feel
abl, to expres. would be	 ated confidentially.
I enclose a stamped addressed envelope for your reply. !Ihnk you for
conaid.ring my request.
Tours sincerely,
Ann. Worrail
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University of Keele
LETTER TO SOLICITORS
Department ol Law
Kea4e, Staffordshire, ST5 5B3
Telephone: Newcastle (Staffs) (0782) 621111
Telex: 36113 UNKUB (3
Dear
I ea a foier Probation Officer, currently dertkirig postgraduate research
at .sls University into NC'y.m4ty Proi.ion for Pemale Offenders". I have
interviewed a ab.r of Probation Officers and vouen clients, but would be moat
grateful to bear th. views of .. e!abers of the legal profession and the
judiciary who have experienc, of dealing with ven
I wondering, therefore, whether you would be prepared to spare me a
littli time (15 - 20 aizuztes would enffio.) to discuss any, or all, of the
following questions s
I • In ya experience, are there particular problems associated with prosecuting,
d.fding or sentencing vn?
2. In your experience, would you expect Social qniry Reports and/or
Psychiatric Reports to be prepared on ven re or lees frequently than on
3. In your experience, do Cts treat wouen more or less sympathetically than
en, or does it
	 - in which case - how?
It you feel unabl, to see , I would be most grateful for any written
osnts. Obviously, 	 views you feel .bl. to express will be treated confid.-
entially.
'Nm you fox, considering request.
Tours sincerely,
Aone Vorxsll
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University of Keele
LETTER TO PSYCHIATRISTS
Keel., Staffordshire, $15 5BG
Telephone: Newcastle (Staffs) (0782) 621111
Department of Law
	
Telex: 36113 UNKUB 0
Dear
I am a former probation Officer, currently undertaking postgraduate
research . t Keel. University into "Comunity irovision for Mentally Disordered
Female Offenders." I have interviewed a number of Probation Officers and
wooen clients, but would be most grateful to hear the views of psychiatrists
who have experience of preparing reports on female offenders for course and
undertaking treatment of women subject to court orders.
I am wondering, therefore, whether you or any of your colleagues would
be prepared to spare ne e little time (15-30 minutes would suffice) to discuss
any, or all, of the folloa,ing questions:
1. In your experience, are most of the women on whom you are asked to prepare
court reports suffering from treatable mental disorders?
2. In your experience, are court orders for psychiatric treatment (in-patient
or out-patient) ever made against your recomaendation or without consulting
you? Is there any difference between men and women in this respect?
3. In your experience, are thers particular problems associated with treating
peopl. subject to court orders? Is there any difference between men and
women in this respect?
I appreciate that your time is valuable and I would be prepared to see
you at any tim. between 9.30 am and 3.30 pm. If you feel unable to see me,
I would be moat grateful for any written comments. Obviously any views you
feel able to express will be treated confidentially.
I enclose a stamped addressed envelope for your reply. Thank you for
considering thi. request.
Tours sincerely,
Anne Worrail
LETTER TO PROBATION OFFICERS
Department of Law
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University of Keele
K.ofe, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG
T&ephone: Newcastle (Staffs) (0782) 621111
Ts.x 36113 UNKUB G
Dear
You mey be aware that I am currently underta!dng research at Keele
University into community provision for adult female offenders. I see
from recent County statatica that you have a number of women on your
caseload and I am wondering whether you would be prepared to allow me to
interview you about them. I am particularly interested in any women who
have, at any time, been diagnosed as mentally disordered (especially
)butlwould
also lik, to ask you some general questions about your work with women.
If you can spare me some time (about 30 minutes), perhaps you would be
kind enough to return the slip below, giving two or three alternative
times that are convenient to you between now and . . .
If you feel unable to spar, this time, I would be most grateful if you
would be prepared to complet. th. attached questionnaire.
If you have any further questions, I can be contacted on the above
tel.phon. number (Monday. are best) or on	 in the evenings.
nk you very much for your co-operation.
Your. sincerely,
A'nm Vorrall
. . S • • • S S S • S • S • • S • S S S • S • S S • • S S S • • S • •
I hafl be availabl, for interview
on	 1.	 at	 am/pm
or2. at	 am/pm
or3. at
	
am/pm
I do/do not object to this interview being tape-recorded (strictly for
the purpose of research).
Signed . . . . . . . . . . . •
	
.
Address . . . S S S S S S S S S S
. S • S S S S • S • • S • • S • S S
S S S S S S S • S S S S S S S S S S
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Can you
help?.
I AM O-w' . 5 mcs,th .Mo
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.a	 ot!
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NEWSLETTER
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SEPTEMBER 1982
Female Offenders
Dear Sir.
I am a fanner probation officer, cur-
rently undertaking postgraduate research
into community provision for female
offenders. I would be interested to hear
from probation officers and social
workers, working with female offenders
in any setting, who could give me mt or-
mation about existing provision or who
would like to express concern about the
treatment women receive from the courts
and the cering agencies.
I would no ask for detailed informa-
tion without obtaining the permission of
the Chief Probation Officers concerned,
but would be grateful to hear from any-
one who would be prepared to assist me
in this research.
Yours sincerely
Ar*a WOtaALL
Dept o/ Law, University of Keel..
Kedir. Staffs
)b 1.
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PROBATION OFFICERS
QUESTIONNAIRP REL'INC TO COM?IUNT1'Y PRO'!ISION FOR ADULT FEMALE
OFFET'TDERS DTNOSED AS
	 ALIX DISORDERED.
A. These questions relate to any female offender currently on Probation
with a condition of p3ychiatic treatment (inpatient or outpatient.)
Al. Please state this woman's ae, offence and. number of previous
convictions.
AZ. Has she been on Probation before or known to Social Services?
*3. Has she received psychiatric treatment before?
Ak. Can you tell me why a condition of treatiiient was included in
this Order?
P5 . Can you tel]. me what treatment this woman has received and what
her response has been to it?
A6. Do you feel that this woman could or should have been dealt with
In other way?
P7. Any other comments?
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B. These question relate to any female offender currently on Probation
without conditions or under any other supervision (including through-.
care) who has any hJ.stoxy of hospital psychiatric treatment (inpatient
or outpatient.)
Bi. Please state this woman's age, offence and number of previous
convictions.
B2. Haz she been on Probation before or known to Social Services?
B3 . Can you tell me why psychiatric treatment was not ozdered in
this case?
Bk. Do you feel that this woman could. or should have been dealt with
in any other way?
35 . Aiiy other comments?
NB If you have more than one woman who fits into these categories,
please include as many as possible, depending on your tIme and. interest!
Thank you for your co-operation.
Please return to:
Anne Worrall,
Department of Law,
University of Keele,
Keel, Staffs, r5 5K;.
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PX)BATION OFFICERS AND SOCIAL iX)RKERS
I am interested in finding out how Probation Officers and Social
Workers feel about their women clients - do you have many on
your caseload?
How did they come to be under supervision?
What have you been doing to try and help them?
Have you had to contact other agencies for them? (Doctors, DHSZ etc.)
What have been these other agencies' attitudes towards them?
Have you wanted t obtain specific services for them? (Jobs, money,
housing, nursery places etc.)
Have you had any problems in obtaining these services?
Do you think that this is the right agency to deal with the women
you have mentioned?
Do you think that women clients, in genera]., present any special
problems for Probation Officers or Social Workers?
).	 Have you bad any woman on your caseload who has given you particular
problems? Could you tell me about her?
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